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Abstract
Democracy, anticipated by American and other Western powers to prevent economic 
chaos and political conflict within and among states, is not evolving as expected. 
Since 1991, Western governments have been providing large amounts of democratic 
assistance to the Former Soviet Union yet few, if any, of the recipient countries have 
developed into genuine democracies. This research argues that part of the failure 
resides in United States (US) democracy assistance’s inadequate consideration of 
gender within democracy programming. The lack of effective gender analysis has not 
only been detrimental to women but has served to obscure comprehensive and vital 
components of democratic transitions. The field research conducted for this 
dissertation demonstrates: (1) that gender is more central to women’s self- 
identification than ethnicity; (2) that the meaning, as well as significance, attached to 
ethnic identity vary between women and men; (3) that there is a greater male 
identification with ethnicity and with official identities such as citizenship; and (4) 
that women are more fully involved in the associations that make up civil society than 
men.
Feminist and socio-political science theories are utilised to examine the interrelations 
of ethnicity and gender within modern Kyrgyzstan—the laboratory of US democratic 
programming and a country self-promoted as the “island of democracy” within a 
region prone to ethnic conflict, divided by gender and of geo-political strategic 
importance. US development practice provides the contextual frame for exploring the 
relationship of gender and ethnicity. As civil society is a mainstay in US democracy 
assistance, this so-called independent variable in democratic consolidation is used as a 
micro framework in this analysis. Gender/feminist theory provides a crosscutting tool 
intended to expand the theories, data, and analysis of this research to include a 
gendered perspective. The case study and corresponding field research test the 
hypothesis that ethnicity is gendered and that it is relevant to democracy assistance. 
Finally, the conclusion considers the unexplored nexus surrounding these 
relationships relative to US democratic assistance programming.
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Chapter One 
The Significance of Feminist Research
“Women are not in the wrong when they decline to accept the rules laid down fo r  
them, since the men make these rules without consulting them. ”
(Montaigne in de Beauvoir 1989:xxviii)
“The women’s movement has experienced, and is still experiencing... being caught 
between the desire to alter the democratic system in its favour and the idea o f
radically transforming it. ”
(Huguette Bouchardeau in Reynolds 1986:xi).
1.1 Research Rationale and Hypothesis
Democracy, the political system that America and other Western powers anticipated 
would prevent economic chaos and political conflict within and among states, is not 
evolving as expected (Diamond 1996). Since 1991, Western governments have been 
providing large amounts of democratic assistance to Eastern Europe and the Former 
Soviet Union (FSU) or newly independent states (NIS); so far, few, if any, of the 
countries in these regions have developed into what could be regarded as genuine 
democracies (Carothers 1999; USAID 1999). Foreign and national governments are 
“getting it wrong” with the process of democratisation. Indeed, it is often suggested 
that uninformed and incomplete efforts to consolidate democracy are having the 
opposite effect (Havel 1995; Moss 1975).
Though it is plausible to argue that democratic forms of government offer the best 
means to promote human rights, economic growth, and social progress, it is unlikely 
that these goals will be achieved without a more critical examination of the principles 
underpinning democratic assistance (Carothers 1996). Ensuring that women are fully 
integrated into the theory and practice of democracy is one crucial element in 
achieving sustainable consolidated democracies (Martin 1994:55; Carothers 1999). 
The related issue that is central to this thesis is that democracies must develop ways of 
addressing ethnic conflict, for of all the issues currently facing the global 
consolidation of democracy—including corruption, nationalism, poverty, financial
9
market collapse, environmental degradation, and overpopulation—ethnic conflict 
represents one of the most grave yet least considered threats. This research provides 
the critical examination of gender in relation to ethnicity that has been lacking in other 
evaluations.1
It is widely remarked that the attachment to ethnicity is enhanced during transitional 
periods (Ra'anan 1980). Would-be democracies are often fraught with dangerous 
national and ethnic divides, and yet these looming conflicts are rarely addressed 
within the framework of democratic assistance (Grey 1997; McFaul 1999; Spencer 
1994). There is, moreover, abundant evidence that nation-building and state creation 
remain male constructs with the patriarchal history of the nation-state apparent in the 
current development of democracy in transitional societies (Pitkin 1984).2 As 
feminists from Cockburn (1998) to Goetz (1997) and others have argued, the role that 
gender plays in building civic society and framing ethnic relations has not been 
extensively considered in the programs for democracy assistance; and while 
international agencies are beginning to recognise the dangers to sustainable 
democratic development when gender is ignored, they have been less quick to 
recognise the significance of what this thesis terms “gendered ethnicity” (Martin 
1994).3
This research focuses on the United States Agency for International Development’s 
(USAID) Democracy and Governance (D&G) sector of the Global Bureau’s 
democratic assistance to the Former Soviet Union’s (FSU)4 Kyrgyzstan. Democracy 
is promoted by Western governments5 because democracy is believed to be the best 
means of preventing conflict and promoting peace, global stability and economic 
development. All these are conceived as being in Western interests (Bova 1997; 
Ikenberry 1999; Held 1993; Ray 1997; Christiano 1997). The US is a significant 
Western/global leader in democratic assistance6 and the FSU is USAID’s highest 
profile and largest democracy project.7 Within the FSU, Central Asia is the region 
most pivotal for US foreign interests, due to the region’s proximity to China, the 
Middle East, oil,8 and geo-hydro political significance.9
10
Within Central Asia, USAID selected Kyrgyzstan as their “laboratory” to prove the 
success of democracy assistance. Correspondingly, only Kyrgyzstan claims to be an 
“island of democracy” in Central Asia, with Kyrgyzstan’s President, Askar Akaev, 
making the most serious verbal commitments to international human rights and law 
(Akaev 1995). Thus, despite Kyrgyzstan’s lack of economic importance, Kyrgyzstan 
receives the largest per capita US assistance in Central Asia because of its perceived 
potential as a democratic “Switzerland” of Central Asia (Anderson 1999; OECD 
1999).10
In addition to being USAID’s laboratory for democracy assistance, Kyrgyzstan is a 
relevant case for this research because of its ethnic complexity and salient gender 
divisions. With over fifty-two various ethnic groups, and three significant cross- 
border ethnic communities - Uzbek, Tajik, and Uigher - the ethnic dimension is 
critical. Kyrgyzstan is highly prone to conflict. Discord cannot be easily contained 
within the confines of the region because of politically sensitive regional 
neighbours/intersections (Reuters 1999). Kyrgyzstan is plagued by: nuclear 
Kazakstan; civil-tribal war in Tajikistan—which has now crossed the border into 
Kyrgyzstan; the Uigher cross-border question; deep reaching environmental disasters, 
a fast-growing HIV/STD epidemic; a looming water conflict in the Fergana Valley; 
neighbouring Afghanistan; increasingly militant Uzbekistan; and a blossoming drug 
and arms trade. How Kyrgyzstan handles the ethnic question, how well Kyrgyzstan is 
governed, and how successfully it consolidates its democracy are therefore important 
considerations. Kyrgyzstan’s democratic reforms offer considerable promise for 
freedom in Central Asia. This could, at its best, mean space for human development, 
progress, and democracy; or it could, as other Central Asian states fear, end up with 
chaos, ethnic conflict, and even outright war.11
While USAID reports success in its democracy programming, United States’ General 
Accounting Office (GAO) documents, supported by Congressional testimony, 
demonstrates serious and prolonged criticism and concern over USAID’s lack of 
success in democracy assistance, particularly within the NIS. The GAO has 
extensively documented the failure of USAID’s programs to incorporate gender 
adequately into their overall analysis, rationale, and programme design; and this thesis
11
provides further evidence of this failure. Much less, however, has been noted about 
the related failure to consider ethnicity ; less still, the recognition that ethnicity itself is 
gendered.12
The gender factor is particularly relevant; first, because the ethnic question appears to 
have significant gender components which have been largely obscured due to the lack 
of gender mainstreaming both within the academy and the development sector. 
Secondly, because women play a leading role in the associations that constitute the 
infrastructure of civil society in Kyrgyzstan, development practitioners are provided 
with a programmatic means for implementing research results of a gendered analysis 
of ethnicity. In terms of USAID-speak, a female-dominated civil society may offer a 
hereto unrecognised “tool” in USAID’s “democratic toolbox” to implement programs 
that reduce ethnic conflict and thereby increase the stability of democratic 
consolidation.
This research employs a body of feminist and gender theory that has challenged the 
exclusion of women/gender from the understanding of democracy, as well as the 
emerging literature that contests the similar failure to recognise the gender dimensions 
of ethnicity. Gender is used to both deconstruct and reconstruct complex 
understandings of how comprehensive gender integration reveals more authentic and 
inclusive ways of thinking about socio-political process, in this case the relation of 
gendered ethnicity to democracy assistance.
The resulting field research conducted for this dissertation demonstrates: (1) that 
gender is more central to women’s self-identification than ethnicity; (2) that the 
meanings, as well as significance, attached to ethnic identity vary between women 
and men; (3) that there is a greater male identification with ethnicity and with official 
identities such as citizenship; and (4) that women are more fully involved in the 
associations that make up civil society than men.
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1.2 The Significance of Gender
“ ‘Gender relations ’ is a category meant to capture a complex set o f social relations 
to refer to a changing set o f historically variable social processes. Gender, both as an 
analytical category and a social process, is relational That is gender relations are 
complex and unstable processes constituted by and through interrelated parts. ”
(Flax 1997:174-175)
Feminism is an umbrella term for a wide range of approaches to the analysis of 
gender relations—spanning liberal, radical, neo-realist, Marxist, post-modernist and 
even post-feminist—and has thrown up a complicated and often contradictory body of 
research (Johnson 1997:102).13 While there continue to be many internally contested 
issues, feminism has evolved a distinctive methodological approach to social science 
research. This includes two elements particularly relevant to this research: (a) the 
emphasis on the integration of qualitative research techniques into a quantitative 
research framework, and (b) the analysis of gender as relational, therefore as cutting 
across and reforming other categories of analysis.
While there may be an apparent discrepancy between a recognition that feminism 
changes the practice of the social sciences and the use of the more traditional social 
science methodology in this research, it is critical to understand that feminist/gender 
research does not necessarily require abandoning methodology associated with the 
practices of empirical social science research or normal standards of scientific rigour 
(Randall 1994). The crucial contribution of feminist research is the transformation 
that the gender variable offers in revealing data that would remain obscure without a 
gender/feminist analysis, and the corresponding implications of this data in social 
science analysis. There is a pressing need to advance empirical investigations that are 
able t o . confirm intuitions about the way gender transforms understandings of 
ethnicity, as conducted in this research. In this research, this is represented by not 
only implementing gender as a variable, but also statistically controlling for gender 
across all variables, and also by empirically testing and confirming the emerging 
theoretical body of literature that argues that ethnicity is gendered.
Feminist/gender theory as a research strategy within more traditional social science
research is relevant and necessary on three levels, which are represented throughout
13
the structure of this research and detailed in Chapter Five. First, adding gender 
research as a strategy within the framework of traditional social science methods 
enables the researcher to overcome, to some degree, the flaws of modem social 
sciences. Gender strategy, thereby, renders methodology more solid and theory more 
adequate in analysing social issues and, therefore, aids in producing less flawed social 
science. Second, in providing a more authentic examination of the entire population 
in question, a gender strategy provides for a valid survey size. Therefore, gender 
research increases the validity and reliability of social science research. Third, gender 
as a research strategy allows for more accurate prescriptive outcomes by increasing 
the prescriptive value of social science research in dissolving stratification systems 
that rank men above women (Lorber 1994:32).
In recent decades, feminism has moved from an initial “add women and stir” 
approach to a more challenging deconstruction of existing categories of analysis: an 
argument that class, for example, is itself gendered; and in this thesis, that ethnicity 
cannot be understood except through an analysis of its gendered nature. Adding 
women, and even more importantly adding gender, is seen as fundamentally altering 
the nature of the research project; for as the theoretical and methodological rules that 
had previously ignored or excluded women are challenged, a paradigm shift occurs. 
Gender is not a unitary, parallel variable, to be grouped alongside the variables of 
religion, nationalism, ethnic identity, social-economic class, race, etc., as an extra 
element in research. It is, rather, a component variable that dissects apparently non­
gendered subject matter. As argued in this thesis, the implications of this are far- 
reaching.
Feminist methods have been particularly important in expanding the conventional 
epistemology in socio-political science, focusing attention on how knowledge was 
produced, who is producing that knowledge, and whether the producer has an impact 
on the outcome (Duran 1991). In one of the best known versions of this feminist 
standpoint theory, it is argued that women have a radically different vantage point 
from men and that this difference in vantage point influences the status of 
“knowledge” (Hartsock 1983). Nancy Hartsock argues that the means of knowing is 
crucially related to the outcome, implying that knowledge is in an important sense
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subjective, bound to who knows and how. This emphasis is not unique to feminism, 
but the “epistemic privilege” accorded to women in Hartsock’s theory represents a 
particularly radical version. In the political counterpart to this, feminists have 
sometimes argued that women exhibit different forms of moral reasoning from men 
(more grounded, for example, in an ethic of care than an ethic of rights), that they 
exhibit alternative qualities in governance (are more co-operative, for example, or 
more willing to listen to others), or that they are more closely attuned to pacifism and 
better equipped to defeat nuclear politics (Kiss 1997:8-11; Reardon 1996). In extreme 
versions, such arguments are very much open to debate, for if gender is regarded as a 
social construction, the notion that women are “natural” caregivers or “natural” 
peacemakers is inherently flawed. To the extent that women do exhibit an alternative 
ethic of care, this is more likely to be a result of learned behaviour than an inherent 
quality. This suggests that men too can learn the “ethic of care” (Robinson 1997). 
Gender differences should not be construed as natural, and yet they may still be 
significant enough to shape political and social practice. They may, as in the case 
study pursued in this thesis, shape the ways men and women relate to their ethnic 
identity; in doing so, they may significantly shape the prospects and possibilities for 
democratic progress.
Standpoint theory signified the beginning of an epistemological paradigm shift and 
was taken further in the contributions from Sandra Harding, who challenged the 
notion that there could be “one standpoint,” and in the process, refined Hartsock’s 
theory (Hekman 1997:342; Harding 1987). Harding argued that initial formulations 
of standpoint theory relied too heavily on Marxism (mirroring its notion of the elite 
class as having a privileged access to knowledge); that it wrongly presented women 
as having access to more accurate knowledge than men; and wrongly presumed a 
single female standpoint that effectively obscured difference of ethnicity, age, 
nationality and class (Harding 1991).14 When used in these ways, feminism 
standpoint theory can defeat itself, but the Hartsock-Harding debate provided for a re­
formulation of a feminist epistemology, not as the view that women know better, but 
that women know differently.15 The modified standpoint theory that emerges from 
this is part of the theoretical underpinning design for this research. This hypothesis is 
that gender relations generates significant differences of standpoint between women
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and men and that these differences express (among other things) different ways of 
understanding one’s ethnicity.
1.2.1 Integrating Gender
In pursuing these insights, this research operates with an understanding of the 
relationship between sex and gender that takes gender as a socially constructed means 
of assigning characteristics to given sex categories.16 The biologically grounded 
category of sex becomes gendered through the use of “gender markers.” Lorber has 
identified eight social components of gender: gender status, the gendered division of 
labour, gendered kinship, gendered sexual scripts, gendered personalities, gendered 
social contract, gender ideology, and gender imagery; and eight individual 
components of gender: sex category, gender identity, gendered marital and 
procreative status, gendered sexual orientation, gendered personality, gendered 
processes, gender beliefs, and gender display (Lorber 1994:14,31). From this 
perspective, nearly all aspects of human interaction are gendered, but the gender 
“boundaries” are contextual and cultural and open to historical change.
Feminist theory seeks to integrate the study of gender relations into the research 
project and argues that the study of women should not be separated from other studies 
of humanity. Too narrow a focus on women, however, can disregard issues related to 
differences between men and women. It is with these variances that gender theory 
has been increasingly concerned. Feminism began with acknowledging and 
understanding the position of women. Gender theory, an outgrowth of this, examines 
how the inclusion of women in research projects illuminates both female and male 
roles. Importantly, it seeks to understand the implications and impact of male/female 
interaction.
As a result of the past three decades of feminist scholarship, social scientists now 
more typically consider gender as relevant to research projects, and more commonly 
include women in their studies, interviews, focus groups, quantitative analysis, etc.. 
However, the misuse and underuse of the gender variable still constitutes one of the 
main problems, with too little attention given to why women were (or were not)
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considered relevant to the study, and exactly how their inclusion makes a difference to 
the research. As Gorelick has noted, “merely collecting descriptive statistics or 
experiential data about women does not constitute feminist research” (Gorelick 
1991:462). In the current climate, there is more general acknowledgement that 
women represent a critical factor that was often absent in earlier research, but the 
commitment to gender and/or feminist theory is often ceremonial rather than rigorous 
and systematic (Code 1995). “Too few who have begun to use gender as a variable 
have played with the profound implications of the shift in thinking that accompanies a 
careful use of sex and gender” (Lahti and Kelly 1995:1).
Within development assistance agencies, the incorporation of gender has typically 
entailed a Women in Development (WID) unit: this is usually separate from the 
mainstream decision-making and power structures of the agency or government. 
Problems surrounding the so-called WID approach will be discussed at greater length 
in Chapter Two. However, it is important to note at this point that the creation of 
WID units has often encouraged a “checking of the gender box” mentality whereby a 
requirement to include women can be added on to any project via the WID unit, rather 
than by a fuller integration of gender concerns. The resulting “ceremonial” inclusion 
of gender is one of the problems frequently noted in the development field, and this 
observation is particularly pertinent to the case study of Kyrgyzstan.
1.2.2 Gender and Cultural Difference
Women’s lives and social roles clearly differ between societies. If there are 
differences in male and female standpoints, there will be equally compelling 
differences in the standpoints of women from the North and South, from Mexico and 
Canada, from the US and Kyrgyzstan. Failure to address these differences can lead to 
a dominant Western discourse that uncritically reproduces its own understanding of 
women’s identity and needs; but paralysis in the face of such difference risks total 
inaction. The solution that simply recognises a plethora of female standpoints does 
not represent a solution, for as Goetz argues, this leads to an “endless deferral of 
epistemic responsibility. A way of saying nothing while claiming to be everywhere 
equally” (Goetz 1991:144). As she describes the problem:
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(There is) a dominant Western discourse about development that has reserved 
for itself the authority to define and name its epistemological categories: 
‘progress’ ‘modernisation’ and its objects: ‘third world’ and ‘third world 
women’. Western feminists have been guilty of extrapolating from and 
projecting a privileged identity as a referent for the rest of the world... (and 
yet) the urgent problems of survival faced by women in the third world have 
made a feminist involvement in the question of women in development 
imperative (Goetz 1991:133).
A more promising approach proposed in recent theory is Nira Yuval-Davis’ 
transversalism. This involves maintaining a starting/standing point/perspective 
coupled with the flexibility to recognise, but not homogenise, other starting/standing 
point/perspectives. According to Yuval-Davis, the term “transversal politics,” 
originates from Italian feminist work and is meant to connote “universality in 
diversity” (Yuval-Davis 1997:125). The Italian women use the words “rooting” and 
“shifting” in order to indicate that transversalism accounts for both one’s own “roots,” 
sense of identity and value set, while at the same time recognising the need to “shift” 
in order to empathise with other values, identity, and social constructions. 
Importantly, the “process of shifting should not homogenise” the “other” nor lose the 
“self’ (Yuval-Davis 1997:130).
Thus, for example, a Western feminist examining practices of polygamy in a non- 
Westem Islamic society could employ a transversal approach that begins with her 
own “roots” in Western values that regards polygamy as a violation of women’s 
human rights, while at the same time “shifting” to consider the social constraints 
within which women of that society operate. Within a transversal understanding, the 
Western feminist might still conclude that polygamy presents inherent problems o f 
human dignity and rights, but come to believe that calling for outright abolition might 
be harmful to women who must operate within social/cultural restrictions drastically 
different from those in the West. Yuval-Davis links transversalism explicitly with a 
thesis about the gendered nature of ethnicity, arguing that “women’s ethnicity often is 
and should be different from that of men” and that feminist politics should incorporate 
female “ethnic” differences into its agenda via transversalism (Yuval-Davis 1998: 
168). She illustrates with the example of Women Against Fundamentalism, a group 
of ethnically diverse women (including Christians, Jews, Muslims, Sikhs, and Hindus)
18
working together as feminists to oppose all forms of fundamentalism (Yuval-Davis 
1998:183).
As such arguments suggest, feminism is at its best when an understanding of different 
forms of patriarchal oppression can be deconstructed. Understanding the context in 
which each “woman” exists enables global feminism to retain its vigilance against all 
forms of patriarchy, without getting caught in either the paralysis of cultural 
relativism or the “cultural” smokescreen behind which male patriarchal societies often 
hide.17 Transversal politics provides a mechanism for feminist solidarity that can 
recognise women’s social and national divisions, and address the all too common 
expectation of Western feminists that non-Westem women will define their problems 
and achievements in terms of an “imagined free white liberal democracy” (Yuval- 
Davis 1997:118). Transversalism also avoids the danger of multiculturalism which 
too often understands the “community” as internally homogenous and thereby 
reinforces the power of unelected traditional male community leaders (Yuval-Davis, 
Werbner 1999:1-38).
1.2.3 Feminism and Private/Public versus Western/Eastern
“Soviet women, more than Soviet men, were able to ‘remain human ’precisely on 
account o f their domestic attachments” (Holmgren 1995:21).
In the context of this research, recognising that cultural norms of gender differ 
through time and across political-geographic space is particularly important, and will 
be considered in greater detail in Chapter Four. The general point addressed here 
relates to different conceptions of the relationship between public and private, and the 
implications of historical and geographical difference in making sense of this divide. 
Feminists have seen this divide as of central importance in sustaining gender 
inequality, but have recognised that it becomes more or less salient in different 
cultures or circumstances (Rosaldo 1974).
In the common Western understanding, the presumption is that the private sphere is a 
sphere of confinement, contributing significantly to women’s exclusion and 
oppression, and that access to the public sphere will play a major part in women’s
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advancement. However, the understanding of the public/private divide in the former 
Soviet countries differs greatly from this. Many felt the experience of exclusion, of 
being outside and ignored by the state structure, worked to the advantage of women. 
The private/domestic world was felt to provide some privileged protection, and 
freedom to women in the FSU.18 In non-democratic systems of government, the 
public, political space is not necessarily so desirable to join and the home may 
provide greater openings for personal freedom than official public space. By 
extension, informal participation through civil society in the post-Soviet realm has 
been more attractive and open to women than formal systems of official/elected 
politics, which remain largely autocratic and corrupt.
Western feminism has tended to understand men’s entitlement to public life as 
derived from public and private control over women. Family stability, ordered around 
female subordination, was said to be essential to public order and to depend on the 
husband’s authority over his wife (Engel 1991:136; Kainz 1984; Narayan 1997). 
Soviet systems, by contrast, were based on different structures. Under Soviet rule, all 
was meant to be public. Officially, one had no private life, property, habits, or even 
thoughts. One lived for the state, for “the collective good.” In reality, in spite of or 
because of, this public uni-system, tiny illegal private spaces were created. The 
home, the kitchen in particular, offered restricted, forbidden, fiercely protected, 
highly-prized private space. This small area of privileged privacy was the dominion 
of women. Perhaps because men feared the state enough to not want to be responsible 
for this valued individual space, women controlled home life. Because women were 
less publicly dominant, and therefore less threatening to state power, women were 
valued for their lack of worth. Women also valued their ability to hide, to some 
degree, from the oppressive state structure in the secret space of the home. This 
domestic space was so significant that “kitchen” became a symbol of freedom during 
Soviet rule (Temkina 1996:220-22; Molyneux 1991; Gray 1997; Buckley 1992). 19
Officially women were also part of the proletariat and were “given the freedom” to 
work outside the home.20 The State told women they were publicly valued, 
emancipated, and important in their public roles labouring for their country. This 
enforced “freedom” to participate in public life gave women what feminists later
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theorised as the triple burden of home/family, work, and state duty. While 
professional working conditions were often more dangerous than in the West because 
of ineffective and out-of-date equipment, the work was rarely as intensive or 
demanding. The true labour of women in the Soviet Union occurred, and still occurs, 
in the home.21 To get bread, eggs, clothing, or other basic commodities involved a 
great deal of effort, blat22 or connections. Acquiring luxury items such as make-up, 
books, records, or a piece of meat were difficult tasks. Housework also required 
extreme physical effort and stamina. Because of a lack of modem conveniences, like 
washing machines, vacuums, and refrigerators that work, daily chores were time- 
consuming and difficult (Goldman 1996:37; Robinson 1995:216; Temkina 1996:227; 
Molyneux 1991).23
Men, by and large, were not active in home life; however, the “double burden” 
defined by Western women is significantly different from the Soviet understanding 
(Temkina 1996). Western feminists often wrongly assumed that Soviet women 
suffered exclusion from the public realm in the same manner as was common in the 
West. But while Western feminists may have wanted men to assume more home 
responsibility, Soviet women were more reluctant to lose control of the hidden 
privileged space in the home. Holmgren explains the binary Stalinist State, which 
was state-versus-society, in the most precise description.
Contrary to Western expectation, this double burden and practical inequity 
did not ferment any sizeable feminist campaign for a domestic revolution. 
Instead, the eventual binary opposition of Stalinist state versus society—that 
determiner of all value—generated an almost inverse scenario. Due to the 
perils and political compromise of public life and a successful ‘career’ in the 
Stalinist system, the domestic sphere and family life came to be cherished, 
even by the women who laboured there, as a site of psychological and moral 
refuge (Holmgren 1995:21).
The public/private separation that is so central to the Western feminist struggle for 
freedom, justice, and recognition by the state is largely inexplicable to FSU women 
(Temkina 1996:217). In the West, women have been fighting to “get into” a state 
structure that they saw as flawed but still beneficial. The same could rarely be said for 
the Soviet Union, where inclusion as a Soviet citizen came with few, if any, positive 
advantages.
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1.2.4 Identity and the Significance of Gender
“Identity constitutes the conscious ‘se lf -  the answer, or rather answers, to the 
question, ‘ Who am I  ’ (Yuval-Davis 1998:169) ?
Understanding state definitions of public and private involves not only concepts of 
citizenship, but also the related conceptions of nationalism and ethnicity. While 
citizenship has been considerably examined by feminist research, and feminist and 
gender theorists are beginning to examine the gendered space in traditional male 
identity formations, particularly nationalism, the ethnic/nationalist experts are largely 
reluctant to consider the role of gender.
When asked to expand on the idea of gender as a component in ethnic creation, a 
panel of experts on ethnicity could provide no answer.24 At this same panel, Michael 
IgnatiefF claimed that humans are “thickly embodied” with ethnic identity. Humans 
are also embodied by gender. Gender is a significant social element that shapes daily 
lives and national projects. A complete understanding of ethnicity will remain 
illusive if the gender component in ethnic identity is ignored. Indeed, Barot, Bradley 
and Fenton (1999) advise that the significance of ethnicity and gender suggests an 
entirely new field of study.
While gender and ethnicity is starting to become a popular topic among younger 
researchers, gendered ethnicity has yet to reach the policy level (Barot 1999:1). This 
relatively unexamined aspect of ethnicity remains a vital academic project to be 
undertaken not only within feminist circles but also within wider academic circles of 
ethnic/nationalist studies and international relations. How ethnicity and gender 
intersect in particular situations is the crucial question. The intended contribution of 
this research to this emerging field is implementation and testing of the theories and 
ideas of gendered ethnic identity in relation to US democracy assistance.
Related to the cultural differences of definitions, it is important to note that concepts 
of citizenship, ethnicity, and nationality are not only gendered culturally but are also
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politically relative. For example, while in the English language nationality is 
synonymous with citizenship, a legal relationship to the state, the Russian word 
natsionalnost refers to an individual’s membership in a collective, inherited from 
one’s parents (Anthias 1989:3). Details of the Soviet versus Western understandings 
of ethnicity and nationalism, relevant to this research, will be detailed in Chapter 
Three.
1.3 Gender Deconstruction and Reconstruction Outlined
This research argues that democracy, historically and currently, has failed to 
adequately account for gender. Western theoretical understanding of how ethnicity is 
defined, created, and operates has also failed to consider gender. Current US 
democracy assistance, as demonstrated by the case of Kyrgyzstan, has failed to 
include both gender and ethnicity within its understandings of how societies transit to 
democracy and, therefore, how the US may assist this process.
Gender is first used, in this research, to deconstruct accepted norms of democracy 
assistance, both in theory, practice, and institutional structural design, as well as the 
body of literature represented by Western ethnic theory. Then, the deconstructed 
understandings of both democracy assistance and ethnicity are examined within the 
context of the case of Kyrgyzstan. Finally, gender is used in a methodological 
framework that supports field research investigating how ethnicity and democracy 
assistance, inclusive of gender differences, is perceived by the population of 
Kyrgyzstan. This layered use of gender theory and the gender variable reveals new, 
and more complete, ways of thinking about the process of democratic assistance. 
This research is constructed in the following manner:
In Chapter Two, democracy theory and practice is explored and defined.25 While 
Western/European academics and materials have been referenced when appropriate, 
this analysis primarily relates to the assumptions that underpin US democracy 
assistance thought and practice. A working definition of democracy, for the purposes 
of this research, is established. Additional external validity to the research results is 
provided in Chapter Two through a feminist analysis of US democracy assistance.
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Chapter Two argues that US democracy assistance has continued to largely overlook 
gender, and this failure demands greater attention. The Women in Development 
(WID) aspect of US democracy assistance is also detailed, along with the gendered 
nature of civil society, the mainstay in US democracy assistance. While some 
programmatic aspects may alter from region to region, US democracy assistance is 
largely centralised by USAID’s Democracy and Governance (D&G) unit and hence, 
what is true of US democracy policy, generally, is also largely true in Kyrgyzstan. 
The same holds for the Women in Development (WID) unit. Details of this lack of 
adequate gender analysis, within the specific context of US democracy assistance to 
Kyrgyzstan, are discussed. Following the main arguments of this dissertation, this 
second half of Chapter Two: (1) outlines the objective and rationale of US democracy 
policy and democracy assistance both generally and specifically to Kyrgyzstan; (2) 
discusses the lack of consideration for gender and ethnicity, which are highly 
significant in Kyrgyz society, as demonstrated in the first half of the chapter; (3) 
demonstrates the importance placed on civil society; and (4) reveals the reality of this 
emphasis in Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyz case is the best indicator of the effectiveness of 
US democracy policy because USAID has selected Kyrgyzstan as a USAID 
democracy “laboratory” for proving results. What is and is not effective in 
Kyrgyzstan has implications for US democracy policy as a whole.
Ethnicity theory is examined and defined in Chapter Three.26 As ethnicity is a form 
of identity, the nature of selfhood is examined, the nation, the state, and the 
community. An initial working definition of ethnicity is also established. Issues of 
ethnicity are discussed in relation to the political/civil, hence democratic, process, of 
which civil society is a key mechanism. It is demonstrated that US democracy 
assistance theory and practice largely obscures and misunderstands the ethnic/conflict 
component. The second half of this chapter combines gender and ethnic theory in 
order to: (1) outline the five main themes of current gendered ethnic/nation research,
(2) argue that female gender is central to, and therefore subject to, male ethnic 
violence, but that by rejecting male-made ethnic boundaries in favour of a gender 
(female) identity, women can also reject ethnic conflict.
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Despite Central Asia’s political significance, as described in Chapter Four, isolation 
and complexity best characterise the region. The relative lack of analysis completed 
of a country highlighted for its democratic potential provides a compelling 
justification for consideration of Kyrgyzstan as a case study of democratic assistance. 
The objectives of Chapter Four are to: (1) outline the case rationale and history; (2) 
demonstrate the importance of ethnicity in Kyrgyzstan and outline the ethnic history;
(3) demonstrate the importance of gender in Kyrgyzstan and, in accordance with the 
transversal approach recommended by Yuval-Davis, outline the competing gender 
constructions; and (4) examine ethnic conflict and the relevance of gender in 
Kyrgyzstan’s “democratic” transition.
Chapter Five includes discussion of: (1) the design and corresponding paradigms of 
this research; (2) the method, type, and quality of data collected in support of the 
research hypothesis; and (3) the method of analysis, as well as results, of the collected 
data. This research is structured on a feminist pragmatist paradigm of mixed model, 
dominate quantitative (QUAN+qual), of the relationship between gender and ethnicity 
in the transitional democratic case of Kyrgyzstan. The primarily deductive assumption 
is that ethnicity has a gendered component that has largely been ignored, in theoiy and 
development practice, and that this oversight is at the detriment of authentic 
participatory democratic assistance. The overall rationale of this research is praxis, 
conducted in an effort to inform and affect human practice.27
The field research presented in Chapter Six complements and tests the theoretical 
arguments, outlined in the previous chapters, via a mixed-model approach. Field 
research was conducted in Kyrgyzstan during August-November 1999, funded by a 
US Department of State grant, and: (1) supports the prior hypothesis that gender is a 
salient variable in ethnic identity; (2) explores the results through the connections to 
democratisation and the influence of ethnicity and gender; and (3) supports the 
objective of comparing and contrasting involved “actors” in the democratisation 
process in Kyrgyzstan via the stated variables. The results constitute a pyramid cross- 
section of Kyrgyz society from akims (representing the pinnacle of local government), 
to average adults with NGO directors in the middle. The Kyrgyz survey (Survey Set 
One) was designed to be compared with the opinions and knowledge of those involved
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with US democracy assistance to Kyrgyzstan (Survey Set Two). As noted earlier, this 
research incorporates gender as a dissecting variable against ethnicity within the 
framework of democracy. This research is concerned with: (a) the social institutions 
of gendered kinship and gendered imagery; and (b) individual aspects of gender 
processes, and gender beliefs of ethnicity in civil society/democracy assistance. The 
complementary survey set results provide a framework that assists the dissertation 
conclusion exploring how an expanded multi-disciplinary understanding of the 
relationships of gendered ethnicity can inform democratic theory and application in 
Kyrgyzstan’s “democratic” transition. Finally, the field research results are analysed 
in the context of inherent connections, linkages, and problems of democratisation and 
the influence of ethnicity and gender.
Chapter Seven compares the analysed field research with Barot’s categories and the 
typology developed by Yuval-Davis-Anthias. It concludes that the research has 
demonstrated a relationship between gender and ethnicity within a democratic 
transition framework that appears worthy of greater explanation. It further argues that 
there is a demonstrated need for increased donor and local government commitment 
to gendeied ethnicity within the understanding of democratic assistance development.
1.4 Summary
Nearly ten years of democracy assistance has not brought democracy to Kyrgyzstan, 
the “star” of USAID’s democracy assistance programme, or to any of the other FSU
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countries. Neither has democracy assistance improved the speed, quality, or 
sustainability of the transitions. While there are many reasons why democracy 
assistance has not been effective, this research argues that one essential factor in this 
failure has been the marginalization of gender that has obscured the significance of 
ethnicity, and hence of gendered ethnicity.29
The object of this chapter has been to explore existing feminist theories relevant to the 
concerns of this research and to introduce gender as a means of theoretical support 
and as an analytical and methodological mechanism embedded in the fundamental 
design of this research.30 Additionally, the importance of considering gender as a
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variable and a control which serves to reveal relationships vital to effective 
democracy assistance has been introduced. Established feminist/gender theory is used 
throughout this research to analyse democracy, in theory and practice, and to support 
the argument that a feminist analysis of democracy assistance reveals the relevance of 
ethnicity which is beneficial in enhancing social understandings of civil society and 
hence democracy assistance—confirming the significance of feminist research.
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Chapter Two: Gendering Democracy
“The terrifying phenomenon o f totalitarism, which has been bom into our world 
perhaps four times did not issue from authoritarian systems, but in each case from  
a weak democracy: the one created by the February Revolution in Russia, the Weimar 
and the Italian Republic, and ChiangKai-shek's China”
(Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in Misconceptions about Russia in Kainz 1984:125).
“Democracy without women is not democracy. ”
Russian Women’s Campaign Slogan
2.1 Dilemmas with Western Democratic Theory and US Assistance Practice
The word democracy, derived from the Greek word for people {demos), generally 
implies rule by the people. Democracy is described in the famous funeral speech of 
Pericles. “Our constitution is called a democracy because power is in the hands not of 
a minority but of the whole people.31 ... Everyone is equal before the law. ... Our 
political life is free and open, so is our day-to-day life in our relations with each other.
... Here each individual is interested not only in his own affairs but in the affairs of 
the state as well” (Pericles in Held, 1993:260).32 Though this provides a proficient 
summary of the goals and characteristics of democracy, it is notable that it describes 
only male citizens.
Contemporary democratic theory and practice leave much to be desired because both 
are riddled with conflation, misrepresentation, and misuse. The body of work on 
democracy is theoretically weak, in structure and agreement, and mired with internal 
conflict, making critical examination challenging (Karl 1991; Mansbridge 1991; 
Touraine 1997).33 Zolo has written most critically of democracy theory arguing that: 
there are substantial incompatibilities between a reflexive epistemology and the 
theoretical paradigms of the most influential conceptions of democracy; that 
democratic theory meets none of the common scientific standards by which research 
is judged, and even that the best theories of democracy fail to offer conceptual 
instruments that are sufficiently complex to permit realistic interpretation of critical 
relationships (Zolo 1992:19, 25, 54).34 Although scholars from Aristotle to Dahl have
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produced volumes on what democracy is and what democracy means, today the 
concept remains indeterminate.
The development of an empirical theory of democracy has been the central 
aim of American and European political science for at least the last three 
decades. .. .Today, at the beginning of the 1990s, not only has this ambitious 
program receded but it is now not even clear what meaning is actually 
conveyed (Zolo 1992:23).
There have been two general approaches to defining democracy, by substance or by 
procedure (Touraine 1997:115). Some scholars claim that there must be a broad 
commitment to the abstract ideal of democratic society while others contend that 
specific conditions should exist. Yet, there is no agreement on what these conditions 
are and how to determine when or if they exist.35 While there may be universal 
recognition that democracy should, at minimum, include free and fair elections, rule 
of law, freedom of speech and media, equality and liberty for all citizens, and basic 
human rights, the understanding of how these democratic components are to be 
applied is more varied (Diamond 1995). The most compelling question, what is 
democracy or what makes a state democratic, does not have an obvious answer. 
Common definitions, theory, purpose, and languages are lacking among democracy 
theorists and practitioners (Schedler 1998:102).36 Instead, various types of democracy 
are constructed. Collier and Levitsky have identified more than 550 “types” of 
democracy (Diamond 1996:21).
A high degree of conceptual clarity is essential to understanding and tracking 
democratic progress, yet what prevails is confusion and disarray; it is plausible to 
suggest that this is partly because maintaining the elasticity is beneficial for US 
practitioners. A developing concept of democracy allows more time to achieve 
results, further consolidation, and to develop different indicators of democratic 
success (Schedler 1998:105). In the context of US democracy programming, the lack 
of clarity provides justification for delaying a long overdue, serious, and 
comprehensive evaluation of US democracy practice by the practitioners 
themselves.37 It also allows US democracy practitioners to remain resistant to 
external critique (Carothers 1999).38 Frustration at the state of democracy theory and 
assistance is expressed most precisely by Vaclav Havel who argues that, “democracy
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in its present Western form arouses scepticism and mistrust in many parts of the 
world” (Havel 1995). Havel claims this mistrust and failure of democracy assistance 
is because the democratic prescription for “saving the world” is a hopelessly “half- 
baked—half a formula” (Havel 1995:3-11). The over simplified and imprecise 
representation of democracy, all too frequent in the US democracy programming 
community, is illustrated by the following statement:
Whatever argument students of democracy may have about its definition, 
peoples and governments today assume that (1) ‘democracy’ means 
something universal and general, and (2) the best models of it are to be found 
in the West (Nodia 1996:15).
In addition to standard democracy theory, there exists a sub-body of research, albeit 
much smaller in scope, which focuses on democratic transitions and consolidations. 
The “transitological” theory of democracy is represented mainly by Philippe 
Schmitter, Guillermo O’Donnell, and Giuseppe Di Palma. Lincoln Allison describes 
transitologists as “theorists of democratisation” for whom the 1980s were a “triumph” 
due to the global spread of democratisation inspired by “the superiority of Western 
models (paradigm case, the USA)” (Allison 1994:8). Allison distinguishes 
“transitologists,” also called democratisation specialists, from those who write about 
“democracy” per se, for whom the 1980’s were “far from a triumphant... as social 
and economic inequalities increased and political participation decreased” illustrating 
the wide gap between the two groupings (Allison 1994:8). James Scott 
comprehensively details key members of the democratisation/transitology community, 
including Western NGOs, international foundations, think tanks and donor agencies 
(Scott 1999:146-170). Scott notes that these actors “tend to reinforce and encourage 
the Western-preferred image o f ‘democracy’ and favour ‘active’ democracy building” 
(Scott 1999: 148, 159). The main actors include: the German Foundations/Stiftungen, 
the US National Endowment for Democracy, The Westminster Foundation for 
Democracy, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the relevant 
development agencies of Western countries, including USAID.
Transitology/democratisation literature is widely used among democracy
practitioners, as it is perceived to be more “realistic” than democracy theory;
however, the transitology body of thought has several major flaws. The first fatal
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aspect of transitology is naivete coupled with lack of rigorous research as 
demonstrated by the following quote, “The greatest victory of democracy in the 
modern world is that—for one reason or another—it has become fashionable” (Nodia 
1996:20). The second flaw is a misconception that if enough money is provided to 
“transitional” countries, they will become and remain democratic. The West, USAID, 
IMF, etc. are in essence paying government leaders to assume the identification of 
“democrat” whether or not democratic reforms and practices actually take place 
(Lloyd 1999).39 Modem democracy “transitology” has introduced the notion of 
“democracy without democrats” or “democracy without prerequisites.” It is enough 
to label a country democratic to claim development success (Nodia 1996:22).
In his article “The Perils of a Protracted Transition,” Michael McFaul, a transitologist 
and correspondingly a member of a prominent democratisation think tank, 
exemplifies how democracy assistance, using transitology, has created “democracy 
without democrats” (McFaul 1999). McFaul notes that while Russian leaders call 
themselves democrats, they act undemocratically. He continues, without irony, to 
explain how Russian democracy has progressed despite a lack of democratic leaders 
and values and has experienced “not one but three” democratic transitions (McFaul 
1999:6). Indeed, McFaul’s title is significant to how transitologists view the “process 
of democratisation,” i.e. that a country never actually fails to become a democracy; 
rather a country, such as Russia, is simply in a “protracted transition.” Transition 
theory also allows the assistance community to avoid critical assessment of authentic 
democratic values, as the aforementioned democracy theorists would contend, by 
asserting that the “democratisation” process is not yet complete. The lack of 
definitive indicators makes transitology popular to those in the democracy assistance 
community because transitology allows for continual programmatic justification and 
avoids responsibility for meaningful evaluation.
In sum, Allison notes the “sloppiness” with which transitology considers the 
relationship between democracy and other political values, particularly rights and 
freedoms, and the assumption that America is the “best paradigm of democracy in the 
real and contemporary world” (Allison 1994:10-11). Transitology research is content 
with an apparent equality of rights, as evidenced by judicial/legal reform and electoral
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processes. Democracy theorists, on the other hand, are concerned with actual 
balances of power within that political system and thus are more concerned with the 
democratic equality in all social relations, including gender. This emphasis by 
transitologists on merely institutional reform has enabled the phenomenon of 
"democracy without democrats,” whereby institutional reform programs have been 
“successfully” accomplished, but the leaders and citizens of such a society continue to 
operate without democratic values, acting around or under the surface of “democratic” 
institutional reforms.
The transition to democracy is followed by the consolidation of democracy, or so is 
the hope. The main researchers here have been Schneider, O’Donnell, Plattner, Linz, 
Przeworski, and Schedler. While democratic consolidation is another ambiguous 
term,40 Plattner provides a reasonably concise definition: “Consolidation is the 
process by which democracy becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimate among a 
country’s population that it is highly unlikely to break down for any internal reasons” 
(Plattner 1995:3). Out of all the “transitional” democracies of the NIS, none qualify 
as consolidated by Plattner’s definition. Indeed, there really is no deterministic 
conceptual basis for understanding consolidation. O’Donnell concedes, “It is 
impossible clearly to specify when a democracy has become ‘consolidated’ ” 
(ODonnell 1996:42). He blames this inability on “conceptual quandaries.” Plattner 
claims that the principal structures41 of democracy must become institutionalised.42 
Formal democracy must become “authentic, genuine, democratic.” Political values 
and beliefs must reflect “greater tolerance, trust, and willingness to participate, 
bargain, and compromise” and these processes should be linked in a causal sequence 
(Plattner 1995:3).43 Horizontal accountability, claims O’Donnell, is what defines 
consolidated democracy (ODonnell 1996:44). When confronted with these 
requirements most scholars and practitioners recognise that the bulk of “incomplete” 
democracies are failing to become consolidated; however, why this is so is not being 
seriously investigated (ODonnell 1996:34). This research contends that the failure 
rests, in part, with the incomplete nature of democratic assistance and the resulting 
inability to consider fundamental facets and dynamics of society, gender and ethnicity 
being two of the most primary.
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The most serious flaw of the consolidation theory is the simple and unrealistic 
assessment* put forth by Juan J. Linz, Adam Przeworski and others, that consolidation 
occurs when democracy becomes “the only game in town” (O'Donnell 1996:41). As 
O’Donnell points out, “Przeworski argues that democratic consolidation occurs ‘when 
no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions.’ ” But this does not 
preclude the possibility that “the games played ‘inside’ the democratic institutions are 
different from the ones dictated by their formal rules” (ODonnell 1996:41). 
O’Donnell could have gone further to question the legitimacy of an argument that 
claims success is based on no other political option existing. Democracy will never 
be “the only game in town.” There will always be other political options, among 
them fundamentalism and communism that are far more attractive to many than failed 
or false “democracy” (Moss 1975; Brauer 1999; Frank 1991; Fish 1995; Malia 1999). 
Indeed, as Paul Goble effectively argues, misguided US democracy assistance in 
Central Asia is breeding Islamic fundamentalism rather than democracy (Goble 
2000).
Despite the disagreements within democratic theory, a legitimate starting point is 
represented by the decades of democracy research. Of all the definitions, Robert 
Dahl’s polyarchy provides the most comprehensive and meaningful definition of 
democracy relevant to US theory and practice. Dahl’s polyarchy requires extensive 
political competition and participation, substantial levels of freedom of speech, press, 
and expression, and meaningful pluralism (Diamond 1996:21). It is Dahl’s definition 
of democracy, a functional understanding of democracy as a governmental system 
where rulers are held publicly accountable by citizens who act indirectly and directly 
through, around, and with their elected representatives in the formation of an active 
civil society, that this research utilises in relation to US democracy practice (Karl
1991).44 If US democratic practitioners were required to systematically survey (as an 
integral component of democratic assistance practice) the basic history of democratic 
thought and theory, some of the well-known democratic quandaries might have 
received greater and more comprehensive programmatic consideration. Instead, the 
main qualification of most US practitioners is that they grew up in a democratic 
country with few understanding the basic tenets and problems of democratic thought 
and theory (Carothers 1999; Bivens 1997).
Former USAID Administrator, Brady Anderson embodied the arrogance and
oversight involved in US democracy assistance in his first USAID all-agency
meeting, August 1999.
I want to ask you a question. What does it mean to be an American? What 
are the qualifications to be an American? If you were to ask that question, 
perhaps [of] a German friend of ours, I think you would get an ethnic 
response. That would be true for a lot of Europeans and people who live 
in other parts of the world. Quite obviously, we Americans don’t give 
that sort of response when we’re asked what is an American, what does it 
take to be an American. .. .We believe in opportunity, personal freedom, 
and hope for the future. We believe in the dignity and worth of every 
person. ... We have a new challenge around the world... and that is an 
incredible opportunity to advance the cause around the world of 
democracy (USAID 1999).
Anderson’s remarks are significant because they set the tone for his tenure as director 
of USAID. By these words, he implies that only Americans believe in freedom, 
dignity, democracy, and hope for the future. All “others” believe in ethnicity. 
Ethnicity is set up as a negative, a non-American value. Democracy and freedom are 
assumed to be positive, American values that Americans should “advance... around 
the world.” The failure of US democracy assistance to relate to “others” has not gone 
unnoticed. The eminent Soviet scholar and former State Department official, George 
Kennan, chastised and startled the US democratic assistance community in an August 
1999 interview when he said, “This whole tendency to see ourselves as the centre of 
political enlightenment and as teachers to a great part of the rest of the world strikes 
me as unthought through, vainglorious, and undesirable” (Ullman 1999:6).
While understanding Western democratic theory and history is a necessary, and often
lacking, component of effective US democracy assistance, it is also essential to realise
that concepts of liberty, equality, and human dignity are not only Western constructs
(Eberhard 1982; Kainz 1984). These are universal aspirations with a global history
(Karatnycky 1999:199). Nor, necessarily, are the “best models... to be found in the
West” (Nodia 1996:15). Contrary to a popular opinion, expressed by Di Palma and
others, that “modem representative democracy was bom in a small, maritime, insular
comer of Western Europe,” democracy has existed in many other parts of the world
(DiPalma 1997:16).45 As Frankel notes, “One of the debilitating illusions of many
Western liberals is that the values of liberal culture are only our own values, that they
34
have little point for those who look at the world differently and no point at all for 
those whose lives are poor, mean, brutish, and short” (Frankel 1962:175). US 
democracy practitioners, in general, fail to enter transitional countries with an 
understanding of the indigenous history and local aspects of democracy.
Russia, Central Asia, and Mongolia provide powerful examples of the failure of US 
assistance to consider anything other than US understandings of democracy (Kainz 
1984; Kaiser 1999) 46 Lukin (1999) argues that the disastrous results of Russian 
democracy were caused by democratic practitioners who were not knowledgeable 
about local conditions and rather attempted to impose their own “abstract ideal.” 
“This ideal was not achieved, and the country’s population has been the real loser” 
(Lukin 1999:37). Neither Russia nor Central Asia have become Westem-style 
democracies with effective market economies. Instead, the FSU has turned into a 
collection of disintegrating states where property and power has been seized by 
various clans and organised criminal groups. “Although ‘democratic’ doctrinaires 
and fanatics must bear the blame, this does not mean that they wanted or foresaw the 
result” (Lukin 1999:37) 47 Kennan also agrees that US democracy assistance policy 
holds some blame for the failure. “I think we were mistaken in believing that a certain 
amount of money placed in the hands of the present Russian government would 
improve things significantly. A large portion of it has, after all, ended up in the 
pockets of various individuals. We should not have put money into that country 
unless and until there were real institutional guarantees against its misuse for purposes 
we never intended” (Kennan in Ullman 1999:4).
Conversely, US practitioners remain surprised that democracy has flourished in 
Mongolia, which “in light of most social-science theories and common sense 
expectations, should have never been: (Fish 1998:127).48 A cursory reading of 
Buddhist concepts (Mongolia, formerly a Buddhist state, has supported a wide-scale 
revival of Buddhism since 1990) reveals that Eastern history and theory also 
incorporates strong democratic principles.49 As noted by the current Dalai Lama,
While democratic aspirations may be manifested in different ways, some 
universal principles lie at the heart of any democratic society—representative 
government (established through free and fair elections), the rule of law and
35
accountability (as enforced by an independent judiciary) and freedom of 
speech (as exemplified by an uncensored press). Democracy, however, is 
about much more than these formal institutions; it is about genuine freedom 
and empowerment of the individual (Dalai Lama 1999:2).
That democratic principles are not alien to Buddhists or to Mongolians explains Fish’s 
“puzzle.”50 US practitioners too often perceive Americans as the only people by 
whom democratic principles are valued. That there should even be a “puzzle” about 
the success of Mongolian democracy is a result of a distinct Eurocentric bias and a 
crucial lack of background reading prior to engaging in democratic assistance. Bova 
concisely expresses the view pervasive among US democracy practitioners that has 
caused so much failed policy: “The question, therefore, is what happens when 
democracy is transplanted to cultural settings where the Enlightenment emphasis on 
natural rights, the individual, and liberty is less deeply rooted,” as if countries with an 
Enlightenment background have hosted unproblematic democracies and constitute the 
natural environment for democracy (Bova 1997:116).
2.2 US Foreign Policy: “The Sport of Democracy”
“The most dramatic burst o f democratisation has come in the former Soviet Union.
There, too, Orwell had it wrong” -Former US Deputy Secretary o f State, Strobe
Talbott (Talbott 1996:54).
During the 1990s, democracy became the buzzword for solving predicaments of the 
developing world (Frank 1991:1). Indeed, there is a “minor growth industry” 
surrounding democracy assistance (Carothers 1996:35). Yet this assistance has most 
often produced “paper” democracy, with actual democratic reform rare.51 Transitional 
democracies are not consolidating, not only because democracy assistance programs 
lack fundamental comprehension (including cognisance of gender and ethnicity), but 
also because US democracy assistance programs place far less premium on the best 
interests of the population in question and far more emphasis on promoting US 
interests abroad. Nearly 98% of funds used for USAID managed programs are spent 
on US goods and services (Tamoff 1999:4). More than anything else, the promotion 
of democracy has been about enhancing the national myth of America, the American 
dream, the freedom that is America (Campbell 1992, 1993).52
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Former US Deputy Secretary of State Talbott admits that former President Bill 
Clinton made the “sport of democracy” a priority in the Clinton administration’s 
foreign affairs. “When America promotes democracy, values and interests reinforce 
each other” (Talbott 1996:47,53). If America’s main foreign policy objective in 
promoting democracy abroad is for domestic political demand, and the simple act of 
promoting American democracy is enough to satisfy the domestic appetite, then 
promoting democracy is an end in itself. There is no compulsion to achieve 
successful promotion. Herein lies the main reason for the unwillingness of the US 
democracy assistance community to be self-critical, attempt effective assistance, or 
create an environment that supports a learning curve that would enhance assistance 
(Carothers 1999). Delivering the aid meets the US foreign policy requirements and 
hence money, or aid, becomes the objective rather than social promotion and 
progress.
Foreign aid is an instrument of US foreign policy, and US relations and 
interests in the former Soviet Union determine levels, direction, and types of 
aid funding... The Central Asian states... are of increasing interest to the 
United States for their oil production and strategic location... The increase in 
funding for the NIS under the FY [fiscal year] 1999 appropriations, however, 
has permitted a 26% increase for Central Asia to $136.9 million. The 
Administration had requested an 18% increase for FY 2000 (Tamoff 1999: 8,
11).
While democracy assistance may satisfy and reinforce the American national myth, 
there are also several official rationales, all of which are problematic, that render 
democracy an essential constituent of American foreign policy. The first reason the 
US supports democratic assistance is trade. Countries that are democratic are thought 
to be better trade and diplomatic partners (Talbott 1996:47). Seymour Martin Lipset 
linked free trade and democracy in the 1950s.53 While democracy and economic 
development have a strong correlation, this correlation does not prove causation.
The second rationale for promoting democracy relates to human rights. The forgotten 
authority of democracy derives from human rights theory, but democracy assistance 
today has been divorced from its origin with the rhetoric of a moral and ethical 
responsibility masking both the degeneration of the democratic idea and the lack of
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substance in assistance programs (Christiano 1997; Grey 1997:250; Touraine 
1997:108). While human rights abuses do occur within democracies and 
democratisation alone cannot guarantee full respect for human rights, authentic 
democracies do have more robust institutions in place for checking power and 
preventing abuse; however, the proposition has been reversed. Democracy does not 
necessarily bring about greater human rights; however, greater protection and 
attention of human rights necessarily promotes more democratic environments (Bova 
1997: 124, 125; Christiano 1997:21-22). Moreover, although most American foreign 
policy analysts strongly believe in the rights rhetoric the reality is that democracy 
assistance today is not being promoted for the sake of human rights advancement 
(Muravchik 1991, Diamond 1992, Allison and Beschel 1992, Mroz 1992/93, 
Lowenthal 1991, Grey 1997). Instead, assistance is more often a flag (or fig leaf) 
allowing exploitation and/or the oppression of the South by the North, and in the 
South by Southern leaders (Frank 1991:1). Distinct evidence of the lack of 
consideration for human rights at any level beyond rhetorical, to say nothing of 
women’s human rights, within US democracy assistance is demonstrated by the recent 
exchange between former Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Rights, and 
Labour (DRL), Harold Koh at the Carnegie Endowment’s symposium "Advancing 
Democracy: The Clinton Legacy," where Secretary Koh provided no evidence that 
human rights were part of democracy programming. When asked directly about this 
lack, Koh justified US policy of promoting democracy without promoting human 
rights by claiming “you do one if you do the other” (CIEP, January 12, 2001).
The third rationale for democracy assistance is global stability and the so-called 
democratic peace idea that greatly influences American democratic policy. The 
democratic peace proposition has been “the essence of the national security rationale 
for vigorously supporting, promoting, and when necessary, defending democracy in 
other countries” (Talbott 1996:49). As former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defence Joseph Kruzel said,
The notion that democracies do not go to war with each other... has had a 
substantial impact on public policy. There are very few propositions in 
international relations that can be articulated this clearly and simply, but 
when you have one, you can really cut through the clutter of the bureaucratic 
process and make an impact (Kruzel in Ray 1997:49).
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Unfortunately, the democratic peace theory is highly dubious. R. J. Rummel’s five 
volume series first outlined the modem democratic peace idea stating, “Violence does 
not occur between free societies” (Ray 1997:49). Michael Doyle then developed in 
detail the Kantian origins of this idea that democratic states deal peacefully with each 
other. It is Doyle who is most often given credit for the theory.54 The problem with 
the theory is that its validity depends heavily on the definition of war and democracy. 
The latter term is well known for its ambiguous and contentious nature. In addition, 
there have been a number of wars between democratic states that render the 
democratic peace proposition “rather less glamorous, dramatic, and attention getting” 
(Ray 1997:54). The 1812 American and United Kingdom war, the Spanish-American 
war, the American Civil War, the Boer war, and the First World War are all notable 
exceptions to invalidate the theory.
Moreover, the correlation between democracies and peace might be coincidental or 
spurious. For instance, a Cold War preoccupation with communism may have 
encouraged democracies not to fight one another. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder 
provide one of the more prominent critiques of the democratic peace proposition, 
noting that while stable democratic states may be less likely to war against one 
another, states in the process of democratic transition are actually quite war prone. 
This has been largely ignored by practitioners, allowing the myths of democratic 
peace to continue to be cultivated in Washington, D.C. because it is politically 
expedient to do so.55 Sustaining a false democratic peace theory has prevented the US 
democratic assistance community from seriously examining conflict (including 
ethnic) within democratic transitions (Ray 1997:55, 59).
Justification for USAID programming directly and unquestionably reflects US foreign 
policy objectives and logic. According to USAID, “The purpose of the diplomacy of 
the US is to a create more secure, prosperous and democratic world for the benefit of 
the American people and those whom they choose to assist” and “democratic 
countries are less likely to engage in war, generate large refugee flows, or disintegrate 
into crisis” (USAID 2000b; USAID 1995b). Indeed USAID claims it has “a record of 
accomplishment” in democracy promotion that is evidenced by the fact that there
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were 58 democratic nations in 1980. By 1995, this number had jumped to 115
nations. USAID provided democracy and governance assistance to 36 of the 57
nations that successfully made the transition to democratic government during this
period (USAID 2000b). USAID policy documents claim that the:
Growing popular demand for democracy is evidenced by a decade of 
dramatic transitions from dictatorship to democracy. We [USAID] have 
provided timely and constructive support during these transitions... by 
promoting democracy, the United States supports governments capable of 
maintaining peace and averting crises. This benefits US economic interests 
as well. Democracies governed by the rule of law are more reliable trade 
partners. We believe promotion of democracy is essential for sustainable 
development.... we help build democracies in four ways: 1) strengthening 
rule of law and respect for human rights, 2) developing more genuine and 
competitive political processes, 3) increasing development of a politically 
active civil society, and 4) promoting more transparent and accountable 
government institutions (USAID 1998c).
Yet, while USAID might claim success, US democracy programs have come under 
serious criticism by the US Congress, mainly via US General Accounting Office 
(GAO) evaluations and reports commissioned by the US Congress. A review of GAO 
documents and Congressional testimony demonstrates that there has been serious and 
prolonged criticism and concern over USAID’s lack of success in democracy 
assistance, particularly within the NIS.56
As the GAO has access to internal documents and notoriously provides rigorously 
researched reports, many of the GAO reports provide the most serious evidence of US 
democracy assistance mistakes. GAO reports from 1992-1999 were reviewed for this 
research with 19 reports relevant to USAID’s democracy programs, Women in 
Development (WID), and/or FSU programs. GAO criticism of USAID has been 
grave and continuous. Problems noted by GAO include: performance benchmark 
poorly defined, weak performance indicators, inadequate progress, key financial 
controls not consistently implemented, internal controls not assuring financial 
accountability, and limited monitoring of grant progress (Suda 1993). The reliability 
of USAID’s programme and financial data is uncertain; programme performance data 
were also determined to be unreliable; USAID’s impact on overall development is 
still unclear; USAID is unable to demonstrate the impact of its projects on objectives; 
programme evaluations are not routinely run; the new management system is not
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working and has created a serious morale problem; and lack of effective coordination 
for US bilateral programs in the NIS has been a problem (Ford 1997; Zanardi 1995). 
In sum, there continues to be an overall perception that USAID is a “closed shop” 
(Ford 1996).
Many of the above weaknesses characterise the US program in Kyrgyzstan, but this 
research focuses on the further weakness—also signalled in the GAO reviews—that 
relates to the treatment of gender. As many have noted, the “engendering” of 
democracy has been a slow and painful process, with the formal inclusion of women 
often coinciding with a continued practical exclusion (Phillips, 1991). The 
“engendering” of USAID programmes has barely proceeded at all.
2.3 Gendering Democracy Theory and Practice
“Broad agreement that democracies have failed to ensure political equalityfor 
women does not translate into any substantial consensus on why this should be so ” 
(Anne Phillips in Companion to Feminist Philosophy, Young and Jaggar, Ed 1999).
Of all the disappointments of democratic thought and practice, the failure to consider 
women has been, and continues to be, one of the most serious oversights both in 
countries that boast an Enlightenment background and in those that do not. 
Democracy is often defined as government of the people, by the people and for the 
people. Yet, slightly over half of the “people” around the globe have not been 
systematically represented. By failing to consider adequately women, democracy 
then seems to default on its own definitional test. “What is it about democracy,” 
feminists ask, “a tradition apparently defined by principles of equality and opposed to 
tyrannical rule - that kept it so long impervious to the claims of sexual equality?” 
(Phillips 1999b).
Historically, it is in the gendered definition of “people” that democracy has been able 
to justify female exclusion because women were not included in what men, from 
Augustine to Rousseau from Spinoza to Ken Waltz, considered “people” for the 
affairs of the state (Lloyd 1996). “Democracies were slow to acknowledge women as 
equal citizens; and even after their belated enfranchisement, women have continued to
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feel themselves second-class citizens” (Phillips 1999b). The definition and concept of
citizen, the public person, has been, and continues to be, a primary justification
through which women’s marginalization from democracy is sanctified (Faure 1991).
As Anne Phillips argues:
All democracies now present themselves as indifferent to sexual difference, 
and they proclaim their citizenship as equally available to both women and 
men. This very indifference, however, is part of what feminists have 
criticised. In detaching itself from what is particular, concrete, or bodily, 
democratic theory is said to write in one sex alone as its norm (Phillips 
1999b).
Any argument that current US democracy assistance is sensitive to the special needs 
and positions of women, as evidenced by the WID unit, and at the same time, 
indifferent to sexual differences, i.e. there is no gender-based discrimination inherent 
in US democracy programming, would be wrong on both counts. The distinct failure 
of USAID’s democracy programs to comprehensibly consider gender, results from 
complex and layered denials of the value of women as democratic participants and 
gender as a relational concept and, thus, a necessary component of the structural 
design of US democracy programs. The marginalization of women and gender is, 
first, supported by the gender-discriminate history of Western democracy theory and 
reflected in current democracy practice. Second, contrary to the rhetoric of USAID 
policy documents, the researcher’s own review of USAID’s programs and 
programming documents demonstrate the exclusion of women/gender. This exclusion 
also has been noticed and documented by prominent critics. Gender problems within 
institutional programmatic design and processes specific to USAID programs will be 
detailed, as related to Kyrgyzstan, later in this chapter. Third, the existence of a WID 
unit does not correct, and sometimes compounds, the marginalization of 
women/gender within assistance programs.
2,3.1 Philosophical Assumptions and Current Practice
The infamous public/private divide of men as public decision-makers and citizens, 
and women as private property inside the home, has been part of the Western concept 
of citizenship since Socrates sent his wife, Xanthippe, home before his death so he 
might be alone with men to discuss matters of consequence (Grant 1991:12). This
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rigid divide, which feminist theory has been breaking down, was based on the 
construct of “rationality” (Narayan 1997: xiv; Elshtain 1997). Men were perceived to 
be created in the image and likeness of the Divine, or God, which has been 
understood to be male. Men, in the image of the Divine, are, therefore, also rational 
and powerful, like God. Women are not rational because they are not formed in the 
image and likeness of God. Hence, women have no “divine authority,” but are 
instead subject to the sub-divine authority of men. This is outlined in Augustine’s 
“The Confessions,” based on Genesis theory from the Bible that God made Man in 
His image and likeness and woman was made from man, a sub-man, subject to man. 
Similar to concepts of sovereignty, the philosophical underpinnings of the 
Enlightenment rest on “Divine authorisation” in that God, the Divine, is a man. This 
has been determined by men, and with no factual, or scientific proof, other than men 
say God is a man. Because God is man, God made men in His image and likeness. 
Therefore, men are rulers. As the notion of sovereignty has been questioned and 
discovered to be fundamentally flawed, so is the base of philosophical epistemology 
in modern understanding. Thus, men advantageously claimed their identity to be the 
image of the Divine with women perceived to be given by God to men as attendants 
and companions (Lloyd 1996).
Rousseau, upon which Western socio-political construct is based, best explains the 
“sexual contract” implicit in his Social Contract. Women, as male companions, are to 
“be pleasing in his sight, to win his respect and love, to train him in childhood, to tend 
him in manhood, to counsel and console, to make his life pleasant and happy, these 
are the duties of woman for all time, and this is what she should be taught when she is 
young” (Rousseau 1974:328). Not enjoying Divine authority, women inherently 
lacked qualities necessary for participation in public decision-making. Domination of 
women was hermetically created and recreated, using biological differences to justify 
social restriction.
Vandana Shiva in “Science, Nature, and Gender,” points out that the Enlightenment 
and the corresponding theory of progress have been centred upon male created 
modern scientific knowledge and economic development. Pursuit of progress, at any 
cost, guided and justified by theories of science and development have been the male
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social, political, economic, and scientific project of the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries. 
This has been based on “male characteristics” of domination, aggression, violence, 
and exploitation. Just as the scientific revolution in Europe turned concepts of terra 
mater into a natural element to be dominated and striped of its raw materials male war 
also turned woman into a “natural” element upon which to signify victory, by 
domination, aggression, violence, and exploitation. The characteristics that men saw 
as undesirable and attributed to women, emotion, intuitive reasoning, co-operation, 
and empathy are, arguably, the personality traits that are most needed in the 21st 
century (Shiva 1996:266).
Feminists, such as Mendus (1992), argue that the sidelining of women in democracy 
has not been an “unfortunate fact,” but is a direct result of embodied ideals which 
will continue to omit women’s inclusion unless “an extensive critical examination of 
its [democracy] own philosophical assumptions” occurs (Mendus 1992:208 in Phillips 
1999b). The philosophical founders of modem European social thought and theory, 
Aristotle and Plato to Machiavelli, Rousseau, Comte, and Nietzsche created theory 
fundamentally flawed in its gender perspective (Makus 1996; Whitford 1998).57 
When female identity was mentioned, it was often as a negative quality/manifestation 
for men to “overcome,” “to beat down,” or “win.”58 The concept of male citizenship, 
and the understanding of the private/public divide, provided the rationalisation for 
female exclusion and theoretical soundness. “The relegation of women to the private 
sphere elevated men to the position of solely responsible moral agents in political 
society” (Windsor in Grant 1991:12). Who has been defined as a citizen, a voter, a 
candidate, and a soldier have all been highly gendered decisions. Political and 
community activity, the identity of the state, and structures of the international system 
have then been constructed on exclusive and artificial gender lines where one’s 
gender has profound implications for who enjoys privileges, undertakes duties, and 
receives the protection of the state. Women, historically, have been excluded from 
creating the state and immune to the privileges and duties of citizenship.59 Democratic 
and ethnic/nationalist theories have been able to ignore the role of women because 
women have not been actors in public or state decision-making arenas, and have thus 
been external to the research project (Newland 1991:2; Yuval-Davis 1997:68-92; 
Zerilli 1994).60
During the 1980s and 1990s, as it became increasingly difficult to ignore the 
inadequacies of state structures in addressing minority rights, concepts of citizenship 
were problematised (Gurr 1993). Gender also surfaced in the academic space opened 
by those who argued that the Western European foundation of the Enlightenment, the 
state system as the prime political outcome, was not meeting many human needs. 
Feminist theories have since made the point that the relegation of women to the 
private sphere was not natural but a gendered social construction; and that women’s 
absence from the public political sphere was not based on physical qualities but on 
assigned meanings for female physicalities, which served as justification for their 
social/political exclusion (Newland 1991:2). During this time, voluminous testimony 
also emerged, primarily by Phillips (1991, 1993, 1995) and Pateman (1988, 1989,
1992), effectively documenting why and how women have not been systematically 
included in the theory and practice of democracy. Yet this research, and women 
themselves, still remain largely ignored by US democracy practitioners.
Although USAID’s own D&G policy documents may claim gender sensitivity and 
consideration, USAID programming documents distinctly lack gender consideration.
A comparison of programming documents to policy documents provides evidence that 
USAID’s claim to gender inclusion is more rhetorical than substantive. For example, 
USAID policy documents claim that:
the most important is the attention USAID pays to women. We work to 
ensure that women have full access to social benefits, such as health care, 
education, and financial markets; that their voice is heard in politics and 
governance; and that they and their children are protected in times of crisis 
(USAID 1998c).
USAID policy reports also assert that USAID D&G programs focus on 
“disenfranchisement of women, indigenous peoples, and minorities; ethnic divisions; 
and the re-emergence of politics based on ethnic, national, and religious chauvinism” 
(USAID 2000b). However, a complete review of USAID’s D&G programmatic 
documents relative to the FSU and Kyrgyzstan reveals that neither gender nor 
ethnicity are considered in the activities of USAID democracy programming for the 
FSU, detailed in section 2.4 of this chapter.
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USAID’s D&G policy programming unit did fund the Global Women in Politics 
Programme (GWIP) as part of the US commitment to the UN Fourth World 
Conference on Women. This funding, however, amounted to only $1 million US 
dollars globally over three years and did not include the FSU, USAID’s largest and 
most visible target for democracy programming. The GWIP program was managed 
by The Asia Foundation, which clearly states that “women’s full participation as 
informed voters, activists, advocates, and elected and appointed leaders is 
fundamental to consolidating the world trend toward democracy and ultimately to 
achieving sustainable development” (GWIP Brochure, Carol Yost, Director of GWIP, 
1999). Despite the success of the GWIP program, USAID chose not to renew the 
funding or extend the program beyond Asia.
The limited funding for global gender initiatives is only a  small part of the problem, 
but it is relevant as confirming the tendency to produce “alibis” that present USSAID 
as firmly dedicated to addressing gender concerns. The over-reporting of 
achievements seems to be a systematic part of democracy programs, and is illustrated 
by the reports from the Women in Development (WID) unit that were also considered, 
in addition to USAID’s D&G policy documents, for this research. WTD/USAID 
reports that all R4 (Results Indicators/Results, Review and Resource Request) for all 
WID SO (strategic objectives) throughout the agency were met or “exceeded 
expectations.” Indeed, a review of all of USAID’s policy documents relating to 
democracy (D&G), WID, USAID management, and R4s reveals that USAID claims 
to “exceed” programmatic objectives in the areas of democracy and WID sectors 
relative to the FSU (USAID/CAR 1999a).
While US AID policy documents may claim programmatic success related to 
democracy and WID issues in the FSU, in addition to this researcher’s review, again 
there is no evidence by others who have also reviewed USAID programming 
documents to support USAID’s policy claims. Notably, the lack of gender inclusion 
with USAID programs has been extensively documented by the GAO. A 
comprehensive GAO review of all USAID’s democracy programming activities in the 
FSU requested by National Security Council, Promoting Democracy, Foreign Affairs
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and Defense Agencies Funds and Activities-1991 to 1993 GAO/NSAID-94-83- 
Promoting Democracy (GAO January 1994: 10-11) demonstrates the distinct failure 
of USAID’s democracy programming to include gender/women in any programs.
So negligent has USAID been on gender inclusion, the GAO also issued a separate 
report, US Has Made Slow Progress in Involving Women in Development (Martin
1994). This GAO report reviewed all of the USAID programs, including, but pot 
limited to, the FSU and democracy. It argued that while a gender analysis is essential 
for sustainable development, women in the FSU assistance countries have not 
received assistance from USAID commensurate with their percentage of the 
population. It noted that while there is an evolving rationale for WID due to the 
severe crisis situation of women in transition countries, host countries often resist 
incorporating gender in their development focus; it further noted that USAID has not 
actively challenged this mind set. The review expressed concern that the problems of 
the most vulnerable women, refugee women, have not been adequately addressed by 
USAID programs, and argues that there is limited leadership for a WID agenda from 
the US State Department, the policy-setting arm of USAID. According to the review, 
and contrary to USAID’s own claims, USAID’s progress on gender inclusion within 
democracy programming is said to be marginal. The review also stressed that women 
are disproportionately hurt by structural adjustment programs, and that attention to 
gender is therefore crucial in economic restructuring, but that USAID has failed to 
consider gender within its economic restructuring programs as well as within its 
democracy programs (Martin 1994). The review notes that USAID’s FSU bureau 
neglected to consider gender in any programs until after the GAO’s gender 
investigation was public.
The Bureau of Europe and the New Independent States had not 
implemented the women-in-development directives at the time we 
completed our evaluation (Martin 1994:26).
Although women are disproportionately hurt by the post-Soviet transition, USAID has 
not focused on women or their increased vulnerability under the “democratic 
transition” in any USAID democracy programming. Finally, the GAO concludes the 
review asserting “understanding the dynamics of gender is essential for sustainable
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development” programs (Martin 1994:55,62). Since gender consideration is not part 
of USAID’s democracy programming to the NIS, this GAO statement provides 
evidence that the lack of gender consideration with USAID’s actual democracy 
programming has, in part, been responsible for the overall failure of these programs to 
be sustainable.
Martin’s report was published seven years ago, and is the latest GAO report on 
USAID and WID issues; however, Thomas Carothers’ more recent, and 
groundbreaking critique of US democracy assistance, provides evidence that US 
democracy assistance still fails to address gender issues. In his research, Carothers 
expands on the failure of US democracy assistance to consider the role of women in 
democratisation, and recommends this as an area that demands greater explanation 
and attention (Carothers 1999:345). Under “Areas for Extra Attention,” Carothers 
calls for future research into the role of women in democratisation, arguing that 
gender has yet to be seriously considered and that it offers a “potentially powerful 
approach that can usefully synthesise many aspects of the democracy agenda” 
(Carothers 1999:345). Carothers is the most recognised critic of US democracy 
assistance, but not himself a gender specialist, and the fact that he would include the 
failure of WID within USAID’s democracy assistance as one of three areas for serious 
reform provides substantial evidence of USAID’s failure. It is notable that, the core 
of the Washington democracy community, present at the launching of Carothers’ 
book, failed to ask about Carothers’ substantive recommendations on the need to 
include women.61
Moreover, feminists have argued that there is a persistent political marginalization of 
women’s views within the development process, “especially at the level of 
development planning in institutions such as state bureaucracies and development 
organisations” (Goetz 1997:2), and this certainly holds true for the 
USAID/Kyrgyzstan context. This marginalization of women is reproduced on both 
the individual levels, through USAID and partner organisation’s interaction with 
society during implementation of the democracy program and through the less overt 
but equally pervasive exclusion of women from democratic theory. By replicating 
Western gender discrimination and reinforcing the patriarchal systems of the host
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country, democracy assistance programs consciously and unconsciously reproduce 
and strengthen gender biases inherent in the history of Western democracy.
USAID democracy assistance compounds the inherent gender problems of the 
Western model by a planning and design process that is heavily biased towards men. 
Original democratisation project plans are created in Washington, D.C. by elite 
members of America’s democracy (“democratic experts” as they are known), who 
have been schooled in Western theory of democracy and citizenship. These 
“democracy experts,” themselves members of a “virtually all male white priesthood,” 
are steeped in Western democratic history (Monica Harrington in True 1993:81). In 
the case of assistance to Kyrgyzstan, for example, at the time of this research, the 
USAID/ Kyrgyzstan staff members is currently all male. Of the possible ten USAID 
representatives in Washington and the regional USAID office in Almaty, Kazakstan, 
there is only one USAID female staff member in Almaty. Of the possible 60 directors 
of US private voluntary organisations (PVO), both in Washington and Kyrgyzstan, 
only three are women; a PVO office in Kyrgyzstan and two PVO offices in 
Washington. Therefore, 93% of US democracy assistance USAID staff members and 
partner organisations, both in Washington and in Kyrgyzstan, are male.
Gender discrimination is further reinforced and compounded by a tendency to adhere 
to local gender codes in the countries where USAID operates. Western donors are 
concerned with creating good relations with the power elite of the country in question. 
Because of this donors often mirror, reinforce, and/or reward their male national 
counterparts. A desire to establish good relations produces a desire to please that 
promotes Western adherence to local gender codes, restrictions, and structures. This 
behaviour is exacerbated in post-Soviet societies where the political is personal and 
male (Temkina 1996:213). In the case of Kyrgyzstan, not atypical of the FSU, the 
local government leaders, oblast akims, are 100% male. The heads of regional 
administrations, sub-oblast level government, are 99% men. Leadership positions 
within The White House of Kyrgyzstan are staffed by 62% men. Men constitute 98% 
of all department heads. The Jogorku Kenesh, the Parliament of Kyrgyzstan, is 
represented by 96% men, increased from 70% during the USSR. The political 
“opposition” leaders supported by USAID funds are 100% men (Zairash 1998).
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2.3.2 Checking the WID Box
The common argument used to demonstrate that US democracy assistance is gender
sensitive is the existence of a WID unit. WID units are charged with responsibility
for ensuring that gender concerns are incorporated into development planning; thus,
on the face of it, the existence of a WID unit is clear evidence that gender issues are
being addressed; however, the notion that a WID unit sufficiently ensures that women
will be included in democracy programming is fundamentally flawed for the WID
unit is weak, sidelined, and not part of the Washington power structure that creates
democracy programming. Anne Marie Goetz (1991, 1995, 1997a, 1997b) has
extensively documented the marginalization of women and gender issues with WID
units and institution designs in developmental practices. One point she stresses is that
women are not included at the level at which they key decisions are made.
Projects designed to strengthen the capacities of a country to determine the 
overall direction of its development. Women were completely absent from 
the process of setting national development priorities in national and 
sectional development plans. This is the level at which crucial decisions 
about resource allocations are made (Goetz 1991:140).
Goetz’s revelations about how WID units are typically structured within overall 
developmental designs holds true for USAID as well. One example of WID’s 
exclusion from U.S. democracy policy programming is represented by the Kennan 
Institute/Woodrow Wilson sponsored USAID Strategic Democracy Planning Session 
of November 30, 1999. At this critical policy planning session there was no one from 
the WID office.
The second problem is that the WID unit may find themselves restricted to the “add
women and stir” approach that is now considered inadequate among contemporary
gender theorists. When women’s issues are treated as separable from mainstream
development concerns, this can encourage a “checking of the WID box,” whereby aid
projects can simply add a gender requirement rather than fully integrating gender
concerns. For example, at the aforementioned USAID Democracy Planning Session,
one former US official claimed the way to help “these countries” is to set up a system
of “small business men and soccer moms, like we have here.” When this remark
provoked concern, another man commented, “Gender is nice, but it is something we
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can do later. First we need to feed and educate the people and support democracy” 
(Author’s Meeting Notes 1999).
As such examples illustrate, it is all to easy for gender to be viewed as a secondary, 
separate program that can be performed after feeding, educating, and supporting 
democracy. “As a result integration came to mean small and separate projects for 
women... providing planners with alibis to prove their commitment to basic needs 
without having to deal with the implications of treating women as equal agents in 
development” (Goetz 1991:139). As Goetz demonstrates, WID units (not only in the 
US) too often content themselves with the allocation of resources to women’s 
projects, micro-credit, poverty alleviation, and handicrafts.
WID issues are far removed from the substantial affairs of government and 
development. Instead of promoting authentic gender integration, WID typically 
serves as the flagship gender/women’s project that both the government and donor 
can use to postpone more systematic inclusion of women’s needs and issues. Gender 
then becomes the object of disjointed policy interventions that stem from two inter­
related processes, “one relating to assumptions about gender and the locus of 
subordination, the other regarding the limiting frameworks of technical development 
agencies” (Goetz 1991:136). WID shares the liberal feminist reluctance to understand
JT/J
gender problems within the context of social relations and systematic change. In 
much practice, this results in development practices that treat the category of 
“woman” as a self-contained identity. “Women are then labelled ‘special’ and are 
isolated from mainstream development activities and decisions” (Goetz 1991:140).
Due to the failure of WID, Gender and Development (GAD) has become increasingly 
popular within development agencies. GAD advocates redistributing power within 
and throughout socio-political relations. While the WID focus was more of an 
affirmative action approach—getting more women in development agencies, getting 
more aid to more female recipients, etc.—GAD involves a more direct challenge to 
male privileges and prejudices inherent within the patriarchal structures of socio­
political institutions. GAD is fundamentally about incorporating the relational value 
of gender analysis/variables within both donor and assistance institutions, and thereby
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uncovering the gender discrimination and imbalances of power that WID could not 
adequately challenge. Not surprisingly, “deep-seated resistance has hampered” the 
efforts to “mainstream” GAD across all aspects of the development process (Goetz 
1997b: 1-4).
While the work that has been done to challenge the institutional gender discrimination 
of development agencies is beyond the scope of this research, it is important to note 
that “the persistence of gendered outcomes of everyday decision-making in both state 
and non-governmental organisations, often in spite of policy rhetoric promoting 
gender-sensitive changes, has led to the conclusion that institutions themselves are 
gendered” (Goetz 1997b: 10). Gender discrimination, in this analysis, is built into the 
very structure of democracy assistance programs, from the institutional down to the 
on-the-ground programming. The implications of this will be examined as related to 
the case of Kyrgyzstan in section 2.4.
One final area, however, that demands attention at this point is the role attached to 
civil society within US democracy assistance, because this sector, at least in 
Kyrgyzstan, demonstrates clearly how the “identifiable patriarchal bargain” operates 
(Kandiyoti 1988) and is supported by institutional gender marginalization. As already 
noted, Kyrgyzstan’s civil society has a strong constituency base of women’s 
organisations and women dominated NGOs; which might, logically, be expected to 
“strengthen the position of the WED/GAD agenda in government, while at the same 
time sensitising it to the needs of the national female citizenship it has proven difficult 
to build up or to exploit this iterative relationship” (Goetz 1995:6). Yet, despite 
repeated gestures to the importance of civil society in the democratisation process, 
this has not been the case. The difficulty comes from institutional discrimination and 
a resulting patriarchal bargain, both of which operate, to confound and restrict the 
process of gender integration.
2.3.3 Civil Society-NGOs and GONGOs
Civil society is as difficult to define as democracy. Says Fish, “There exist nearly as 
many conceptions of it as theorists who have examined it” (Fish 1995:55). For the
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purposes of this research, civil society is understood as a collection of institutions 
(primarily, but not exclusively, NGOs) whose members are engaged in non-state 
activities, usually revolving around the social service sector, including economic, 
cultural, family, voluntary associations, education, and media. Actors in civil society 
may have the opportunity to transform and/or preserve their own identity through
non-formal pressures on state systems and community leaders (Fish 1995:55; Keane
/<>
1988). However, for US democracy practitioners, civil society has become entirely 
synonymous with non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Although Western 
donors now rely heavily on the concept of NGOs, community action, and public 
society to support a democratic state system, NGOs remain a new concept that is 
understood in very different terms by FSU citizens.64
A closer examination of civil society and gender is relevant for several reasons. First, 
US democracy promoters have heightened the importance of civil society arguing that 
an active civil society—understood in USAID terms as a flourishing sector of 
NGOs— necessarily promotes democracy. Second, within US democracy assistance, 
nowhere is the lack of comprehensive gender integration more clear than in the realm 
of understanding civil society, and no where is it more apparent how complex gender 
issues and analysis can be. Where women are key actors in civil society—as they are 
in Kyrgyzstan—the importance attached to civil society should counteract the 
indifference to gender issues. And yet, the understanding of civil society, combined 
with the tendency to emphasis procedure over substance, means that women remain 
marginalized even when one of their main spheres of activity becomes central to the 
understanding of democracy.
While it is usually agreed that democracy does require a commitment to civic virtue— 
a significant citizen component—civil society has become a “magic bullet,” a primary 
“tool” in US democracy assistance (Held 1993:261). “One of the most widely shared 
understandings of what must be done to ensure the survival of democracy has been 
that civil society must be further developed and strengthened” (Reisnger 1997:66; 
Lipshutz 1992; Held 1991; Keane 1988; Kangas 1995; Bateson 1990; Tismaneanue
1995). Citizens, acting in civil society, are now perceived to be a critical ingredient of 
democratic society, central to the processes of transitions and consolidation. So
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important is civil society that it has been named the “dependent variable” of 
democracy (Fish 1995:54).
US democracy assistance has consistently emphasised procedure over substance. In 
relation to civil society, this is evidenced by the attention given to the quantity of 
NGOs present. USAID’s Assistant Administrator—Bureau for Europe and Eurasia— 
Donald Pressley, claimed, in a Congressional Testimony on April 12, 2000: “We are 
proud of what USAID programs have been able to accomplish. Civil society is 
growing in magnitude and sophistication in all five countries. Citizens’ organisations, 
non-existent in 1991, now number over 3,000” (Pressley 2000). In his eight-page 
testimony, Pressley references NGOs forty-four times, an average of five per page. 
Civic/civil/citizen appear 42 times and democracy, by comparison, is referenced 25 
times. Further, in an April 2000 joint press release, US Department of State and the 
Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, former US Secretary of State Madeline 
Albright, “praised the role of NGOs and civic groups... [and] stated that the United 
States will continue to provide support for grassroots organisations in their efforts to 
develop a robust civil society” (Rubin 2000). This increased responsibility on NGOs 
to reverse USAID’s probable failure in Kyrgyzstan provides evidence of USAID’s 
envisioned role of local NGOs as the saviour of US policy on democracy.
While a pro-active citizenry does indeed create a powerful check against autocratic 
rule, sheer numbers of NGOs, understood by Washington to equal active civil society, 
do not necessarily indicate or ensure a vibrant civic society. Indeed, in Kyrgyzstan, 
USAID emphasis on the quantity of NGOs has created an awkward dynamic where 
groups form to meet Western expectations and/or to take advantage of Western funds 
rather than meet local needs. This has hindered the development of authentic civil 
society and resulted in a community weakened by the large presence of government- 
operated NGOs, now widely known as GONGOs. As Radio Free Europe’s Paul 
Goble states in his April 12, 2000 Congressional Testimony on US democracy 
assistance to Central Asia:
Genuine NGOs are severely restricted in their activities or even banned 
altogether, with the authorities recreating a phenomenon pioneered by the 
Soviet regime: government-organised non-governmental organisations or 
GONGOs. Such groups are trotted out by the authorities to demonstrate that 
these regimes are moving in a democratic direction, a tactic that works all 
too often not only in Central Asia but elsewhere as well because many 
Western governments and scholars now equate NGO development with 
democratic change (Goble 2000).
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GONGOs, NGOs in name only, are consciously created, often by relatives of 
government officials, to act as a “legitimate” collection mechanism of foreign donor 
hard currency. According to one prominent USAID PVO partner, Counterpart 
Consortium, an American NGO with headquarters in Washington and an office in 
Kyrgyzstan, 961 NGOs were legally registered in Kyrgyzstan as of September 1999. 
Of these, 132 focus on women/women’s issues. Of those not dealing with women’s 
issues, 53 include women in their mission statement. One hundred and ninety-four 
NGOs have no director listed but of those that do list a director—767 in all—365 list 
women as their director. Although Counterpart is the PVO that administers the 
majority of USAID funds for NGOs in Kyrgyzstan and provides USAID with 
information about how many NGOs exist, the 1999 USAID report on Kyrgyzstan, 
under the section, “USAID Role and Achievements to Date,” states that “over 450 
NGOs have been established” (USAID 1999).
As this indicates there are no consistent accounts of the number of NGOs in existence, 
but it is an “open secret” is that the majority of organisations are GONGOs 
masquerading as NGOs. Common estimates, from both nationals and internationals 
who work in the NGO community of Kyrgyzstan, are that only 50 to 100, at most, of 
the registered NGOs are authentic. Authentic here means simply that there is an 
operating office, staff, and mission statement. The inflation of numbers means that 
the NGO community in Kyrgyzstan is largely passive due to nepotic conflicts of 
interest, and the population is justifiably cynical of both foreign assistance and NGOs.
Despite the known occurrence of GONGOs, it remains difficult to gather evidence 
because their proliferation is a direct result of donor demand and supply. Donors 
need to demonstrate “civil society” results, and large numbers of NGOs provide an 
impressive and easy accomplishment. Money is the major donor “deliverable.” 
GONGOs make a convenient outlet for excess funds that must be spent in-country. 
Additionally, while internationals and nationals are willing to discuss their concerns 
about the authenticity of NGOs and proliferation of GONGO, few are willing to go on 
record. This reluctance results from: (1) fear that criticism could jeopardise the 
funding of civil society and thus (2) threaten international jobs/careers, and (3) 
endanger the promotion of civil society; a mechanism that many professionals, rightly 
and genuinely, believe offers the best means for promoting human rights and social 
protection and, thus, authentic democracy. Yet, the silence surrounding the GONGO
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phenomenon threatens the very civic values that donors and NGOs are dedicated to 
promoting.
Although it is difficult to find people who have worked with or within GONGOs and 
are willing to speak out against their practices, two people were willing to talk about 
first-hand experiences they had with The Women’s Congress of the Kyrgyz Republic 
and another “NGO” called Ai-Danek. Natalia Ablova, Director of the well-known 
Bishkek based Bureau of Human Rights and Rule of Law, described two GONGO 
scenarios.
The much criticised parliamentary elections [February 2000] have become a 
sort of a test for NGOs’ commitment, professionalism and reliability because 
the elections made a clear division between genuine grassroots civil society 
groups and lots of ‘NGO-like institutions.’ The commonly shared concerns 
of our society over these ‘dirty elections’ were voiced mainly by human rights 
advocacy groups, a couple of energetic youth and women NGOs, and the 
NGO Coalition for Democracy. Where, I wonder, are all those numerous 
‘NGOs’ that wrote solemnly in their charters ‘we intend to build a democracy 
in Kyrgyzstan?’ Were they going to practice ‘democracy building,’ on the 
moon? The elections were the chance to prove their missions because the 
election results are crucial not only for ‘democracy building’ but for the very 
existence of the so called ‘third sector.’ But instead, stubborn and 
demonstrative non-participation was self-imposed by most ‘NGOs.’
- Natalia Ablova 2000 (Personal Correspondence to the Researcher 
5/8/00)
Ablova illustrated what she meant by self-imposed NGO censorship or 
“demonstrative non-participation” in another personal correspondence sent to the 
researcher with the subject heading “GONGO Horror Story” about the “NGO” Ai- 
Danek.
During the discussions in front of President Akaev today, the floor was given 
7 times to a Ms Umetalieva from an obscure NGO,’Ai-Danek’, who gave her 
credentials as a speaker not only on behalf of her organisation but on behalf of 
ALL NGOs and even, in a way, on behalf of the Soros Foundation of 
Kyrgyzstan. She called to what even the most reactionary officials here would 
not dream of doing: to put all NGOs under a government control, to prohibit 
any external funding for all ‘political NGOs.’ Then the list was announced: 
NGO Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society (the main elections monitor 
in February-March 2000), Committee for Human Rights (Dyryldaev) and my 
Bureau. Then it was mentioned by Ms. Umetalieva that we are paid by 
foreign, mostly American, money to ‘damage the image of the fatherland’
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while the country is practising a ‘democracy without limits’ and so on. 
Byelorussia revisited!
I did not seriously believe, you know, that all these quasi-NGOs can be 
dangerous but in such witch-hunting campaigns, they can be easily set against 
real grassroots. So far this weapon was not used by the authorities. Now they 
gained the momentum for it. And a person appeared who is ready to undertake 
this dirty job - on American money! Yes, this is the mockery of the situation!
... But today all disguises were waved away: Umetalieva publicly promised to 
President Akaev that from now on ‘her fund’ will be at the disposal of the 
authorities, and that journalists training sessions will be held in the spirit of 
the loyalty to the state.
- Natalia Ablova 2000 (Personal Correspondence to the Researcher 6/8/00)
This type of behaviour is not atypical for the GONGO community. Aisuluu 
Bedelbaeva, a former USAID funded Muskie Fellow, was willing to “go on record” 
about her first-hand experience with a suspected GONGO. The summer of 1996 
Bedelbaeva was recruited by Zamira Akbagysheva, President of Woman's Congress 
of the Kyrgyz Republic, to volunteer as “project director” of a week-long delegation, 
arranged by the Pakistan Embassy to Kyrgyzstan and the Women’s Congress, of a 
small group of Pakistani Girl Scouts visiting Kyrgyzstan. Of this experience 
Bedelbaeva says,
Although Zamira insisted that the entire week be a no-expense budget, as the 
Women’s Congress was an NGO, I suspect that funding may have been 
provided by international donors but this is difficult to prove as the Women’s 
Congress’ financial records were secret. So, free accommodation, for 
example, was found at Kyrgyz Technical University’s dormitories, which 
were really inadequate accommodations. Zamira provided a list of mandatory 
meetings, which included factory and hospital directors and Zamira, herself, 
invited the media to the arranged meetings.
I suspect that money may have been made by the media presence because 
later, when I worked for the American Council of Teachers of Russian 
(ACTR) the exchange program that sends students from the former Soviet 
Union to American high schools and universities, Zamira invited ACTR to 
appear on her television show, ‘Call Us on Thursday,’ for the price of $500 
per show paid to the Women’s Congress. The offer was, of course, declined.
Of all the meetings only the orphanage on Belorusskaya Street in Bishkek 
provided me with evidence of financial gain by Zamira.
At the delegation’s final dinner, hosted by the Pakistani Embassy at the 
exclusive Ak-Keme hotel, the Girl Scout leader announced she regretted that
the Belorusskaya orphanage director was not there because she wanted to 
donate one hundred U.S. dollars. Although the Embassy had requested those 
who had assisted with the trip be invited, Zamira, unbeknownst to the 
Embassy, invited those whom she needs to ‘repay’ or request favours from in 
the future. Zamira took the money and promised to give the orphanage’s 
director the funds; however, because my aunt worked at the orphanage I was 
able to investigate and learn that this money was never transferred.
-Aisuluu Bedelbaeva 1999 (Researcher’s Notes, Kyrgyzstan
1999).
In order to avoid interviewing GONGOs when conducting research for this thesis, the 
researcher relied on two years of knowledge from working with the NGO community 
in Kyrgyzstan and thereby knowing which NGOs had an office, a project, and were 
active participants in civil society. The researcher was also guided by the credible 
and active NGO Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society (known as the NGO 
Coalition) which Ablova mentions in her first e-mail. Therefore, only 50 NGOs, that 
in the researcher’s opinion are authentic working NGOs independent from 
government control, were asked to complete the NGO surveys that inform this 
research. Of these NGOs 28 did so.
Of these 28, NGOs, 76% were directed by women. 96% of these NGOs surveyed 
thought that women were leading NGOs nationwide. Local Kyrgyz government 
officials and USAID PVO partners also thought that the majority of NGOs in 
Kyrgyzstan were directed by women. As part of this research, described in greater 
detail in Chapter Five and Six, the author asked local NGOs, “Are there many women 
leading NGOs? Why or why not?” 96% responded, “Yes, most NGOs are led by 
women.” Women not only dominate NGOs in Kyrgyzstan but in other FSU countries 
as well, such as Mongolia. Of Mongolia’s democratic success, Fish notes “The case 
under examination evinces the independent power of a strong civil society. Two 
crucial NGO sectors, women’s groups and journalists’ associations, were instrumental 
in pushing democratisation forward” (Fish 1998:139-140).
2.3.4 Patriarchal Bargain Producing Paradoxical Results
Despite USAID’s assertion that civil society promotion is essential to achieving 
democratic success, there appears to be an overall lack within USAID of any
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meaningful attention to who is participating in civil society development and why. 
The correlation between gender and civil society is noted for the first time in USAID 
documents in 1997; however, USAID simply determines that this means “promoting 
even greater participation [of women in civil society] will further accelerate reform” 
(USAID 1997,32). This statement evidences that the “checking of the WID box” 
mentality is still very much a part of the structure and process of how US democracy 
assistance perceives women and gender issues. Additionally, USAID’s general 
assertions of success and claims to gender parity are rarely evident in USAID reports 
requesting funding from Congress or in USAID’s final programmatic and country 
reports themselves, as will be demonstrated in Chapter Four.
Although gender considerations have been largely ignored, USAID/Central Asian 
Republics (CAR) did commission a special report on gender-related activities in 
Central Asia during the summer of 1999. This task of surveying, analysing, and 
suggesting programmatic design on gender issues for all of Central Asia, however, 
was given to a summer intern, indicating something about the priority level that 
USAID places on including gender in any serious manner (Arnold 1999).65 Research 
for this report occurred in Kazakstan with a one-week trip to Uzbekistan. The results 
the intern recommended, despite her lack of adequate knowledge of the region and of 
any stated specific gender expertise, were meant to inform gender programming for 
the entire region. Yet, “USAID/CAR recognise that gender issues are gaining 
prominence and distinction in our portfolio” claims the report (Arnold 1999:4). The 
report notes “the Mission currently facilitates many gender-related activities that span 
all SOs. These activities may not necessarily be the result of a conscious effort to 
target women...” (Arnold 1999; USAID 1999d).66 Finally, the report concludes:
A majority of the Democracy and Governance activities have focused around 
the strengthening of the developing civil society, primarily through support 
for NGOs/PVOs and independent media. Mission efforts to empower 
women and ensure their participation in political and economic decision­
making at the national and sub-nation level have focused largely on support
for women’s NGOs the number of NGOs ...including those run by and
involved with issues of particular concern to women, has been steadily 
increasing... more than 100 in Kyrgyzstan... support of women’s NGOs has 
been very strong and the outcomes successful (Arnold 1999).
Interestingly, it is assumed that the high involvement of women in NGOs reflects an 
increase in what can be termed “women’s NGOs” and it is still not recognised that 
women might be playing a major and active role throughout the NGO sector. Thus, 
even in recognising the observable fact that women are leading civil society, USAID
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has failed to understand the implications of a female-driven civil society. Moreover, 
the happy assumption that a proliferation of women active in NGOs adds up to an 
equality in political decision-making is both erroneous and detrimental to authentic 
political participation for both women and civil society as a whole.
Enter the “identifiable patriarchal bargain” (Kandiyoti 1988). If, as Touraine asserts, 
“We cannot divorce democratic culture from political consciousness, which is not 
simply a sense of citizenship but a demand for responsibility,” (Touraine 1997:150) 
then it is the women of Kyrgyzstan who are taking on the burden of both creating and 
assuming public responsibility for the democratic transition while the “new (male) 
democrats” are busy “sipping beer and dancing the night away” (Bransten 1997). As 
this thesis explores, it is through the building of the informal sector of a democratic 
society that women may come to recognise a more peaceful ethnic identity. Women 
are certainly realising greater force and effectiveness as active citizens in the third 
sector, the civil society of Kyrgyzstan, by contributing to the overall improvement of 
life for all citizens. The strongest, most successful civil sector organisations (these 
include Interbilim, Institute for Regional Studies, Kyrgyz-American Human Rights 
Bureau, The Talent Support Fund, and Ukuk, among others described in greater detail 
in Chapter Four) have been created and are being directed by women; some but not all 
of these are NGOs. The only independent newspaper, Res Public,61 and university, 
The American University, are also being directed by women. As Djanaeva Nurgul, 
Director of the Forum of Women’s NGOs in Kyrgyzstan claims, among the NGOs a 
“practical realisation of the social responsibility is taking place” (Moldogazieva
1996). It is concern for their children, families, and country that has catalysed women 
to lead the nascent, yet rapidly expanding, NGO/civil society movement in 
Kyrgyzstan (Kuehnast 1997:76-77).
On the other hand, however, if women are leading NGOs and a majority of NGOs are 
GONGOs then women and women’s issues are increasingly being linked to non- 
authentic civil society/GONGOs. Moreover, while the growth of women’s NGOs 
may be directly related to increased international recognition of women as a vital and 
neglected component of development, the predominance of unconditional and 
uncritical donor support for women directed and women’s issue NGOs places the 
fragile emergence of gender inclusive development assistance in jeopardy. Finally, 
while the female domination of civil society may be perceived as a positive factor, the 
gendered nature of civil society also represents a negative trend because it reflects 
women’s limited access to higher levels of decision-making. Thus, women are
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increasingly finding themselves marginalized in a large, but potentially meaningless, 
civil society.
While democracy promoters place a great deal of hope in the “blooming” civil society 
of the FSU, meaningful citizen activity is still limited (Tismaneanue 1995). As the 
state continues to restrict citizen activity and prevent meaningful participation in 
Kyrgyzstan, “policies will continue to be directed by inclusive leaderships that seek to 
justify their own authority and in the process, consolidate power” (Kangas 1995:271). 
It is important to understand that citizenship is a highly-confusing and unresolved 
political issue because the population belonged to a now non-existent superpower that 
was an authoritarian, police state (Kangas 1995:281). Moreover, the FSU was a 
superpower that the citizens of Kyrgyzstan did not want to leave.68 There was no 
democracy movement. Hence civil society is not starting from the same Western 
democratic base from which USAID understands civil society to be beneficial to the 
promotion and consolidation of democracy.
A gender in development (GAD) approach would understand that the non-formal, 
civic, public space that developed with the assistance of Western money and support 
was open for women to join because men did not view NGOs to be part of the power 
and/or decision making structures. For the majority of society, particularly male 
society, the state system, whether is it called communist or democratic, remains the 
locus of power. A Marxist analysis would understand NGOs to have been placed 
outside the political power structure precisely because they represent the equivalent of 
a “cheap and exploitable reserve army of labour” (Lorber 1994:33). NGOs have little, 
if any, influence on government. The ladder for political and financial ambitions still 
is the state structure. It is government officials, a majority of whom are male, who are 
recognised and rewarded for “creating” a democracy, largely by their position in the 
state political structure and hence their ability to receive the largest amounts of funds 
from Western aid. These rewards are given in many ways, mainly trips abroad or 
large chunks of “consultancy fees” given to government officials where there is no 
consultancy requirement or duties for the “consultant” who happens to be, not a 
consultant, but a member of the government or a member of the political power elite. 
Matt Bivens provided one of the only exposes of these “rewards” in a 1997 article
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where he discusses the “rewards” provided to favourite government officials by the 
USAID implementing partner (Bivens 1997:68-76) 69 Therefore, because: (a) NGOs 
are not seen as important by local political leaders, and (b) NGO work is difficult, and 
brings fewer financial rewards, women have been allowed to dominate the non- 
formal-civic public space. By Soviet standards of power structures and elites, not 
much has changed (Pakulski 1996).
Women’s advancement and recognition then still remains within the framework of 
gender stratified societies, so that what men do is valued more than what women do 
(Lorber 1994:33). It can be argued that the political leaders of FSU and the Western 
democracy donors are “allowing” the women to do the “dirty” work of transforming 
society and at the same time devaluing that work. Male work is more highly valued 
simply because men do it (Lorber 1994:32). Civil society is where the labour 
necessary for democratic consolidation occurs. Building a civil society involves a 
great deal of exertion and involvement in the delivery of social services. In the FSU, 
it is women, rather than officially-elected male politicians, who are building civil 
society, largely through Western-funded NGOs (Fisher 1996).70
Although civil society appears to be a less restricted public space, in which women 
can become socially active, revolutions and/or transitions typically do not deliver 
equal political power and status for women once a consolidation of power occurs 
(Lorber 1994:254). In this incipient realm of relative “freedom,” women’s strategies 
remain within the context of “identifiable patriarchal bargains” (Kandiyoti 1988) that 
define, limit, and inflect their public and private options and actions. As Kandiyoti 
notes, “Patriarchal bargains do not merely inform women’s rational choices but also 
shape the more unconscious aspects of their gendered subjectivity” (Kandiyoti 
1988:285). On closer inspection, then, female domination of civil society does not 
necessarily translate into long-term gains for women as official and equal political 
decision-makers. Nor, given the abundant evidence of the harsh impact FSU’s 
transitional democracies have had on women’s quality of life, does a female 
dominated NGO community appear to provide even short-term gains to women.
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US democratic assistance, male and patriarchal, is also contributing to the subjectivity 
of female-led civil society. Donors insist that civil society is critical for democratic 
consolidation, yet the actors in civil society are not being groomed for local or 
national political office, nor are they engaged by the donors as serious democratic 
actors.71 By a positive coalescence of dominant male gender-stratified societies, in 
the US and the FSU, the benefits of civil society are cancelled, primarily because 
neither society values work with which women are predominately engaged. 
Paradoxically, the work that is devalued is often the most important and most difficult
nowork in society. The activities in civil society that are allowed by more repressive 
governments are largely those of women’s NGOs or NGOs directed by women. As 
women are perceived to be outside the official political process, women’s NGOs are 
not perceived to be a threat to that political process. However, precisely because 
women are less publicly powerful and perceived to be less threatening to the state, 
women’s NGOs represent a democratic and opposition value that has largely been 
unrecognised by the US democratic assistance community. Hence, despite an entire 
body of research that has successfully gendered democracy theory, US democracy 
assistance practice continues to be designed by men for the benefit of other men.
For example, the GONGO problem is especially acute for women’s NGOs given that 
western donors need to show that their assistance helps women. Since women are 
leading NGOs and many NGOs appear to be government organised with the goal of 
draining donor coffers, authentic women’s NGOs and women’s issues in general are 
increasingly being linked to non-authentic and often corrupt organisations. Thus, the 
patriarchal bargain can be clearly seen within the female dominated NGO community 
in Kyrgyzstan that, paradoxically, is not yielding gender-sensitive results or 
necessarily creating gender solidarity as women choose to operate within the confines 
of a male state and donor directives.
Authentic civil society promotion has been hindered by the lack of a GAD approach 
and instead resulted in a community weakened by the large presence of GONGOs. 
Moreover, while the growth market of women’s NGOs is directly related to an 
increased international recognition that women are a vital and neglected component of 
development, the predominance of unconditional and uncritical donor support for
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women directed and women’s issue NGOs places the fragile emergence of gender 
inclusive development assistance in jeopardy. While the female domination of civil 
society is often perceived by donors as a positive, the gendered nature of civil society 
also represents a negative trend in blocking female access to authentic decision­
making positions.
Due to the donor community’s reluctance to apply a GAD analysis to the NGO profile 
in Kyrgyzstan, the nascent reputation of women as serious players in democratic 
development risks being ruined in the drive for quantitative over qualitative 
developmental indicators. A paradoxical situation is created where a female 
dominated NGO community does not necessarily yield gender sensitive policies and 
advancement of women’s rights due to the double patriarchal bargain that women 
involved in the NGO sector face. First, the female led NGO sector must operate 
within the male dominated political space of the country in question. Second, the 
female NGO sector must respond to the male dominated US democracy assistance 
donors that fund their programs. Thus, women in civil society find themselves 
located in a position that severely limits the extent that they can support gender 
sensitive polices and advance political leadership and human rights for women.
2.4 USAID’s Democracy Assistance in Kyrgyzstan
“Because Western countries have invested tremendous political capital in 
Kyrgyzstan’s image as the ‘island o f democracy ’ in Central Asia, it is likely that 
donors will continue to support Kyrgyzstan no matter what ” (Raballand 2000)
“Democracy on paper. The texts o f the Central Asian constitutions— 
each has one—were tailored to look attractive to the United Nations hut have little 
application in the countries ’political lives. Each proclaims freedom o f the press and 
freedom o f speech, hut as in Soviet times, those freedoms are limited to the presidents
and their supporters’’(Panfilov 1997:58)
Kyrgyzstan’s President Askar Akaev, perhaps because he was a protege of Andrei 
Sakharov, is said to understand democratic principles. He can quote, as he often does, 
Lincoln, Adams, and Jefferson (Akaev 1995). However, while Akaev has excelled at 
“paper democracy,” the reality in Kyrgyzstan is quite different. The difficulty the 
people of Kyrgyzstan are having is not learning how to live with freedom, as Akaev 
claims, but learning how to exist with civil/political restriction and social anarchy.73
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Since USAID officials have stated that Kyrgyzstan is “a ‘laboratory’ for 
demonstrating that democracy can work in Central Asia” (Raballand 2000), delivering 
the intended outcome is vital to proof of the success or failure for US democratic 
assistance. As USAID Deputy Administrator George Ingram commented in a 
Congressional testimony, “I am pleased to report that our assistance in Central Asia 
continues to achieve notable success—particularly in Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan” 
(USAID 2000e).
Unfortunately, there is little evidence of “success” for US democracy assistance in 
Kyrgyzstan thus far. Even the critical assumptions of USAID are daily being proven 
wrong. For example, the 1997 USAID Strategic Plan for Kyrgyzstan, which outlines 
objectives up to the year 2002, noted, “The Kyrygz [sic] Republic will not interfere 
significantly with the development of citizen participation in political and economic 
decision-making” (USAID 1997a). USAID's objectives involve close work with the 
Kyrgyz Central Election Commission (CEC). Although USAID claimed that, “If at 
any time it appears that elections won't be free and fair, USAID will immediately 
terminate assistance to the CEC,” (USAID 1997a) it was only as of April 12, 2000, 
that USAID publicly committed itself to ending this assistance. In this same report, 
USAID confirms that democratic development requires “both commitment at the 
upper levels of government and dedication on the part of individuals” (USAID 
1997a). In every case, the Kyrgyz government’s manipulation of the February 
elections, described in Chapter Four, only prove USAID’s assumptions to be critically 
defective and not even close to political reality in Kyrgyzstan (Handrahan 2000e).
The earliest USAID reports for Kyrgyzstan include optimistic prospects for a quick 
transition to democracy. These are countered, not only by the current situation in 
Kyrgyzstan but also by US Congressional Testimony on USAID’s Democracy 
programming in Central Asia, which references US policy 20 years ago in Iran (Goble 
2000). Democracy spending increased steadily to a $6 million peak in 1998, only to 
decrease thereafter. Although aid has been given to Kyrgyzstan since 1991, separate 
USAID reports only exist from 1995. Prior to this, funds and reports for Kyrgyzstan 
were mixed with NIS funds/reports, with no delineation according to country. 
Additionally, USAID only provides approximate figures. While USAID’s Fiscal 
Year (FY) Congressional Presentations (CP) are the most reliable source of 
information for tracking progress, even these reports are not standardised, with a mix 
of estimated amounts and requested figures. USAID’s regional Central Asian office 
(CAR) reports that “1991-1996 funding totals $460 million” for Central Asia as a
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region. According to annual FY CP reports, USAID has given the following amounts 
of aid to Kyrgyzstan (USAID 1996a).74
Year Amount Status of Amount Amount for
Democracy
1993 $14,859,000 N/A N/A
1994 $53,495,000 Estimated N/A
1995 $19,000,000 Requested $1.5 million
1996 $17,000,000 Requested $2 million
1997 $20,000,000 Requested $3 million
1998 $24,518,000 Actual $6 million
1999 $28,520,000 Estimated $4 million, fifty thousand
2000 $34,500,000 Requested $ 4 million
USAID’s failure is due in part to the fact that democracy assistance is not engaging 
with the variables that affect the growth or decline of democracy within the political 
process of institution building—ethnicity and gender. In a review of general USAID 
policy documents, ethnicity was only mentioned in passing in one document 
“Strategic Directions for 2000 and Beyond” under Conflict Prevention subheading 
(USAID 1997:32) and in an off-the-record internal strategy session (USAID E&E 
Strategy Session November 4: 1999). In a recent USAID five-year strategy plan, 
there is no consideration given to why ethnic conflict begins and how ethnic violence 
may be prevented (USAID 1999g). A review of USAID’s Kyrgyzstan programming, 
for democracy strategic objectives (SO) overall USAID spending, and USAID’s 
political assessment, reveals that ethnicity is only mentioned once, in a passing 
reference in a description of demography. The general failure of USAID to account 
for gender has been highlighted. In Kyrgyz specific USAID documentation, women 
are mentioned twice, once in relation to healthcare in 1997 and once in 2000 in 
relation to a new USAID commitment to “increased attention paid to improving 
women's legal rights and their participation in the political process” (USAID 2000a). 
NGOs, in contrast, are mentioned as the most important aspect of USAID’s 
programming in every report.
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Specific democracy programs in Kyrgyzstan demonstrate that in addition to the 
gender discrimination inherent institutionally within USAID, Western democratic 
theory, and the receiving country’s political leadership, USAID also fails to account 
for gender discrimination within specific assistance programs even when severe 
discrimination against women constitutes a larger concern with the process. One 
notable example is the case of family voting where, even when a large percentage of 
the population is actively discouraged from voting, i.e. women, this did not ever 
render, in the opinion of US donors, any election results in Kyrgyzstan invalid. 
Moreover, the disproportional crisis conditions facing women in the “transitional 
democracies,” additional emphasis, beyond structural considerations of gender, is also 
justified.
In 1995, it was estimated that some 70-80% of rural women in Kyrgyzstan lived 
below the poverty line, with the Maternal Mortality Rate (MMR), in 1994, estimated 
at 72.4 per 100,000 (European average 10.5). This is the second highest in the region 
after Tajikistan (Kuehnast 1997:48-49, 31-32). However, despite authentic cause for 
alarm, the dramatic back-sliding of economic, security, health, education, and other 
personal impacts resulting from sectoral collapse across all aspects of society has had, 
disproportional, on the lives of just over half the population, women, none of these 
concerns are reflected in U.S. democracy programming. Even when the U.S. State 
Department notes, “Violence against women is a problem which the authorities often 
ignore,” there is no mention that the USAID has also, largely, ignored this problem in 
its democratic assistance programming (US State Department Country Reports 1996).
The following summary, arranged by fiscal year (FY) has been extracted from 
USAID’s records, reports, and Data Activity Sheets (located in the appendix). The 
actual USAID Data Activity Sheets, charts, tables, following this summary, are taken 
directly from USAID’s web pages. It is not possible to provide precise budgetary 
details of how much money was given to each USAID partner PVO and how much 
USAID partner PVO’s distributed to national government and NGOs partners. 
USAID does not make these micro details public.
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FY 1995
The FY 1995 program highlighted “support for rule of law and democratic process 
programs will be featured.” A “Democratisation Pluralism Initiative” was also 
included “to support the Kyrgyz Republic’s democratic transition through 
development of the rule of law, electoral and political process, civil society, and 
enhanced public administration, particularly at the local level.... grants to NGOs that 
support rule of law objectives and the growth of civil society are also envisaged..,, 
support for Kyrygz’s [sic] Republic’s democratisation is one of the U.S. 
Government’s highest priorities.” USAID intended the “Major Outputs” (later called 
SO) to be “more efficient and informed legislative and legal processes; strengthen 
legal and judicial infrastructure; improved management of financial practices of city 
governments; improved services to city residents; NGO operations expanded and 
strengthened; and strengthen political parties.” Politically, USAID’s 1995 report said, 
“The Republic’s early leadership in reform merited, and received, a significant 
response from the United States... as of September 1994, however, there were mixed 
signals from the Kyrgyz Republics” leadership on continued commitment to reform 
and maintaining an open political system. These developments must be carefully 
monitored and factored into U.S. assistance activities.” This early note of caution and 
warning indicates that USAID was well aware of the potential lack of legitimacy of 
“democracy” in Kyrgyzstan.
■ FY 1996
The 1996 USAID report affirms that, “United States interests are served by 
supporting the reform process in a country with such promising prospects for a 
successful transition.” The report also states, “The President was an outsider and not 
part of the previous power structure. A relatively free press and opposition parties 
began to grow shortly after independence.” This tone and text is very different from 
the 1995 report warning of mixed signals from the Kyrgyz government vis-a-vis 
democratic commitment. The 1995 Democratisation Pluralism Initiative changed to 
“Building Democracy” and SO 2. “Support the transition to transparent and 
accountable governance and the empowerment of citizens through democratic
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political processes.” Building Democracy for USAID in 1996 means “civic group 
activities related to free and fair elections” with indicators of USAID’s future success 
evident by: “(1) the election authority is operating independent of political 
interference, (2) free and fair elections are held at all levels of government, (3) 
legislation or other measures that facilitate independent political parties to function 
and operate without pressure are adopted, (4) legislation providing for an independent 
judiciary is developed and adopted, and (5) the percentage of surveyed citizens who 
believe that the courts are free of political control and influence increases.”
■ FY 1997
USAID’s 1997 report contains the first and only reference to ethnicity and this is only 
in passing reference as a descriptive and not a programmatic response. “Despite 
considerable out-migration over the past several years, the country remains ethnically 
diverse. Ethnic Kyrgyz represent the majority population, but there are sizeable 
communities of Russians, Uzbeks, Germans, Tatars, Uigers, and others” (USAID 
1997). The 1997 report continues, “there is strong desire to work with Kyrgyzstan 
reformers to build and sustain a democratic and market-oriented country that could 
serve as an example to neighbouring countries...a vibrant, independent Kyrgyzstan... 
is important to maintaining stability in an area of the world where a number of 
international players, including Russia, China, Iran, the Middle East, and the Indian 
Subcontinent, have displayed strategic interests” (USAID 1997). The 1997 report 
labels democracy programming, “Democratic Transitions” with “SO 2.1 Citizens’ 
Participation.” The 1997 report begins to demonstrate an over emphasis on 
NGOs/civil society.
Democratisation programs will increasingly focus on developing the basic 
foundations for a civil society, in large part through promoting a variety of 
independent means of communication and in building an indigenous non­
government organisations (NGO) sector... efforts to enhance the flow of 
information and help develop the basic features of a civil society in 
Kyrgyzstan take place on a number of levels. First, USAID would like to 
help nurture and develop the non-governmental organisation (NGO) sector 
as a way to enhance citizen participation and involvement. ... virtually, 
no NGOs existed before the break-up of the Soviet Union. Since then, 
several hundred NGOs have emerged, but are poorly funded and make a
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limited contribution to the political, economic and social life of 
Kyrgyzstan. However, the generally open environment for NGOs provides 
opportunities that are being increasingly realised. USAID-fimded groups 
work directly with such groups, providing both training and small grants 
to assist in program development ... the importance of an active non­
governmental sector...are all prominent features of this effort (USAID
1997).
Of the political situation USAID notes, “Kyrgyzstan remains the most open Central 
Asian country, but there have been a number of recent setbacks on the road to 
democracy. Examples include the muzzling of some newspapers, constitutional 
changes that limit the power of the legislature, and the disqualification of several 
candidates in recent presidential elections. In this environment, the importance of 
building and sustaining a vibrant non-government sectoral with active citizen 
participation and a free media becomes even more important” (USAID 1997).
■ FY 1998
The 1998 FY USAID reports stays with Democratic Transition and separates this 
objective into two SO’s Citizen Participation (at $4 million) and Local Government 
(at $2 million). The emphasis is still very much on NGOs and the wording is a near 
repeat of 1997.
Democratisation programs will increasingly focus on developing the basic 
foundations for a civil society, strengthening parliament, promoting 
independent means of communication, and building indigenous non­
government organisations (NGOs). Work in the area of effective, 
responsible and accountable local government is also envisaged. ...efforts 
to enhance access to information and help develop the basic features of a 
civil society in Kyrgyzstan take place on a number of levels. First, USAED 
is helping to nurture the non-governmental organisation (NGO) sector to 
enhance citizen participation. ... viable democracies depend on the 
participation of all citizens, as individuals or as members of interest 
groups. Virtually no NGOs existed before the break-up of the Soviet 
Union. Since then, several hundred NGOs have emerged. Many tend to be 
poorly funded and make a limited contribution to the political, economic 
and social life of Kyrgyzstan. However, the generally open environment 
for NGOs provides opportunities that are increasingly being realised. 
USAID-funded groups work directly with such NGOs, providing both 
training and small grants to assist in program development (USAID,
1998).
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Of the political situation, USAID reports, “Kyrgyzstan was one of the earliest and 
most active reformers among the former Soviet Union. United States strategic 
interests in Kyrgyzstan are twofold. First, there is an interest to work with reformers 
in Kyrgyzstan to build and sustain a democratic and market-oriented country that 
could serve as an example to neighbouring countries which seem less committed to 
these values. Second, a stable, independent Kyrgyzstan interacting positively on a 
wider international stage is important to maintaining stability in an area of the world 
where a number of international players, including Russia, China, Iran, the Middle 
East, and the Indian Subcontinent, have displayed strategic interests of their own” 
(USAID 1998).
■ FY 1999
The FY 1999 USAID report is the first to mention women, albeit once, and only in 
relation to health care. NGOs remain the centrepiece of the democracy programming. 
“Program focus will continue on strengthening civil society... increasing the 
capabilities of the parliament and the community of NGOs will lead to a more 
participatory political process” (USAID 1999). Democratic Transition has the same 
SOs of 1998, Citizen’s Participation ($2,050,000.00) and 2.3 Local Government 
($2,000,000.00) down $2 million from 1998. In the 1999 report USAID has a new 
section, “USAID Role and Achievements to Date: Over 450 NGOs have been 
established” (USAID 1999). USAID also claims success via “democratic reform and 
respect for the rule of law, though still fragile, took an important step forward, for 
example, with a successful USAID-assisted housing program” (USAID 1999). 
Regarding the political situation, USAID reports, “The national interests of the United 
States in Kyrgyzstan are economic prosperity and democracy.... The U.S. has a stake 
in encouraging Kyrgyzstan to proceed with democratic reform, including respect for 
the rule of law, separation of powers, and individual rights. From a regional security 
viewpoint, Kyrgyzstan's location at the headwaters of major river systems in Central 
Asia means that it can dramatically affect critical and sensitive sectors such as 
agriculture and electricity generation in the downriver countries (e.g., Kazakstan, 
Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Any negative action on the part of Kyrgyzstan
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regarding this power source would impact its neighbours and disrupt regional 
stability, thereby hindering regional co-operation and posing a threat to American 
economic and political interests” (USAID 1999).
■ FY 2000
USAID FY 2000 report notes, for the first time, the importance of including women 
in the political process and protecting women’s rights, “Programs will continue to 
strengthen civil society, promote independent media, solidify the rule of law, furnish 
election assistance, and deepen respect for human rights... there will be increased 
attention paid to improving women's legal rights and their participation in the political 
process” (USAID 2000). Democracy programming maintained the SO 2.1 Citizen’s 
Participation ($2,750,000.00) and SO 2.3 Local Government ($1,250,000.00). 
“Democratic reform and respect for the rule of law, though still fragile, took a number 
of important steps forward in 1998. .. .The nascent civil society is being strengthened 
through human capacity development programs benefiting the community of NGOs 
and the legal and media professions” (USAID 2000). Regarding the political situation, 
“The U.S. has a stake in encouraging Kyrgyzstan to proceed with democratic reform, 
including respect for the rule of law, separation of powers, and individual rights. From 
a regional security viewpoint, Kyrgyzstan's location at the headwaters of major river 
systems in Central Asia means... any negative action on the part of Kyrgyzstan with 
this power source would seriously affect its neighbours and regional stability, and 
pose a threat to American economic and political interests” (USAID 2000).
2.4.1 Programmatic Design and PVO Profile
In Kyrgyzstan, US democracy assistance has primarily focused on the following 
“tools” in USAID’s “toolbox” of democracy promotion. Since USAID democracy 
programs are structurally similar and are centrally planned in Washington by the 
D&G policy department, even if the in-country situation is dramatically different, i.e., 
Poland to Uzbekistan, the structure of democracy programming remains the same. 
Thus, the democracy programs designed for Kyrgyzstan are not exclusive to 
Kyrgyzstan but reflect a model of all US democracy assistance. As noted in Chapter
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Two, these programs are designed with the objective to influence procedural theories 
of democracy promotion rather than substantive influencing of behaviour, norms, and 
attitudes.
Election Assistance: primarily administered by The International Foundation for 
Electoral Systems (IFES). The director of IFES in Washington, D.C., the regional 
director and the Kyrgyz director are all men. These funds are primarily administered 
to the Central Election Commissions (CEC), directed and staffed by men, of the 
assistance country and consist of technical training on how to conduct an election. 
The fact, for instance, that family voting, when the male head of the household votes 
for the women of his family, is a serious problem in Central Asia, is not considered 
part of “election assistance” therefore IFES does no training related to family voting 
issues. Hence, the fact that women are actively disenfranchised is not considered a 
serious flaw in the election process.
Rule of Law: primarily administered by The American Bar Association Central 
and Eastern Europe Law Initiative (ABA-CEELI). The director of CEELI in 
Washington, D.C., the regional director, and the local Kyrgyz director are all men. 
ABA-CEELI provides legal assistance to the lawyers and legal associations of the 
FSU. Although the majority of lawyers in the FSU are women, CEELI did not, until 
very recently, have gender specific programming. The rule of law programs have 
primarily focused on legal training to judges and areas of constitutional and criminal 
law, predominately male-dominated areas of legal assistance. CEELI also created 
legal libraries, which in Kyrgyzstan is managed by a woman. In the year 2000, 
CEELI did start a very limited domestic violence legal assistance program, available 
only in some countries, of which Kyrgyzstan was not one. Serious and widespread 
programs that thwart rule of law, both domestic and international, such as bride
• 76kidnapping, trafficking in women, female slavery, and polygamy have been ignored.
Local Government: primarily administered, first by the International and City/County 
Management Association (ICMA) and then by The Urban Institute. The director of 
both organisations in Washington, as well as their local directors in Kyrgyzstan, were 
and are, men. Local government reform focuses on administrative structuring and
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processing of local service needs such as condominiums, water, heat, tax, and 
accounting systems. Local government, like national government, is dominated by 
male leaders. No attempt has been made to encourage women to engage in local 
government or to create programs that would address the special gender needs of 
women in urban environments, such as the lack of electricity and light bulbs in the 
post-USSR environment which has made streets and apartment building entrances 
dangerous for women to navigate at night, the increase in domestic violence and the 
lack of local authorities willing to protect women who are victims of domestic 
violence, etc. Resurgence of aksakal courts, village level courts of male elders, un­
elected leaders handing down judgements on village disputes, although undemocratic 
and of serious concern for women’s rights, has not been considered part of the local 
government programming.77
Parliamentary Assistance/Reform: primarily administered by the National Democratic 
Institute (NDI). The director of NDI in Washington, D.C., is a man, as well as the 
director in Kyrgyzstan. Political reform is largely meant to encourage and 
development more accountable, transparent political systems. The program holds 
workshops on these issues for members of parliament, overwhelmingly male, and also 
helps to cultivate a political opposition, again predominately male, by offering 
training in campaign techniques and other political party development tools. In 1999, 
NDI began its first program directed at the lack of women holding elected office by 
offering a series of training seminars for women in leadership; however, this was only 
after a decade of programming, and primarily available for urban women, and did not 
target the most prominent female civil society leaders. The fact that NDI, although 
supporting a small women in politics program, still does not view women as political 
leaders became evident in discussions with NDI’s Amb. Ledsky, regional director for 
Central Asia. The researcher was asked to recommend new leaders in Kyrgyzstan 
that could be cultivated as authentic democratic opposition. The researcher 
mentioned several prominent female NGO leaders, listed below, and asked why none 
of these civil society leaders, now with a decade of democracy promotion experience, 
had been cultivated by USAID or USAID PVO partners. These names and questions 
were ignored by Amb. Ledsky and his staff. Instead Amb. Ledsky returned to 
discussion of the few “opposition leaders” naming the male opposition leaders and
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what the researcher thought of these individuals. The researcher said, “They are all 
just like Akaev and will do just what he has done if they get in power.” The response 
from Amb. Ledsky was, “what other options do we have?” NDI’s small women in 
politics program, appears to remain secondary to what Washington democracy
# 7 0
promoters consider “real opposition leaders,” i.e., men.
Media: primarily administered by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), whose 
director is a man. RFE/RL is one of the better USAID funded programs as it provides 
the population with their only source of independent news. Moreover since this radio 
news is broadcast from Prague in Russian, as well as all of the local languages, 
Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Tajik, etc., it is a USAID funded activity that nearly everyone can 
benefit from as even the poorest shepherd has, or shares, a radio. RFE/RL has as 
many female stringers as male and makes an active effort to consistently report on 
issues facing women, such as bride kidnapping and trafficking in women (Handrahan
2000).79
Civil Society: This assistance is primarily delivered by Counterpart Consortium, 
whose director in Washington, D.C., and Kyrgyzstan are both men. USAID civil 
society assistance primarily supports non-political NGOs, dealing with issues such as 
environment, disabled children, street children, handicraft products, education, youth, 
associations, and other “soft” or “safe” NGO subjects. Within civil society assistance 
the gender issues become more complex and paradoxical. Perhaps because PVOs in 
Washington are primarily directed by men, USAID and the partner PVOs did not 
anticipate the female domination of the newly created NGO community. As noted 
earlier in this chapter, although USAID admits this happened by default and through 
no plan of USAID to support women’s leadership in NGOs, USAID still takes credit 
for this unplanned result as an indication of their gender sensitivity along with other 
aspects of this issue.80
2.4.2 NGO Community Profile
Although it is beyond the immediate scope of this research to profile the NGO 
community in detail, a thumbnail sketch is necessary to inform the grounded reality of
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the NGO community in Kyrgyzstan. Although some researchers might list in an 
NGO profile: The Women's Congress of the Kyrgyz Republic, Central Asian 
Women's International Congress, The Women's League For the Preservation and 
Development of Peoples' Traditions and Customs, Women in Development, Women's 
Art Union Kanykey, Women's Association, The Jer-Ene Kyrgyzstan Moslem 
Movement, The Shoola (Spark) Karakol City Women's Counsel, the Women's 
Association of Artists and Art Critics, Diamond Association, the Gender Analytical 
Center, and Ai-Danek, in the author’s experience most, possibly all, of these NGOs 
are less than active, independent NGOs. If donor support were to cease, it is the 
author’s opinion that many of these NGOs would also cease. Details of Ai-Danek and 
The Women’s Congress was profiled earlier in this chapter in the discussion of 
GONGOs versus NGOs.
The most active and authentic leaders of civil society in Kyrgyzstan are located in 
Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, with some of these NGOs supporting regional 
offices. Not all of the strongest civil society leaders direct NGOs, despite USAID’s 
perception of NGOs as the be all and end all of civil society. All of these initiatives 
are directed and founded by women who are not working on women’s issues per se 
but rather general promotion of democratic attitudes, behaviour, advocacy, education, 
and research. All of these organisations have, at some point, received small grants 
from USAID, either directly or through USAID partner PVOs. Although it is not 
possible to gain access to these figures, grants to NGOs come under USAID’s small 
grants programs and would thus constitute less than $25,000. Moreover, although 
some of these organisations had US support, when they became more politically 
active, they lost some or all of this support. For example, Tolerance International, 
once funded by Counterpart Consortium when it focused on primary and secondary 
education, is now funded by the Swiss government to perform conflict resolution and 
political negotiations in Southern Kyrgyzstan.
Interbilim: Interbilim is a NGO information clearinghouse and training/resource 
centre. It has been extremely successful in co-ordinating the frantic pace at which 
NGOs are sprouting and has provided depth and effectiveness to the activities of new 
NGOs. Asiya Sasykbaeva is the director of Interbilim. With Interbilim, she has
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created a pulse and nerve centre for the NGO movement in Kyrgyzstan. Without 
Interbilim the civil society movement would be substantially less co-ordinated and 
mature.
Institute fo r Regional Studies, (IRS) formerly The Kyrgyz Peace Research Center): 
Anara Tabyshalieva, director of IRS, was recently a fellow at The U.S. Institute of 
Peace in Washington, D.C., The organisation that Tabyshalieva created is the main, if 
not only, effort to provide the entire population with civic and human rights 
education. IRS leads a successful teacher-training program, helping to educate 
secondary and post-secondary schools in human rights, democracy, and civil society. 
Additionally, IRS conducts professional and substantial research related to peace, 
reducing and avoiding ethnic conflict, human rights, civil society, and gender issues.
Kyrgyz-Americcm Human Rights Bureau: Natalia Ablova created and directs the 
Bureau. As a former journalist, Ablova focuses many of the Bureau’s activities on 
freedom of speech and press. The Bureau is a key source of information for leading 
international human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch. Additionally, the Bureau runs a secondary school human rights 
education project, staffed by university students, that actively involves secondary 
school children in human rights and civic community projects. Finally, the Bureau is 
the leading human rights activist organisation, often organising and participating in 
protests around such diverse issues as children’s rights and nuclear testing at Lob Nor.
The American University o f Kyrgyzstan (AUK): inaugurated by former U.S. First 
Lady Hillary Clinton and sponsored by The Soros Foundation to become a regional 
Central Asian university, is the brain-child of Camilla Sharshekeeva, formerly an 
English teacher at Kyrgyz State National University (KSNU). Despite pressure and 
lack of support from KSNU and the White House of Kyrgyzstan, AUK has developed 
as the institute to undertake and accomplish educational reform. With an objective to 
provide “democratic life skills,” AUK embarked on numerous activities outside the 
classroom including; sex education, democracy round-tables, student government, 
debate clubs, student newspapers, and leadership training. In addition, the curriculum 
offered at AUK is the first to support updated material, anything after the 1970s, and
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teach in a “Western” style, i.e., seminars, small group discussions, and critical 
analysis.
The Talent Support Fund: The Support Fund, directed by Dinara Chochunbayeva, is 
one of two leading organisations to undertake support, both material and otherwise, of 
the most vulnerable section of the Kyrgyz population—children and women. The 
Support Fund has been extremely successful in fund-raising, immunisation, advocacy, 
etc., stepping in where the government has been unable, or unwilling, to allocate vital 
social service sector funds for the needs of children and their mothers.
Ukuk: Ukuk is the leading NGO promoting rule of law and legal reform. Founded 
and directed by Mirgul Smanalieva, Ukuk has been able to contribute significantly to 
public advocacy, advancement of a legal society, and NGO development. Ukuk 
organised, and maintained leadership of, an on-going effort to push the parliament to 
adopt NGO legislation, that would officially recognise NGOs in Kyrgyzstan, provide 
regulations, and stipulate examinations, i.e., tax codes.
Res Publica: Res Publica is the only opposition newspaper to continue to test. 
President Akaev’s commitment to free speech and media. Despite a demonstrated 
lack of understanding and/or commitment to journalistic ethics, Res Publica is filling 
a vital role in freedom of the press, as notably the only media to openly question and 
criticise President Akaev and his government. Two, now famous editors, Zamira 
Sydykova and Tamara Slashcheva, were given suspended prison sentences of 18 
months and one year, respectively, and were banned from publishing until January 11, 
1997, for presidential libel after publishing an article critical of the president’s 
luxurious lifestyle. Without Sydykova and Slascheva, it is fair to say that the open 
space of media freedom would be significantly less, and violations of media freedom 
would not have come, so frequently, to the fore.81
NGO Coalition: The mission of the Coalition is to develop a democratic, independent 
and transparent electoral system in Kyrgyzstan through means of civic education, 
protection of rights and interests of citizens, and regional and national level watchdog 
type activity. Ismailova Tolekan Asanaliyevna is the president of the Coalition
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founded in December 1998. The Coalition facilitates coalition-building among NGOs 
and works on a variety of activities, including taking a lead in the development of 
Kyrgyzstan's first NGO law and lobbying on several bills, training on civic lobbying, 
and training monitors to participate in the October 1998 referendum on land property 
issues. In February 1999, the Coalition achieved a co-operative agreement with the 
National Democratic Institute (No. 99-1907-KYR.0-262) and received its first six- 
month sub-grant of $29,910 USD. In August 1999, the Coalition received its second 
sub-grant from NDI, a one-year award of $60,000 USD. Coalition staff and activists, 
with NDI’s assistance, trained more than 2,300 monitors, 1,900 of whom actually 
observed the October 17, 1999, local elections.
Tolerance International (TI): Raya Kadyrova is Executive Director of Tolerance 
International. Initially, the project strategy was to supply schools with teaching 
materials, primarily books, which would enable teachers to have lessons where issues 
of interpersonal conflict resolution, racism, and stereotyping could be discussed. It 
was felt that in this controlled and supportive environment, the attitudes of youth 
could be examined and challenged. Hopefully, sufficient numbers of youth would 
question those who would encourage them to attack or take violent retribution in the 
name of nationalism. Perhaps then the spread of violence in one community, on a 
small scale, to others on a larger scale, could be halted. However, since 1998, the 
focus of the project has switched from material production to teacher training and the 
support of teacher training centres and more conflict resolution type work in “hot 
spots” of Kyrgyzstan. TI was the only active NGO involved in Batken and Southern 
Kyrgyzstan. TI has established a resource centre in Batken and is working on issues 
related to the potential for water conflict in the remote Southern Kyrgyzstan.
2.5 Summary
In The Republic, Plato criticised democracy and cautioned that democracy 
marginalizes the wise and provides a selfish lust for power (Held 1993:261). Plato’s 
description, illustrated by the famous sea captain metaphor, adequately describes both 
the “democratic transitions” and US democracy assistance in the FSU and Kyrgyzstan 
today.82 Too much of US democracy practice has been based on flawed theory, ill-
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conceived practice, and simplistic Eurocentric notions of democracy. As 
Montesquieu once warned, “The two dangers of democracy are extreme inequality 
and extreme equality” (Hill 1945). Transitional democracies of the FSU are
83producing extreme inequality that US democracy assistance has failed to correct. Of 
the many problems with democracy theory and assistance, the foundations of Western 
democracy have been demonstrated to be seriously gender-blind, reluctant to include 
women in the concept of citizenship, and even overtly misogynous at times (Narayan 
1997:48-67).
US democratic assistance has a very limited understanding of the process of 
democratic transformation. Indeed, US democracy policy has been built on 
misguided and wrong assumptions of how societies change and has obscured actual 
issues of political transitions, such as ethnic identity and gender relations. Moreover, 
the implications of a patriarchal Western democracy “teaching” about concepts of 
citizenship, democracy, and pluralism have led to programs for democratic assistance 
that are fraught with serious problems of inclusion. The hierarchical authority of men 
within the nation-state necessarily corrupts the authentic meanings of democracy and 
inevitably produces ineffective, gendered democracy (True 1993:81).
Women all over the FSU, and elsewhere, have been “slapped by democracy” 
(Goldman 1996:40). First, by their male society and again by the Western male 
import. Despite the overwhelming involvement of women in the organisation of civil 
society, the self-reported mainstay of US democratic assistance, US assistance still 
embodies “democratisation with a male face” (Moghadam{1990}in Lorber 
1994:280). The reality of “democracy” for women has meant increases of: female 
poverty, prostitution, AIDS and other sexual transmitted diseases, higher rates of 
maternal and child morbidity, Islamic fundamentalism, nomadic traditions recreated 
in particularly misogynous ways-particularly bridekidnapping, domestic violence, 
sexual crimes, and girl-child prostitution (Handrahan 2000).84 The lack of gender 
inclusiveness in US assistance has not only been damaging for women in transitional 
democracies, but has also obscured fundamental aspects of democracy transitions 
such as the importance of gender and ethnicity, which could help to promote more 
successful democratic assistance programming.
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Chapter Three 
Gendering Ethnicity
"... who I  am is answered both for me andfor others by the history I  inherit, the 
social position I  occupy, and the ‘moral career ’ on which I  am embarked ”
(Steven Lukes 1987)
“Scarcely a human being in the course o f history has fallen to a woman’s rifle ” 
Virginia Woolf (Morokvasic 1998:65)
3.1 Ethnic Identity: Definitions, Debates, and Theoretical
Development
Identity is an inescapable dimension of human life. No one can exist outside of an 
identity. Yet, defining human identity is a complex and controversial task. From 
social science to medical science,85 disagreements abound as to how humans identify 
themselves. The field of ethnic relations is no exception. Inescapable as identity is, 
whether personal or collective, identity is not fixed by nature, God, or human 
behaviour (Campbell 1992:8). Human identity can be fluid but it can also be 
intractable. One of the more terrifying events for humans is the loss of identity 
(Volkan 1994).86 This explains the resistance to and violent reaction against a 
threatened or perceived loss of ethnicity. An identity vacuum, according to Volkan’s 
theory, creates human fear, confusion, and violence because identity is the 
fundamental process through which understanding of the human world is created 
(Mach 1993:5).
Identity, as Campbell (1992) defines it, is “more than something which derives its 
meaning solely from being positioned in contradiction to difference; identity is a 
condition that has depth, is multi-layered, possesses texture, and comprises many 
dimensions. As such, identity is a condition for which there can be catalogued no 
single point of origin or myth of genesis; the manifold, diverse, and eclectic 
ingredients that comprise settled identity cannot be reduced to any single spatial or 
temporal source” (Campbell 1992:86). Erik Erikson explains that identity “includes a 
subjective sense of continuous existence and a coherent memory” (Erikson 1968:61).
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Identity is not a static quality; it is formed by action and interaction. Identity is a 
dynamic, procedural, and contextual phenomenon, resulting in localised classification 
of the human world (Mach 1993:5).
Campbell (1992) believes that identity is constituted in relation to difference with 
difference created in relation to identity. The problematic of identity/difference 
contains no foundations that are prior to, or outside of, its operation. Moreover, the 
creation of identity is achieved through the inscription of boundaries which function 
to demarcate an “inside” from an “outside,” a “self’ from an “other” (Campbell 
1992:8). Humans are bom into an identity that has been created by their ancestors 
who have delineated fundamental items that summarise what is essential for their 
community. This group identity of a “people” becomes the basis for the legitimacy of 
the state and its subsequent practices. Benedict Anderson describes group identity, or 
national identity, as an imagined community (Anderson 1991:6). The community is 
imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. The nation is imagined, says 
Anderson, because even the members of the smallest nations will never know, meet, 
or hear most of their other members, yet in the minds of each community member is 
the image of mutual communion (Anderson 1991:6).
How ethnicity is defined, produced, and reproduced is subject to confusion and 
disagreement within and between communities, as well as within the academy. As in 
the case of democracy, there is no single agreed definition of ethnicity. This 
ambiguity of definitions has created a serious problem in theory building (Kellas 
1991:2). In reality, ethnic identity embraces multiple levels and is heavily contextual 
with ethnic categories overlapping each other (Karlins 1986:42). Mach offers one of 
the most concise definitions of ethnic identity. “Ethnic identity is essentially 
subjective, a sense of belonging, a definition of self and one's own group in relation 
with others. It consists of two mental processes: the search for the self and the 
constriction of boundaries between one's own group and that of the others... [and] is 
based on self-definition” (Mach 1993:12). Anthony Smith outlines ethnicity as “a 
named human group claiming a homeland and sharing myths of common ancestry, 
historical memories and a distinct culture” (Smith 1992:438). Paul Brass 
characterises ethnicity as an identity source that is subjective, symbolic, and
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emblematic. He claims that ethnicity is used by one group to differentiate itself from 
others and to create an internal cohesion that is an alternative form of social 
organisation (Brass 1991:19). Barth notes two considerable, but not surprising, 
discoveries. The first is that ethnic boundaries persist despite a flow of people across 
them. The second is that ethnic boundaries may be maintained or reinforced because 
of the trans-boundary flow that accents the dichotomised ethnic groups. In other 
words, interaction does not lead to ethnic liquidation. Cultural differences can persist 
despite and perhaps because of inter-ethnic contact and interdependence (Barth 
1969:9-10). Despite faults in Van den Berghe’s work, he did expand on Barth’s idea 
with the realisation that ethnicity is not an all-or-nothing concept. Ethnic boundaries, 
unlike state borders, are not systematically sharply drawn; although they can be, 
particularly if they correspond to phenotypic differences or exist in times of conflict 
(Van den Berghe 1981: 56).
Ethnicity, in this research, is recognised as a means by which the leaders of human 
communities base ascriptive and exclusive, yet fluid, maintenance of human/social 
“boundaries,” or markers of ethnic/group identity. These markers do not have a 
permanent order of priority, nor must an ethnic group necessarily assume all boundary 
markers. Rather, ethnic boundaries allow a human community, largely regulated by 
male leaders of that community, to establish, understand, and define their internal and 
external identity. Features chosen during the process of identity marking are not 
necessarily objective elements of reality but may represent meaning to that 
community. Ethnic identity is a result of a conceptual classification of the world; it is 
a symbolical expression. Culture and identity are symbolic constructions which often 
feature emotions and arbitrariness. These combined symbols, or boundary markers, 
represent expressions of group ideas, values, and history (Mach 1993:20, 22-24, 55).87
3.1.1 The Soviet Experiment: Nationalism and Ethnicity
Both the purpose and the process of Soviet research conducted on ethnicity and 
nationalism, as with all socio-political sciences within the Soviet academic system, 
differs dramatically from Western understandings of accepted academic practice. 
Academic research was viewed, like all work in the Soviet Union, as property of the
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State. Results, therefore, were only tolerated when they supported Soviet policy. As 
has been made clear since the collapse of the USSR, there was no academic freedom, 
no freedom of thought or expression, and limited room to produce critical and 
independent research within the authoritarian Soviet system.88 This extreme control 
was true of every aspect of Soviet life; the research that was produced relating to 
ethnicity/nationalism was no exception.
Therefore, the vast body of Soviet research on ethnicity is not used in this dissertation 
because it was not produced freely or objectively but was rather part of the planned 
Soviet system and was constructed to justify political ends. Moreover, the research of 
this dissertation focuses only on a post-Soviet context that revolves around current US 
and Kyrgyz perceptions rather than historical or Russian understandings, which would 
justify delving into the Soviet research. It is, however, important to analyse the 
understanding of ethnicity/nationalism that predominated through the USSR and 
continues to shape Kyrgyz perceptions. Details of Soviet ethnic policy as these relate 
to the historical context for the study of modem Kyrgyzstan are provided in Chapter 
Four. Chapter Five, Section 5.4.1, details the necessary precaution taken in the 
research design phase when addressing the terms of ethnicity and nationalism.
As outlined in Chapter One, the Russian equivalent of the English word nationality is 
natsionalnost. While nationality in a Western context often refers to citizenship, the 
Russian natsionalnost referred to an individual’s membership in a “national” 
collective within Soviet citizenship. Natsionalnost is inherited from one’s parents and 
grazhdanstvo, or citizenship, from the State. Ethnicity in Russian is ethnos. Soviet 
research largely understood ethnos to be “self-reproducing collectives based on self- 
identification and a distinct culture as well as... a major determinant of social action” 
(Shanin 1989:414).
The Soviet experiment with Marxist-Leninist ideology was to provide a solution to 
the nationalist question. It was thought that "the Communist system had a strong 
capacity to destroy national barriers and eliminate ethnic differences. Communism 
created a new, bland, homogenised community of people who...were 'beyond 
nationalism' "(Diuk 1990:16-17). The most important and lasting Soviet contribution
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to the socialist order was to be an evolution beyond nationalism. Simplified, Marxists 
believed that nationalism was a passing phenomenon tied to capitalism. Ethnic 
identity itself would be transcended and disappear into what Marxists called the waste 
heap of history when capitalism was replaced with socialism. The nation-state would 
wither away because the nation was only a product of economic relations (Motyl 
1987:2-3). Ironically, the Leninist compromise was to give, albeit limited, a national- 
statehood in exchange for political support to Communism.
Details of Soviet ethnic politics differed across the Soviet Empire but the research, 
and corresponding policy, that supported the system always rested on Lenin’s, and 
then Stalin’s, definitions. These can be summarised as Soviet centralised treatment of 
ethnicity and nationalism evoking a sense of duty on behalf of ethnic Russians to 
assist their ethnically backward comrades and partake in advancing the “oppressed” 
or “backward” natsionalnost of the Soviet Union (Diuk 1990:31). This policy 
fostered self-determination and ethnic/national “self’ or “autonomous” rule. 
However, paradoxical to Western understandings, this project was always under the 
supreme Soviet umbrella of spreading the socialist revolution. The slogan was “ethnic 
in form, socialist in content” (Shanin 1989:417-418) or the Leninist principle of unity 
through diversity (Slezkine 1996:222). Raznoobrazie, national diversity, and 
svoeobrazie, national uniqueness, were promoted by the Soviet state but only within 
the strict Soviet context of “internationalism,” intematsionalnost, and “friendship of 
the peoples” or druzhba narodov.
Great successes of the working people of Kirghizia have become possible 
owing to the triumph of Lenin’s national policy, owing to the tireless 
activity and paternal care of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government, constant help of all 
fraternal peoples of our country and first of all to the Russian people, its 
working class. ...The prosperity of the Kirghiz nation as any other 
socialist nation was impossible without the help of the Russian people, 
without the firm relationships between all the Soviet nations, without their 
mutual material and spiritual intercourses, without their great fraternal 
friendship. This Lenin’s friendship of peoples is one of the greatest 
victories of socialism has uncovered the creative activities of the Kirghiz 
people... in Soviet Kirghizstan the representatives of 80 nationalities live 
and work for the welfare of the socialist fatherland... and confidently go 
to the new victories in communist construction (Ostashev 1983:12).
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These official slogans were designed to engender close ties among all Soviet 
natsionalnost, and, thereby, discourage nationalist sentiment that might foster 
authentic independence from the USSR while simultaneously they promoted the 
attitude that the national minorities, i.e. all non-Russians, should feel grateful to the 
Soviet state for assistance in developing their minority or ethnic identities—self- 
identity, but only within a Soviet context.
“Lenin’s ideas about free-will union of free nations, Lenin’s principle of national 
unity... cleared the way to happy life for Kirghiz people as well as for the other 
nations of our country” (Ostashev 1983:12). The Soviet definition of “free” and 
“autonomous” are not the Western sense of freedom or autonomy to choose, lifestyle, 
government, elected officials, etc. So-called “autonomous regions/republics” were 
under the rigorous control of the Soviet central government in Moscow and were 
rewarded as republics for cultivating national uniqueness within “the mode of life is 
[sic] a Soviet one,” (Ostashev 1983:12). Kyrgyzstan, for example, as the Kirghiz 
Autonomous Region of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, received 
“decoration” from Moscow as a region for its “mighty flight in economics, political, 
and cultural life in the united family of Soviet nations” (Ostashev 1983:12).
Yet, the reality of Soviet rule meant a constant, wide-ranging attack on the integrity of 
national cultures, which did not lead to a homogenised community (Diuk 1990: 29). 
The ethnic resentment of the Russians against all other non-Russians was quite 
evident and often reflected in a broad lexicon of ethnic slurs that echoed underlying 
attitudes. Central Asians and the darker-skinned Caucasian people were called 
chemozhopye or black asses (Diuk 1990: 32).
Ethnicity and nationalism were used by the Russian dominated Soviet state as carrots 
and sticks to fulfil socialist and authoritarian goals of Soviet-style colonisation. 
Merits and demerits were handed out by the Soviet state as needed to ensure that self- 
determination outside of the Soviet model was impossible. For instance, although 
many ethnos/natsionalnost groups were given “their own political territories,” they 
were provided only token power to rule these regions. “Nations were to be seen but 
not heard” (Brubaker 1994:46, 36).
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This policy worked for 70 years, due to the massive security apparatus of the USSR. 
The history of the brutal state security apparatus, beginning with the Cheka in 1917 
and ending with the Soviet KGB, that wrought near absolute control over every aspect 
of the domestic population of the USSR—and killed, by conservative estimates, some 
20 million Soviet citizens (Conquest 1970:533)—is well documented by Christopher 
Andrew (1990, 1991, 1999) and Hingley (1970), Gorbatov (1964), Conquest (1968, 
1970), and Barron (1974). Therefore, there is no need to review this material here. 
However, it is paramount to emphasise that the Soviet policy toward ethnicity and 
nationalities cannot be understood without reference to the system of control that 
existed to enforce these policies. In addition, to the internal secret police, the NKVD 
(The People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs), the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy 
Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security—commonly known as the KGB), the 
Main Administration of Corrective Labour Camps (GULAGS), purges, no 
independent media or judiciary, and a myriad of other authoritarian mechanisms 
existed to enforce effective control of Soviet policy on the people of its “nations” to 
ensure that they heard and spoke only what Moscow deemed appropriate.
Accompanying Lenin’s policy on the national question was his “scientific concept of 
dictatorship [which] means neither more nor less than unlimited power resting 
directly on force, not limited by anything, nor restrained by any laws” (Lenin in 
Barron 1974:2). This absolute force was embodied in the KGB. The KGB was the 
“most effective means of suppressing ethnic minorities” (Barron 1974:1). Internal 
control of the ethnos/natsionalnost groups by the KGB was particularly assisted by 
mandatory internal passports, which one had to carry at all times, created in the 
1930s. These identity cards listed, among other pieces of information, one’s 
natsionalnost or ethnos.
In sum, ethnicity and nationalism were not seen in the Soviet context as phenomena to 
be explored, examined, or understood, but as tools to be used and manipulated in 
order to advance the goals of the Soviet state. The residue of Soviet ethnic/national 
policy of control and manipulation has fostered different consequences and modem 
day problems in the resulting newly independent states (NIS) of the FSU. Details
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relevant to present day Kyrgyzstan will be discussed in Chapter Four. This 
dissertation, however, for reasons outlined above, rests on Western theories of 
ethnicity rather than Soviet.
3.1,2 Western Theory
The history of ethnicity as a Western academic subject is brief. During the 1950s 
anthropologists began to refer to tribes as ethnic groupings, particularly in Africa, 
when the term “tribes” took on politically incorrect connotations during the decline of 
colonialism. The advance of the study was marked by Fredrick Barth’s 1969 study, 
Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organisation o f Cultural Differences and 
Glazer and Moynihan’s Ethnicity: Theory and Experience (1975). These studies 
began to understand ethnicity not simply as a substitute for racial concepts but as a 
theory about fundamental stratifications between societies. The academy began to 
dissect concepts of race and ethnicity, understanding race as a component of ethnicity. 
Michael Lyons (1973) argued that race creates a boundary of exclusion, while 
ethnicity creates a boundary of inclusion for a particular social group.
In 1982, Robert Miles developed an influential analysis of the “race relations 
problematic,” stating that race was not a scientific concept and therefore it was a 
methodological error to treat it as a sociological reality, in the same way that class, for 
example, was understood. Racism was the salient idea in problematizing concepts of 
race. Racism is the theory of innate inferiority or superiority that justifies social, 
civic, political, and economic discrimination, exclusion, and marginality of a 
particularly social group based on phenotypic characteristics. Fenton spoke of 
sociology undergoing an “emancipation from the concept of race,” as “race” was 
placed into brackets to signify that it was no longer an acceptable sociological term 
(Fenton 1996:141). To date, consistent use and agreement of the terms race, racism, 
and ethnicity remain lacking. After Lyons’ work, race as related to biology, gave way 
to ethnicity as related to culture. The yet unresolved debate between primordialism 
and constructionalism then emerged. Primordialists stress the “given nature” of social 
ties, while constructionists (sometimes called situational or instrumental) stress the 
shifting relevance of ethnicity according to social need, context, and political purpose
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(Geertz 1993). The primordial-constructionalist debate creates an academic 
preoccupation with defining “attributes” of ethnicity and ethnic communities rather 
than exploring and understanding relations.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Barth (1969) changed ethnic studies from 
“empiricist butterfly collecting” to an understanding that ethnicity is a dynamic 
process (Eriksen 1992:28). This incorporated an essential understanding that 
ethnicity cannot be adequately described, understood, or explained, unless human 
behaviour is included. Eriksen (1992) followed Barth and warned against treating the 
ethnic group with too rigid an analytical method in order to account for production 
and reproduction of ethnicity and concrete manifestations of ethnicity (Eriksen 1992: 
31). Ethnicity is a source of cultural meaning and social differentiation; therefore, 
ethnicity is highly distributive within all societies (Eriksen 1992:31). Furthermore, 
there is a concept of ethnic density, the cultural context of ethnic differences, which 
should be included in description and analysis (Eriksen 1992: 32).
In the 1990s, modernity brought about a global contradiction between ethnicity and 
the process of universal “modernisation.” Jus soli, where one lives, or jus sanguine, 
who one is, have traditionally been the dividers of human communities (Ra’anan 
1980:12-13). Modem elites often scom the idea that people would rather align 
themselves by jus sanguine, blood-ties, than jus soli. This is especially true in self­
described modem, multi-ethnic countries like the United States (US), Canada, or the 
former Soviet Union (FSU) where what matters most is birth on, or above, certain 
soil. Place of birth bestows the adjective American, or Canadian, or formerly Soviet, 
along with automatic citizenship, which is supposed to be the over-riding identity 
commitment for the new-born citizen. This new privileged community is based not 
on race, religion, or blood, but on territory and the opportunities this “land” 
represents. This notion of jus soli has been viewed by elites as the modem, politically 
correct, non-racist way of ordering the world. Yet becoming American, or Canadian 
or former Soviet, more often than not means giving up an ethnic identity and 
conforming. The melting pot too often has meant conformity to white-anglo-saxon or 
white-communist-Russian, and always male, values (Williams 1989:8).
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In reaction, the frequently unfulfilled promise of the state-created community which 
respects and encompasses all other identities, is being rejected world-wide as ethnic 
communities everywhere opted for identities based on ethnic origins while modern 
political science, policy makers, and academics attempted to break down these 
identities and/or render them, if not useless, secondary to a modem post­
ethnic/nationalist cosmopolitan identity. Yet, contrary to predictions by many 
liberals, the process or threat of modernity has compelled people to cling more tightly 
to ethnic identity, often causing “ethnic conflict.” Ethnic conflict can be related to the 
modernisation process in three different ways. In the first, ethnic conflict is viewed as 
a mere relic of an outmoded traditionalism by “modernity.” In the second, ethnicity is 
regarded as an unusually stubborn impediment to modernisation. In the third, ethnic 
conflict is interpreted as an integral part—even a product—of the process of 
modernisation (Horowitz 1985:96-97). Not all academics blame modernity for 
conflict. Some researchers believe it is human occupation of territory that creates the 
ethnic conflict. People come together in space to facilitate survival and are obliged to 
exclude others in order to survive.89 Conflict is seen as an inevitable outcome of this 
process (Chisholm 1990:1).
Ethnicity is often the scapegoat for discord because it is easier to condemn a minority 
than to articulate abuse of power, collapsing ideologies, global economic 
discrimination, and environmental destruction. Rather than acknowledge the world's 
disasters and complications, many governments and community leaders seek means 
of inventing culpability. All too often, this is accomplished by denouncing minority- 
ethnic groups. At its best, ethnicity contributes to a sense of security, self-worth, and 
human value—the idea that one is not alone in the world. Ethnicity can provide the 
answer to the question asked by many humans, “who am I?” Yet the “they” of 
ethnicity is responsible for its worst moments; justification for discrimination, 
genocide, assimilation, and annihilation. Ethnicity is volatile. It “may contribute to 
the enhancement of the group, or it may just as easily result in the further brutalization 
of humanity” (Stack 1986:3).
Current debates in the field are concerned with whether ethnic identity represents a 
rational choice that individuals can elect to transcend or if it has an inherent quality
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that drives or determines human behaviour. For the purposes of this research, it is 
sufficient to state that humans are bom into pre-existing communal identities where 
ethnicity can be fluid, malleable, and constructed. Humans will make “rational” 
choices about their ethnic identity when they need or are forced to do so. However, 
transcendence of ethnicity as a political question does not cancel out the obvious 
existence of an intrinsic nature of ethnicity; the passion, love, and kinship for 
common myths, languages, history, folk-heroes, etc. Like all aspects of human 
existence, there are few absolutes.90
In all of this research, definitions and understandings of ethnicity, the ideas, values, 
symbols, and history, in sum, identities, have been assumed by researchers to be 
gender neutral, when, in fact, they are usually highly gendered. Discussions of gender 
have been absent from Brass to Mach, from Anderson’s imagined community to 
Campbell’s inside/outside. Anderson does note that there is a “fraternal” aspect to 
ethnicity, responsible for violence, but fails to take this analysis further. Anderson’s 
ethnic fraternity represents the under researched gender division of 
nationalism/ethnicity that has been, until very recently,91 largely ignored by theorists 
and practitioners. The community may be imagined, as Anderson argued, but it is so 
largely by men. Women occupy a very different place “inside” and “outside” 
Campbell’s understanding of community, as women have not been decision-makers 
or public leaders in the imagining process of either the state, nation, or ethnic group.
Ethnic identity, as understood in this research, is multi-level, heavily contextual, 
overlapping, and in constant motion (Karlins 1986). Ethnicity is imagined, created 
and sustained through the efforts of political leaders, both national and local, who 
have been and remain disproportionately male. Therefore, the process of creating and 
sustaining ethnic identities has not been, and is not, gender neutral. Ethnicity is 
understood to be “marked,” like gender, by the following social “boundaries,”92 which 
are not ordered in priority: (1) religion as social order surrounding deity belief, (2) 
language as a mode of communication and symbol of culture, (3) life style, 
demonstrated by traditions, cultures, arts, foods, human-made markings, i.e., tattoos, 
piercing, etc., (4) kinship that is assumed, real, or imagined signified by family 
relationships usually linked by male blood connections,93 ancestry, myths94 and folk
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heroes, (5) a homeland or concept of a homeland understood by geographical links to 
specific land, (6) phenotypic characteristics, such real or perceived distinct95 facial, 
skin, hair, and body structures, and (7) definitions and roles of gender relations 
within and without the group which represent a “sacred spot” in defining and 
“contaminating” ethnic identity;96 most often relating to behaviour and appearance of 
the female within a group as a marker of that group.
In addition to the exclusion of gender, the history of ethnicity in the academy includes
07several disparities. First, the primordialist versus constructionalist debate has 
obscured research into other essential understandings of ethnicity. The relationships, 
justifications, the how and why and when of ethnic identity demands far greater 
academic understanding. Second, “race” has been excluded as a sociologically 
acceptable condition and term. The use of racial differences is one boundary marker 
in ethnic identity formation (Wallman 1986:229) 98 The attempt to “ignore” race, to 
marginalize race, can be interpreted as racism. Race may not be relevant for white 
elites, just as gender may not be relevant to elite males, but race is certainly vital if 
one is a black minority living in a white majority (Morrison 1997). As Barot 
suggests, “The sharpness and force with which racism persists is the principal reason 
why we cannot simply substitute for a discourse of race and racism a discourse of 
ethnicity” (Barot 1999:7). Race does not cause racism. Human social behaviour 
justifies racism by race. Therefore, it is not “race” that needs to be put into brackets 
but “racism” (Morrison 1997). Third, the notion of “transcending ethnicity,” like 
other aspects of modernity, may create new identity problems that cause humans to 
yearn for ethnicity.99 The main methodological defect in the “transcending” argument 
returns to the fundamental confusion surrounding race, gender and ethnicity. 
Academics assert that “it is possible to envision an ethnicity-free social order” on the 
presumption that ethnic identity is something that humans can progress beyond, and, 
moreover, that it is desirable to progress beyond (Barot 1999:10).100 Yet it is not 
through “transcending” but protecting ethnic differences that conflict may be 
mitigated. One aspect vital to promoting the emphatic “peaceful” component of 
ethnic identity is an analysis of gender relations and the components of ethnic 
communities (Reardon 1996).
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In sum, although the nature of the ethnic bond and its “wellspring remain shadowy 
and elusive,” academics and practitioners must strive to understand the nature of what 
Volkan labels the “emotional glue” that bonds human communities, if social science 
and policy makers are to prevent future conflict (Connor 1978:379). Whatever else 
ethnicity may or may not be, it is clear that modernity has not reduced ethnic identity 
but in fact has increased the importance of local/ethnic identity.101 Furthermore, it is 
evident that the pursuit of understanding ethnic identity has been largely undertaken 
by male academics who have failed to recognise the gendered nature of ethnicity. 
The field research of this exploration demonstrates that ethnicity is more essential to 
male identity than to female identity. This discovery has serious implications in how 
ethnicity is understood and mobilised in political processes.
3.2 Ethnicity and The Political Process
“Ethnicity is no more a merely ‘neighbourhood’phenomenon than off-shore oil is 
simply a matter o f particular resort beaches” (Enloe 1986:25)
Modem states are founded upon the belief that the state is the political entity that 
represents and protects a nation, a group of people self-identifying as ethnic kin. 
However, the nation-state is effectively a global fiction. Very few modem states were 
founded by a nation or encompass only one, or even two, nations. Many modem 
states were created first with the nation devised as an afterthought to justify the state. 
“Genuine ‘nation-states’ have remained exceptional factors on the political 
landscape” (Ra'anan 1980:5). The state as an erroneously created identity does not 
necessarily imply that the nation/ethnic is an authentic identity. Ethnicity is often 
thought to be mobilised by the community and nationalism by the state. In reality, 
however, both the state and local leaders shape and mobilise ethnic identities for 
various rationales at different junctures in political processes.102 The confusion 
between ethnicity and nationalism, and the concepts and the nexus between them, 
remain vivid. Ethnicity can generally be understood as originating from the 
local/community upward to the state. Nationalism can be understood as originating at 
the state-govemment level and moving down toward the local community. 
Nationalism cannot exist without a national structure, and ethnicity cannot exist
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without a community/local origin. The point where ethnicity and nationalism meet is 
a fertile area for future research.
Nationalism, or loyalty to the nation, has acquired negative connotations in inter- 
watfowaZ-relations, as an “ism” which promotes and fosters ethnic violence.103 The 
main difficulty with nationalism is that “no nation imagines itself coterminous with 
mankind” (Anderson 1991:7). Anderson believes that the nation is conceived of as a 
deep, horizontal comradeship. “It is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the 
past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to 
die for such limited imaginings” (Anderson 1991:7). There should be little surprise at 
the widespread resurgence in the assertion of ethnicity since the modem state, by and 
large, is failing to meet human needs. Human communities are increasingly 
negotiating for new spaces for their identities and for more meaningful ways of 
expressing their identities (Eriksen 1992:190). More often than not this leads groups 
away from the state, particularly when the state is restrictive of minority rights, and 
toward ethnic identity. In this age of modernity, the state identity, including 
democracy as a political state form, is increasingly unattractive and void of meaning 
for many groups of people. 104
Yet there is astonishment that the state, and particularly the newly emerging 
democratic state, is not universally attractive and has not mitigated the power of 
ethnicity. This shock at the failure of the democratic state is largely due to the liberal 
idea that has misunderstood the human need for ethnicity (Stack 1986). “Liberalism 
discounted the political significance of ethnicity. This is one of the reasons why 
Western scholarship has been shocked and dismayed with the apparent increase of 
utterly intransigent ethnic conflicts since World War IT’ (Stack 1986:6). Liberalism 
assumed that with modernity, ethnicity would become obsolete. Liberalism contended 
that rational and universal values of democratic development and capitalist political 
economy were antithetical to the “premodem” nature of ethnicity. Liberals 
confidently predicted that global communications, trade, culture, politics, etc., would 
result in irreversible trends of assimilation extinguishing ethnic differences, and hence 
ethnic conflict. Liberalism failed due, in part, to a belief in the transitory nature of
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states and in a very limited power of nationalism (Stack 1986:6). On all these counts, 
liberalism has been wrong.
Instead of solving ethnic conflict by doing away with the ethnic, the emergence of the 
modern nation-state has resulted in minority problems that have, in part, kindled the 
past two World Wars (Francis 1976:xi). The nation-state appears to be less and less 
an effective political framework. Says Francis of the nation-state, “I have little hope 
that, within its own framework, more promising methods of solving its innate 
conflicts will be discovered” (Francis 1976:xvi). The modem nation-state, created to 
subvert the Hobbesian version of original sin—that human's natural condition is 
war—has, in fact, created serious conflict. The sovereign nation-state has resulted in 
“boundaries (that) are constructed, spaces demarcated, standards of legitimacy 
incorporated, interpretations of history privileged, and alternatives marginalized” 
(Campbell 1992:75). Control of territory combined with the liberal ideal of 
assimilation has meant that the dominant culture enjoys state-sponsored privileges 
while minority cultures within those same state boundaries are marginalized 
(Williams 1989:5). Constant tensions are created which are not solved by 
“transcending the ethnic” but instead result in the minority groups in question fighting 
for some degree of control and/or autonomy within the state and, failing that, 
launching a secession movement, i.e. transcending the state.
“Ethnicity is mobilised to generate nationalism” when conflicts over material goods or 
political resources exist (Frederiksen 1985). Shielded by the popular idea that 
democracies are necessarily peaceful—discussed in Chapter Two—US democracy 
practitioners have believed that nationalism/ethnic conflict is improbable. Yet, 
democracy implies the right to self-determination and self-government. Nationalism 
also relies on the principle of self-determination. The two concepts are both 
theoretically and practically linked (Helsi 1997:190). Nationalism, therefore, has two 
sides. First, nationalism has been a positive historical force that has provided the 
political base for democratic governments. Second, nationalism has also promoted 
serious aggressive and hostile political elements, including ethnic conflict, ethnic 
cleansing, forced assimilation, and at the extreme genocide (Helsi 1997:191). 
Therefore, nationalism has serious potential either to promote or constrain democracy;
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however, this vital link is rarely made or understood in the democracy assistance 
community (Karatnycky 1999:118). Instead, nationalism/ethnic conflict prevention is 
practised by a political and academic endeavour separate from democracy. 
Karatnycky is one of the few US democracy analysts to understand the destructive 
power that nationalism can wield on a political system and a population. Since the 
end of the Cold War, nationalism has occurred alongside violence and intolerance. 
There is also a strong correlation between violent national conflict and irredentism 
(Karatnycky 1999:119). Nearly every FSU state has one or more irredentist claim due 
to the drawing and re-drawing of maps and forced population movement that occurred 
under Stalin.105
The persistence of tribalism, as represented in either clan ties or regional loyalties, is a 
significant factor in political life throughout the FSU. Ethnicity, particularly in the 
FSU where it has historically been the basis for oppression, labour allocations, 
housing and land allotment, and government perks or abuse, is a highly salient factor 
to political systems in transition.106 This nationalism/tribalism is difficult for 
outsiders to comprehend and thus is often dismissed as being an insignificant element 
in the building of democracy (Carley 1995:304). The World Bank provides the only 
exception, with a recent report recognising the salience of ethnicity and the urgent 
need to understand ethnicity as it relates to assistance and current domestic political 
process and foreign assistance (Youssef 1995).
In addition to practitioners, scholars have also neglected to incorporate ethnicity into 
theories of political change. There are several reasons for this oversight. First, 
Western scholars tend to exaggerate the importance of materialism in human affairs. 
Second, there is the misunderstanding that greater contact between ethnic groups 
necessarily leads to greater tolerance. Third, political scientists, by and large, 
examine the political unit of the state rather than regions within states and cross- 
border minority groups (Helsi 1997:202). Helsi argues that an understanding of 
ethnically based political participation should be incorporated into the general study 
of regime transformation and/or democratisation and provide a nearly comprehensive 
structure for this critical merger (Helsi 1997:198). Here too, however, gender is 
absent.107
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Ignoring the potential for conflict represents a fatal flaw of US democracy assistance 
programming because a major deterrent to the promotion of democracy is violent 
conflict. Of all the types of potential conflict, the FSU has been, and is, embroiled in 
ethnic conflicts. Given the history of the FSU,108 coupled with the knowledge that 
turmoil accompanies transition, there should have been far greater attention directed 
toward preventing ethnic conflict as a component within democracy assistance. Yet 
ethnic conflict programs represent the smallest percentage of democratic assistance 
packages when they are even included. While authentic democracy may prevent 
ethnic conflict, democracy also creates a powerful incentive for minorities to demand 
their own sovereign states, which often leads to conflict (Spencer 1994:1-2). 
Moreover, preservation of new “democracies” depends critically on governmental 
ability to manage existing ethnic tensions within and along their borders. Ethnic 
enclaves will continue to demand collective rights, particularly in increasingly 
desperate economic times. “New states may be replaced by ever more new states 
based on finer divisions of national identity—unless democracy itself and the 
democratic procedures that are adopted can provide a way to resolve ethnic conflict 
within the existing states” (Helsi 1997:191). The evident failure of key transitional 
democracies, such as Kyrgyzstan, forces US democracy assistance to reconsider 
essential assumptions that have been held about the procedures by which countries 
“transition” to democracy. Reich believes that an “us” versus “them” conception, 
supported in violent ethnic/national conflict, has eroded public values to the point 
where “citizens support policies that marginally improve their own welfare while 
harming everyone else” (Reich 1991:306). Alternative modes of citizenship, Reich 
asserts, can and must be created (Reich 1991:311).
Since “the politics of citizenship are inextricably intertwined with those of cultural 
nationalism,” discussion of citizenship leads to linkages between civil society and 
ethnicity and the gendered nature of these dynamics (Yuval-Davis 1999:15).109 First, 
in many communities around the world, the FSU being no exception, there is a so- 
called crisis of masculinity resulting from poverty and the gendered behaviours 
allowed for male youth versus female youth (Waetjen 1999:663). In the developing 
world, inner cities, or poor rural regions, young unemployed women are often
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required by their families to remain at or near the home to manage family 
responsibilities. Unemployed young males from the same families are not expected to 
manage such responsibilities. A high proportion of these young men are spending 
their “free” time on the streets (Reid 1998:275). Free time on the street is inevitably 
combined with drugs and male ego issues. Unable to fulfil the male role of family 
provider through employment, the male youth looks elsewhere for confirmation and 
demonstration of his masculinity. Young men have left the rural regions and migrated 
to the capital city in Kyrgyzstan, as world wide, in search of work. Finding no 
employment many young men are to be found on the street, drinking and playing 
games. These men are a prime target for movements that provide a strong positive 
“manly” identity to a group desperately in need of guidance. In Kyrgyzstan, Islam is 
filling this vacuum with mosques opening at the rate of ten per day throughout Central 
Asia (Youssef 1995:61). This “crisis of masculinity” is linked directly to inter and 
intra ethnic violence because these frustrated males are susceptible to violent displays 
of “masculinity” fuelled by drugs, alcohol, and a lack of positive self-identity. A 
breeding ground for violent nationalism/ethnic conflict is thus formed, and it is 
largely male.
Second, as previously outlined, the female population of the family, in addition to 
managing the home, is also engaging in and indeed, taking over civil societies 
globally (Yuval-Davis and Werbner 1999). Women are often too busy holding the 
community together to be interested in ethnicity, nationalism, or fascism or any other 
“isms.” As one survey respondent in the field research of this dissertation said in 
response to a question about his mother’s ethnicity, “You know my mother doesn’t 
have time to think about this ethnicity. She is too busy trying to earn money to feed 
our family,” (Author’s Field Research Notes September 26, 1999, Bishkek Internet 
Cafe). By and large, women around the globe are the “work horses” of their 
communities, leading the NGOs, the schools, and other community activities. 
Women have been largely left outside the structures of local and national politics as 
well as the structures of ethnic conflict and violent nationalism. However, 
governments and community populations look toward women to fill the social gaps 
and be the community caregivers. The role of women as leaders of civil/community 
society is accepted when it applies to social service deliveries, within the home and
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the community, but not in respect to women’s involvement with local political 
decision making, local government, and/or relating to ethnic identity.
Therefore, any attempts to respond to Reich’s call for new citizenship models would 
be greatly aided by a recognition that traditional citizenship models have been male, 
as Chapter Two argued, and have mobilised around concepts of “fraternity” and 
ethnic brotherhood necessarily including violence, as Anderson has argued. 
Furthermore, recognition of the gendered nature of civil societies and the linkages this 
dynamic shares with ethnic identity may aid democracy assistance programming in 
creating democratic procedures that provide means to relieve ethnic tensions. Starting 
from these premises, a feminist analysis of ethnicity potentially offers a great deal to 
those engaged in preventing ethnic conflict and promoting democracy.
3.3 Gendering Ethnicity
“Even as they perpetuate it, women have always transformed tradition ”
(Engel 1991:135)
To a larger degree than ethnicity, the state, nation, and nationalism have been de­
constructed by feminist analysis. The late 1980s and 1990s have seen several 
groundbreaking studies that intersect the identity and gender fields: gender and 
nationalism (Yuval-Davis 1997); gender and citizenship (Voet 1998); gender and 
democracy (Pateman 1985, 1989 and Phillips 1991, 1993); and gender and the state 
(McKinnon 1989). Feminist perspectives on ethnicity, however, have been largely 
absent from the academy because there has been a reluctance to view ethnicity as 
anything other than a relic of “traditional” societies (Allen 1998).
There is relatively little literature available on gendered ethnicity. An important
example of the analysis deficiency is indicated by The Oxford Reader on Ethnicity
which consists of 422 pages of which only six are devoted to gender. The few
sources that do exist deal more with nationalism and nation rather than internal and
external ethnicity and ethnic versus gender self-identification. Gender and identity
consideration has also been absent from most research on race, ethnic, and gender
relations as these concepts relate to development, democracy, and international
relations; both gender and ethnicity have been marginalized from core socio-political
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science theory. Therefore, vital understanding of the interrelations between gender 
and ethnicity and socio-political science are still lacking (Allen 1998:49). Only in the 
late 1990s did gendered understandings of ethnicity begin to emerge in the academy, 
largely in relation to marriage and labour markets (Barot, Bradley and Fenton 1999), 
issues of gendered citizenship and identity (Yuval-Davis and Werbner 1999, Charles 
and Hintjens, 1998), and gender and nation/nationalism (Yuval-Davis 1997).
The importance of private and public in relation to feminism and women’s exclusion 
from the formal political process of the state and, hence citizenship, has been outlined. 
Ethnic identity also embodies a gendered public/private divide that similarly serves to 
restrict and control the female gender. As citizenship implies representative 
belonging, so does ethnic identity. Ethnicity, like citizenship, has origins in the 
brotherhood of male conflict. And ethnic identity, like citizenship, has been assumed 
to be a gender-neutral identity, when in fact, like citizenship, it has been very male. 
In ethnicity research, as in the rest of the academy, “the perception has been so taken 
for granted that women are defined in relation to men, particularly as mothers, wives, 
sisters, and daughters, while men are taken to be representative of a non-gendered 
subjectivity, of non-gendered human beings” (Allen 1998:55).
The gendered constructs of identity are consequential because this knowledge assists 
in explaining the “fraternal” and violent aspect of ethnicity and may relieve/prevent 
ethnic conflict (Allen 1998:59).110 “What is strikingly constant is the fact of a link 
between citizenship and the division between women and men that war, and the 
preparations for war, enforce” (Benton 1998:27). It is only the separation from the 
household, therefore separation from women and the creation of a male community, 
that allows men to become a fraternity (Charles 1998:17). There is an inherent 
paradox at work. Fraternity can only be maintained outside the home. The “selfless, 
communal experience of brotherhood, which is the model of civic virtue, is 
unsustainable” without war (Benton 1998:43). Without conflict men have no excuse 
to leave the home and fight the “other” male. Therefore, male conflict becomes a 
necessary component of citizenship and civil virtue, as well as of ethnic identity and 
value to one’s ethnic community.
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Ethnic identity, dissected by gender, demands a “reading of the silences” (Allen 
1998). While understanding the unspoken is a crucial aspect of any investigation, 
capturing the silences is particularly important to feminist research, as it is women’s 
voices that have been most often dormant. The positive potential role that women 
may contribute to breaking the fraternity of violence has been ignored. On the one 
hand, women are allowed, even encouraged, to manage NGOs, when this means 
taking care of the elderly, young, and disadvantaged within the community. On the 
other hand, women are not allowed to partake in ethnic-political decisions, or to 
represent, or to protect the ethnic community. The paradox of female activity in civil 
society simultaneous to their obvious absence in consideration of preventing and 
arresting ethnic conflict is maintained from the community level all the way up to the 
international donor level (Reid 1998). This paradox has been labelled by Yuval-Davis 
as, the problem of the “ideology of ‘the community;’ an international donor idea that 
assumes ‘the people’ and ‘the grassroots’ are the origin of all that is good and 
‘authentic’ in society” (Yuval-Davis 1998:172). “Community” connotes, in 
international development language, an organic wholeness—a perception by Western 
donors that “community” represents a “natural,” and therefore good, social unit. “It is 
somehow ‘out there’ and one either belongs to it or not” (Yuval-Davis 1998:174). 
This imagined naturalness of the “community” assumes a given collective with given 
boundaries discounting the voices that are silenced in the community and assuming 
that those, generally men, who claim to represent the community may not have the 
legitimate representational power nor may be in place as a community voice as a 
result of the will of the entire community (Yuval-Davis 1998:174).
The assumption that ethnic identity is gender neutral, when in fact it is highly male, 
obscures the possibility that women may understand ethnicity differently from the 
standard, male conception. Indeed, it may be that women removed from decision­
making activities of ethnic belonging may reject an ethnic identity in favour of a 
gender identity altogether. The failure to explore female capacity to co-operate across 
ethnic lines within their universal role as caretakers and leaders of civil society means 
that a powerful tool for the prevention of ethnic violence, and thus consolidation of 
democracy, is being overlooked. Instead, donor promotion of male leaders has 
largely reasserted the public-private dichotomy and helped to foster the establishment
101
of dominant male ideologies within “transitional” democracies. This results in little 
commitment to gender equality in the home, community, or state, and allows, even 
fosters, gendered definitions of “male” citizenship and ethnic identity based on male 
involvement in the public political domain which, as demonstrated above, necessarily 
involves violence (Charles 1998:19).
Feminists have effectively argued that women know differently from men, it is likely 
that ethnic “knowledge” will also demonstrate a gendered divide (Stacey 1996). 
Although this area is under-researched, Yuval-Davis (1983, 1997, 1998), Yuval-Davis 
and Stasiulius (1995), Kandiyoti (1984, 1985, 1987, 1988), have been leading the 
field, followed by Cockbum (1998), Charles and Hintjens, et al (1998), Barot, 
Bradley and Fenton, et al (1999), Frederiksen and Wilson, et al, (1995), Kaplan, 
Alarcon, and Moallem, et al (1999), Wilford and Miller, et al (1998), Moghadam 
(1994), Wyche and Crosby, et al (1996), Elshtain, (1992), Peterson (1995), Hasan, 
(1994), and Maynard (1994). These researchers have begun to build a 
feminist/gendered theory of ethnicity through various constructs of human sexual, 
social, and political identity.
From France to Nicaragua, revolutions have been symbolised by images of women 
with child and gun, or the female body at risk, or an unusual woman emerging to lead 
the masses in battle (Brown 1986:18; Williams 1986; Reynolds 1986; West 1997; 
Pointon 1986). From Mother Russia to the mothers of the African National Congress 
(ANC), from Chinese Socialist motherland to Betsy Ross, creator of the US flag, 
motherhood has been used in political/national campaigns (Charles 1998:3-5; Benton
1998). The symbolic location of woman as the holder, bearer, and origin of national 
identity is well established (Charles 1998; West 1997:xiii). Emerging feminist 
research has recently been occupied with locating gender differences within ethnic 
and/or national identity. The majority of this research probing gender and ethnicity 
falls into five main categories, listed below (Barot 1999:6).
• First, theorists have located the place of national identity and nationalism in the 
female. This takes the form of analysis of female roles/bodies within the male 
national and state project (Kandiyoti 1989; Elshtain 1992; Pavlycahko 1992;
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Moghadam 1994; Peterson 1995; Moghadam 1997; Cockbum 1998). In this 
research, it is widely argued that women’s bodies are used as “vehicles” for the 
symbolic depiction of political purpose (Kandiyoti 1988, 1989:132). Nira Yuval- 
Davis’ Gender and Nation (1997) represents the most comprehensive study to 
date.
Secondly, there has been a smaller amount of research focused on the “special” 
role of women, especially in the role of mother, in transferring and teaching ethnic 
identity (Engel 1991:135; Coomaraswamy 1999:8).111 This includes a 
controversial body of peace research literature that presents women as . inherently 
more peaceful than men (Reardon 1996.)
Third, there has been a rethinking of sexual relations and the racial component of 
ethnicity (Cornell 1990). Racism has been analysed as a highly sexed and 
misogynist doctrine, in which the subversion of the “other” race is often primarily 
related to violent sexual abuse of the “other” female. From black and white 
relations in America to Korean comfort women and recent war-torn Yugoslavia, 
there is extensive evidence and analysis of how sexual violence is perpetrated 
against the “other's" woman as a means to destroy the “other's" male and his 
ethnic identity (Morrison 1997; Mexnaric 1994; Benderly 1997; Coomaraswamy
1999).
Fourth, an emerging body of research has examined ethnic or racial differences 
within or across the female gender, relating primarily to the deconstruction of 
white, Western, and middle class feminism, which has been perceived to be the 
norm in much feminist research. Black feminist deconstruction has provided the 
most vivid research (Edwards 1990; Allen 1998; Maynard 1994; Anderson 1988; 
hooks 1981).
Fifth, feminist research has been occupied with examining ethnicity as operating 
in a specific context, largely minority ethnic communities in Great Britain or 
former British colonies (Barot, 1999:6; Reid 1998). These understandings and 
analyses place gender and ethnicity within the framework of British and more
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specifically English understandings. The paradigm is a dominant nation and a 
dominant ethnic group with an imperialistic and racist history (Afshar 1998). The 
very framework problematizes ethnicity and gender and adds yet another layer of 
post-colonial research to the relationship (Chateijee 1993).
Nira Yuval-Davis and Flora Anthias have also outlined ways in which women 
themselves participate in the ethnic group process. Yuval-Davis and Anthias created 
a typology of five ethnic/national/state processes in which women take part as 
gendered beings. These are: (1) as biological reproducers of members of ethnic 
collectives, (2) as reproducers of the boundaries of ethnic/national groups, (3) as 
central participants in the ideological reproduction of the collective and transmitters 
of its culture, (4) as signifiers of ethnic/national differences—as a focus and symbol in 
ideological discourses used in the construction, reproduction, and transformation of 
ethnic/national categories, and (5) as participants in ethnic national, economic, 
political, and military struggles. The research in this dissertation recognises ethnicity, 
nationalism, and the state (the body politic) as three separate, but overlapping, societal 
constructs. The Yuval-Davis/Anthias typology forms the base for the field survey 
research in Kyrgyzstan. Categories one through four are particularly relevant and are 
examined in greater detail below.
3.3.1 Male Honour and the Female as Ethnic Boundary Marker: Point One
There is overwhelming evidence that ethnicity and violence has a distinctly male 
gender component, with violence often directed at the “other's” women. In October 
1997, for the first time in history, a woman testified before an international criminal 
tribunal as a victim of sexual violence during wartime. Ms. Coomaraswamy, the UN 
Special Representative on Violence Against Women, cites excerpts from this 
woman’s testimony. “The rapes were public—they raped us in front of our children. 
The rapists were young rascals. Try to imagine a mother raped by young boys” 
(Coomaraswamy 1999:2). Rape, particularly public rape, and sexual torture of the 
enemy female asserts dominance over the enemy male because women’s sexuality is 
perceived to be under the protection/control of men. Rapes are used by men during 
conflicts to: (a) erase the enemy woman’s ethnic identity, (b) “pollute” and “defile”
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the enemy male “other,” and (c) signify conquest and perpetuate the ethnicity of the 
dominant community (Coomaraswamy 1999:1-5).
Once a woman has “allowed” penetration by the enemy “other,” her own community 
may reject her because she is believed to be ethnically contaminated and hence no 
longer of value to the community. Since female honour and sexual control are 
regulated by the male community leaders, female members of the ethnic are thus 
reproducers of the boundaries of ethnic/national groups (Yuval-Davis 1997). Female 
defilement signifies ethnic contamination of the male “other.” “If women are strictly 
controlled and only permitted to express sexuality with men of their own community 
then it is apparent that the community lays great emphasis on ethnic purity. During 
war that purity is deliberately assaulted precisely because it strikes at the core of 
ethnic identity” (Coomaraswamy 1999:18). Male community honour and identity is 
“located” in the body and behaviour of women and can be preserved or lost through 
the female.
The female of the ethnic group not only represents the place of male honour but also 
personifies the weak link in ethnic boundary markers. If the woman is violated, the 
entire ethnic group is threatened. As such, sexual violence is seen as a crime of 
honour and a means to perpetuate ethnicity of the male conqueror. Female ethnic 
identity is directly linked to male ethnic identity and the female’s ability and/or choice 
to remain monogamous to her ethnic community. Wartime rape is, thus, an act 
against the ethnic group in question and not the physical integrity of the individual 
female victim (Coomaraswamy 1999:6). Serbian rape camps in Bosnia (1993-94) 
brought attention to the historical practice of rape as a tool of war, illustrating the 
vulnerable female location of ethnicity (Mexnaric 1994; Cockbum 1989).
During ethnic conflict, rape and sexual violence are well known strategies for 
destroying ethnic reproductive capacities as well as the ethnic boundaries of the 
enemy male. It is not unusual for male soldiers/rebels to tattoo the breasts or genitalia 
of their rape victim with insignia of their ethnic group signifying reproductive/sexual 
dominance by physical claim of the enemy female’s reproductive/sexual organs and 
marking the female with a new ethnicity (Coomaraswamy 1999:7-10). As ethnicity is
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most often perceived to be transferred from father to child, there is also forced 
reproductive captivity, as in the case of Bosnia, where the enemy female is raped and 
forced to give birth to a child of the “other's" ethnicity. Therefore: (a) the female 
body, (b) female reproductive capacity, and (c) female sexual capacity are significant 
markers of ethnic identity.
Coomaraswamy created a typology of violence against women during armed conflict 
which included, women forced to parade naked in front of family members, women 
raped in front of family members, or women raped by intimate family members. She 
found that public sexual shame and humiliation in front of the community was key to 
all activities (Coomaraswamy 1999:11). Suicide by the women to save their 
community honour is not uncommon. “Those who did not commit suicide feel that 
the community has concluded that they gave into sexual violence to save their lives, 
that they did not have a sense of honour to take their own lives” (Coomaraswamy 
1999:12). Women suffer as widows and as victims but also as perpetrators. “The 
complicity of women with regard to the violence of their men... is [a] very 
distributing phenomenon” but not surprising considering that women assist and 
enforce the rituals—from female genital mutilation to bride burning and kidnapping— 
that often hurt them the most (Coomaraswamy 1999:16). Women are at the receiving 
end of patriarchal societies where male identity appears to be linked to violence and, 
thus, women learn to solve their own problems through violence—too often against 
self or other women. Women, as a weak ethnic link, provide both vulnerability and a 
target during ethnic conflict, and place female identity at the nexus of ethnic 
contamination and creation.112
3.3.2 Gender as Central to Ethnic Violence and Peace: Point Two
Male control of women’s sexuality and reproductive capacity is an integral 
component of nationalism and ethnicity not only during conflict by enemy “others” 
but also internally to the ethnic group in times of ethnic building/recreation (Yuval- 
Davis and Anthias 1989). Ethnic violence, usually sexual, is directed inward and 
committed against the female “self’ when male community leaders “mark” and/or 
“protect” their boundary markers, the women being a prominent ethnic marker. As
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Cockbum notes, Bosnian women know “how extreme national movements transfix 
women as living boundary-markers” (Cockbum 1998:43). If nationalism is ethnically 
derived and is defined “as something that runs in the blood, then it necessarily 
involves a tight control of women’s sexuality in order to define and maintain the 
boundaries of the ethnic community” (Charles 1998:6). Therefore, female difference 
from men is essential and provides a distinct location within the ethnic collective. 
Female inclusion in the group is, however, dependent on how the male leaders decide 
to symbolise the ethnic (Charles 1998:6).
The female is subject to male violence by both “other” male and “self’ male in 
relation to concepts of ethnicity. It has been argued that women are also violent in 
defence of their “ethnic” or national boundary. There have indeed been cases of 
women engaged in ethnic violence from Rwanda to South Africa from Latin America 
to the French Revolution. However, these instances are limited and exceptional when 
compared to the scope of male ethnic violence (Coomaraswamy 1999). As Yuval- 
Davis points out, “Identities available to women are constructed within specific power 
relations which provide the framework of choice” (Yuval-Davis in Charles 1998:21). 
The dominant political and community frameworks are defined by male leaders. 
Women can be mobilised to violence, but female ethnic violence, when it happens, 
occurs within and because of dominant power relations and decisions that are male. 
When women are allowed to, or encouraged to, participate, it is male leaders who are 
controlling and creating the violence within which women are given a “temporary” 
place. This “temporary” place is usually manifested in the form of revolutionary 
action rather than ethnic conflict.
While ethnic violence focuses on the female, alternatively female gender alliances can 
reject ethnic conflict. The shared experiences women have as women, mothers, and 
wives may reduce the significance of ethnic or national identities. Cynthia Cockbum 
(1998) has produced a ground-breaking qualitative study of three cases—Northern 
Ireland, Israel/Palestine, and Bosnia—where women have worked together across 
violent ethnic conflicts, rejecting male defined ethnic identities linked violence and 
favouring a predominant female gender identity linked to peace-building activities 
(Cockbum 1998). The rationale for women coming together across ethnic lines was
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that, “If a militarised society was a disaster both to the women of the oppressing 
community as well as the community of the oppressed, an alliance between women 
would help both groups” (Cockbum 1998:128). In all three cases Cockburn 
documents how the women were “the backbone of their community” (Cockbum 
1998:60). This female dominated controlling position at the community (civil 
society) level allowed for a position of some political leverage when the emergence of 
cross-ethnic community based women’s groups and activities began to emerge. One 
of Cockbum’s study participants says of this power-shift, the “emergence of the 
community-based women’s centres really challenges that [male-political] leadership; 
it challenged that [patriarchy, ethnicity and violence] mode of thinking” (Cockbum 
1998:61).
In all three of Cockbum’s case histories the catalyst for rejecting ethnic identity in 
favour of gender occurred when women defined themselves as reproducers of their 
collectivity. At this point, the women have the opportunity to gain (or regain) control 
of their reproductive potential and their own sexuality (Moghadam 1994; Papanek 
1994; Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989; Charles 1998:8). By doing so, women reject 
the intra-ethnic violence directed against them as “ethnic boundary markers,” and also 
reject the inter-ethnic violence between ethnic groups (Reid 1998). Women are more 
vulnerable to possession by “the other” (who is male) when women inherently lack 
self-possession of their own (Benton 1998:35). It thus follows that women’s rights 
and empowerment may be a vital ingredient in preventing ethnic conflict. The main 
argument is that ethnicity cannot be collapsed into identity and/or culture and 
therefore women’s ethnicity often is different from that of men. Feminist politics 
should incorporate the notion of women’s positioning and ethnic differences into its 
agenda, rendering all feminist politics coalition politics (Yuval-Davis 1998:168). That 
said, overwhelming global evidence that men perpetrate violence—often manifested 
around issues of ethnicity and sexuality—more than women, does not necessarily 
indicate that women are inherently less violent or more peaceful. It simply indicates 
that patriarchal social constructions have allowed women only limited positions of 
power and exhibitions of violence.
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3.3.3 Ethnic Myth of Creation and the Female: Points Three and Four
Women are said to be the cultural symbols of ethnic worlds and representations of the 
spiritual private domain of ethnicity. Women in the home have been perceived to be 
caretakers of nationalist and ethnic practices and rituals “that keep the identity alive in 
a visual, coherent sense” (Coomaraswamy 1999:9). In addition to rituals, such as 
weddings, holidays, cultural/ethnicity is also represented on the female body by the 
jewellery a woman wears, the type of clothes, the manner of clothes she wears, her 
make-up/body painting or lack of make-up, length and style of hair, etc. While the 
ethnicity field of ethnic studies is rich with examination of so-called “external” 
community markers by which an ethnic group defines itself to the outside world, 
concept, understandings, and implications of the internal markers of ethnicity have 
been largely left unexplored. In order to maintain external unity, in this case ethnic 
boundary markers, and all human communities must have internal structure and 
divisions of labour. Because ethnic studies has largely ignored the “private” domain 
of ethnic identity, the role of gender within the creation, recreation, and maintenance 
of ethnic external boundary markers has also been unexamined. Moreover, use of 
women as an external boundary marker has been largely ignored as well. This 
research is not concerned with how the female body is used by ethnic groups as 
salient boundary markers, i.e., rape, sex, reproduction, customs, jewellery, for there 
are increasingly studies that examine this aspect. In light of these studies of the 
female role in ethnicity, it is clear that in addition to race, language, religion, myth, 
etc., female gender must also be added as a boundary marker of ethnic groups. 
Moreover, the female gender is a marker that dissects the five other pre-established 
markers. Women represent the blank space where men can project and transfer an 
ethnic identity. Women are thus ethnic boundary markers, physically, socially, 
culturally, and sexually.113
Gendered aspects of ethnicity are also evident in the role women play in the creation 
of ethnic and nationalist identity, as ideological reproducers of the myths and legends 
(Benton 1998). There are well-documented and rich images of the female at the 
origins of ethnic identity. Many cultures’ ethnic myths of creation symbolise woman 
giving birth or a woman hero embodying and protecting the ethnic man. From the
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Japanese Sun Goddess to Chinggis Khan’s wife, mother of the Mongol nation, from 
Eve in the Garden of Eden to Armenian goddess Anahit, origin is frequently defined 
by the female (Benton 1998). Concepts of sex, sexual power and fear are also 
involved with notions of creation. The female role in ethnic myth and legend is 
heavily set in a male dominant sexual context. Women’s role in the formation of 
ethnic identity is typically procreation, sacrifice, and birth. It is through blood, milk, 
and sperm that myths of ethnic reproduction are created (Charles 1998). This is due to 
the heavy emphasis on biological or racial contours of ethnic identity. If biology/race 
was not a powerful factor in the ethnic, the female as biological ethnic producer 
(carrier) would not be so vital.114
Nationalist ideology and myths of origin/nation are predicated on a sexual order. This 
sexual order excludes women from the community, the creation, and the polity. The 
myth of origin relies on “essential identities” to define belonging. This results in 
exclusionary ideologies (Charles 1998:7). Movements toward sexual equality are 
often rejected because that would undermine sexual difference and require the male to 
carry more of the ethnic weight of representation (Charles 1998:12). Currently, the 
burden of ethnic creation and recreation is firmly placed on the female who carries 
most of the ethnic responsibility with few of the privileges or decision-making power. 
This uneven distribution is not only a disadvantage for women, it is also a leading 
rationale for male violence.
3.4 Summary
To achieve stable democratic regimes, strategies for managing and resolving ethnic 
conflict are essential (Helsi 1997:201). “How can ethnic competition best be 
managed (resolved) within the structures of a democratic state?” is the question the 
democracy assistance community must ask of itself (Helsi 1997:201). The argument 
developed throughout this thesis is that a feminist understanding of ethnicity provides 
one significant strategy. Although the feminist research project has made great strides 
since the beginning of the twentieth century, ethnicity is one area of social science 
that can benefit from increased gender consideration, particularly in the context of 
democracy assistance. As Abner Cohen (1974) asserts, “Ethnicity may best be used
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as a signal of the relationship between the symbolism of identity and its development 
in political mobilisation and the political process” (Barot 1999:5). The relationships 
are significant. As Eriksen affirmed, “Ethnicity is not an attribute of groups; it is a 
dimension of relationships” (Eriksen 1992:12). For too long the debate has focused 
on the attributes rather than the relationships. This chapter argues that the relationship 
of ethnicity to democracy and gender are worth examination. Socio-geo-political 
differences must be “grasped in all their complex intersections” (Yuval-Davis and 
Werbner 1999:10).
It is through a recognition of the gendered nature of civil society that ethnicity 
becomes salient for democracy assistance. Although traditionally unmentioned and/or 
unrecognised, gender is also a significant element in the formation of ethnicity. 
Female gender serves the ethnic identity process in three ways. First, the female is a 
boundary marker herself (Mexnaric 1994). Second, the female is a location upon 
which to mark, place, or otherwise display boundary markers. Third, the female is a 
sacred, protected, location or vessel for the “virtue,” the integrity of the ethnic 
identity. A gender analysis of ethnicity problematizes complexities of social realities, 
concepts of community, and understandings of ethnic conflict and solution (Yuval- 
Davis 1998:179). As Stuart Hall notes, “All identity is constructed across difference” 
(Hall, 1987:44 as quoted in Yuval-Davis 1998:180). It is evident that one of the main 
differences across which ethnic identity is constructed, created, and recreated (internal 
to the group and external) is gender. The implications of this for understanding 
political conflict and processes of democratisation constitutes an urgent research 
agenda to which feminist analysis has much to offer. The field research of this 
dissertation investigates the assumptions and theories in this emerging field.
I l l
Chapter Four
Gender and Ethnicity in the “Democratic” Transition of Kyrgyzstan
“I  dare say that in Kyrgyzstan the seeds o f democracy are sown in fertile soil....
however, there is nothing more difficult than learning to live free ” (Akaev1995:14)
“Based on its historical legacy alone, few successor states o f the USSR would appear 
as ill-prepared for a democratic transition as Kyrgyzstan ”(Huskey 1999:243)
4.1 Kyrgyzstan Case Rationale
The Former Soviet Union, (FSU), provides an optimal place to examine gender and 
ethnicity within the framework of democracy because these emergent countries are 
the pivotal regions and the pilot tests of democratic theory and assistance.115 
Nation/state building is occurring at a rapid, haphazard, and frantic pace. Therefore, 
if democratic assistance is relevant anywhere, it must be applicable in the FSU. 
Within the FSU, Central Asia is most pivotal for US foreign interests due to: (a) 
regional concerns relating to China and the Middle East, (b) the potential for oil, and 
(c) the regional tendency toward conflict.116 Discord cannot be easily contained within 
the confines of Central Asia because of politically sensitive neighbouring countries 
(Reuters 1999). How these states handle the ethnic question, how well these states 
govern (their ability to create acceptable human conditions for their populations) and
11 7whether democratic consolidation occurs are, thus, vitally important considerations.
Within Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan has been selected for analysis due first to its 
apparent commitment to democracy. Of all the Central Asian states, only Kyrgyzstan 
claims to be an “island of democracy.” Kyrgyzstan’s President, Askar Akaev,118 has 
made a most serious verbal commitment to international human rights and law (Akaev 
1995). Kyrgyzstan receives the largest per capita democracy assistance in Central 
Asia because of its perceived potential as a democratic “Switzerland” of Central Asia 
(Anderson 1999; OECD 1999). The second point about Kyrgyzstan is its ethnic 
complexity. With over 52 various ethnic groups, and three significant cross-border 
ethnic communities, Uzbek, Tajik, and Uigher, the ethnic dimension is critical. 
Thirdly, gender divisions are particularly salient because women are leading 
movements in civil society and because Kyrgyzstan is a society marked by influential 
gender roles. Finally, Kyrgyzstan is of considerable geo-political, hydro significance. 
Kyrgyzstan holds the region’s water supply and, thus, the region’s access to electric 
power. Given the looming water conflict, and due to the former Soviet structure, the
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Central Asian states are dependent on each other for supplies of gas, fuel, power, and 
water. This is another significant aspect of the pivotal role that Kyrgyzstan holds in 
the balance between regional stability and chaos. Kyrgyzstan’s democratic reforms 
provide the greatest amount of freedom in Central Asia, which could either mean 
space for human development, progress, and democracy or could mean, as feared by 
other Central Asians, space for chaos, ethnic conflict, and outright war.119 Thus, this 
research focuses on the role played by a leading Western democratic donor, the 
United States, in a country self-promoted as the “island of democracy,” within a 
region prone to ethnic conflict divided by gender and of significant strategic 
importance (Huskey 1999; Kuehnast 1997).
4.2 History of Kyrgyz People-Region
“There are virtually no facets o f Central Asian life that have not been seriously 
affected by the experience o f colonial domination” (Clement 1994:87)
Although this dissertation is not an attempt to examine the historical context of 
Russian and then Soviet conquest of Central Asia, a brief historical background 
provides a context for evaluation of the field research results put forth in the next 
chapter. There is practically no other region of the world that has “literally dropped 
off the map for centuries” (Carley 1995:294). Comparatively little has been written 
about Kyrgyz history primarily because the Kyrgyz people never governed 
themselves prior to “independence” from the USSR in 1990. Before Russian 
involvement, the history of the Kyrgyz people is vague, sporadic, and controversial, 
with a “homeland,” the region that is now called Kyrgyzstan, long inhabited before 
the arrival of any Kyrgyz ethnic group (Anderson 1999:3). The most accurate history
this that the Kyrgyz, at the beginning of the 10 century, came from the Upper Yenisey 
river of Siberia and were forced to migrate south due to advancing Mongol tribes. 
Once settled around the Issy-kul and Naryn regions, they were unable to escape the 
established Mongol domination.
Prior to Russian/Soviet involvement, the Kyrgyz people were a relatively minor and 
insignificant tribal group. Unlike Mongols or Kazakhs, the Kyrgyz did not enjoy 
regional prominence until Soviet rule when USSR leaders created the “myth” of 
limited “statehood” and national identity for the Kyrgyz. Modem Kyrgyz territory 
was inextricably part of the power struggles between Great Britain, Russia, and 
Turkey at the beginning of the century, dubbed the “Great Game” by Kipling. The 
Russians, and hence Soviets, heavily influenced Kyrgyzstan’s history as winners of
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the Great Game. The Soviet past created the “grounded reality” of all-social, 
political, cultural, ethnic, gender, and economic forces, past and current. Soviet and 
Russian components of Kyrgyz history are inextricably bound to the past and present 
adding to the complexity of current reality (Clement 1994:87).
thAfter Mongol rule, the Kyrgyz tribes fell to the Chinese, in the middle of the 18 
century, under the powerful khanate of Kokand. Kokand held power until the Russian 
influence in the region increased and gained control. In 1775, the first Kyrgyz 
emissary was sent to Russia. In 1830, the tribes of the region accepted suzerainty of 
the land of what was then called Kokand. By 1862 some Kyrgyz tribes joined 
Russian soldiers in storming the current capital, then called Pishpek (then renamed 
Frunze and currently called Bishkek). By 1876, Kyrgyz territory became subordinate 
to Russia.120 Russian/Soviet rule acquired control over a group of tribal-nomadic 
people who had been under Mongol, then Chinese dominion.
The region of land that now encompasses modem day Kyrgyzstan came under 
Russian, and then Soviet, rule as a result of the Russian/Soviet triumph in the Great 
Game, a period of time, spanning the middle 1800s, where Great Britain and Russia 
conducted a race to be the first to conquer, colonise, and, therefore, rule, the vast area 
of land that is known as Central Asia, circled by India, China, the Middle East, and 
Russia. Kyrgyzstan, thus, is a country recovering from a colonial past. Although the 
policies and tools of Soviet colonisation were dramatically different from that of the 
European powers in Africa, the resulting confusion over matters of identity and 
government are similar. The following excerpt from Imperial Russia’s version of 
manifest destiny regarding Russia’s intention in Central Asia demonstrates the 
colonial attitude that began during the Great Game and continued with Soviet rule 
over the region.
The position of Russia in Central Asia is that of all civilised States which 
are brought into contact with half-savage nomad populations, possessing 
no fixed social organisation. In such cases it always happens that the 
more civilised State is forced, in the interest of the security of its frontiers 
and its commercial relations, to exercise a certain ascendancy over those 
whom their turbulent and unsettled character makes most undesirable 
neighbours -Gorchakov Circular 1864- (Olcott 1987:75).
The only serious challenge to Soviet/Russian rule came in 1916 when the Russians 
tried to draft the local male population into military service to fight in World War I. 
In mid-July of 1916, over 10,000 people gathered in Osh to demonstrate against the
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draft. The demonstration led to violence with over 2,000 Russians killed in the more
isolated Russian settlements, and over 100,000 Kyrgyz dead when the Russians
responded harshly to the killings. Over a third of the Kyrgyz population fled to China
1 1via the Torugart Pass with many perishing along the way (Anderson 1999:7). After 
the 1920s, there was no serious threat to Russian/Soviet rule. The Russians, thus, 
embarked on a campaign to provide basic universal education, healthcare, and 
industry. The Kyrgyz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was created in 1927 and 
was renamed the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic in 1936.
In 1938, the Stalinist terror reached Bishkek with the trial and execution of leading 
Kyrgyz political and cultural leaders. After 1938, the pace of political changes, 
occurring since 1916, slowed and Soviet consolidation began in earnest. Due to its 
military importance, Kyrgyzstan was a closed republic within the Soviet Union. The 
USSR used the Kyrgyz republic to test torpedoes in Lake Issy-kul,122 mine uranium in 
the rich veins of the Kara-Balta region, and provide a buffer along the Chinese border 
of Naryn oblast. In return for tight security and greatly restricted freedoms, even by 
Soviet definition, the material needs of the Kyrgyz Republic were met by Moscow.
Employment was guaranteed. Poor, elderly, and other disadvantaged members of 
society were supported by the state. Education and healthcare was universalised, 
industry was created, and housing was built. Many of the USSR’s top Russian 
scientists were sent to Kyrgyzstan for military purposes, resulting in large 
communities of Russian Jews and Russian German scientists who established and 
promoted an excellent education system and a rich cultural life in the capital city. 
Due to its proximity to the Fergana Valley, the breadbasket of the USSR, Kyrgyzstan 
enjoyed lush and abundant fruits, vegetables, grain, and sugar. Meat from cows and 
sheep was also bountiful. In general, the subsidised life was, if not politically free, 
materially satisfactory. After World War n, many Russians attempted to gain transfer 
to Kyrgyzstan as life was considered much better in Frunze than other parts of the 
USSR. From a non-distinct nomadic past to a region of importance in a world 
superpower, Kyrgyzstan had come a long way. Between 1938-1985, the majority of 
people were “grateful” and “loyal” to the Soviet modernisation project, resulting from 
both genuine commitment to the Soviet modernisation process and due to their 
inability to be hold any dissenting views given that any opposition to Soviet policy 
resulted in serve consequences, including loss of life.123
On August 31, 1991, the Kyrgyz Republic became an independent secular state.
Since 1999, the three essential factors underlying Kyrgyzstan’s present situation,
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which influences gender and democracy, are: (1) involuntary independence from the 
USSR, (2) anarchy, and (3) ethnicity. First, Central Asia, and Kyrgyzstan, did not 
launch an independence movement from the USSR, instead the USSR/Russia 
removed itself from Central Asia. The result of Soviet/Russian colonisation was that 
the collapse of the USSR “was an abrupt and unexpected end to membership in what 
most residents regarded as a legitimate political community” (Huskey 1999:3). 
Unlike the Baltics or Eastern Europe, or Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan along with other 
Central Asia states, did not want to leave the USSR. The ambivalence, even 
reluctance, with which Kyrgyzstan greeted the Soviet Union’s collapse is directly 
related to the Soviet contribution in modernising Kyrgyzstan and “in nurturing, if only 
unintentionally, the beginnings of a Kyrgyz national identity” (Huskey 1999:3).
In a March 17, 1991, referendum (nine months prior to the official end of the USSR) 
the Central Asians overwhelmingly voted to remain part of the USSR (Snyder 1995 : 
xv). The population of Kyrgyzstan today is not one that looks back to a heroic 
resistance or a daring independence movement. There are no democratic leaders in 
Kyrgyzstan since there was no movement for freedom, independence, and democracy. 
The resulting post-Soviet population generally feels abandoned and yearns for the 
Soviet past. With no goal, no struggle, no clear vision of the future, anarchy is one 
likely resulting state of affairs. The population of Kyrgyzstan is one that did not want 
to leave the USSR, and today overwhelmingly agrees that life was much better during 
Soviet times than today because there was certainty, security, and jobs.
The second factor, then, is the anarchy that has existed in Kyrgyzstan since the Soviet 
collapse.124 As Claudia Svyatkina, president of a local election commission in Jalal- 
Abad said, “What we have now is not democracy but anarchy,” (Associated Press
2000). The anarchy has been increasingly controlled by an underlying, thus far soft, 
totalitarianism. The original Western euphoria over President Akaev’s commitment 
to authentic democracy and economic reform has significantly diminished due to 
increasing repression and corruption.125 President Akaev has increasingly emulated 
President Nazarbayev’s (Kazakstan) and President Karimov’s (Uzbekistan) autocratic 
rule, while frequently objecting that, as President of Kyrgyzstan, he does not have 
enough power to accomplish the necessary reforms.126
The first serious retardation of democratic development began in 1994, only three
years after independence, when Akaev, disillusioned with the very limited democratic
constraints on his executive power, launched an authoritarian offensive, which has
increasingly strangled democratic culture (Huskey 1997:257; US Department of State
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1995). First, Akaev formed the Committee to Defend the Honour and Dignity of the 
President during this time. Second, always reluctant to respect the basic tenets of a 
democracy—a constitutionally limited term of office—Akaev began building his 
power base that would support him as a permanent president. Akaev is “not the head 
of the executive branch but a kind of republican monarch who serves as the guarantor 
of the constitutions... operating at the pinnacle of state power” (Huskey 1999:17). By 
the time of the 1995 parliamentary elections, what was emerging was not a 
consolidation of democracy, but an increasingly cynical population alienated by 
excessively corrupt and self-interested elites. These elections also confirmed the 
continuing strength of tribal and clan ties with both Akaev’s and his wife’s clans in 
firm control. “If the 1995 parliamentary elections represent a defining moment, it is 
not in the consolidation of democracy but in the criminalization and regionalization of 
politics in Kyrgyzstan” (Huskey 1997:265-266).127
1996 brought President Akaev’s February referendum that greatly extended his 
powers. This referendum violated both the Constitution and the Law on Referendums 
(US Department of State 2000). This referendum consisted of a simple “yes” or “no” 
vote to more than 50 complex constitutional amendments. Most constituents admitted 
they did not understand the referendum. The US Department of State reported that 
voter apathy was high; turnout was low, and ballot stuffing was rampant, yielding 
results “reminiscent of the Soviet era” (US Department of State 2000:11). The 
President’s power was consolidated, and he became the dominant political force in 
Kyrgyzstan, with the power to nominate the prime minister, appoint the government 
ministry heads, and the director of the state bank (Pannier 1997:94). Akaev also 
controls the courts128 (US Department of State 2000). Judges wishing to maintain 
their position must allegedly pay $25,000 (USD) for this privilege (International 
Helsinki Federation for Human Rights 1999). Additionally, Akaev has taken serious 
measures (mainly via the courts) to silence and subjugate the media (Pannier
1 7 01997,94). From Res Publica to Vercheny Bishkek the major independent news 
sources of Kyrgyzstan have been intimidated into submission by the government and 
the minor newspapers have been closed.130 Potential political opposition has also 
come under the same serious intimidation and harassment, resulting in no organised 
political opposition whatsoever. The media has been used by President Akaev to 
manipulate opinion against the opposition.131
The culmination of these controls was evident in the February-March 2000
parliamentary elections when Akaev attempted to control both the process and the
outcome of the elections through the courts and the media. Blatant governmental
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manipulation resulted in spontaneous country-wide protests, including 
demonstrations, hunger strikes, and even a suicide, by citizens frustrated with the 
overt corruption and their lack of the ability to elect their own representatives 
(Handrahan 2000). The government countered with arrests and injunctions against 
those who demonstrated.132
The mass popular protests represented a point of desperation. While both the US and 
the Kyrgyz governments may hope these protests will quiet down and be forgotten, 
any such naive assumptions would indicate a serious underestimation of the long-term 
impact that these unleashed frustrations may have. Ignoring the demands of the 
protestors may serve to further align the population with other elements in the region 
that are addressing the needs of the average person, perhaps, more effectively than 
Western assistance, i.e., the competing Islamic fundamentalist movement. With large 
numbers of Islamic fundamentalists allegedly posed for insurgency into Central Asia, 
a disgruntled, hopeless, and resentful population is just what a fundamentalist 
movement needs.133
There is little authentic governmental commitment to democracy and a decreasing 
belief by the population that Kyrgyzstan is a democracy.134 From the average Bishkek 
teacher135 to the mountain shepherd, people are aware that Akaev and his government 
have stolen their chance for a better economic future.136 As Pannier notes, “If the 
Kyrgyz economy does not improve, Akaev will have few to blame but himself’ 
(Pannier 1997:95).137 With a porous border, incompetent and ineffective government, 
and general anarchy, people who live in Kyrgyzstan are seeking alternative 
environments. Over 594,000 of the top Russian Jews and Germans (and other Slavic 
peoples) have already emigrated to Russia, Israel, or Germany leaving an intellectual 
and administrative vacuum, notably in the fields of healthcare and education, which 
have virtually collapsed. 138 Uzbekistan, with its police state, at least offers personal 
security, something that Kyrgyz citizens desire. The Islamic fundamentalist insurgents 
in Batken offer jobs and money. For families that have been living on bread and tea 
since the apricot industry collapsed with the USSR, any source of income is welcome 
(Handrahan 2000). Throughout the August 1999 war in Batken, Akaev never visited 
the region, choosing instead to visit Germany. This lack of commitment to the south 
served to further align the population in this region with the insurgents.139 When the 
state provides no benefits for the citizens, citizens will vote with their feet if they 
cannot vote in legitimate elections, as is the case in Kyrgyzstan, and the state will 
eventually cease to exist. This is a distinctly possible future for Kyrgyzstan (Olcott 
2000:6).
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The third influential factor since 1991 has been the importance and persistence of 
ethnicity to politics and power distribution, including the potential for serious, 
prolonged ethnic conflict. Ethnicity is the most critical factor in political processes 
and the one most often ignored by democracy promoters. There have already been 
two serious ethnic conflicts in Kyrgyzstan. First, the Osh incident of June 1990, the 
most serious and prolonged ethnic conflict, the Caucasus excepted, in late Soviet 
history. Second, the Batken incident of August-November 1999, based on clear 
ethnic lines of Tajik, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek. Kyrgyz support for the insurgent Muslim 
fundamentalist Tajik/Uzbek rebels was directly related to the poverty and frustration 
of Kyrgyz in that region.140 Academics and practitioners alike continue to caution that 
ethnic conflict is potential; however, in Kyrgyzstan, it is more than a “potential” 
(Sagdeev 1995). Ethnic friction has been ongoing in direct relation to the highly 
ethnic political process of government. Recently Max van der Stoel, Commissioner 
for National Minorities with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), gave a serious warning that Central Asia might soon become the “new 
Kosovo” (Reuters 1999). Key people responsible for US democracy assistance to 
Central Asia were not even aware that this statement had been made.141 Moreover, US 
democracy officials remained unwilling or unable to notice how salient ethnicity is to 
the political process and hence to democracy building efforts.142
4.3 The Relevance of Ethnicity
“Kyrgyzstan lies on the northern edge o f a conflict zone that extends from western 
China to the Caucasus—running through the region is a set o f high mountain ranges”
(Huskey 1999:1)
Ethnicity in Kyrgyzstan is at the centre of a complex web of economic, social, and 
political relations. The complicated ethnic tapestry is a residue from the Soviet era 
when republics were multi-national political systems that are now separated by 
competing, largely corrupt, clan systems. Since 1991, Akaev has been building a 
national identity from scratch with a serious dearth of usable national history.143 
Unlike other FSU states, Kyrgyzstan had no prior period of national independence. 
Due to a constructed absence of effective institutional checks and balances, the 
President enjoys “broad discretionary power in defining the country’s national 
identity and therefore its national interests” (Huskey 1999:7). Akaev is, thus, the 
primary narrator of Kyrgyzstan’s story, which has become almost exclusively an 
ethnic Kyrgyz narrative. Wide-scale and/or state-sponsored/sanctioned intolerance
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and/or ethnic conflict and/or benefit is perceived by the population to be the 
responsibility of Akaev.144
Not only has Kyrgyzstan been a crossroads for various ethnic groups, numerous 
religious traditions have also influenced the region, including Maniceaism, 
Shamanism, Nestorian Christianity, Buddhism, Zoroastrians, Confucianism, and 
Islam (Pannier 1995:26). When the Muslims came to Central Asia in the 7th century, 
they made far better progress converting the settled societies of Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan than the nomads of Kyrgyzstan. Islam was introduced to Southern 
Kyrgyzstan in the 8th century, during an Arab invasion, and in the North as late as the 
18th century, yet the nomadic populations of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakstan did not adopt 
Islam until the end of the 19th century, and even then Islam never successfully 
converted the population (Carley 1995:295; Dobson 1995:3). Until the 1990s, Islamic 
influence in Kyrgyzstan has been relatively impotent and sporadic. The overriding 
ethnic influence has been Mongol, resulting in Kyrgyz being historically a nomadic 
people with yurts (felt tents), saddles, handicrafts, traditions, and shamanism, very 
similar to those of their 10th-17th century rulers, the Mongols. 145
The Kyrgyz are generally classified as a sub-section of the dominant Kazak ethnicity 
and were first distinguished by the Russians/Soviets as Kara-Kyrgyz, being somewhat 
darker due to the higher altitude of their grazing pastures.146 The Kyrgyz people of 
today descend from various Mongol, Turkic, Chinese, Russian, Greek, and Arabic 
people. “Kyrgyz” history has been one of disunity and internal war and struggle, with 
various tribes and khans assaulting each other in bids for power and pasture 
(Anderson 1999:3). Due to a weak and vague past, mainly under domination, there 
are no strong folk tales or national myths that the Kyrgyz can rely on to boost their 
sagging collective identity. Despite Akaev’s push for the dubious Manas, an ancient 
Kyrgyz warrior, to be the national hero of choice, including an UNESCO sponsored 
$2.5 million dollar thousand year anniversary of Manas in 1995, Manas is only a 
passing reference for the average person. The UNESCO “celebration” was largely 
greeted as a waste of money by an increasingly cynical and poverty stricken 
population.147
During Soviet rule, there were two major immigrant streams into Kyrgyzstan. First,
there was a massive influx of Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, Tatars, Armenians and
other Europeans during the period between 1926-1959.148 Second, Stalin’s
deportation policies brought Koreans, Crimeans, Germans, and Turks to Central Asia
as punishment for collective disloyalty during World War II. Under the USSR, ethnic
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Russians accounted for between 22% and 59% of the population, concentrated in the 
capital cities of Central Asia. Ethnic Central Asians were largely excluded, in favour 
of the Russians, from highest-quality education, the best employment opportunities, 
and good heath services because: (a) these were concentrated in the capital city, and 
(b) were primarily created for non-Asians.
Thus, the “ethnicity factor” in current Central Asian politics originated in the Soviet 
habit of forced population movement and arbitrary redistricting. During the early 
1920s, the new Soviet-created republics shattered an existing zone that was 
territorially structured into city-state khanates and tribal confederations. The Soviets 
hoped to modernise Central Asia and to prevent dissension with a divide and rule 
tactic that involved creating five distinct national entities. By carving out the 
territories, “the Soviets made certain that sufficient ethnic diversity is included within 
each boundary to prevent the emergence of a powerful unified force with anti-Soviet 
tendencies” (Youssef 1995:3-4, 21-22).
While the Soviet creation of the Kyrgyz “autonomous republic” provided the Kyrgyz 
with symbols and rituals of statehood, which they lacked, Russian cultural 
imperialism which accompanied the Soviet state-building experiment was heavily 
promoted in Central Asia; much more so even than in Russia itself. Ironically, it was 
easier to find copies of Tolstoy or Dostoevsky in Bishkek than in Moscow. Russian 
culture and Soviet ideology penetrated Central Asia simultaneously with a Soviet 
sponsored “Kyrgyz” identity. Kyrgyzstan today is left “with a Soviet mentality to 
undo; a mentality that has left them looking to the state for direction on just about 
every facet of life, before they can set about solidifying and developing a sovereignty 
more germane to their own history and culture” (Carley 1995:302, 300).
The resulting Kyrgyz identity has been one that in large part has been created, or is at 
least heavily influenced by the Soviets. Before the Russian Revolution, people in this 
region did not define themselves as a member of a nation or ethnic group because 
these nations did not exist (Carley 1995). Thus, “Kyrgyz as a separate nation would 
not have existed at the end of the 20th century without Imperial Russian and Soviet 
Rule” (Huskey 1999a:245). Near the end of Soviet rule, in 1989, the ethnic Kyrgyz 
population became a majority in their own country for the first time, accounting for 
52% of the national count (Youssef 1995:11). In sum, the Kyrgyz have traditionally 
been politically weak as well as ethnically solvent, generally passive, people. Only a 
modem twist of Soviet-influenced fate provided a political homeland that the Kyrgyz 
neither fought for nor particularly desired.
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An overview of Kyrgyz history since independence (1991-2000) demonstrates the 
constant presence of ethnicity within the political process, as well as ethnic conflict. 
Indeed, the entire political culture exists under a shadow of ethnic tensions. Important 
governmental institutions, such as the akims, internal police, the White House, and 
law enforcement organs such as the courts and the police, blatantly function as ethnic 
Kyrgyz preserves. The President’s Press Secretary, Kamil Baialinov, admits, “It is 
not a secret that responsible officials of the highest rank come primarily from this or 
that clan (rodovogo klana). That is reality. In our small republic, no matter where you 
turn, everyone is someone else’s man [sic]” (Huskey 1997:263). The system of 
rewards, favours, bribes, perks, and punishment is Kyrgyz and male (Anderson 
1999:23-62; Carley 1995:309).149
Corruption, the primary means for distribution of material wealth and goods, falls 
along clear ethnic divisions. While the poor migrants in the cities are almost 
exclusively ethnic Kyrgyz, the Russians and Uzbeks still enjoy the best housing in 
Osh and Bishkek, a carry-over perk from Soviet days. Paradoxically, because 
essential institutions have become Kyrgyz preserves, valued access to hard currency is 
provided almost exclusively for elite ethnic Kyrgyz. The history of corruption was 
well established under the USSR, with clear linkages between corruption, localism 
and ethnic identity. Independence brought foreign aid (the largest single source of 
hard currency), which both exacerbated the scale of corruption and provided the new 
Kyrgyz ethnic elite with all but unrestricted access to large sums of money. Amid the 
new electoral rules and “democratic” structures the old traditions and networks of 
corruption continue at an intensified and ethnically Kyrgyz level (Huskey 
1995:816).150
Distinct cultures exist, within the Kyrgyz ethnicity, in the five major valleys, Fergana,
Talas, Chui, Issy-Kul, and Naryn. This is evident in speech, dress, food, and even
political and social values. These Kyrgyz clan ties, linked by blood or marriage, are
profoundly important and highly regional. Promoted most prominently by President
Akaev, Kyrgyz clanism contributes greatly to the tribal nature of politics and resource
allocation (Anderson 1999:39-41). Robert Putnam has effectively argued that trust
among elites, which only comes in Kyrgyzstan via family members, provides the
mortar for democracy construction. If the population does not trust the elite
government members, as is the case in Kyrgyzstan, and the government does not trust
the people, authentic democracy is unlikely. In Kyrgyzstan, there is no actual political
elite, there is only Akaev and his clan.151 Akaev holds power through the akim system
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(local regional governors) whom he appoints directly and who are exclusively ethnic 
Kyrgyz. The akim structure is the backbone of Akaev’s authorisation power (Huskey 
1997:259). Akims exercise firm control over their regions, and Akaev exercises firm 
control over the akims. Despite the first local elections in 1999, the akims are still in
1 ^7firm control of their regions or oblasts (Handrahan 2000).
Internally originated violence continues to result from a crisis of governing. The 
increasingly dissatisfied population is frustrated by the ethnically based corruption 
that interferes with the government’s ability to provide citizens with the most basic 
social and economic rights. Besides the disgruntled new ethnic minorities (i.e. 
Russians) and the insurgents in Batken, the poor alienated Kyrgyz male youth 
represent a serious threat to public order and provide a potentially strong support for 
extremist politics. The male Kyrgyz youth began the Ashar demonstrations for 
government housing, leading, in part, to the ethnic violence in Osh of 1990 where an 
estimated 200 people died (Anderson 1999:19-20; Huskey 1999:2).
Women, excluded from the long established system of patronage, represent 
significantly freer political players and potential democracy advocates. “Inasmuch as 
a high level of women’s public involvement contributes to the emergence of a civil 
society, and a civil society in turn serves to minimise the likelihood of armed conflict; 
the increasing constraints on women’s role in Kyrgyzstan may make the country more 
prone to social violence” (Huskey 1999:15). While Huskey, one of the foremost 
researchers on Kyrgyzstan, has contributed greatly to the understanding of how vital 
the ethnic/clan/national is to political power and material distribution in Kyrgyzstan, 
he has, like all other researchers, missed the significance of gender within ethnic 
identity. As this research demonstrates, through fieldwork outlined in Chapter Five, 
ethnicity/clan/kin matters far more for men than for women.153
4.4 The Relevance of Gender
“Kyrgyzstan is a land o f contradictions'’ (Anderson 1999:xi)
Because the official state government and civil society are both highly influenced by
gender in the FSU-Kyrgyzstan, mapping these relationships is salient in
understanding key relations/dynamics (Moghadam 1994). As explained earlier in this
chapter, vast paradoxes span every area of human development and existence, with
events and symbols often not what they appear, creating a strange phenomenon and a
vocabulary for describing Kyrgyzstan rich with words like: murky, ambiguous,
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paradoxical, bizarre, fuzzy, shaky, etc. (Carley 1997:293). This condition also applies 
to gender situations and definitions. For example, while women’s participation in 
civil society is at a high level so is domestic violence. Bride kidnapping is on the 
increase yet so are the numbers of women graduating from post-secondary education. 
As the Asian Development Bank reports, “While women are among those groups 
most seriously affected by the overall decline in social indicators, they have also 
become a major driving force in the political and economic reform” (Kuehnast 
1997:2). An overview of Kyrgyz history since independence (1991-2000) 
demonstrates the constant pressure on women to conform to various aspects of new 
identities that are in competition for dominant socio-political power. The increased 
reports of female slavery (sharoo), prostitution, trafficking in women, rapes, gang 
rapes, murders, bride kidnapping, sexual and domestic violence, and extreme poverty 
are indicative of a society in turmoil with conflicts of gender (as defined by each 
competing socio-political identity) and, hence, women, situated at the centre of the 
crisis. The following section examines the gendered significance of ethnicity, within 
the framework of Kyrgyzstan’s “democratic” transition in which Muslim ideas of 
female identity vie for attention alongside the transitional/democratic concept of 
“woman” and both notions are attempting to replace the established norm of the 
Soviet model of “woman.” These conflicting male definitions of ethnicities and their 
gendered identities are resulting in extremely high levels of violence against women 
(Kuehnast 1997:39; Karasaeva 1998; United Nations 1999).154
Currently, there are five competing socio-political processes, all with their own 
definitions of “woman.” . The four dominant patriarchal models are: (1) a former 
Communist-Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist ideological foundation, (2) the new influence 
of Islamic/Muslim fundamentalism, (3) an indigenous process of “remembering” 
nomadic and tribal traditions, and (4) the influence of Western democratic assistance. 
The fifth process is the aforementioned anarchy that paradoxically allows women the 
opportunity and freedom to create, occupy, and determine their own model of 
“woman.” This phenomenon might be called the Kaleidoscope Model as women are 
pulling, mixing, and matching the most beneficial components from all four male 
patriarchal models. Creation of this female space/identity is occurring alongside the 
struggle for one patriarchal dominant model and is most evident in the dominance of 
women in civil society.
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4.4.1 Soviet Construction o f Woman
Because the foundations of the FSU still remain relevant to Kyrgyz society, Soviet 
gender roles are also still an influential model. A critical understanding of gender and 
the political process from a Former Soviet Union (FSU), non-Westem perspective is 
necessary. Attempts to understand FSU gender definitions through Western feminist 
ideals produces a bewildering situation. References to “gender”, “emancipation,” and 
“feminism” are irrelevant to a cynical, slogan-weary FSU audience. Western 
feminists discuss the right to work. FSU women speak about the new-found freedom 
not to be mandated to work. Western feminists discuss changing sexual 
objectification of the female body. FSU women are only now discovering the power 
of female sexuality. In the FSU, feminism was, and is, generally portrayed as a 
luxury for “bored, whiny, bourgeois Western women who could afford to bum bras, 
while women in East Central Europe lined up for hours to get them” (Goldman 
1996:37; Molyneux 1991; Berry 1995; Goetz 1991; Goldman 1996:36; Holmgren 
1995:15).155
First, during Soviet times, make-up and stylish clothes could only be found illegally,
through contacts and connections. Obtaining such goods signified a personalised
triumph over state-imposed norms and consumer priories and signified the worth of
the woman to her family. Hence, the recent explosion of beauty contests and overt
sexuality in Kyrgyzstan, as in the rest of the FSU, is a political statement about the
freedom to explore femininity and sexuality which did not exist during Soviet times.
Second, where Western feminism focused heavily on reproductive rights, Soviet
women, with limited birth control available, had ample access to abortion. Free
abortion, provided by the state, was often the only birth control available. Freedom of
choice was not an issue in the FSU. Third, the state also provided creches at work
and a year’s paid maternity leave. Issues of childcare and maternity leave are also
non-issues. Fourth, formal representation of women was obligatory under the
repressive Soviet Union. The resulting moral onus on public life has not diminished
with “democratic” development but has grown in direct relation to the number of
corrupt politicians and unscrupulous businessmen, and the general failure of
“democracy.” Therefore, “politics” takes on a very different definition than Western
understanding and this helps explain the lack of desire to be involved in corrupt,
criminal, and repressive state systems. Fifth, as explained in Chapter One, the Soviet
public/political environment provided little privilege in the realm of freedom and
human rights. Domestic space was the only place for limited freedom and humanity
in daily life, and this was highly valued. While Western women “have struggled to
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escape a devalued home into a powerful professional and political world, many Soviet 
women (and men) sought sanctuary and fulfilment in the less monitored world of 
family and friends, a domestic space that was far more capacious and stimulating than 
obligatory work or meaningless politics” (Holmgren 1995:21-22).156
The Soviet Revolution, like other revolutions, promised women “emancipation” in 
return for active support (Reynolds 1986). Yet, the promises of “equality” never fully 
materialised. Despite Marx’s claim that male and female workers constituted a 
“genderless class,” the roles of Soviet “women” were restricted by gender 
definitions.157 The “ideal Soviet woman,” who was always depicted as being Russian, 
was valued publicly for three reasons. First, the Soviet state relied heavily on the 
image of “the good Soviet mother” in producing, mobilising, and controlling the 
population. Women had a specific role in physically producing the nation158 and were 
valued for their childbearing, hence, population-increasing capacity. The State even 
provided Hero of the USSR awards if a woman had more than six children. The ideal 
woman was always a mother. Second, women were valued for their contribution to 
the labour force. In the race to beat the West, all human capital was recognised and 
mobilised. Work was not a privilege. It was not even a choice. While the Soviet 
woman was a heroic worker, she was also an icon of beauty and sexual desirability 
who was also a strong, tough, “macho,” manual labourer contributing to her country’s 
development. Third, women were valued not for their sexuality as humans, as 
women, but for the sexual gratification they could and should provide to the men of 
USSR as their duty. Stalin even called on women to also fulfil the patriotic duty of 
“keeping the fires burning in their hearth and their men happy by taking care of their 
beauty.” These concepts of the Soviet “woman” still form the expectations and 
behaviour of women in Kyrgyzstan today (Temkina 1996:220; Williams 1986:68; 
Pavlycahko 1992:96).159
4.42 Muslim History: Re-Invented and New
Gender relations in countries that are transitioning to democracy while simultaneously
strengthening an Islamic identity produce bizarre paradoxes. Nira Yuval-Davis and
Deniz Kandiyoti have written significantly about the role of gender,
nationalism/ethnicity and transitional societies, Kandiyoti particularly in reference to
Turkey/Central Asia. Kandiyoti puts forth anecdotal evidence of what active
feminism translates to in Turkey; “In 1987 Turkey was a country offering the
perplexing spectacle of a sit-in and hunger strike by ultra-religious women students
demanding the right to don the veil to go to classes... and a small group of feminists
126
marching through the streets to demonstrate against violence against women” 
(Kandiyoti 1989:126). Due to a similar ethnic identity and an increased Turkish 
influence/presence in Kyrgyzstan, Kadiyoti’s example has relevance to the Kyrgyz 
case. Similar paradoxes exist in Kyrgyzstan.
There are currently two forms of Islamic resurgence in Kyrgyz society carrying 
different understandings of “woman.” The first is an indigenous “remembering” 
influenced by increased funds, presence, and conversion activity in progress mainly 
by the Turks and Saudis as they attempt to bring Central Asia under their influence. 
The new “remembered” Muslim influence is highly varied but is predominantly 
concerned with the renewal of traditions that increase male power. For example: (1) 
kalym, the price that is paid, by money, property, or livestock, to acquire a bride; (2) 
a widow may not marry anyone else of her choosing but is required to remarry the 
next of kin in her dead husband’s family, i.e. brother, uncle, etc. This is a customary 
tradition in Kyrgyzstan, sometimes called jenesin aluu; (3) bride kidnapping, the 
practice of “stealing” a bride when one cannot afford the kalym. This is not a Muslim 
tradition but rather a nomadic tradition that originated in the need for a nomadic 
women to marry a strong nomadic man, but it is often understood to be a Muslim 
tradition; (4) making polygamy legal, for example, was debated for two full days in 
the Parliament on the basis that it is a Muslim tradition that the Russians prohibited 
and if Kyrgyz men want to be “real” then they must reinstate the tradition of 
polygamy. Outlawing vodka, which is forbidden by Muslim tradition, was not 
discussed (Moghadam 1997:81).160
Second, there is an element of radical Islam in competition with traditional Sunni 
Islam, Wahabism.161 Wahabism, supported by the Taliban and also funded by the 
Saudis, supports a greatly restricted role for women as a central theme (Moghadam 
1994). With Taliban support behind the Batken rebels in Southern Kyrgyzstan, the 
case of Afghanistan is foremost on the minds of the population, particularly women, 
who fear a Taliban take over. The Taliban, now in control of the majority of 
Afghanistan, are not only explicitly antifeminist, they promote a brutal regime of 
terror and violence with human rights abuse focused primarily on the women within 
their own society. A system of gender apartheid has been created in Afghanistan. 
Women are the property of the men, and male honour depends upon the virtuous 
conduct of the female (Moghadam 1997:75,78). It is important to note that the 
Taliban came to rule as a result of Western and US foreign assistance, which is 
supposed to support democracy, civil society, and human rights, but, in the case of 
Afghanistan, failed to support women’s rights.162
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In the south of Kyrgyzstan the Wahhabis, most often called “mojahedin” by the local 
population, are reported to be engaged in re-education sessions for women. In one 
village, several girls were gathered and “educated” in the ways of radical Islam and 
then rolled together, five or six, in a carpet and beaten “to get the devil” out of them. 
Two girls died. The “education” and exorcism of the “devil” is directed at the female 
members of the community.163 Because the mojahedin have a permanent base in 
Tajikistan, historical tensions between Kyrgyz and Tajiks have been heightened. Yet, 
despite the strain, Tajik and Kyrgyz women have crossed the ethnic line to meet in 
each other’s homes to make carpets. When asked how they avoided the ethnic 
friction that the male members exhibit, the women said that first, as women, they 
want to feed their children. Since the Kyrgyz women make better wool and the Tajik 
women make better designs, they decided to co-operate. “In business between 
women,” one woman said, “there is no ethnic conflict.” Paradoxically, in the same 
region, Tajik women were reportedly forced by their husbands to lie naked in front of 
the only water source in order to prevent Kyrgyz men from obtaining water. These 
juxtaposed incidents prove how pivotal gender can be either to harmony or conflict.
4.4.3 Tribalism
In an effort to locate public and private identities, many people have returned to the 
tribal roots that shaped this region of the world only 70 years ago. Some prominent 
Kyrgyz researchers, such as Achylova, claim that “tribalism is a fundamental aspect 
of the modem Kyrgyz national consciousness and though it represents another basis 
for division, it is largely responsible for the survival of Kyrgyz civil society through 
various periods of subjugation” (Achylova 1995:326). Tribalism thus is equated with 
civil society in Kyrgyz understanding, leading to the argument that the origins of the 
tribal Kyrgyz had roots of democratic principles. To some degree this is authentic in 
terms of Western understanding of civil society and democracy. Historically, 
nomadic society relied on co-operation and individualism; however, the roots of the 
Kyrgyz nomadic tradition have been completely erased and Russified.164 Therefore, a 
resurgence of tribal norms in modern life results in patriarchal, and often barbaric, 
rule by terror, resplendent with human rights violations rather than civil society and 
progressive stability as Achylova argues (Moghadam 1997; Achylova 1995:321).
Moreover, because tribalism is ruled through a biological, paternal, kinship lineage,
with power reserved for certain essential male biological descendants, tribalism is
essentially patriarchal. Therefore, in the realm of tribalism, women are “channels of
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non-descent” and, hence, non-important (Bloch 1987:330). In Kyrgyzstan, tribalism 
results in practices such as the revived aksakal courts. Aksakal courts (literally 
translates as White Beard Court) consists of the oldest men in the village who make 
all the village decisions, including moral and family, and rule the villages as if an 
elected town and family morality council. Although the aksakal are not elected, they 
have been given powers of judgement and punishment, with the police force under 
their control, by President Akaev. Moreover, President Akaev has publicly supported 
the role of aksakal courts and has reinforced and revived their importance in Kyrgyz 
society, despite reported cases of medieval punishment, such as public stoning by the 
aksakals as punishment for violating local custom and rules.165
Of aksakals Amnesty International notes,
Allegations have recently been brought to the attention of Amnesty 
International concerning activities authorised by the so-called ‘elders’ 
{aksakal) courts,’ which were set up following a call reportedly made by 
President Akaev at a congress of elders in January 1995 for ‘the formation of 
a wide network of autonomous and active civil institutions, independent of 
state and political structures.’ That congress reportedly adopted a provisional 
status regulating the activities of aksakal courts, whereby they were given 
responsibility for examining cases of administrative violations; property, 
family and other disputes; and minor crimes passed to them by state 
procurators. The President is reported to have signed a decree approving this 
statue on 25 January 1995.... Furthermore, Amnesty International is 
concerned about allegations that extra-legal militias operating under the 
authority of aksakal courts have subjected people to illegal detention and ill- 
treatment and have administered punishments handed down by aksakal 
courts, including whipping and stoning (Amnesty International 1996:5).
These militias are known as choro. Little restriction has been placed on their activities 
by regular law enforcement bodies. In some villages an azindan, or place of illegal 
detention, has even been established. Corporal and capital punishment by the aksakal 
and choro have been reported. The US State Department Report for 1996 notes, 
“local elders’ courts have committed a number of abuses.... torture is sometimes used 
to extract confessions” (US Department of State 1997).
4.4.4 Western Democratic Influence
The emergence of “male democracy,” both in the Kyrgyz government and reflected 
by US “male” democratic assistance, has substantially decreased, rather than 
improved, women’s quality of life. “Democracy” has brought reports of female
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slavery (sharoo), prostitution, trafficking in women, rapes, gang rapes, murders, bride 
kidnapping, sexual violence, a 30% increase in domestic violence, and extreme 
poverty, with women now comprising 90% of the poorest sectors of society (United 
Nations 1999). Violence against women has become so extreme that the UN issued a 
report warning the government to address this issue, “in the face of widespread 
violence against Kyrgyz women—including domestic violence, gang rape, and 
systematic assault and battery—expert members of the Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination against Women... urged Kyrgyzstan to re-evaluate its programs and 
policies... astonished at the rise in the number of vicious crimes against women, they 
pressed the Government to identify the root causes of that grave phenomena and 
devise ways to suppress it” (United Nations 1999). In this same report Kyrgyzstan 
was described as a “patriarchal society” (United Nations 1999).166
The “macho-capitalism” element in the “emerging” democracy of Kyrgyzstan is also 
evidenced by the new power structures that are dominated by young, mostly male, 
“entrepreneurs,” who are members of the former Soviet nomenclature and corrupt 
government officials. US democracy assistance mirrors the Kyrgyz patriarch power 
structure by sending mostly male experts to train Kyrgyz men in the principles of 
democracy. Male democracy assistance not only fails to provide “democratic” 
programs/progress for women, but it has also disregarded women as potential political 
leaders in Kyrgyzstan, and in other newly emerging societies, even if they have a 
proven track record in democratic leadership skills through their leadership of civil 
society/NGOs. Feminist and women’s projects, perhaps because they are restricted 
by a narrow WID sector, have not been successful. Western feminists brought to 
Kyrgyzstan have too often focused on “an exclusionary insistence on women’s needs 
and concerns (the historical Achilles heel of liberal Western feminists)” and have 
largely ignored the rapid, largely unchecked devaluation of those needs and concerns 
in the new FSU, including Kyrgyzstan (Holmgren 1995:25, 27).
Nevertheless, even this exclusion has been paradoxical. As Holmgren notes, “despite
the inequalities of capitalism (or for that matter, the hidden privileges of democracy)
women have not only been made its victims and unwitting accomplices, but have
managed to work the system to gain political and economic power” (Holmgren
1995:26). This gain has been.through the leadership of NGOs. Achylova correctly
points out that “the future of democracy in Kyrgyzstan depends on developing a civil
society and a political culture that can address these ethnodemographic problems”
(Achylova 1995:330). The future of Kyrgyzstan also relies on the role that women
can play in this problem-solving and to what extent women can negotiate the
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public/private chaos and determine an acceptable female identity both in terms of self- 
identity and society. By disregarding the democratic political worth of female NGO 
leaders and instead insisting on backing male political leaders with no “democratic” 
track record, US democracy assistance is crippling its own goals of democratic 
consolidation as well as implicitly informing Kyrgyz women that democracy, at the 
public policy level, is a male domain both in Kyrgyzstan and in America.
4.4,5 Transitional Society and Linkages Between Gender and Conflict
“For women, all revolutions have failed  ” (Lorber 1994:277)
While the “democratic transition” in Kyrgyzstan has meant violence against women, 
transitional periods also create anarchy and anarchy produces openings. Openings 
provide an opportunity for women to become involved in society. Women are often 
involved in revolutions; however, although visible and active at the early stages of 
revolution they are not able to capitalise on their contributions and achievements in 
times of societal transitions because gender domination always remains more vital 
than political change. Although women are welcome in the informal sector, the 
relationship between women and formal politics, i.e. the state, has always been 
problematic. Women are exploited differently but equally whether it is the Soviet 
system or the new “democratic” system. Women have never had their “own” 
revolution (Lorber 1994:277-278; Reynolds 1986:xiv).
Women must strategize within a set of constraints that Kandiyoti terms “the 
patriarchal bargain.” “These patriarchal bargains exert a powerful influence on the 
shaping of women’s gendered subjectivity and determine the nature of gender 
ideology in different contexts” (Kandiyoti 1988,275). Kandiyoti goes on to explain 
that the patriarchal bargain does not simply inform women’s rational choice but also 
shapes the unconscious aspects of gendered subjectivity because the “bargain” begins 
early in childhood socialisation and continues through the adult stages (Kandiyoti 
1988:285). This is all the more confused as the accepted behaviour of a woman in 
Soviet society was quite different from what it now means to be an “acceptable” 
woman. Between a renewed Muslim influence, a Western capitalist influence, and a 
recent Soviet history, all with very different standards of what it means to be a woman 
and a citizen, women are finding themselves off balance and constantly negotiating 
and re-negotiating their womanness in a patriarchal as well as political and economic 
transitional phase.
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In addition to a fundamental crisis in what defines “woman,” the collapse of the 
communist order has also resulted in an intense psychological crisis throughout 
Kyrgyzstan. Norms, standards, values, and concepts of being an individual and being 
a citizen are in fundamental flux. This private and public identity crisis represents the 
greatest danger for the construction of a stable, democratic, and civil society. This can 
be no better explained than by a Kyrgyz citizen. Achylova’s statement pinpoints the 
“kaleidoscope” effect of transition.
At one level, the problem for civil society is the arrested development of 
new cultural and political institutions due to the co-operation and 
paralysis suffered during the Soviet period and the economic pressures 
that exist today. The key weakness, however, is that although political 
independence has meant spiritual and psychological emancipation and 
freedom of discussion and creative activity, personal freedom has 
nevertheless, been hindered by a growing atmosphere of lawlessness, 
corruption, nihilism, and impoverishment. All these factors prohibit the 
development of civil society (Achylova 1995:325).
The increase of violence directed toward women is indicative of a society in turmoil 
with conflicts of gender, as defined by each competing socio-political identity. Since 
gender relations/definitions are situated at the centre of the identity crisis, women are 
placed to receive a substantial amount of the turmoil; the “identity fall-out.” Because 
the female body, female reproductive capacity, and female sexual capacity are all 
significant markers of ethnic identity, each varying strand in the complicated ethnic 
tapestry in Kyrgyzstan mandates a different definition of “woman.” Since the entire 
socio-political culture exists under a shadow of ethnic tensions, society at large also 
necessarily exists within the tensions of competing gender definitions. Hence, gender 
relations, similar to ethnicity, are also located at the centre of the same complex web 
of economic, social, and political relations. This severe crisis of identity, economy, 
and politics, integrally complementing each other is the “grounded reality” for women 
in Kyrgyzstan (Carley 1995:300, 309; Tabyshalieva 1997).167
The jumble of cross-laid identities and confused concepts of “what it means” to be 
“Kyrgyz” (or Russian or Uzbek, etc.) is projected upon women’s bodies and 
behaviours as the principal spaces where men define what it means to be a man and 
thus a Kyrgyz or Uzbek, or Uigher, etc.168 The male nature of ethnic identity is 
evidenced by the facts that: (1) ethnic identity in Kyrgyzstan is perceived as being 
more important for men than for women, with the majority of adults defining their 
primary identity as gender if they are women, and ethnically based if they are male; 
and (2) ethnic Kyrgyz know they are “Kyrgyz” if they have “seven generations of
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fathers.” To be Kyrgyz, therefore, one must be male and have firm control of the 
paternal lineage.
As described in the previous section, due to the forced independence of Kyrgyzstan, 
President Akaev has been responsible for creating a corresponding new national 
identity. National ideology and myths of origin/nation are predicated on a sexual 
order. This sexual order excludes women from the community, the creation, and the 
polity because the myth of origin relies on “essential identities” to define belonging, 
resulting in exclusionary male ideologies (Charles 1998:7). To be “Kyrgyz” (or 
Russian, or Uzbek, etc.) fundamentally means to be a man.169 Being a “Kyrgyz” (or 
Russian, or Uzbek, etc.) man is defined predominantly by: (1) treatment of women, 
(2) amount of vodka consumed, and (3) toughness and/or fearlessness. Women are 
excluded from the origin of Kyrgyz ethnicity. This female exclusion mandates male 
sexual control of the female in order to preserve “clean” male generations.170 Such
171“control” often results in and justifies male on female or male on male violence.
4.5 The Potential for Ethnic Conflict
The term that best describes Kyrgyzstan since independence, particularly in reference 
to ethnicity, is murky. Crucial aspects and understandings of society are nearly 
impossible to pin down as a result of the many ambiguous determinants and few 
absolutes. In relation to identity, an anarchical and paradoxical nature reigns. Few 
other FSU states are undergoing such a frantic search for a viable identity. “Indeed, 
in some other new states, it is hardly an issue” (Carley 1995:299). Moreover, the 
political identity of the average citizen has become strongly ethnic since 
independence with “ethno politics” regularly superseding “nationality politics.” With 
no common external enemy, and thus no unifying force against which the male 
“citizen” can assert himself and prove his value to society/nation, nationalism turns 
inward with ethnic identities, stretched across borders, becoming ascendant. The 
Soviet heritage that gave every country in the region a mixed, multi-ethnic population 
provides the current excuse/right for each country to interfere in the affairs of others 
in defence of its kin (Youssef 1995:ii, iii).172
Nearly ten years since “independence,” some Soviet habits are atrophying, leaving a
vacuum for tribal norms to reassert themselves, and Islamic fundamentalism to assert
itself. While some scholars argue that “what is taking place is a return to tradition,
not an eruption of fundamentalist passion” (Reiff 1997:17), fundamentalism is
becoming an increasingly apparent element in the composition of the post-Soviet
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ethnic make-up. While some researchers claim that “the attraction of this [Islamic] 
‘forbidden fruit’ seems to be waning somewhat as the realities of Islamic morality 
become more apparent” (Pannier 1995:26), the success of the Batken mojahedin in 
co-operating with Kyrgyz families, combined with new Saudi sponsored mosques in 
every small village in Kyrgyzstan since 1991, provides evidence that Islam’s hold in 
the region is tenacious. The future of Kyrgyzstan rests, in part, with the forthcoming 
effect Islam has on the region as people either flee due to fear or embrace Islam due to 
the security Islam offers. Any power of persuasion that radical Islam has is directly 
related to popular satisfaction with “democratic” development.173
Of all the development agencies operating in Kyrgyzstan, only The World Bank 
[hereinafter the Bank] has assessed ethnicity in relation to development practices. 
The Bank’s study notes that the recent outbreaks of violence demonstrate that 
development-related problems, i.e., poverty, unemployment, lack of housing, lack of 
water, lack of women’s rights, collapsed education systems, etc., exacerbate existing 
relationships of conflict between ethnic and tribal groups. Yet, the Bank also fails to 
examine in depth the role of gender in ethnic conflict. The Bank concludes that there 
are three types of potential ethnic conflict: (1) ethno-territorial, (2) ethno- 
environmental, and (3) ethno-economic. The potential for wide-scale ethnic conflict 
in Kyrgyzstan/Central Asia is high. Serious conflict is predicted due to a mixed and 
often resentful ethnic population experiencing: extreme poverty, unemployment, 
corruption, poor self-image and confidence, with no strong past history or positive 
national identity, drug trade, weapons trade, and a powerful, well-financed Muslim 
fundamentalism movement seeking recruits in the South. Of the Bank’s three ethnic 
conflict types, ethno-economic, exacerbated by ethno-territorial, is the base for ethnic 
tensions and conflict already ongoing in the South of Kyrgyzstan (Youssef 1995:ii, 
3).174
To understand the origin of ethnic conflict in Kyrgyzstan, arguably the origin for 
Central Asian conflict, Muslim identity and the history of Southern Kyrgyzstan (Osh 
and Jalal-Abad oblasts) must be examined. In Osh oblast ethnic conflict between 
Uzbek and Kyrgyz, over the lack of housing, left more than 200 dead in 1991. It is in 
Osh Oblast that the Batken war of 1999 occurred and reoccurred in 2000. In 1995, 
Youssef, among other researchers, already noted that the southern region of 
Kyrgyzstan was experiencing “severe instability” (Youssef 1995:50). In 1999-2000, 
that instability manifested itself in Batken. More than a few Kyrgyz believe that Osh 
may even break away from Kyrgyzstan within three to five years.175
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Studies of the potential for ethnic violence erupting again in Osh, as it did in 1991, are 
conflicting. Lubin, for example, states that, “For many Uzbeks and Kazaks included 
in the survey, nationality or citizenship play an insignificant role as a focal point of 
identity. The family and community showed to be the major point of reference and 
more powerful source of self-identity” (Lubin 1994). However, the comprehensive 
World Bank study states that, “ethnic affiliation showed to be the strongest bond in 
most aspects of life for the majority of Uzbeks and Kazaks respondents surveyed in 
1994. Most expressed strong desires to not work with and not live next door to 
another ethnic group than their own; least of all to have a member of another ethnic 
group marry into their family” (Youssef 1995:24). Field research from this 
dissertation supports the Bank’s results. Ethnic/national identity is a vital aspect to 
the lives of citizens of Central Asia, particularly Southern Kyrgyzstan. Even when 
ethnic identity is not the justification for conflict—water, housing, and land are the 
genesis of the conflict—ethnic identity easily lends itself to be manifested as the 
conflict due to deep-seated ethnic animosity from the Soviet history which put in 
place and which has been allowed to continue, a highly contentious pattern of 
economic, political, and goods (land, housing, water rights, etc.) distributed along 
ethnic lines (Youssef 1995:47).
There are two main reasons for the Southern instability in Kyrgyzstan. First, the 
ethnic violence that the region is experiencing today is a residue of Soviet 
redistricting. The new oblast of Batken, for example, includes seven enclaves that 
belonged to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Osh is part of the fertile Fergana Valley. This 
land originally belonged to Uzbekistan but was divided by the Soviets in 1929 
(Youssef 1995:46). One section (Samarkand and Bukhara) was given to Tajikistan as 
compensation for losing Holy Land in Uzbekistan, and the other part was given to 
Kyrgyzstan in the form of Osh oblast. The remainder of the Fergana Valley stayed in 
Uzbekistan. In 1936, the Pamiris, people who lived in the Pamir Mountains bordering 
Kyrgyzstan, were stripped of their distinct ethnic identity by the Soviets, and 
incorporated into Tajikistan. Second, there is a Muslim fundamentalist movement in 
the Tajik-Kyrgyz border areas, funded by the Saudis, closely linked to Usamah Bin 
Ladin, terrorist in nature, and led by an ethnic Uzbek. This group has declared a jihad  
on Uzbekistan. Important to this equation is the fact that the Uzbek minority is far 
better off economically and politically than the ethnic Kyrgyz in their own country 
(Y oussef 1995:13).176
The substantial Uzbek community in the South has been very active in the revival of
Islam, particularly in Osh province. This Muslim identity is much stronger than the
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“Muslim” identity of the north of Kyrgyzstan. Being a Muslim is one example of the 
new male attempt to define Kyrgyz, and other Central Asian, identities. While most 
Kyrgyz (men and women) will self-identify as Muslim, now able to practice after 70 
years of Soviet imposed atheism, their idea of what it means to be Muslim has been 
heavily influenced by Shamanism and Buddhism from Mongol rule and typically 
combines Shamanist/Buddhist traditions with misinterpreted Muslim ideas.177
There is an ongoing process in Osh that is the transformation of Islam from a religious 
identity to a distinct mode of ethnic self-expression. Islam provides a vital “hook,” a 
facet of nationalism that provides psychological comfort for people searching for a 
modem identity. Therefore, there is a great potential for Islam to become political 
both as a positive identification force and as a means of protest against the Kyrgyz 
government which has proven itself incapable of meeting the urgent needs of its 
population, particularly in the South (Fuller 1994:100, 114; Youssef 1995:63). This 
behaviour mirrors similar reactions and embracing of Islam globally, as both Fuller 
and Youssef document. The fundamentalist movement that is growing in Kyrgyzstan 
is like fundamentalist movements all over the world. These are “basically political 
movements which have a religious or other cultural imperative and which seek in 
various ways and in widely differing circumstances to harness modem state and 
media powers to the service of their gospel” (Yuval-Davis 1998:175). Yuval-Davis 
asserts that the rise in fundamentalism is directly linked to a global crisis of 
modernity. Although this statement reflects global issues, Yuval-Davis also provides 
a nearly exact summary of the ongoing situation in Kyrgyzstan, the dissatisfaction, the 
clear failure of so-called “democracy,” and the emotional identity vacuum. As the 
promise of democracy fails, the rise of Islam replaces the hope for democracy and 
capitalism, particularly in Southern Kyrgyzstan.
Both capitalism and communism have proved unable to meet people’s 
material, emotional, and spiritual needs. As Afshar illustrates... a general 
sense of despair and disorientation has opened people up to religion as a 
source of solace. It provides a compass and an anchor that gives people a 
sense of stability and meaning, as well as a coherent identity.... In the Third 
World... the rise of fundamentalism is also intimately linked with the failure 
of nationalist and socialist movements to bring about successful liberation 
from oppression, exploitation, and poverty. Religion and other traditionalist 
ideologies have also been utilised by militants as ‘indigenous’ imperialism 
and the interventions of superpowers (Yuval-Davis 1998:176).
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4.6 Summary
In sum, the case of Kyrgyzstan confirms that: (1) ethnic identity is an essential 
component of the political process, (2) male definitions of female behaviour, societal 
role, and appearance are an essential component of ethnic identity, and (3) gender is a 
considerable variable in the political process. Additionally, as a result of competing 
identities in the transitions, each with their own gender definitions, women have been 
the foci of a great deal of violence and “transitional” stress. Nonetheless, ethnicity, 
and, therefore, gender within ethnicity, have been largely overlooked as integral 
components of the political process, and, hence, the “democratic transition” by US 
democratic assistance. This neglect, in relation to gender, is related to macro-level 
problems, outlined in the previous chapters, that democracy theory and assistance has 
with “inclusion” and patriarchy. Moreover, this oversight is at the expense of 
authentic democratic assistance due to significant factors that are revealed when 
gender and ethnicity are examined within the “democratic” transitional process in 
Kyrgyzstan. A comprehensive feminist analysis necessarily reveals under-developed 
gendered understandings of how society operates, with ethnicity being an essential 
factor, as this chapter has examined; providing evidence of the salience of gender and 
ethnicity to the political reality of Kyrgyzstan.
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Chapter Five 
Analysing Identity in Kyrgyzstan: 
Fieldwork Method and Design
“White feminists working outside o f their own culture face certain ethical 
and methodological challenges’’(Cmkovich 1995:105)
5.1 Feminist Mixed Model Research Design and Paradigms
The following chapter outlines the components of the fieldwork involved in this 
research explaining: the rationale and design of the research methods, survey sets, 
data collection, the relationship between qualitative and quantitative methods used, 
the methodology for interpreting the data, and the protections that were built into the 
research design and data collection to guard against “tainted” research and improve 
the validity of the research and results. Fieldwork was conducted in Kyrgyzstan in 
1999, preceded by an 18-month period in the field as a volunteer, that fostered both 
cultural and socio-political immersion. Essential understandings gained during these 
18 months were implemented into both survey set design and data collection 
methodology and are described in the appropriate sections of this chapter.
A pragmatist, feminist, parallel/simultaneous mixed method design supports this 
research. This research uses gender as a research strategy, dissecting all theories and 
research methods. In other words a feminist/gender perspective on the two main 
theoretical frameworks, ethnicity and democracy, is undertaken. Gender is also 
considered with the mixed methodology framework of this research implementing 
both qualitative and quantitative gender analyses (Ribbens 1998). Building on past 
methodological developments, including Burton (1992), the methodology in this 
research attempts to incorporate both “conventional” and “alternative” in a framework 
that takes advantage of the best that both models have to offer in the most appropriate 
context. The mixed method design is based on Tashakkori and Teddlie’s (1998) 
typology, that includes parallel and/or simultaneous gathering of both qualitative 
(QUAL) and quantitative (QUAN) data, with an emphasis on QUAN (QUAN+qual). 
Creswell (1995) and The Patton Design Dimension, Patton (1990), also inform this 
design (Tashakkori 1998:52-56). The Patton Design mixes methodologies across the 
three stages of the research process: (1) design, (2) measurement, and (3) analysis. 
The mixed model strategy implemented in this research offers a controlled research 
design in a natural setting, with a dominant QUAN aspect, and employs the most
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appropriate methods to answer the fundamental hypothesis. Mixed design also aids in 
obtaining results that are more accurate because the overall design best mirrors the 
process of inductive and deductive reasoning that occurs in the research process. 
Pragmatism is also relevant because this approach recognises that QUAN and QUAL 
techniques are compatible (Tashakkori 1998:12).178
As “the lives of women have been largely overlooked in the interest of objective and 
quantitative research,” the research design builds on feminist insights about 
methodological inclusion (Tomm 1989:4). The assumptions built into quantitative 
research have traditionally allowed data collection to mitigate the validity of the 
women or the female in data collection. Feminists have greatly added to the 
acceptance of qualitative research that allows the subject knowledge to come through 
without being placed in a research made framework that often restricts or ignores 
female responses. An increased use of qualitative data, either alone or incorporated 
into a mixed methodology, has allowed for an improved understanding of quantitative 
data and provided a data collection method that allows the research to locate action 
and experience in the context in which it occurs. Qualitative research also allows for 
“new” units to be “discovered” or included. Hitherto, social science data collection 
has seen the “public” and not the “private” as the appropriate field in which to ask 
questions. Therefore, quantitative research questions were designed with the public 
and, thus, the male in mind. The validity of the “private”, i.e., domestic and female, 
was not sufficiently considered. The less structured nature of qualitative data 
collection allows for narratives to arise from unexpected places, and these include 
female, private, and domestic (Ribbens 1998).
Mixed model research is a growing trend in the social sciences because mixed models
offer more comprehensive research strategies (Tashakkori 1998:x). Greene et al.
(1989) outlined five mixed model rationales that provide clarity and encourage
researchers to choose the riskier complexity over the ease of certainty. Greene’s
objectives include: (1) triangulation, seeking convergence of results, (2)
complementarity, examining overlapping and different aspects of a single
phenomenon, (3) initiation, uncovering paradoxes, contradictions, and new
perspectives, (4) development> a sequential use of data, and (5) expansion, adding
breadth and scope to a research project (Greene in Tashakkori 1998:43). Since the
present research is concerned with the relations between variables, rather than a
description of the variable itself, only a mixed model or a triangulation of data,
method, and theory can begin to capture these relations (Patton 1990; Brewer and
Hunter 1989). Moreover, due to the complex nature of “transitional” social norms
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and relations in Kyrgyzstan, an uni-dimensional research approach would fail to 
capture/ understand the nature of gendered ethnicity in the complex transitional 
process. The triangulation/mixed model provides the most comprehensive theoretical, 
methodological, and analytical framework to discover the complementarity, initiation, 
and expansion of the variables.
5.2 Feminist Data Collection Method and Type
Data collection follows the dominant-less dominant (QUAN+qual) mixed method 
design, with an overall feminist method resting on quantitative measures supported by 
selected qualitative techniques (Tashakkori 1998:44). Data collection techniques were 
primarily field experiments conducted in a natural setting that sought to confirm a 
prior hypothesis. The quantifiable aspects of this research include inferential statistics 
gathered through survey/questionnaire research with supporting qualitative aspects 
mixed in, including participant observation and interviews. This QUAL data was 
recorded simultaneously to QUAN collection in a reflexive research journal with the 
objective of informing the QUAN data collection as well as generating documentation 
of additional QUAL data. The journal is discussed at greater length at the end of this 
chapter. This QUAN+qual data collection method is described by Creswell (1995) as 
having the advantage of presenting a consistent paradigm and gathering limited
170information that allows the researcher to probe in detail (Creswell 1995:177).
5.2.1 Survey Strategy and Procedure
The survey sets are located in the appendix. In order to ensure accurate and 
appropriate measurement, a pilot test of the survey sets was performed via a small, 
informal, focus group of Kyrgyz citizens prior to field research. This tested the 
validity of the questions relative to the Kyrgyz cultural context. The survey sets were 
designed with carefully worded neutral language and a question order formulated to 
alternate between quantifiable and qualitative data, with quantifiable information 
valued as less threatening by respondents than qualitative questions. A clustering 
method was used for random sampling on the adult population by interviewing in 
local markets in the capital cities of each oblast. Although variables such as ethnic 
identity are notoriously difficult to measure, there are counterbalancing variables that 
are relatively easy to measure, i.e., level of education and gender.
Research methods followed self-report techniques mixed with an interview format.
The survey questionnaire, administered in an interview format, acted as a funnel for
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containing structured, closed-ended quantitative questions to informal, open-ended
/
qualitative questions. In addition to the formal interviews, both Survey Set One and 
Survey Set Two included an informal/observational component that was critical in 
overcoming tainted survey results, building trust in the target population, and 
contributing to qualitative research aspect. Eight separate surveys were prepared for 
field research implementation. All surveys were written with similar questions in 
order to contrast and compare different levels of society.
Survey Set One was designed and administered in order to determine local self- 
identification of primary identification levels. As explained in Chapter One, obtaining 
results that delineated ethnic identity was the primary objective of Survey Set A.l. As 
ethnicity is theoretically understood to be “marked” by social “boundaries,” including 
religion, language, life style, kinship, homeland, phenotypic characteristics, and 
gender roles, this survey was designed to test the theory of ethnic identification in a 
practical setting. The survey also sought to determine if identification differs between 
gender, rural-urban, education level, ethnic groups, and how it has or has not changed 
under, and after, Soviet rule. Survey Set One was administered through personal 
interviews (the researcher speaks Russian) with the assistance of a Kyrgyz translator 
when necessary to: (A.1) rural population adults and community leaders, (B.l) rural 
population children, (C.l) capital city, Bishkek, community leaders, and (D.l) rural 
and Bishkek government officials. The Child Self-Identification, Survey Set B.l, 
surveyed children age eight to eleven, randomly from secondary schools in each 
oblast capital. As any child in school can read and write, surveys were completed 
during classroom time under the supervision of the researcher. Although the results of 
this survey subset were interesting, the survey results were inconclusive for the 
purposes of this dissertation. Analysis of the child population has been set aside for 
future research.
Survey Set One-Average Adult Population Self-Identification (A.1) is the survey 
designed to test the prior hypothesis that ethnic identity has a gendered variable. 
Because survey A. 1 is the primary survey, the most extensive statistical analysis has 
been completed on A. 1. Other surveys were designed as supplementary surveys to 
elicit supporting evidence related to concepts of democracy, gender, and ethnicity. 
However, only A. 1 was directly designed and is henceforth, relevant to the primary 
hypothesis of this dissertation. Quantitative statistical analysis was carried out using 
the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS for Windows version 6.0). 
Complete data results are listed in the appendix.
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Adult Population Perspective: Because Kyrgyzstan is a closed population that 
does not allow for easy access into the home, questionnaires were completed in the 
central markets of each oblast s capital cities. Since the markets are the centre 
place for debate, dialogue, and human interaction, the bazaars offered the most 
natural, non-threatening, environment. By interviewing in the markets, the 
researcher met the survey population in a manner that aided in producing a high 
participant comfort level that contributes to a high internal validity rate. 
Additionally bazaar based interviews aided in: (a) not biasing the samples toward 
Kyrgyz, who are more open to foreigners and might invite them into their homes, 
(b) avoiding the former Soviet method of home and community forum interviews, 
which would incur the risk of invoking former fears from Soviet style 
categorisation, particularly around the issues of ethnic identity, and might thereby 
taint the sample results, and (c) providing greatest access to the more inaccessible 
populations, as the most remote rural populations habitually travel into the oblast 
centres to sell their produce. Market place interviews made it possible to access a 
diverse and representative sample population as all ages, income levels, 
ethnicities, gender, etc. shop and/or work in the markets. The following sub­
categories are used to organise the questions that comprise Survey Set A. 1. These 
sub-categories assist in detailing specific considerations in the rationale and design 
of Survey Set A. 1.
Primary Identity: A .l’s survey design was constructed to be consistent with
Mach’s definition of ethnicity. “Ethnic identity is essentially subjective, a sense of
belonging, a definition of self and one's own group in relation with others. It
consists of two mental processes: the search for the self and the constriction of
boundaries between one's own group and that of the others... [ethnicity] is based
on self-definition” (Mach 1993:12); and Nira Yuval-Davis’ key question on
identity, “Identity constitutes the conscious “self’ -  the answer, or rather answers,
to the question, “Who am I?” (Yuval-Davis 1998:169). The opening and closing
questions of this survey sought directly to solicit participants’ primary identity,
“Who are you?” and “Describe yourself in one word.” Interestingly, while no one
had difficulty in answering the first question, the last question (in some ways the
same question) provoked great curiosity, anguish, and embarrassment. To sum
one’s self/life into one word proved to be a difficult and thought provoking task.
Additionally, many people were pleased/flattered by these questions and took
great time/care in responding. Many people, particularly women, told the
researcher that no one had ever asked them this question, and/or they had never
thought about this before and how important it was. A number of women told the
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researcher that these questions made them think of their lives in a new context and 
caused them to consider who they really were. Additionally, these questions about 
self-identification were designed to be un-linked to ethnicity.
Ethnic Origin and Teaching fo r Self and Children: The series of questions about 
children’s ethnic identity, origin, and teacher of that identity were designed to 
elicit responses that indicate the unconscious manner that gender influences 
ethnicity. These questions were the first to inquire about ethnicity because: (a) 
asking about someone else’s identity is less threatening, and (b) most parents 
enjoy questions about their children. Therefore, these questions were designed to 
“warm/open” the participants. As with the questions addressing knowledge of 
their children’s ethnicity, participants were asked, later in the survey, how they 
knew their ethnic identity. For the purpose of comparative values, these responses 
will be described in this section. This question provoked a great deal of laughter 
and confusion, as many people had never thought about how they know, they “just 
know” was a frequent response. This indicates the assumed nature of ethnicity, 
e.g. one is what one is because one is. Participants were then asked who taught 
them about their ethnic identity. This repeat of the child question was designed 
primarily to determine if there is a generation difference that might be attributed to 
ethnic identity formation under the USSR as compared to independence.
Ethnicity o f Self & Other: Qualities and Descriptions: The series of questions
relating to ethnicity and self/other identity comprise the “heart” of the survey.
These were designed to probe about the nature of ethnic identity and gender.
Participants were asked if they had an ethnic identity before they were asked any
other questions about their own ethnicity. The researcher did not want to assume
that people thought they had an ethnicity. This procedure also was followed for all
surveys. The participants were then asked about the qualities of their ethnicity.
This question, coupled with a later question about the traditions, symbols, values,
and stories of the participants’ ethnicity, was designed to capture “ethnic identity
markers” as people who live these markers understand them. The body of
literature on ethnicity is rich in the importance of land, traditions, symbols, values,
and stories in ethnic communities. The researcher wanted to determine if these
were as important to people in daily life as the academy might claim. The final
questions of this series were asked later in the survey, when people felt the most
comfortable, and asked directly if men and women have different understandings
of ethnic identity. This question was directly followed by asking the participant if
they as a man (or woman) felt an ethnic or citizen identity before being male (or
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female). Then the question was reversed, and the participant was asked how they 
thought the opposite sex would respond.
• Citizenship & Ethnicity o f State: The questions on citizenship and ethnic identity 
of the state complement similar questions in all of the other surveys. These were 
designed for comparative value between different actors in society, those 
attempting to influence new concepts of citizenship, state identity, and ethnic 
identity, i.e. government leaders, USAID officials and partner NGOs, and 
community NGOs, and those who are the target of that influence, i.e. the adult 
population. As concepts of citizenship, state, and identity have all drastically 
changed since independence from the USSR, these primary political identities are 
in great flux and suffer from different actors attempting to influence the population 
in different ways. The question, “Who is a citizen of Kyrgyzstan?” sought to 
determine if the increasing “Kyrgyzness” of the state identity was influencing the 
population’s understanding of who belonged as well as the predominance of jus 
soli, where one lives, or jus sanguine, who one is. This question also hoped to 
solicit a gender response. The series of questions regarding the ethnic identity of 
the state proved baffling for most people. The no response rate was high on this 
question, as most people were reluctant to respond directly that they did not know.
• Active in Politics/Community/Nationalism: These questions were meant to 
determine the level of political and community apathy, as well as the level of 
nationalism. These answers are very indicative of how “democracy” has blocked, 
restricted, and ignored the population rather than engage and empower the average 
person as it should. This indicates how poorly “democratic” reform is working in 
Kyrgyzstan.
• Life Conditions Under Independence Versus the USSR: This question was written 
to ask, “If you have an ethnic identity, is it different under the new Kyrgyz State 
than it was during the Soviet period?” Originally, the question was meant to gain 
insight into the changing nature of ethnicity. However, it became very clear, after 
the first few surveys, that people interpreted this question as, “How has life 
changed since Soviet times?” The question was changed to ask, “Is life different 
now than it was under Soviet rule?” This question, more than any other, provoked 
great discussion, gratitude, and grief. Participants often “poured their hearts out” 
relating how bad life had become.
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Survey Sets C.l and D.l. NGQ-Govemment were administered in order to determine 
NGO, largely female, and government, largely male, reactions to concepts of 
ethnicity, democracy, gender, and citizenship. These surveys aim: (a) to establish if 
the official and the male perspective is hostile to women’s political participation, if 
NGO participation is taken seriously, if men see the public space expanding for 
women, and if male government leaders view women as (equal) citizens; (b) to 
determine why leaders of Kyrgyz civil society became involved, if they have formal 
political ambitions, how they see their work affecting Kyrgyz “democracy,” if there is 
an ethnic component to this work, if they think there are problems between citizenship 
and women; and (c) to assist overall determining linkages between gender, civil 
society, citizenship, and ethnicity.
• NGO Perspective: In order to identify the relationship between civil society, 
gender, ethnicity, and democratic assistance, leaders of NGOs in Kyrgyzstan were 
interviewed. It is already known, through previous research and work in the 
community by the researcher, that this population is disproportionately female. 
When possible, NGO directors, rather than staff, were interviewed because the 
NGO leaders influence the policy and decisions of that NGO. These surveys were 
completed in writing by the participants under the supervision of the researcher.
While the survey sample is small, because the respondents are simultaneously: (a) 
community leaders, and (b) actors in whom US donors place so much hope in and 
responsibility for encouraging democracy in Kyrgyzstan, the weight of the 
responses is substantial and indicative. Responses have been coded and averaged. 
Exhibit responses have been drawn from the interview text and are displayed as 
recorded, when appropriate. These responses represent the exact answers of NGO 
members in Kyrgyzstan and have not been altered except for minor grammatical 
and spelling changes. Original text was in Russian or Kyrgyz and was translated 
to English by a native Kyrgyz/Russian speaker. No responses were interpreted as 
(a) do not know but is reluctant to admit a lack of knowledge or understanding, (b) 
is reluctant to provide a response due to fear/concern as the response may be 
considered controversial or anti-government, or (c) felt that the follow-up question 
was redundant to answers already provided to the primary question. Full survey 
responses are located in the appendix. Similar questions were asked in different 
ways, and questions were also supported by two or three follow-up questions. 
Follow-up and repeat questions serve to: (a) elicit a greater understanding of why 
an original response was provided, and (b) often provide the opportunity to gain 
responses to more sensitive questions by re-phrasing the question in a manner that
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is, perhaps, less threatening. The first three questions on the survey, name, region 
and title and name of NGO have been suppressed in order to protect identities. 
Full responses are in the appendix.
• Governmental Perspective: In order to identify the relationship among the Kyrgyz 
government, gender, ethnicity, and democratic assistance, all leaders of the local 
government, akims, were interviewed. It is already known through previous 
research/work that this population is completely male. These surveys were 
completed in an interview style with a tape recorder, and the researcher wrote 
responses onto the survey form. Although it was anticipated that these interviews 
might have been difficult, or impossible, to obtain, all akims who were able 
provided long interviews on very short notice.
Survey Set Two was designed to obtain foreign donor population response to 
concerns about local concepts of ethnicity, citizenship, civil society, and gender, and 
to determine if contradictions exist between local and international understanding of 
democracy, ethnicity, gender, and the linkages of these factors. Unfortunately, for the 
entire Survey Set Two, the only respondents were two USAID partner organisations in 
Kyrgyzstan. Due to the poor response rate of A.2, B.2, and C.2 the administration of 
D.2 was cancelled. Analysis of Survey Set Two was primarily valuable to consider 
what a significant no response rate indicated. USAID themselves undertook a 
“stocktaking” survey to determine their own reputation and areas for improvement 
(USAID 1998). Upon contacting their own staff and NGO partners, USAID had a 
staggering no response rate and in fact had to request completion of the survey and 
extend the survey deadline several times. When NGO partners did respond their 
answers were as negative as the response that this research received in this dissertation 
(USAID 1998). Therefore, both the difficulty USAID had in obtaining responses and 
then the receipt of negative answers are in support of similar difficulties this 
researcher encountered with the USAID and USAID partner surveys.
• Foreign Donor Perspective: The foreign donor and donor partner survey samples
were designed for interviews with the unit directors of the US foreign donor and
foreign donor partner population both in Washington, D.C., and Kyrgyzstan in
order to determine if there is a location relationship between understanding the
Kyrgyz identity and a location relationship between gender and democratic
assistance. When the donor community was approached by the researcher,
everyone consistently requested an e-mail of the survey rather than take the time
for an interview. All USAID and USAID partner surveys were e-mailed, three
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times at intervals of approximately four weeks. Yet, despite good relations with 
the donor community, invitations to internal meetings, and the provisions of all 
documents requested by the researcher, the response rate of the surveys was 
extremely low. Although the researcher knew the foreign donor community is a 
hermetically sealed community, as the researcher had worked in that community 
and had built good relations, the researcher did not anticipate difficulty gaining 
access and responses from the donor community. Unfortunately, for the entire 
Survey Set Two, the only respondents were two Partner Organisations in 
Kyrgyzstan out of a total estimated possible 60 responses. Due to the poor 
response rate of A.2, B.2, and C.2, the administration of D.2 was cancelled. It is 
already known through previous research/work that this population is 
disproportionately male.
5.3 Sample Size and Method of Measurement
A.1 and B.l in Survey Set One used the population parameter of the countrywide 
population of Kyrgyzstan, 4,856,200 as determined by the 1999 Kyrgyz government 
census.180 The capital city, Bishkek, is nearly at 800,000. Of the entire population
2,375,000 are men and 2,481,000 are women (Itar-Tass 1999). This population was 
sub-divided among the six oblasts plus Bishkek in order to sample a relevant 
proportion of urban-versus rural population and to gain a sample size that is accurately 
distributed throughout the country. In October 1999, a new oblast was created, 
Batken. However, the field research had already been conducted when this new oblast 
was part of Osh oblast. Therefore, this data is based on the number of oblasts at the 
time of the field research in August 1999. As the 1999 census did not provide a 
break-down of population by oblast, an assumption was made that the oblasts grew at 
the same rate and proportion since the last governmental figures, listed below. This is 
the most accurate population breakdown currently available. The sample size 
calculation used Epi-info for a proportion (relative margin) with a total population of 
4,856,200 confidence rate at 95% or .95 margin .05 probability .50 sample size is 384. 
Of this sample size, approximately half of the population interviewed were women, 
half men. Proportional random, cluster sampling procedures were used for A. 1 and
B.l.
C.1-D.2 in Survey Set One and Two defined the population parameter as the number
of directors or managers in each set. Government officials are defined as: akims, or
oblast directors. Non-proportional, non-random systematic matching, purposeful
sampling procedures were used for C.l and D.2. The C.l Survey Set takes into
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account the fact that while officially 961 NGOs are legally registered in Kyrgyzstan, 
common estimates place the number of authentic NGOs at an estimated 50 to 60 in 
number.
Sample Size fo rA .l andR 1
OBLAST POPULATION & PERCENTAGE181 SURVEY SIZE
Bishkek 592,100= 13.2%=642,051 51
Chui 747,900=16.7%=810,994 64
Issy-Kul 425,300= 9.5% = 461,179 37
Osh 1,415,500= 31.6%= 1,534,914 121
Naryn 264,200=5.9%=286,488 23
Jalal-Abad 826,800 = 18.5% = 896,550 71
Talas 204,600= 4.6%=221,860 18
Sample Size fo r  A. 1-D. 2
Survey Set One Survey Set Two
A.1) Average Adult Population: 384 A.2) USAID officials in Kyrgyzstan: 10
B.l) Average Child Population: 384 B.2) USAID partners in Kyrgyzstan: 20
C.l) NGO Leaders: 50 C.2) USAID in Washington: 10
D.l) Akims: 1 D.2) USAID partners in Washington: 20
5.3.1 Measures o f Association/Relationship
The mixed method data analysis used in this research was modelled on Tashakkori 
and Teddlie’s (1998) Type V Mixed Design (Confirmatory Investigation, Quantitative 
Data/Operations, Qualitative Analysis and Inference) (Tashakkori 1998:164); 
however, this research manipulated that model slightly to: Confirmatory Investigation, 
Dominant Quantitative Data/Operations with Supporting Qualitative Data/Operation 
and Concurrent Quantitative Analysis and Inference via Narrative Profile Formation 
by Sector. This cross-checking by mixed methodology also serves to strengthen the 
reliability and validity of all data. QUAN data is presented by the descriptive methods 
of central tendency, relative standing, and association relationships between variables.
Relevant conclusions drawn from the field research results are divided by survey set 
and sector, as outlined below. All survey sets C.l-D.2 confirmed the argument
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developed in Chapters One and Two that the understandings of democracy, 
citizenship, and civil society are highly gendered to the disadvantage of women. 
Significantly, the research confirms the reality of these theories in the daily lives of 
citizens in the transitional democratic structure of Kyrgyzstan, and provides evidence 
that all “players” are aware of the gender divisions and discrimination against women. 
Additionally, all survey sets expressed frustration/problems with foreign assistance. 
A.1, the survey set designed to test the primary hypothesis that ethnicity is gendered, 
confirms the emerging body of literature that asserts there is a gender character to 
ethnic identity. Survey Set A.1 results and conclusions are described first and 
separately from the remaining surveys.
The main variable in this survey set revolves around adult males compared with adult 
females regarding their perception of ethnic identity. Gender is the independent 
variable (x) and the concept of ethnic identity is the dependent variable (y). Gender 
emerges as the determinant of ethnic identity. This research is correlation research, 
not influencing any variables but only measuring and seeking relations (correlation) 
between the sets of variables with the main variable set relationship being that 
between gender and ethnic identity. The nature of the variables, or indicators, listed 
below is nominal variables, allowing for qualitative classification and for quantitative 
measurement. Additionally, the resulting data was crosstabbed for four key variables: 
gender, age, location by regional oblast, and ethnicity and then also controlled for 
gender. Education was also crosstabbed and controlled for gender; however, this 
initial cross variant analysis was not factored into the final results because education 
level appeared to have little affect on response. The only two questions where 
education levels had significant results were: (1) in relation to the question, “Is 
ethnicity more important for men or women or is there no difference?” 51% of 
secondary school educated women said there was no difference while 51% of 
university educated men said they did not know; (2) The question, “Does the Kyrgyz 
state have an ethnicity?” 68% of secondary school educated women and 59% of 
secondary school educated men. The highest percentages of responses that cited 
Kyrgyz blood and/or ethnicity came from both university educated men and women.
The aim of this exploratory research was to provide, or map, an understanding of how
people perceive the issues surrounding ethnicity. Therefore, however cumbersome for
statistical analysis, open answers were the only research tool that could ensure more
valid, untainted responses. In survey set A.1, the free range of response mechanisms
resulted in a large and diverse body of data with many similar or slightly similar
responses. In order to organise A.1 results for statistical analysis, these responses had
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to be reduced into categories. While categories do not necessarily produce the most 
precise tool, they are necessary in order to gain generalisation. Two levels of analysis 
were used in A. 1 in order to enable the clearest understandings of the results. The first 
category grouping, resulting in Frequency Table One, listed in the appendix, was used 
for the first tier of results, level one. In the frequency tables, the valid percentage is 
the number used for data analysis. At times, original raw responses are mentioned, 
when the lack of statistical significance renders these answers valuable.
The second level of analysis utilises Frequency Table Two, listed in the appendix, 
unless otherwise stated, and forms a four-step process. First, the original analysis was 
crosstabbed by region, ethnicity, age, and gender. Significant and stable relations that 
emerged from this first crosstab step are described in the result section. Second, 
gender was controlled for across all questions. Third, this entire process was repeated 
in collapsed categories that enabled the small sample size to provide slightly more 
statistically significant responses. This is called Crosstab 2. The first data analysis is 
labelled Crosstab 1. Fourthly, on Crosstab 2 only, gender was controlled for, making 
Crosstab 2G. Any significant relationships that emerged due to a gender control or 
were suppressed due to a lack of gender analysis are described and explored in the 
analysis of the research. Controlling for gender provided evidence of several 
important aspects of ethnicity and demonstrated the relevance of a gender analysis in 
relation to ethnicity.
At times, significant relationships emerged that were not stable. A stable relationship 
is defined as having a minimum of 20%, or less, cells with an expected count less than 
five. The lower the percentage the more stable the relationship. The instability of 
some results was largely due to the low sample size; thus even though a relationship 
may exist the sample size must be larger in order to determine if the relationship is 
always likely to exist. However, significant relationships that are not stable still 
provide indication that more extensive surveying may yield a significant-stable 
relationship and are thus worthy of mention. Nearly stable significant relationships 
are still accounted for. It is important to understand that the two measures of 
association, the Pearson R correlation coefficient and the Spearmen correlation, are 
conservative measures given the small sample size and the exploratory nature of the 
analysis. Therefore, the results have been taken beyond simple statistical analysis and 
controlled for gender.
Significant relationships are defined as having a Pearson Chi-Square value, often
called the P-value, lower than 0.05. The lower the P-value the more likely the
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relationship. The Pearson Chi-Square represents the statistical significance of the 
relationship. A P-value was run on the resulting data. The reliability or the P-value 
(statistical significance level) of a result is the estimated measure of the degree to 
which it is an accurate representative of the population. The value of the P-value 
represents a decreasing index of the reliability of a result as outlined by Brownlee 
(1960). The higher the P-value, the less reliable the observed relation between the 
sample variable as an indicator of the relation between the respective variables in the 
population. The P-value represents the probability of error involved in accepting the 
observed result as valid, i.e., a P-value of .05 (i.e., 1/20) would indicate there is a 5% 
probability that the variable relation is a “fluke.” In an effort to consider the widest 
possible range of results, statistically significant or near significant, and stable or near 
stable results have been included in the results section below. The final matrix, 
however, includes only significant and stable results. Gender Control results are noted 
by (G), i.e., AgeG. Under regional significance, the capital city, Bishkek, is part of 
Chui oblast, which makes Chui a significant region,
5.4 Evaluation of the Validity/Reliability of Data Results
The power of the research to support results/inferences is highly dependent on the 
quality of the data collection and the assurance of validity. Therefore, before outlining 
the data results the following section considers the reliability and quality of the 
collected data by examining: (1) validity of research design/structure, (2) validity of 
research measurement, and (3) validity of the forthcoming results. Since this is mixed 
methodology research, both QUAN and QUAL validity considerations are relevant. 
Measurement validity of QUAN is dependent on the quality of the data collected. 
Internal and external validity is then a component of the conclusions made on the 
analysed data. QUAL methods, on the other hand, require that analysis coincides 
with, or takes place, shortly after data collection. Inferences are made and more 
information is collected. Because the researcher collected the QUAN data directly, 
the researcher was able to take advantage of both QUAL/QUAN methods and 
improve the overall outcome, validity, and depth of the research results.
A dominant QUAN method of collecting data, evaluating data quality, and analysing
for results was implemented parallel to supporting QUAL methods including: (1) the
ability of the surveys to be flexible and respond to concerns that participants had,
either in re-wording questions in one case, or in going off the track of the survey to
record related issues, stories, etc. that were not part of the formal interview process;
(2) being “in the field” also allowed for the vital QUAL methods of observation and
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prolonged engagement; (3) a reflexive journal maintained throughout the QUAN data 
collection supports and contributes to data results; (4) most important, although the 
surveys had a pre-established structure/questions, these questions allowed for the 
QUAL principle of emerging categories. While this meant a great deal more effort 
during the QUAN analysis phase, grouping and regrouping, in order to gather diverge 
responses into similar and meaningful categories, the QUAL emerging principle 
greatly enhanced the reliability of the data in that it was not influenced by the 
researcher providing pre-existing categories to select from, but allowed for open- 
ended response, thereby gaining a more accurate representation of the participants 
authentic opinions; and (5) QUAN data has been Qualitized into narrative summaries. 
In sum, QUAN data without the support of QUAL methods is significantly weaker. 
As this research benefits from a mixed model approach, the quality of the data is 
significantly increased.
5.4.1 Validity o f Research Design Strategy
First, in order to reduce for error and increase the MAXMINCON principle (Kerlinger 
1986), maximise experimental variance, minimise error, and control extraneous 
variance (Tashakkori 1998:31), the following factors, intended to overcome selection 
bias and account for additional relationships that could influence the main variable, 
were taken into account as part of original research design and data collection 
techniques.
Observer Interference: Conducting field research into the areas of gender and 
ethnicity in Central Asia is sensitive. As the researcher is female, this creates 
additional consideration. Due to historical factors and current tensions surrounding 
both gender and ethnicity, this field research was designed with the utmost cultural 
sensitivity. In addition to specific considerations, listed below, feminist 
methodologies have contributed throughout the research to constructing a more 
sensitive research design. The very nature of feminist standpoint theory and feminist 
ways of knowing contribute to a more reliable, less threatening, data collection 
instrument (Renzetti and Lee 1993:171). Feminist methodology was used in 
constructing a sensitive research design that enabled all aspects of the field research to 
gather highly sensitive material in a relatively unobtrusive manner.
The researcher’s own identity underwent several shifts (away from Western, white
female) that were advantageous. First, because gender is so salient in Kyrgyz society
and owing to the fact that the majority of the people do not know how to categorise a
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Western, white woman, the third gender of “honorary male” is often used by the 
Kyrgyz. The status of honorary male provided the researcher with all the benefits of 
being a female in Kyrgyz society and few of the negatives as well as most of the 
benefits of being a male to which there are few negatives. For example, the researcher 
was welcomed among the women as ajay, sister/aunt, but could also be alone with all 
the men to discuss politics. Second, the researcher occupied the respected status of 
guest, which is a position of considerable importance due to local rules and norms of 
hospitality. A foreign guest receives heightened respect due to fear, curiosity, and a 
desire to show foreigners the most famous aspect of Kyrgyz identity: hospitality. 
Although the researcher was a foreigner, the researcher was also considered “a Kyrgyz 
daughter,” due to the length of time the researcher had lived and worked in 
Kyrgyzstan and the knowledge that the researcher exhibited about Kyrgyz culture and 
traditions. The researcher was placed into the optimal hybrid category receiving the 
respect for a foreigner and the intimacy that would be provided to a Kyrgyz, the 
flexibility and obscurity of a woman and access and privilege reserved for men.
Participant Reactivity: Due to historical factors of fear associated with “official 
surveys” and questions of citizenship, employment, and ethnic identity, participant 
reactivity is an important element to consider. Allowances for mitigating participant 
reactivity were considered. Additionally, as participant reactivity is directly correlated 
to an observer component, the researcher's status also was factored into situational 
analysis. Finally, in order to mitigate sampling bias and sampling error the research 
design took the following factors into account during analysis. Although the 
researcher anticipated a high degree of reluctance to answer questions, honestly or at 
length, she was surprised to find these expectations were not correct. On the contrary, 
due to the extreme frustration, poverty, and loss of hope, the majority of people 
interviewed were grateful to have been asked their opinion and, in most cases, more 
than willing to speak openly, honestly, and at great length about issues of citizenship, 
democracy, and ethnicity. The researcher’s consideration, in the end, was how to 
conclude interviews that might have gone on for hours, in a gentle manner. The 
researcher did not anticipate the emotional fatigue resulting from the desperation of 
the respondents and their psychological need to “unload.” Additionally, the researcher 
did not anticipate the gratitude and pride, exhibited by the majority of respondents, at 
being asked their opinion about their country. The researcher was frequently thanked 
and congratulated for her interest in Kyrgyzstan.
This positive participant reaction also resulted from the selection and accompaniment
of a young Kyrgyz female research assistant. While Kyrgyz participants felt more
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trustful and open due to the presence of a Kyrgyz assistant, Russian and Uzbeks in the 
rural regions were often more guarded, thus, slightly tainting some responses. In 
Bishkek, minorities did not seem troubled by the presence of a Kyrgyz assistant, and 
frequently related problems with relationships with Kyrgyz. A small degree of tainted 
results did occur in Jalal-Abad and Osh oblast where Uzbeks would claim they were 
nationalists but refuse to explain why (due, most likely, to the presence of a Kyrgyz 
research assistant). Correspondingly, Kyrgyz in this region claimed they were 
nationalists because they “hated” Uzbeks. Uzbek-Kyrgyz tensions in this region are 
notoriously high. Additionally, Osh adult population surveys were not performed by 
the researcher but by a male, Kyrgyz tolerance education NGO worker, trained by the 
researcher. Therefore, Osh adult population results may be tainted and cannot be 
guaranteed for quality control.
Soviet Residue for Terms o f Ethnicity and Nationalism: As outlined in Chapter Three, 
the Russian equivalent of the English word nationality is natsionalnost. While 
nationality in a Western context often refers to citizenship, the Russian natsionalnost 
referred to an individual’s membership in a “national” collective within Soviet 
citizenship. Natsionalnost is inherited from one’s parents and grazhdanstvo or 
citizenship from the state. Nationalism, natsionalism, was understood to be a 
dangerous and negative term under the USSR. Inter-national, or friendship among the 
nations of the USSR, was the accepted term. The Survey A.1 asked “Are you a 
nationalist? If so, yes? If not, why not?” This question was designed to determine if 
the negative context of nationalism, believing that one’s nation/ethnic group is better 
than others or that one hates another nation/ethnic group (which would have been a 
crime against the state under Soviet rule) had increased in the decade of authentic 
Kyrgyz independence since the collapse of the USSR.
Due to the outbreaks of ethnic tension and fighting in Kyrgyzstan, there has been 
concern that nationalism, in the negative sense of hating another ethnic group, has 
drastically increased. The follow-up question asking for a justification for being or 
not being a nationalist was structured in order to determine reasons for ethnic hatred 
or tolerance. As anticipated, with the exception of the South of Kyrgyzstan, most 
people responded that they were not “nationalists” but “inter-nationalists” because 
they grew up with a “love for all Soviet nations.”
Ethnicity in Russian is ethnos. Soviet research largely understood ethnos to be “self-
reproducing collectives based on self-identification and a distinct culture as well as...
a major determinant of social action” (Shanin 1989,414). The researcher did not want
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the surveys to reflect an assumption that people inherently had an ethnicity. Thus, the 
first survey question was, “Do you have an ethnos?” In line with literature and 
history, many Russians felt that only non-Russians had ethnicity, that it was 
something more primitive than Russians, as the former dominant ethnic group had. 
When a person did not understand the word ethnos (i.e., a few people gave tribal 
answers), no correction was made as the researcher wished to determine how people 
in Kyrgyzstan understood these concepts today. When translated into Kyrgyz the term 
that best conveyed the concept of ethnicity was tamyr which translates as roots and 
implies a tribal or regional response and not an ethnicity. Therefore, even when doing 
the survey in Kyrgyz the Russian word ethnos was used. Complete survey questions, 
both in Russian and English, are located in the appendix.
Gender: Information was collected, whenever possible, separated by gender. Due to 
the traditional nature of Kyrgyz society, a female’s results may be tainted by her 
husband’s opinion if both were interviewed together. Had these interviews been 
conducted collectively, with spouses/relatives present, the measurement validity 
would have been severely hindered as, due to the patriarchal nature of society, wives 
would not feel free to respond to the questions honestly but, in most cases, would 
provide the same response as her husband. Evidence of this phenomena is 
demonstrated by the intractable problem of “family voting” where the husband votes 
for the wife and female relatives.
Rural/Urban Difference: The population of Kyrgyzstan is 4.8 million of which
800,000 live in the capital city, Bishkek. In order to obtain a more reliable survey of 
the representative population of Kyrgyzstan, survey samples were divided per oblast. 
As the rural/urban divide is drastic, a proportional representation was also necessary to 
consider the difference between rural and urban citizens and the impact, if any, that 
relationship may have on gender and ethnic concept.182 Moreover, since of the 111 
foreign donor offices located in Kyrgyzstan only 15 foreign donor offices are located 
outside of Bishkek/Chui oblast, the majority of interaction with foreigners occurs in 
Bishkek. In the more remote regions, the researcher was, at times, the first 
foreigner with whom people had direct contact. This often prompted curiosity and 
delight, as opposed to foreign-local relations in Bishkek, which are steadily declining, 
and most often resentful and cynical.
Illiteracy/Poverty: The illiteracy rate in the rural population is high. Moreover, most
of those who are literate do not have a telephone or receive mail, as the postal system
has collapsed. In order not to bias the sample toward literate/wealthy individuals,
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questionnaires were not dispensed but were read to individuals with responses 
recorded by the researcher. The rural areas were surveyed in Kyrgyz language, when 
necessary, with the assistance of a Kyrgyz language translator/assistant. Nearly all 
interviews were performed with the presence of a tape recorder, as a backup to the 
written records.
5.4.2 Validity o f Measurement
Although statistic validity for the adult population, A.I., was high when controlling 
for gender between gender and ethnicity (outlined in section 8.4.5) and other variables 
because confidence in the results (conclusions/inferences/relationships) is so depended 
upon further proof of validity, the following three sections provided additional 
evidence, not only for A.1, but for all the other survey sets (B.1-D.2), which were not 
as extensively statistically analysed. These validity considerations ensure that the 
research measured what it was intended to measure and not something else and that 
the measurement was relatively error free. These validity tests, structured into the 
development of the surveys and run on the resulting data, provide confidence that the 
survey sets and resulting data do possess a high-validity rate and thus, give additional 
credibility to the results. The first section explains the validity of the measurements.
The face validity, what the survey appeared to be surveying, was constructed slightly 
differently from the actual objective, in order to lower the likelihood of participant 
reactivity that would skew results. Participants often thought the surveys were 
primarily about gathering the stories and traditions of Kyrgyzstan rather than testing 
for ethnic identity and gender. This low face validity was apparent by the participant 
reactions (outlined in section 8.2.2., Participant Reactivity). The low face value 
indicates that participant reactivity was also low, thereby, obtaining “cleaner,” more 
authentic results.
Judgement validity in this research is proven to be high. Prior to and during survey
implementation, various “experts” were invited to assess the questionnaires in order to
provide professional judgement as to the validity of the structure and content relevant
to determining anticipated outcomes. The statistics advisor at The London School of
Economics’ Methodology Institute, Amani Siyam, examined, and approved all survey
structures and methodology prior to implementation. Two Kyrgyz, on professional
USAID fellowships in America, Salta Sulamanova and Aisuluu Bedaleava, and
Kyrgyz students at the American University in Kyrgyzstan examined and approved
the surveys’ cultural content. Kate Johnson, of the Women in Development (WID)
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office of USAID examined the surveys’ development and gender content. Johnson 
suggested that all questions highlighting different levels of knowledge between 
USAID Washington and USAID Kyrgyzstan were unnecessarily antagonistic. These 
were removed at Johnson’s request on the condition that she would encourage USAID 
staff members to complete the surveys if these questions were removed. USAID staff 
members in Kyrgyzstan and Washington examined the surveys for content and 
responded positively, citing that USAID was attempting new programs in the 
unexplored area of gendered ethnicity, and that these results would be very useful. 
Cultural, developmental, and statistical “expert judgements” were sought prior to and 
during survey implementation, all with very positive feedback, providing proof of 
high levels of judgement validity.
The predictive validity is high because of the high indicant of expected/anticipated 
results matching actual results, particularly the main hypothesis. Therefore, the 
survey instruments are considered valid because they were able to accurately predict 
the pre-supposed outcome/responses. The effectiveness of this research to support the 
inference that stated variables, particularly gender and concepts of ethnicity, are linked 
in a relational manner is high due to the research structure that isolates concepts of 
ethnicity, across the population of a country, with the gender factor. Moreover, the 
mixture of qualitative and quantitative inquiry allows for greater examination and 
explanation of the resulting relationship. This is readily apparent due to the statistical 
conclusion validity of the resulting high covariation of gender and concepts of 
ethnicity. Therefore, the internal validity rate is proven to be high.
Empirical validity is the most common means of assessing measurement validity 
providing proof that results should be consistent with measures of other related 
constructs or surveys/measures of similar construct (convergent validity) and/or 
results should be inconsistent with unrelated measures of unrelated constructs/surveys 
(discriminate or divergent validity). In other words, triangulation of data results from 
different survey sets within the overall research should indicate similar results, which 
they do. For example, USAID partners provided evidence of problems with foreign 
assistance in Kyrgyzstan, as did akims, and NGO directors. The reliability of the 
results that there appears to be problems with foreign aid is high. Likewise with the 
question concerning the gender of NGO directors, all survey groups confirm that 
women form the NGO community of Kyrgyzstan. This empirical validity is proven 
through the survey sets results, in the preceding sections, as results were compared 
and contrasted between sets.
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External validity of the measurements is also the degree to which the results may be 
transferable. Transferability of generalisation is a considerable outcome of this 
research because of: (a) the global nature of gender ethnicity, i.e. these are not 
relationships exclusive to Kyrgyzstan; and (b) the global nature of democracy 
assistance and their standard structures, i.e. the US government does not only provide 
democracy assistance to Kyrgyzstan. USAID’s request to examine these research 
results for assistance in future programming as well as the small, but growing, body of 
literature linking and examining the relationship between gender and ethnicity 
provides evidence that the results of this research are regarded as externally valid.
Empirical/ convergent validity is also evidenced by the high rate of compatibility of 
the research results of this dissertation to those from similar surveys. Although there 
have been no other surveys completed in Central Asia that isolate gender, ethnicity 
and US democracy assistance, there have been a number of surveys completed on 
issues that relate to parts of the survey sets of this dissertation. These studies have 
been referenced in Chapter Four and include:
• The World Bank completed the only known survey on the relevance of ethnicity 
to development in Central Asia (Youssef 1995). The Bank concludes that there 
are three types of potential ethnic conflict: (1) ethno-territorial, (2) ethno- 
environmental, and (3) ethno-economic (Youssef 1995:3). Potential for wide 
scale ethnic conflict in Kyrgyzstan/Central Asia is high.184 The study notes that 
the recent outbreaks of violence demonstrate that development-related problems, 
i.e., poverty, unemployment, lack of housing, lack of water, lack of women’s 
rights, collapsed education systems, etc., exacerbate existing relationships of 
conflict between ethnic and tribal groups (Youssef 1995:ii). While the Bank failed 
to examine in-depth the role of gender in ethnic conflict, the other Bank results 
corroborate the results of this dissertation research: that ethnicity is relevant, 
influential, and an ignored component of development, and that lack of attention 
to women’s issues is one component of potential ethnic violence.
• Richard Dobson’s (US Information Agency [USIA] Office of Research) survey of
the Kyrgyz population regarding the state of “democracy” (Dobson 1995)
confirms results from this dissertation field research in the area of lack of
democracy, popular frustration, and a general feeling that life was better under
Soviet rule than today. According to the Dobson study, “Many participants drew
attention to improprieties in the appointment of persons to positions of
responsibility, especially appointments according to family, clan, or ethnic ties
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rather than competence” (Dobson 1995:2). Dobson’s respondents noted, “People 
say with dismay that the law of the jungle is beginning to rule,” says a Russian 
student at Jalal-Abad University (Dobson 1995:5). One man in Jalal-Abad said, 
“It’s impossible to build a house, yet kingly villages are springing up! Little towns 
of well-to-do people are growing our midst” (Dobson 1995:5). A law student 
explained, “We don’t have rich people and poor people but rich people and 
destitute people!” (Dobson 1995:5). Additionally, the US Department of State and 
Amnesty Internal support Dobson’s findings and the results of this research (US 
Department of State 2000; Amnesty International 1998). These, among other 
reports from NGOs that monitor the region, are listed through Chapter Six, as 
providing evidence to the assertions of this dissertation.
• The International Foundation for Electoral Systems’ (IFES) USAID funded survey 
(IFES 1997) contradicts both this researcher’s findings and Dobson’s results with 
a reported 60% of those interviewed in the IFES survey claiming that Kyrgyzstan 
is a democracy. There are two factors that may account for this contradiction: (a) 
the IFES survey was completed four years before the field research of this 
dissertation; and (b) IFES conducted interviews in people’s homes-which means 
that people would have been conscious of making a good impression on their guest 
and also initiates the fear (from Soviet times) that their home may be wire tapped. 
IFES also reported that 43% of people thought the life of their children would be 
worse than their life—compared to only 32% who thought their children’s life 
would be better. In addition, 86% said that official corruption is a serious 
problem.
• Lubin’s (1994) study provides inconsistent or divergent validity on the point of 
nationalism; however, Lubin’s study is in conflict with all other studies relating to 
the potential for ethnic violence in Central Asia. Lubin states that, “For many 
Uzbeks and Kazaks included in the survey, nationality or citizenship played an 
insignificant role as a focal point of identity. The family and community showed 
to be the major point of reference and more powerful source of self-identity” 
(Lubin 1994). However, The World Bank study states, “Ethnic affiliation showed 
to be the strongest bond in most aspects of life for the majority of Uzbeks and 
Kazakh respondents surveyed in 1994. Most expressed strong desires to not work 
with and not live next door to another ethnic group than their own; least of all to 
have a member of another ethnic group marry into their family” (Youssef 
1995:24). Field research from this dissertation supports The Bank’s results,
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demonstrating that ethnic/national identity is a vital aspect to the lives of citizens 
of Central Asia, particularly Southern Kyrgyzstan.
• Finally, an instructive study of “ethnic” conflict in London communities 
discovered that in response to the fundamental problems resulting from a 
particular conflict, “women expressed the belief that, as women, they were part of 
the solution to these problems” (Reid and Burlet 1998:280). Moreover, the 
women argued that in the private space of the home they held power that they 
could use to discourage their male relatives from participation in violent street 
protests. These women also asserted that they were a powerful influence in 
encouraging constructive solutions to community problems (Reid and Burlet 
1998,280). Finally, many of the women argued that the exclusive presence of 
men in conflict situations is symptomatic of a “macho religio-cultural identity 
which socialises male youths to believe that they are more important than women 
and exclusively in charge of community honour” (Reid and Burlet 1998:280). The 
Reid and Burlet study suggests that women in civil society hold the potential to 
heal and prevent ethnic conflict. As outlined in Chapter Four, although 
democracy assistance programs believe that civil society promotion is the key to 
consolidating strong democracies, they have not yet recognised and, therefore, 
have failed to utilise a powerful tool in combating and preventing ethnic conflict 
and violent nationalism, women at the community level who are leading civil 
society. The Reid and Burlet study, combined with the knowledge that women 
comprise the overwhelming leaders in civil society and the results from the field 
research of this dissertation demonstrating that women: (a) self-select gender over 
the ethnic as a primary identity and that (b) women’s understanding of an ethnic 
identity is significantly less violent than corresponding male descriptions and thus 
demands urgent follow-up from policy makers and the development community. 
These findings should also encourage the academy to examine and understand 
ethnicity in new gendered dimensions.
5.4.3 Validity o f Results
Reliability, internal validity, and credibility of results represent different terms for the
same concern; are the results valid and if so why? It is not sufficient to prove that the
measurement tool, surveys in this case, had a high validity. The credibility of the
results, or the internal validity of the data, must also be examined. For survey set A. 1,
this is largely accomplished by traditional QUAN methods listed below. For the
remainder of the surveys, and including A.1, the following methods of reliability tests
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provide additional means for proving that the relationships between the variables, 
primarily gender and ethnicity, are “real” and not spurious (Tashakkori 1998; 
Krathwohl 1993).
Proof of explanation credibility and translation fidelity provide conceptual evidence 
linking the variables. In this research, the relationship between the variables is 
theoretical and conceptually sound because gender identities cross and influence all 
other human identity layers. Therefore, ethnic identity, as a form of human identity, is 
also influenced by, and exhibits, gendered differences. The translation fidelity, the 
degree to which the conceptual framework has been translated into elements of the 
measurement tool is high. This is indicated by the matching theoretical categories of 
Chapter One to Five, democracy, ethnicity, and gender, in the survey structures. 
Eliminating rival explanations is critical for result reliability. Any other plausible 
explanations for the results have been eliminated by the detailed participant reactivity, 
Section 8.2.2. of this chapter. Because the survey method was carefully constructed to 
consider and overcome selection bias, account for, and eliminate, additional 
relationships that could influence the main variable (that men and women were 
interviewed separately), the possibility of interfering factors or rival explanations has 
been reduced. The results are credible because both conceptual and empirical 
evidence has been careful constructed.
QUAN Indicators o f Reliability
Because the nature of A.1 was exploratory and mapping, attempting to indicate 
hypothesised correlations, there are no exact tests for quantitative validity that can be 
observed, other than those inherent to the statistical process of obtaining results. 
These tests and measures of data validity were included in the data results section 
above and explained as part of the process of examining the range of observations 
possible from the data. That four levels of analysis were completed on this small 
sample size and that questions were open-ended, providing more reliable results, are 
the most significant measures of reliability for Survey Set A. 1.
QUAL Indicators of Reliability
The additional crosscheck of qualitative and quantitative provides final evidence of
the high rate of validity and reliability of the results and the methods of this
dissertation research Survey Sets A.1-D.2. Lincoln and Guba (1985) provide the basis
for accounting for the “trustworthiness” of the data, as it is often called in QUAL
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research. The following tests provide evidence of QUAL credibility (Tashakkori, 
1998:90-93). Credibility is the same concept as QUAN reliability.
Prolonged engagement in the research environment, or “the field,” is vital to 
establishing credibility of knowledge and comprehension of how that society operates. 
Of all the QUAL credibility measures, prolonged engagement is most important 
because without this “deep immersion” a researcher is more than likely to 
misunderstand complex cultural norms, alienate the participant population, ask 
irrelevant questions, and risk missing important considerations. Moreover, a 
researcher who has not spent sufficient time in the field is unable to determine if 
participant responses are valid or if, perhaps, the participant is lying or providing 
misleading information due to cultural issues. Without a solid background of 
prolonged engagement, QUAN results are highly suspect.
Persistent observation is complementary to prolonged engagement. It is possible for a 
researcher to be in a community for an extended time without exerting observation 
techniques. In other words, quantity of time spent in the field does not necessarily 
indicate a firm and adequate understanding of the community in question. It is the 
QUAL credibility check of persistent observation that provides validity to the 
prolonged engagement aspect. Persistent observation, coupled with prolonged 
engagement, is particularly relevant to the Kyrgyz context in that Kyrgyzstan, as a 
society in transition, is extremely socially complex with vast paradoxes, and 
competing social norms. Indeed, it was not until the researcher had lived and worked 
in Kyrgyzstan for a year that she began to understand how and why things were done 
and began to think with a “Kyrgyz mentality.” That said, acquiring the “Kyrgyz 
mentality” was a difficult and painful process because this viewpoint is almost 
completely opposite to a Western understanding of the world.
Moreover, because the Kyrgyz are a closed and paranoid society, it took nearly a year
before the researcher was accepted as a friend, and trust was adequate enough to be
invited into Kyrgyz homes: the ultimate indication of acceptance. During this time,
the researcher maintained a non-fictional account of her life focusing on the
psychological difficulties, for observer and participant, of living in a country in
transition. This manuscript provided a reference for recalling the emotions and
insights into the Kyrgyz culture/ethnicity, gender relations, and problems with foreign
democracy assistance. Indeed, the account assisted in configuring the conceptual
framework of this dissertation. Extensive prolonged and comprehensive engagement
and observation provided additional guarantees that both the researcher’s quality of
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information, as well as inferences from this data, were based on extensive and multi­
faceted experience in Kyrgyzstan and the foreign assistance community.
Benefits of thick description/descriptive methods were further evidenced by the use of 
a daily reflexive journal maintained during the field research surveying in 1999. 
These QUAL tools allow for a great deal of descriptive information to be gathered, 
considered, and explained. Moreover, maintaining the reflexive journal, recording 
regular information about self and method forced the researcher to reflect on the day- 
to-day issues of the on-going QUAN research. This additional QUAL support and 
data collection necessarily enhanced the QUAN data collection because daily time 
was set aside for thinking about the process of QUAN data collection, participant 
responses, the researcher’s role, the type of information that was being collected, etc. 
Without this pre-established simultaneous QUAL tool, the researcher may not have 
thought about the QUAN process and issues of research interference, etc. The QUAL 
reflexive journal ensured that the researcher was conscious, on a daily basis, of the 
role the researcher was playing and, no doubt, enabled the researcher to collect QUAN 
data in a far more sensitive and thoughtful manner than might have occurred with the 
QUAL reflexive journal.
5.5 Summary
Although some QUAL researchers believe that triangulation implies a fixed “truth”
can be found, this researcher understands triangulation of sources, methods, and
theories, to provide greater assurance of reliability, as well as more in-depth and
diverse insights (Denzin 1978). While there can never be “one truth,” there are social
phenomena that occur across communities and nations demanding investigation,
comprehension and comparison. The nature of reality is multiple and, to a large
degree constructed; however, there are still reasonably objective and agreed upon
social phenomena. There is a “reality” that can be tested and determined; however,
“reality” has to be recognised as confined within ways of knowing reality that are not
absolute but rather exist in degrees that can be inconsistent and multiple.185 Therefore,
because the epistemological base cannot be completely free from relationships, values,
and judgements, the “realities” of this research reflect both deductive and inductive
logical reasoning. The relationship of the knower to the known is somewhat
inseparable, including degrees of objective and subjective understandings. The role of
values in inquiry is influenced, but not bound, by the values of the knower and the
known. At its best, social science acknowledges and reduces human error; however,
social science can never be completely free from the realities of human life. This
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research supports enquiry that is relatively objective, uninfluenced by personal 
relationships, value-free, and independent. Generalisations, accounting for time and 
context, are possible and necessary. Casual linkages, cause and effect, do exist and 
although it may be difficult to obtain complete accuracy, it is necessary to 
establish/examine these kinds of relationships. Logic is both inductive and deductive.
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Chapter Six
Gendered Attachments to Ethnicity: Survey Results
“Men better understand the concepts o f citizenship 
because they feel a responsibility for their family and the republic. ” 
(Response from male akim)
“Women are submissive and it is the culture for them to be in the background.
The majority accepts this role. The few that don’t, are quite literally, outcasts. ” 
(Response from male international donor)
“Anyone can be a man but l a m a  Kyrgyz man! ”
(Response from average adult male)
6.1 Results of All Survey Sets
This chapter describes the results of the field research, divided by the relevant Survey 
Sets. Complete conclusions are detailed in the final section of this chapter. While 
some of the appropriate literature is referenced in relation to the results detailed 
below, survey results will be primarily examined in relation to the literature discussed 
in the first three chapters in Chapter Seven, primarily the Yuval-Davis Typology. 
This chapter seeks to present the research results in an objective and clear manner. 
Due to the richness of the data obtained from the complex Survey Sets, a separate 
analysis of the key results in Chapter Seven allows for a more concise presentation.
The central finding of the field research was that men and women relate differently to 
ethnic identity. Though ethnicity proved to be important to both, it was a less 
centrally defining feature for women. The women interviewed also understood their 
ethnicity in a less antagonistic way than men, as the women were less likely to define 
their ethnicity with adjectives and events that presumed a conflict with “the other.” 
The second important finding was that all participants shared the perception that it 
was women who were overwhelmingly prominent in the associations of civil society. 
However, this recognition of women’s role in civil society was not taken as evidence 
of their centrality to processes of democratisation. On the contrary, many men 
interviewed took the strong association between women and civil society as a marker 
of the lesser importance of non-governmental organisations in comparison to elected 
and appointed political positions. Men welcomed women’s involvement in the less
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important civil society sphere because they saw it very much as “women’s work” 
while politics was viewed as “men’s work.”
Low Response Rate
Only one survey set suffered a high no response rate: USAID Survey Sets A.2-D.2. 
This low response rate is consistent with other attempts, including one by USAID 
themselves, to survey attitudes of USAID staff members and partners and indicative of 
the sense of fear and closed corporate society that permeates USAID (Carothers 
1999). One USADD/WID staff member, originally enthusiastic about this research, 
informed the researcher that it would be difficult to receive survey responses due to 
the fear in “the agency” of providing answers to any research where it might be 
possible to determine the origin of the comments. This USAID staffer, who asked to 
remain anonymous, said “the agency” feels under attack and predicted a low rate of 
response. This low-response rate provides evidence that USAID, although attempting 
reform, remains an agency suffering from low staff moral and high paranoia, resulting 
in a “closed shop” mentality and reputation. Moreover, the high level of frustration 
toward foreign assistance by the two USAID partners did complete the surveys 
indicates that the surveys may have been perceived as a vehicle to “vent” because 
official channels for dissent, constructive criticism and even programming suggestions 
do not appear to be available.
Primary Identity
The responses to both questions relating to primary identity in Survey Set A. 1 provide
overwhelming evidence that gender is a more primary identity for women than
ethnicity, and that ethnic identity is a more primary identity for men. Moreover, the
results from both questions support each other and provide further confidence that
these results are not spurious. Not surprisingly, the majority of those who gave ethnic
responses were Kyrgyz, the new ethnic majority in Kyrgyzstan. Age and region had
some affect on responses with people at or over 35 largely giving ethnic, citizen, or
gender responses. When age was controlled by gender it revealed that the women
who did give an ethnic response were largely 35 or older, while the men, conversely,
who gave an ethnic response were under 35. This may indicate that ethnic identity
and attachment develops and is an identity that women “grow” or are conditioned into;
alternatively it may suggest that ethnicity is becoming less central to the younger
generation of Kyrgyzstan’s women. As for region, the overwhelming majority of
those that provided negative adjectives when describing themselves were exclusively
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young people from the South. The negative self-impression indicates a lack of 
belonging and dissatisfaction among the Southern youth and is concerning. This 
should be factored into development programs dealing with Southern poverty and 
identity issues. When region was controlled for gender, it was revealed that half of the 
women who gave an ethnic response live in the North; while half of the men that gave 
an ethnic response, live in the South. These results are highly interesting and 
unpredicted, providing evidence of a stronger male youth ethnic attachment/identity, 
primarily in the South of Kyrgyzstan. Finally, the positive reaction to both questions 
about self-identity provides evidence of the importance of identity and self­
perceptions o f identity to people.
Overall, these results provide greater insight into the apparent willingness of women 
to cross ethnic boundaries and work together in situations of ethnic conflict. If, 
indeed, ethnicity is less important for women than their female gender then the fact 
that women are willing to co-operate in bridging ethnic communities is not surprising. 
Correspondingly, if men, particularly young men, hold a higher affinity for ethnic 
identity, then it is not surprising that a man who feels his ethnic identity is threatened 
may resort to defensive tactics, including violence. While the results do not indicate 
that women always choose gender over ethnicity, the high level of gender identity 
responses for women compared to the low level of gender identity response for men, 
for both questions, indicates the potential power a female gender identity holds. 
These results are significant to the emerging field of gender and ethnicity and demand 
greater exploration with larger survey sizes and diverse regions in order to determine 
the degree to which this may be a global phenomena.
Ethnic Origin and Teaching for Self and Children
A father, the paternal line, was the dominant response to questions about ethnic
educator and ethnic determinant of the children, with responses to both questions
supporting each other. That most participants understood their children’s identity to
be determined by the father/father’s “generations” indicates the patriarchal nature of
ethnic identity. However, this paternal nature of ethnic determinants occurred more
with ethnic Kyrgyz men and women than any other ethnic group. When ethnicity was
controlled by gender, an overwhelming percent of non-Kyrgyz non-Slavic, i.e. ethnic
“other” men, provided maternal determinant responses. More Southern women, also,
gave maternal determinant answers than any other region. In order to provide
increased assurance that these responses are not spurious, adults were asked the same
questions of themselves. When asked about their own ethnicity, more adults thought
167
their ethnicity was determined by paternity than any other response. The state came in 
after paternity as the ethnic determinant with the smallest percentage claiming 
maternal determinant. More men than women said the state was the ethnic 
determinant. Again, the majority of both men and women that gave maternal 
determinant answers live in the South and were ethnic “other.” 0% of Kyrgyz men 
gave a maternal determinant answer. This time age appeared to be relevant when 
controlled for by gender with the majority of women giving maternal determinant 
answers being under 35 years old.
As far as ethnic education is concerned, the prediction that fathers may determine 
ethnicity but mothers educate was invalid. When asked who is the ethnic educator of 
their children, paternal responses came in first, followed by schools and maternal 
response last. Again, the paternal nature of ethnic educator occurred more with ethnic 
Kyrgyz than any other ethnic group with more Kyrgyz men and women providing 
paternal educator responses. When ethnicity was controlled by gender, an 
overwhelming percent of non-Kyrgyz non-Slavic, i.e. ethnic “other” men, provided 
maternal educator responses. More Southern men and women gave maternal educator 
answers than any other region. When adults were then asked who taught them their 
own ethnicity, paternal responses came in second as ethnic educators, after school, 
with maternal response enjoying an increased, but still low, percentage. Again, ethnic 
Kyrgyz, both men and women, comprised the majority of paternal educator responses. 
O f the men who responded with maternal educator responses, the majority were again 
ethnic “other.” Again, the majority of men and women who gave maternal responses 
live in the South.
The results for this series of questions predicted and provided evidence of significant 
differences between how parents and children learned about ethnic identity. Adults, 
primarily, claimed that they had learned about ethnicity in school yet, only a small 
percentage of the same adults said their children learned about ethnicity in school. 
The difference in responses relating to school might be due to several factors 
including: adults with children to young to be in school yet, a break down of the 
education system since the USSR and increased poverty resulting in a reduction in 
both schools and people sending their children to school, and/or a change in the state- 
sponsored ethnic curricula in schools since the USSR. Despite these difference, that 
schools emerged as a significant factor in the education of ethnic identity is important 
for future development assistance that seeks to promote tolerance education.
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Most significant, these results provide further evidence that the woman is perceived as 
the receptacle but not the determinate of ethnic identity and supports the literature 
outlined in Chapter Three that argues there is an assumed male nature in ethnic 
identity. What these answers refute is the literature that argues that women are ethnic 
educators. In a highly patriarchal society, such as Kyrgyzstan, the survey answers 
indicated that women had little control over how and what ethnic identity their 
children learned. The results indicate that patriarchal nature has increased since 
independence by the increased role maternal educators and schools played for adults 
versus the dominant paternal role that adults claim determine and educate the ethnicity 
of children. This may be linked to the correlation between paternal educator and 
determinant and the Kyrgyz ethnicity since the Kyrgyz ethnicity has become more 
dominant since independence. The repeating maternal response from ethnic “others” 
in the South is curious and worthy of future investigation.
Ethnicity o f Self & Other: Qualities and Descriptions
The results of the questions designed to probe the nature of ethnic identity and gender 
provided supporting evidence to the body of ethnic theory in the academy that views 
symbols of ethnicity, i.e. land, traditions, values, and stories, as important to 
perceptions of ethnic community. Regarding ethnic qualities, more than half of the 
men surveyed responded with negative adjectives while more than half of the women 
responded with positive adjectives. The majority of the women and men who gave 
negative answers live in the South. The majority of men who gave negative answers 
were also ethnic “other” while the majority of women who gave positive adjectives 
were ethnic Kyrgyz. The majority who did not define their ethnicity by adjective but 
rather by non-adjectives, such as treatment of women or religion, etc., were 35 or 
older, indicating, perhaps, a change in ethnic identification by age. Clearly, these 
results support other answers in providing more evidence of high levels of 
dissatisfaction and negative self-image in the South.
The responses regarding the question about traditions, symbols, values, and stories, 
demonstrated that ethnic symbolism is highly important to all ethnic groups 
questioned, except for Russians.
The majority of those who mentioned geo-physical symbols, i.e. land, mountains,
were women. Nearly the same proportion of those who gave responses including
jewellery, dress, appearance, and food were also women. Men, on the other hand,
were far more interested in stories, songs, folk traditions, national games, and bride
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kidnapping. Age proved relevant, when again the youth provided the majority of 
negative responses and those 35 or older gave the majority of positive responses. 
Participants enjoyed these questions the most and would typically spend the longest 
amount of time answering these two questions by telling the researcher long “ethnic” 
stories of ancient khans who ruled this or that valley, battles that were fought between 
this and that clan, and hence why Kyrgyz are this way or that, and ancient stories of 
why this clan is the clan of the deer because seven generations ago someone married a 
beautiful deer in the forest, etc. Every holiday and tradition was often listed to the 
researcher in detail to prove that the participant knew the traditions. Indeed, the 
participants took great pride in naming all of the traditions possible. If a participant 
was short on time, they would often insist that they knew and loved all of their 
traditions but there just was not time to list them all. The researcher gained the most 
credibility by asking these two questions, as the researcher was frequently praised for 
“caring” about Kyrgyz traditions and stories and travelling to all the oblasts to 
“gather” these stories before they are forgotten. Indeed, many people assumed the 
objective of the research was to catalogue all the Kyrgyz stories and traditions.
These results support the prediction that ethnicity has different associations for women 
and men. It appears that women associate ethnicity with “things” such as jewellery, 
food, and clothing, while men associate ethnicity with “action” that can include 
violence. These results support the arguments made in the emerging body of gendered 
ethnicity that asserts women are perceived to be part of the ethnic symbolism of the 
community by their appearance and behaviour. That men provided more active and 
sometimes violent contents of ethnic identity, such as sheep polo—and other national 
games, or traditions that included subjugating women, such as bride kidnapping, does 
provides some evidence of the association of male violence and ethnic identity. 
Additionally, these deductive conclusions are further supported by the survey results 
that when asked directly if ethnicity was more important for men or women, both 
sexes of all ethnic groups responded that ethnicity was more important for men and 
less important for women.
When asked directly if men feel ethnic or male first, the majority of men reported to 
feeling male first. A majority of women did not know. The majority of those who 
said ethnic first were, again, ethnic Kyrgyz male and female, although this time, as 
opposed to earlier responses, fewer of the youth and more of those over 35 gave 
precedence to ethnicity. When asked directly if women feel ethnic or female first, the 
majority said female with the majority of men responding that they did not know.
Those who put ethnic first were 35 and older, live in the South and are ethnic Kyrgyz.
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While the majority of men who responded with female before ethnic live in the South. 
These results are less clear than other Survey Sets, but do indicate a reluctance to 
comment directly on the other gender’s perception of ethnic or gender priority. These 
results also provide more supporting evidence to the ethnic Kyrgyz attachment to 
ethnicity and a Southern maternal influence. What was not anticipated, but was 
brought out by this survey, was the men who refused to separate being a man from 
being Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Russian. Although statistically this figure was only 1%, the 
men who felt this way became angry and insulted, demanding to know how a man 
could be separated from his ethnicity. This indicates how strongly some men link 
their ethnicity to their “maleness,” e.g. one respondent said, “Anyone can be a man 
but I am a Kyrgyz man!” Women respondents never exhibited the same tensions 
between a gender and ethnic relationship.
The male ethnic link was more clearly established when adults were asked directly if 
ethnicity was more important for men, for women, or made no difference between the 
two. Although not overwhelming, one third of respondents said that ethnicity was 
more important for men. This response was equal to those who did not know and 
those who thought it depended on the individual or the level of education. Only a 
small fraction thought that ethnicity was more important for women and the majority 
of both men and women who thought this live in the South, with ethnic “other” 
women providing the majority of these answers. This supports the increasingly 
apparent maternal influence in the South that is reflected in these results. Women 
tended to think ethnicity was more important for men and men tended to think it was 
more important for women; however, most of these respondents explained that it was 
more important for women because women had less control over their ethnicity in that 
they would lose their ethnicity if they married outside of their ethnic community. 
Younger people thought ethnicity was more important overall than people 35 or older.
Citizenship & Ethnicity o f State
These questions, designed for comparative value with the NGO, akim, and USAID 
surveys, indicated very open, non-Kyrgyz, non-discriminatory responses. Living in or 
being bom in Kyrgyzstan, followed by legal definitions, all rated higher than Kyrgyz 
blood, providing evidence that the average citizen does not prejudge their perception 
of citizenship based on ethnicity.
President Akaev’s “Kyrgyzstan is Everyone’s Home” campaign was often mentioned.
The Presidential message is that all ethnic groups belong to Kyrgyzstan. This is a
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positive result in that the message of the necessity of ethnic tolerance has been both 
heard and taken seriously by the average citizen. Only three people provided the 
correct legal definition of citizenship; this was higher than the NGOs and akims, none 
of whom provided a correct definition. What was unanticipated in the citizenship 
question was the number of respondents, 2%, who provided answers such as, “only 
the rich” or “only the corrupt.” These negative answers indicate a frustration on the 
part of the average adult population who perceive themselves to be outside the 
privileges, economic, legal, and political, of “new Kyrgyz citizen.” These viewpoints 
reflect the authentic situation where the privileges of the state are increasingly 
reserved for a few Kyrgyz, now very wealthy from foreign aid, who belong to the 
tribal families of President and Madame Akaev. The majority of those who gave 
Kyrgyz ethnic answers live in the South and were 35 or older. The majority of those 
who gave a legal definition or said anyone/everyone also live in the South.
Relating to gendered perceptions of citizenship, the question, “Who are you?” did 
provide evidence of the gendered perception of citizenship, as of those who gave a 
citizenship identity, 73% were men. As described below, the NGOs, akims, and 
USAID surveys all provided evidence that concepts of citizenship are male and biased 
against women; but the adult population, by and large, provided gender-neutral 
responses. However, this question yielded less than 1% who gave an overtly gendered 
response. Yet, when ethnicity was controlled by gender the majority of women who 
said anyone/everyone were ethnically Kyrgyz, while half of the men who said 
everyone/anyone were ethnic “other.” The majority of women who said ethnic 
Kyrgyz were ethnic “others;” of the men who said ethnic Kyrgyz, half were ethnic 
Kyrgyz. These results are perplexing and inconclusive. Future research is needed in 
order to draw conclusions on what ethnicity controlled by gender in the context of 
citizenship perceptions might mean.
When NGOs were surveyed with questions relating to citizenship, 36% of NGOs
surveyed indicated that a person had to be “Kyrgyz” in order to be a citizen. In
contrast, Only 10% of the average adult population provided “Kyrgyz” related
response to the question of citizenship. This contradiction slightly weakens the more
tolerant “ethnic” findings and reveals more of the “ethnic” Kyrgyz prejudice that has
been increasing since 1991, even among the NGO population. Of greater concern, for
several reasons, is the 0% rate of correct legal definitions. (1) As only citizens can
vote, how well the general population, and the NGO leaders in particular, understand
criteria for citizenship and hence voting privileges has the potential to greatly affect
who participates in elections. (2) A major component of USAID’s democracy
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assistance has focused on funding NGOs, the NGO Coalition as the leader, to train 
election monitors for the elections. Therefore, the leaders of the NGOs are: (1) being 
funded to inform the population on citizenship issues, and (2) perceive that they have 
a role in creating better understanding of citizenship, yet, overall, they lack the most 
basic knowledge on who is a citizen and indicates a serious training or learning gap. 
Additionally, gender was considered highly significant in concepts of citizenship with 
citizenship largely understood to be male as women were not protected by either legal 
or political representation.
When akims were asked questions relating to citizenship, the responses on these 
questions indicated a high level of ignorance regarding both the definitions of 
citizenship and the relationship between a government representation and citizens in a 
democracy, i.e., there was a demonstrated lack of understanding that government 
officials were representatives of the population and/or public servants. Yet, as the 
akims are not elected and none has a background in government “serving” the people 
but rather in the Soviet idea of government “controlling” the people, these answers are 
not surprising. It is deeply disturbing that not one response provided the correct legal 
definition of citizenship. As with the NGO surveys, gender was considered highly 
significant in concepts of citizenship, with citizens perceived to be, and should be, 
highly male. The USAID partner answers indicated a gap between donor objectives 
and results vis-a-vis concepts of citizenship. While USAID partners had a high level 
of knowledge about citizenship and indicated that part of their job was to promote 
these ideas, the lack of knowledge with the NGOs and akims does indicate a 
training/transfer gap. That USAID partners supported the local NGO and akims 
perception that citizenship is gendered to the disadvantage of women is significant as 
it represents unanimity.
In the adult survey, a follow-up question to citizenship asked adults directly if the new 
state had an ethnicity. Half of the adults did not know while one third said Kyrgyzstan 
as a state did have an ethnicity, and that was ethnically Kyrgyz with the majority who 
gave these answers being ethnic Kyrgyz men and women living in the South. These 
results again demonstrate the increased attention surrounding concerns of ethnicity in 
the South. When NGOs were surveyed on issues relating to ethnicity, the majority of 
NGOs responded that Kyrgyzstan as a state has an ethnicity and that this is multi­
ethnic. This may indicate that the NGO community is more aware of the need for 
tolerance/multi-ethnic identity, etc. It may also indicate a higher level of 
sophistication when compared with the average adult population response where 30%
out of 384 surveyed said that the ethnic identity of the new state was “Kyrgyz.”
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Relating to ethnicity, the akims, by half, noted that the state ethnicity was Turkish 
based. This finding is unique to the akims and may be indicative of the activity of the 
Turkish government in the region to gain power and loyalty. That half believed the 
state was multi-ethnic is a positive recognition of the importance of ethnic 
tolerance/diversity at high-political levels. Ethnicity was seen to be a key issue to 
peace, stability and growth in the region by leading representatives of USAID 
democracy assistance partner organisations, yet ethnicity is not prominently 
considered in US democracy assistance.
Gender and Politics/Community/Nationalism
The series of questions related to activity in politics/community/nationalism revealed 
a high level of apathy by the average citizen. The large majority said they were not 
politically active. The majority of those who said they were politically active were 
Kyrgyz men 35 years or older, living in Chui oblast. This clearly indicates the 
perception that politics is the domain of men, particularly older and ethnically Kyrgyz 
men living in the capital city, and indicates a serious “disenfranchisement” on behalf 
of the population that is not Northern, ethnic Kyrgyz, and male. When asked about 
the level of activity in the community, again, the large majority was not active. Of 
those who were, the majority, both men and women, live in the South, with the men 
tending to be 35 or older. Community activity proved to be less exclusively male and 
ethnic, with no significant difference according to gender and ethnicity. That people in 
the South are more active in the community and more people in the North in politics 
demands further investigation.
Although it was predicted that nationalism might be significant, overall responses
were low with only 15% of all adults claiming to be a nationalist. Not surprisingly,
over half of those who said they were nationalist live in the South and were ethnically
Kyrgyz. Interestingly, of those women who said they were nationalists, the majority
were Kyrgyz and under 35, while the majority of men who claimed to be nationalists
were ethnic “other.” These results are slightly tainted due to the Kyrgyz research
assistant that accompanied the research and thus reluctance on the part of non-Kyrgyz
to be blunt about nationalist feelings. During the interview, Kyrgyz would frequently
relate that they “hated” Uzbeks, while Uzbeks would only say they were nationalist
but either refused to say why or would respond that they preferred Uzbeks to all other
ethnic groups. The difficult economic times do not seem to be breeding resentment
against other nationalities/ethnicities but rather against the corrupt government that is
responsible for the overall poverty and collapse of social services. The high rate of
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nationalism found only in the South is concerning and provides more evidence to the 
preoccupation with ethnic tensions/hatred simmering in the South.
Of NGOs surveyed, relating to gender and political issues, the majority of respondents 
indicating that governmental positions were important but that women were not free 
to take part in these due to patriarchal behaviour and systematic restrictions 
responsible for the lack of female access. Responses overwhelmingly claimed that 
men, in contrast, are free to act in politics but do so out of self-interest. In direct 
contrast to the positive (beneficial for society) reasons that women would like to 
become involved in politics, the NGO directors provided no positive responses 
relating to male involvement in politics.
Relating to gender and political issues, akims clearly responded that women’s place 
was not in politics but “in the home.” Men, akims claimed, belonged in politics 
because men are more responsible than women. These responses correlated with the 
NGO perception of citizenship and politics as male dominated. However, while the 
akims thought that the presence of men in politics was beneficial for society, NGOs 
overwhelmingly expressed that men enter politics for selfish reasons. USAID partner 
organisation representatives in Kyrgyzstan believed gender to be relevant to issues 
related to: NGOs, citizenship, ethnicity, and politics. Generally, women were 
perceived to be discriminated against by the men in society and government and 
treated as “second class citizens.” This discrimination: (a) greatly restricted the 
positive role that women can and do play in society and also resulted in (b) a general 
submissive nature among the women because women who do not submit to the male 
power structure are “quite literally, outcasts.” Women were perceived to be more 
responsible, industrious, focused, trustworthy, caring, and better financial managers 
than men, as well as less prone to alcoholism and internal divisions than men. Women 
were perceived to be less concerned with ethnicity, and more likely to work together 
as women across ethnic lines than men.
Life Conditions Under Independence Versus the USSR
The vast majority believes that life was better under the USSR with only a fraction
claiming life is better now. Of the more than half of all adults who thought that life
was better under the USSR because of jobs, money, and education, the majority were
35 years old or older. While this response was anticipated, it was not predicted that
nearly one third of all people, mostly Kyrgyz men, think life was better under the
USSR due to freedom, rule of law, security, and democracy. This indicates the
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extreme level of corruption in the Kyrgyz state today and how very far the state is 
from democracy, despite what President Akaev and USAID claim. The question 
seeking to determine the level of satisfaction with life under independence when 
compared with life under the USSR provoked responses indicating the high level of 
dissatisfaction with the current government and the inability of the “democratic” 
government to provide basic services. That the majority of people interviewed 
preferred life before is a grave indication of the failing nature of the democratic 
transition.
NGO Issues
An overwhelming majority of NGOs surveyed thought that NGOs were beneficial for 
society. One remark indicated the increase in “false” NGOs or GONGOs 
(Government Operated NGOs) that are flourishing in Kyrgyzstan due to the amount 
of money there is available from donors for NGOs. The object of creating an NGO to 
earn money is also indicated by “Four girls got a job!” remark. The overwhelming 
majority claimed that women dominate NGOs because the NGO sector requires hard 
work and solving difficult social problems and the (male) government does not want 
to be bothered; therefore, women are allowed, even encouraged, to manage the NGO 
sector.
The fact that akims thought that all/most NGOs were led by women, should be led by
women, and are part of democracy is positive; however, it appears paradoxical when
compared with responses about women in “politics,” i.e., White House and
Parliament, where the akims did not believe women belonged. Although the akims
thought NGOs were part of democracy, it was clear that NGOs should have the same
view as government and “help” the akims. NGOs were needed, not for “democratic”
value but because they were necessary in that NGOs performed the difficult tasks in
society, supporting the same view that NGO directors expressed. It is interesting that,
in contrast to the NGO surveys, only one akim realised that NGOs allowed women a
chance to be involved in “policy” because the political space was not open. The
comparative results from the akims and NGO directors around the issue of gender and
NGO/politics illustrates a fundamental paradox,186 expressed in the literature; that is
the extent to which female involvement is allowed and encouraged in civil society
(when this means taking care of the elderly, young, and disadvantaged within the
community as outlined in Chapter Two) compared to the restricted female role in
ethnic-political decisions to represent or protect the community. USAID partners
responses supported that of local NGOs and akims with a belief that NGOs are both
176
beneficial for society and the domain of women. USAID partner responses also 
mirrored local NGO responses in perceiving women as more responsible and, 
therefore, “better” at NGO work.
Democracy and Governance Issues
Among NGOs surveyed progressive democratic elements of society were seen to 
originate from civil society, citizens, and the population. Conversely, regression in 
democratic advancement was clearly blamed on government action. The series of 
democracy questions indicated that the leaders of the most active and authentic NGOs 
in Kyrgyzstan, those that receive democratic training and funding from the US, have 
an unclear and/or ambiguous understanding of: (1) what constitutes democracy, (2) if 
democracy is important or relevant for Kyrgyzstan, and (3) do not believe that the 
international community can bring/assist/provide democracy to Kyrgyzstan. Overall, 
the NGO leaders blame the government for repressive measures that block or hinder 
democratic growth, and give credit to civil society for promoting and enhancing 
democracy. However, those who did not believe there was democracy in Kyrgyzstan 
felt that a mix of citizen action and governmental reform was needed in order to 
promote a democratic culture. The low-response rates to some of the democracy 
questions may indicate that: (a) people are concerned about providing responses 
because of their fear of the government, and/or (b) there is, again, a serious gap in 
knowledge of “democracy” among the leaders of Kyrgyzstan’s civil society. If the 
later, this indicates a serious training or learning gap on the part of US democracy 
assistance that has provided extensive “study tours,” training, and expertise to the 
leaders of the NGO community. The fact that only one respondent thought the 
international community could assist in democracy promotion also suggests that the 
democratic assistance that is currently being provided is irrelevant to the local 
situation/needs.
Akim responses on democracy and governance issues were much more honest and
open than anticipated. Although more than half of the responses indicated that
“government” was understood to mean President Akaev, one akim was openly critical
of the role of government. That half of the akims credited President Akaev with the
amount of foreign assistance Kyrgyzstan receives, indicates the high level of
presidential control over foreign-aid distribution. However, that half of the akims
related problems with foreign aid indicates a level of frustration with the connection
between corruption and foreign aid, in, as one akim noted, the White House. This
level of dissatisfaction is indicative in one akim’s, again surprisingly frank, response
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that he hopes there will be a new president in ten years. Concern with rising 
nationalism, noted by one akim, is a positive sign in that there is recognition of the 
destructive nature of nationalism. The greed of the akims, for both power and money, 
and their loyalty to Akaev, is highly indicative throughout all responses. As was the 
lack of knowledge on basic issues of citizenship, governance, and democracy. This 
lack of knowledge was confirmed by one akim who hoped that in ten years akims 
would be of better quality and better trained to do their jobs. As for representatives of 
foreign assistance—USAID partners—foreign assistance was perceived to be 
extremely negative. The candour with which the respondents answered this question 
indicates a high level of dissatisfaction with the ethos and methods of foreign aid, and 
a deep frustration at the lack of effectiveness in foreign assistance in meeting 
objectives of providing positive developmental “assistance.”
6.2 Results -Quantitative Survey Set (A.1) Average Adult Population Self- 
Identification: Qualitized Narrative Profile Results Description by Sector
Survey Set One______________________________
A.1) Average Adult Population: 384____________
B.l) Average Child Population: 384_____________
C. 1) NGO Leaders: 25________________________
D .l) Akims: 7_______________________________
This section reports the results from Survey Set A.1, Adult Population, Primary self- 
identity. This research was carried out in every oblast in Kyrgyzstan, with the except 
of the new oblast of Batken. The response rate was 100%.
6,2.1 Demographics
The demographics accurately reflected the population in question. 30% of those 
surveyed lived in Bishkek or Chui oblast. 20% were from Naryn, Issy-kul, or Talas 
and 50% were from the South of Kyrgyzstan, Jalal-Abad, and Osh. Although each 
oblast and Bishkek were surveyed separately, in order to ensure correct population 
proportions, for statistical significance: (1) Chui and Bishkek have been combined, 
(2) Naryn, Talas, and Issy-Kul, the mid-regional oblasts, have been combined and (3) 
Osh and Jalal-Abad, the two Southern oblasts, are combined as the South.
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48% of those surveyed were 35 years or younger and 52% were over 35, providing a 
fairly even percentage of those who grew up under the USSR as opposed to those who 
became adults during independence. No one under twenty-one was surveyed. 45% of 
those surveyed were Kyrgyz. 17% were of Russian or other white, Slavic, or 
European origin. 40% were ethnic “other,” including Korean, Chinese, Uigher, 
Dungan, Jewish, etc. 48% were women and 52% were men, also a near accurate 
reflection of the gender breakdown in Kyrgyzstan. 44% of those surveyed had 
finished or had some secondary schooling. 56% had higher education, or specialised 
technical education. 5% were divorced. 66% were married. 28% were single and 1% 
were widowed. 13% were professionals. 27% worked as traders in the bazaar or as 
drivers. 18% worked in the “alternative” economy engaged in “private business.” 
6% worked in factories, cafes, or stores. 2% were farmers or shepherds. 19% were 
unemployed. 14% worked for the government. The composite of the average adult 
would be a married Kyrgyz (man/woman) from the South who has some kind of 
specialised or higher education, over 35 years of age and is working in the bazaar or 
as a driver.
6.2.2 Primary Identity 
•  Who are you?
Level One
24% of all people responded with their name. 22% of people were not sure or 
responded with answers relating to human identity, i.e., person, me, human, etc. A 
gender or professional response came in at 18% and 17% respectively, with ethnic 
responses at 9%, slightly ahead of citizenship at 6%.
Level Two-Crosstab 2 Results by Variable and Gender Control________________
Gender: 73% of those who responded as citizen were men while only 27% were
women. 66% of those who gave a gendered response were women 
while only 34% were men. Of those surveyed who provided an ethnic 
response, only 36% were women while 66% were men.
Age: Of those who gave an ethnic, citizenship, or professional identity, 77%,
' 58%, and 71%, respectively, were over 35 years of age. Of those who 
gave negative adjectives, such as, poor, sick, stupid, and unemployed, 
to this question 80% were 35 years or younger, according to Crosstab 
1.
179
Region: 100% of those who gave negative adjective responses to the question
“who are you?” resided in the South of Kyrgyzstan.
Ethnicity: Of those surveyed who gave an ethnic identity, 74% were “other”
ethnic group, i.e. non-Kyrgyz or Slavic. Ethnic Kyrgyz constituted 
53% of those who responded with their name._____________________
AgeG: 65% of women who gave their profession and 82% of women who
gave an ethnic response were over 35 years of age. Of those women 
who gave their name, 65% were under 35 years of age. Conversely, of 
those men surveyed who provided their name, 62% were over 35 years 
of age. Of men who provided an ethnic or professional response 75% 
were over 35.
RegionG: Of the women who provided an ethnic response, 46% live in Chui
oblast. Of the men who gave a gender response, 64%, and ethnic 
response, 55% live in Southern Kyrgyzstan.
EthnicityG: Of the women who gave their name, 51% were Kyrgyz. This
compared to women who gave an ethnic answer of whom 55% were
non-Kyrgyz/Slavic. For the men, of those who gave their name, 55% 
were Kyrgyz, of those who gave gender, 59% were non-Kyrgyz- 
Slavic, and of those men who gave an ethnic answer, 85% were non- 
Kyrgyz-Slavic.
• Describe yourself in one word?
Level One
17% responded that they were a human, person, or being. Only 6% provided ethnic 
responses. 17% described themselves with a gender response. 4% provided positive 
adjectives, such as confident, pretty, decent, dependable, extraordinary, energetic, fun 
loving, friendly, happy, and honest, with 6% providing negative adjectives, such as, 
bad, bored, fool, lonely, not responsible, of weak character, pessimist, rude, slow, 
unnoticed, and unlucky. 7% described themselves by their profession and only 2% did 
not know. Gender response held a second place ranking in both questions after “don’t 
know” and human being. Ethnicity ranked low in both questions.
Level Two-Crosstab 2 Results by Variable and Gender Control________________
Gender: Of those who gave a gender response, 70% were women compared to
31% men. Of those women who gave a professional responses, 35% 
____________were women, compared to 65% men.____________________________
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Age:
Region:
Of those who gave an ethnic response, 71% were over 35 years of age. 
Of those who gave negative adjective, 71% were under 35 years old. 
Of those who gave profession, 69% were over 35 years old.
Of those who gave an ethnic response, 57% were from the South. Of 
those who gave a negative adjective, 76% also were from the South.
Ethnicity: Of those who gave an ethnic response, 62% were Kyrgyz. Of those 
who gave a gender response, 55% were also Kyrgyz. Of those who 
gave negative adjectives, 48% were “other” ethnicity, i.e. non-Kyrgyz 
non-Slavic.
AgeG:
RegionG:
EthnicityG:
Of those women who gave a negative response, 89% were under 35 
years of age. Of those men who gave an ethnic response, 80% were 
over 35 years old.
Of those men who gave an ethnic response, 70% were from the South. 
Of men who gave negative adjectives, 92% were also from the South. 
Of those women who gave an ethnic response, 64% were Kyrgyz; of 
those who gave a gender response 58% were also Kyrgyz. Of those 
men who gave an ethnic response, 60% were Kyrgyz. Of those who 
gave a negative adjective, 50% were “other” ethnic men.
6.2.3 Ethnic Origin and Teaching for Self and Children 
• How do you know your child’s ethnicity?
Level One
In particular it was predicted that participants would say that their children’s identity 
was determined by the father or father’s “generations.” This proved true with 22% 
responding in this manner, the second highest percentage after “don’t know” at 41%. 
3% thought ethnicity was determined by mothers or female generations and 21% 
thought that both parents determined the ethnicity of the child. Only 10% thought the 
state determined the identity by passports or language and 41% did not know.
Level Two-Crosstab 2 Results by Variable and Gender Control
Gender: Of those who responded with mother or grandmother, 6% were
women.
Age: Of those who responded with father/grandfather, 65% were over 35
years o f age. Of those that responded with state 68% were also over 35
years old.
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Region: Of those who did not know, 67% were from the South.
Ethnicity: Of those who responded with father/grandfather, 59% were Kyrgyz.
AgeG: Of those women who said mother grandmother, 63% were over 35
years old. Of those women who said state, 69% were over 35 years 
old. Of men who said mother/grandmother, 75% were under 35 years 
old.
RegionG: Of those women who said mother grandmother, 63% were from the
South. Of those women who did not know, 70% were also from the 
South. Of men who said both parents, 54% were from the South.
EthnicityG: Of those women who said father/grandfather, 65% were Kyrgyz. Of
those who said state, 69% were also Kyrgyz. Of those men who said 
father/grandfather, 52% were Kyrgyz. Of those men who said 
mother/grandmother, 75% were “other.” __________________
•  Who taught ethnicity to your child?
Level One
It was also predicted that while men determined ethnic identity, women, particularly 
grandmothers, taught about ethnicity; however, this prediction was false. 
Surprisingly, respondents overwhelming claimed their children learned about their 
ethnicity from their fathers and male relatives/community members at 23%. Schools 
came in second at 12%, equal to mothers and/or grandmothers. 15% said that both 
parents taught the child ethnic identity and 32% did not know.
Level Two-Crosstab 2 Results by Variable and Gender Control_________________
Gender: Of those who responded father/grandfather, 67% were men. Of those
who said mother grandmother, 71% were women.
Age: Of those who said father/grandfather 72% were over 35 years old. Of
those who said school, 72% were over 35 years old. Of those who did 
not know, 72% were under 35 years old.
Region: No regional significance.
Ethnicity: Of those who said father/grandfather, 51% were Kyrgyz. Of those who
____________ said both parents, 60% were Kyrgyz.____________________________
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AgeG: Of those women who said fathers/grandfathers, 69% were 35 years or
older. Of those women who said schools, 68% were over 35 years of 
age. Of men who said schools, 78% were 35 years or older. Of those 
who said father/grandfather, 73% were over 35 years old.
RegionG: Of those women who said schools, 53% live in Chui oblast. Of those
women who said mother/grandmother, 65% live in the South. Of those 
men who said school, 50% live in the South. Of those who said 
mother/grandmother, 69% live in the South; of those that said 
father/grandfather, 56% live in the South, and of those who said 
grandparents, 67% live in the South.
EthnicityG: Of those women who said father/grandfather, 59% were Kyrgyz. Of
those women who said both parents, 84% were Kyrgyz. Of those men 
who said mother/grandmother, 54% were “other.”
• How do you know your ethnicity?
Level One
When asked how the adults knew their ethnicity, only 10% thought their ethnic 
identity was determined by blood, genes, or land. 36% claimed their ethnicity was 
determined by their father/grandfather or male generations, compared to 4% who 
thought their mother or female generations determined their ethnicity. 12% claimed 
that some type of state sponsored mechanism such as passport, language, or both 
parents determined their identity.
Level Two-Crosstab 2 Results by Variable and Gender Control_________________
Gender: Of those who said father/grandfather, 60% were men. Of those who
said mother/grandmother, 63% were women. Of those who said state, 
61% were men.
Region: Of those who said father/grandfather, 46% live in the South. Of those
who said mother/grandmother, 81% live in the South. Of those who 
did not know, 63% live in Chui oblast.
Ethnicity: Of those who said mother/grandmother, 50% are ethnic “other.” Of
____________those who said father/grandfather, 51% are Kyrgyz.________________
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AgeG: Of those women who said mother/grandmother, 60% were younger
than 35 years of age. Of those men who said father/grandfather, 58% 
were 35 or older. Of the men who said mother/grandmother, 83% 
were younger than 35 years old.
RegionG: Of those women who said mother/grandmother, 70% live in the South.
Of those women who did not know, 71% live in Chui oblast. Of those 
men who said mother/grandmother, 100% live in the South.
EthnicityG: Of those men who said mother/grandmother, 0% were Kyrgyz. Of
those men who did not know, 70% were “other.” ______________
• Who taught you your ethnicity?
Level One
When asked who taught the adults their ethnic identity, 37% claimed they learned 
about their ethnicity in school. 20% said fathers or grandfathers taught them their 
ethnicity, with only 14% claiming that mothers or grandmothers taught ethnicity. 
11% said both parents and 10% did not know.
Level Two-Crosstab 2 Results by Variable and Gender Control
Gender: Of those who said father/grandfather, 70% were men. Of those who
said mother/grandmother, 70% were women. Of those that said
grandparents, 86% were women.
Age: Of those who said mother/grandmother, 69% were younger than 35
years old.
Region: No significant relationship by region.
Ethnicity: Of those who said school, 44% were Kyrgyz, 
mother/grandmother, 51% were “other.”
Of those that said
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AgeG: Of those men who said mother/grandmother, 82% were younger than
35 years of age.
RegionG: Of those women who said mother/grandmother, 50% live in the South.
Of those men who said father/grandfather, 58% live in the South. Of 
those men who said mother/grandmother, 91% live in the South. 
EthnicityG: Of those women who said father/grandfather, 9% were Russian/Slavic.
Of those women who said grandparents, 58% were Kyrgyz. Of those 
men who said mother/grandmother, 0% were Kyrgyz and 27% were 
Russian/Slavic with 72% “other.” Of men who said grandparents, 50% 
____________ were Russian/Slavic and 0% were Kyrgyz.___________________ ___
6.2.4 Ethnicity o f S e lf & Other: Qualities and Descriptions 
• Do you have an ethnic identity?
Level One
7% did not know, or did not have an ethnicity. 45% of those surveyed said they were 
Kyrgyz. 17% were Russian or Slavic non-Asian. 26% were other, including Korean, 
Chinese, Jewish, etc. Although there is some perception that tribal roots are the most 
important identity in Kyrgyzstan, only 4% responded with tribal answers.
Crosstab 1 was primarily used for this question because collapsing the categories into 
Crosstab 2 obscured important gender and regional distinctions evident in Crosstab 1.
Level Two-Crosstab 1 Results by Variable and Gender Control
Gender: No significant relationship.
Age: 75% of those who said they were ethnically mixed were younger than
35 years old.
Region: Of those who were ethnically mixed, 75% live in the South. Of those,
who did not know their ethnic identity, 68% live in the South.
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AgeG: Of those women who said they were ethnically mixed, 75% were
younger than 35 years old. Of those men who said they were 
ethnically mixed, 75% were younger than 35 years old.
RegionG: Of those women who were ethnically mixed, 75% live in the South.
Of those men who were ethnically mixed, 75% also live in the South. 
EthnicityG: Ethnicity cannot be crossed by ethnicity.
• What are the qualities of your ethnicity?
Level One
11% didn’t know or claimed there were no qualities of their ethnicity. Less than 1% 
provided responses that included behaviour or control of the women in their ethnicity. 
11% provided negative adjectives, with 65% providing positive adjectives. 7% 
defined the qualities of their ethnicity by things, such as mountains, clothing, etc. 
Less than 1% related religion to their ethnicity and only 5% mentioned tribal 
attributes.
Level Two-Crosstab 2 Results by Variable and Gender Control
Gender: Of those who gave negative adjectives, 62% were men. Of those who
gave positive adjectives, 52% were women.
Age: Of those who defined ethnicity by non-adjectives, including religion,
quality/treatment of women, etc., 65% were 35 years old or older. Of 
those who did not know, 74% were younger than 35 years old.
Region: Of those who gave negative adjectives, 61% live in the South. Of those
who gave positive adjectives, 53% also live in the South.
Ethnicity: Of those who gave positive adjectives, 49% were Kyrgyz. __________
AgeG: Of those women who gave non-adjective, i.e. including religion,
quality/treatment of women, 61% were 35 years or older. Of those 
men who gave non-adjective, i.e. including religion, quality/treatment 
of women, 68% were 35 years or older.
RegionG: Of those women who gave negative adjectives, 63% live in the South.
Of those men who gave negative adjectives, 59% live in the South.
EthnicityG: Of those women who gave positive adjectives, 51% were Kyrgyz. Of
those men who did not know, 61% were “other.”
•  What are the traditions, symbols, values, and stories of your ethnicity?
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Level One
41% did not know or answered “many.” This high “don’t know” does not indicate 
that many people do not know but that many people, perhaps, had not thought about it, 
or did not have the time to relate all. 19% mentioned family celebrations with 7% 
mentioning religion and religious holidays. 5% said that dress, customs, jewellery, 
food, etc, were symbols of their ethnicity. Less than 1% noted phenotypic responses. 
9% mentioned literature, song, dance, folk stories. 7% noted national games. 3% 
provided negative adjectives with 8% providing positive adjectives. Less than 1% 
noted the land, mountains, or the country.
Level Two-Crosstab 1 Results by Variable and Gender Control
Crosstab 1 was primarily used for this question because collapsing the categories into 
Crosstab 2 obscured important gender and regional distinctions evident in Crosstab 1.
Gender: Crosstab 1 revealed that of those who gave geographical responses, i.e.,
land, mountains, 68% were women. Of those who said jewellery, dress, 
appearance, food, 67% were women. Of those who gave negative 
adjectives, 70% were men. Of those who gave racial response, 100% 
were men. Of those who gave stories, songs, folk traditions, etc., 61% 
were men.
Age: Of those who gave negative adjectives, 69% were younger than 35. Of
those who gave racial characteristics, 100% were under 35. Of those 
who said land, mountains, 100% were 35 years old or older. Of those 
who gave positive adjectives, 71% were 35 years or older.
Region: Of those who said they did not know, 64% live in the South. Of those
who gave religious answers, 50% live in Chui oblast. Of those who 
gave dress, food, jewellery, 56% live in the South. Of those who gave 
racial response, 100% live in Chui. Of those who gave negative quality, 
53% live in the South. Of those who said, land-mountains, 67% live in 
Chui.
Ethnicity: Of those who said family celebrations, over 50% were ethnic Kyrgyz.
Of those who responded with religion and/or religious or other 
holidays, over half were Russian/Slavic. 84% of those who gave 
positive adjectives were ethnic Kyrgyz. Also over half of those who 
gave national games, literature-songs-dance, and/or dress,-jewellery-
____________ food were ethnic Kyrgyz.
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AgeG: Of those women who gave negative responses, 75% were under 35,
with 92% of those women giving positive response 35 or older. Of 
those men who gave literature, song, dance, 70% were 35 or older. 
RegionG: Again, of those women and men giving negative response, over half
were from the South.
EthnicityG: Of those women giving negative responses, 75% were Russian/Slavic,
whereas, nearly half of those men giving negative response were 
____________ Kyrgyz._______________________________________ ___________
•  Do men and women have different ideas & means of ethnic identification?
Level One
35% did not know. 29% said it depends on the individual person or level of
education. 4% said ethnicity is more important for women. 31% said ethnicity is 
more important for men. 2% thought that there was no difference within their own 
ethnic group but other “lower” ethnic groups discriminated against “their” women.
Level Two-Crosstab 2 Results by Variable and Gender Control________________
Of those who thought men and women do understand ethnicity in 
different ways and that ethnicity was more important for men, 71% 
were women. Of those who thought men and women do understand 
ethnicity in different ways and that ethnicity was more important for 
women, 53% were men.
Of those who thought men and women do understand ethnicity in 
different ways and that ethnicity was more important for women, 64% 
were younger than 35 years old. Of those who thought there was no 
difference or that it depended on the individual, 66% were 35 years old 
or older.
Of those who thought men and women do understand ethnicity in 
different ways and that ethnicity was more important for women, 88% 
live in the South.
Of those who thought men and women do understand ethnicity in 
different ways and that ethnicity was more important for women, 50% 
were “other.”_______________________________________________
AgeG: Of those women who thought men and women do understand ethnicity
in different ways and that ethnicity was more important for women, 
70% were younger than 35 years of age. Of those men who thought
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Gender:
Age:
Region:
who there was no difference or that it depended on the individual, 66% 
were 35 years or older.
RegionG: Of those women who thought men and women do understand ethnicity
in different ways and that ethnicity was more important for women, 
8% live in the South. Of those men who thought men and women do 
understand ethnicity in different ways and that ethnicity was more 
important for women, 100% live in the South.
EthnicityG: Of those women who thought men and women do understand ethnicity
in different ways and that ethnicity was more important for women, 
60% were ethnic “other.” Of those women who thought men and 
women do understand ethnicity in different ways and that ethnicity was 
more important for men, only 5% were Russian/Slavic. Of those men 
who thought men and women do understand ethnicity in different ways 
and that ethnicity was more important for women, 50% were Kyrgyz. 
Of those men who thought that there was no difference or that it 
 depended on the individual, 53% were Kyrgyz.___  ___________
• Do you feel an ethnic identity before being a man?
Level One
70% said that men are male first. 26% said that men are ethnic first. 2% did not know 
and less than 1% said it depended on the individual or level of education. 1% said that 
men and their ethnic identity cannot be separated.
Level Two-Crosstab 2 Results by Variable and Gender Control
Gender:
Age:
Region:
Ethnicity:
Of those who did not know 64% were women.
Of those who said ethnic before male gender, 66% were 35 years or 
older. Of those who did not know or said it depends on the person, 
64% were also 35 years or older.
Of those who said male gender before ethnic, 58% lived in the South. 
Of those who did not know or said it depends on the person, 73% live 
in Chui oblast.
Of those who said ethnic before male gender, 65% were Kyrgyz.
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AgeG: Of those women who said ethnic before male first, 61% were 35 years
or older. Of those men who said ethnic before male, 80% were 35 
years or older.
RegionG: Of those women who did not know or said it depends on the person,
71% live in Chui oblast. Of those men who did not know or said it 
depends on the person, 75% live in Chui oblast.
EthnicityG: Of those women who said ethnic before male 69% were Kyrgyz. Of
____________ those men who said ethnic before male 62% were Kyrgyz.___________
• Do you feel an ethnic identity before being a woman?
Level One
78% said that women are female first. 18% said that women are ethnic first, with 3% 
that did not know and less than 1% claiming it dependent on the individual or level of 
education.
Level Two-Crosstab 2 Results by Variable and Gender Control
Gender:
Age:
Region:
Ethnicity:
Of those who did not know or said it depends on the person, 92% were 
men.
Of those who said ethnic before female gender, 65% were 35 years or 
older. Of those who did not know or said it depends on the person 85% 
were also 35 years or older.
Of those who said female gender before ethnic, 54% live in the South. 
Of those who said ethnic before female gender, 52% were Kyrgyz.
AgeG: Of those women who did not know or said it depends on the person,
100% were 35 years or older.
RegionG: Of those women who did not know or thought it depends on the person,
100% live in Chui. Of those men who said female gender before ethnic, 
58% live in the South. Of those who said ethnicity before female 
gender, 51% live in the South.
EthnicityG: Of those women who did not know or thought it depends on the person,
100% were Russian/Slavic. Of those women who said ethnic before 
female, 61% were Kyrgyz. Of those men who did not know or thought 
____________ it depends on the person, 50% were Kyrgyz.
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6.2.5 Citizenship & Ethnicity o f State
• Who is a citizen of Kyrgyzstan?
Level One
34% said anyone who lives here with 6% saying anyone who is bom in Kyrgyzstan. 
27% said me, anyone, everyone, or all people. Only 10% provided answers that 
related to ethnic Kyrgyz. Less than 1% respond with gendered answers, e.g. one 
woman said, “My son is a citizen but not my daughter.” By and large, however, the 
majority of people gave responses that were gender and ethnically neutral. While 
12% based their responses on legal measures, only three out of 384 gave the correct 
legal definition; however, this is significant when compared with the NGO and akim 
population where no one provided the correct legal answer.
Level Two-Crosstab 2 Results by Variable and Gender Control
Gender:
Age:
Region:
Ethnicity:
Of those who gave a legal definition, 63% were men.
No significant relationship.
Of those who said everyone, anyone, 52% live in the South. Of those 
who gave a legal definition, 65% live in the South. Of those who gave 
an ethnic Kyrgyz response, 57% live in the South.
No significant relationship.
AgeG: Of those women who said anyone bom or living in Kyrgyzstan, 62%
were under 35 years of age. Of those women who gave a legal 
definition, 65% were 35 years or older. Of those men who gave an 
ethnic Kyrgyz response, 67% were 35 years or older.
RegionG: Of those women who gave a legal definition, 71% live in the South. Of
those men who gave a legal definition, 62% live in the South. Of those 
men who gave an ethnic Kyrgyz response, 61% live in the South.
EthnicityG: Of those women who said everyone, anyone, 61% were Kyrgyz. Of
those women who gave an ethnic Kyrgyz response, 53% were “other.” 
Of those men who said everyone, anyone 51% were ethnic “other.” Of 
those men who gave an ethnic Kyrgyz response, 50% were Kyrgyz.
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• Does the new Kyrgyz State have an ethnicity?
Level One
50% did not know, thought maybe, or provided no response. 30% said that the state 
did have an ethnicity and this was Kyrgyz, blood, or ethnicity. 9% said the state had 
no ethnic identity. 4% said that before there was the USSR and now there were only 
negative identities. 2% said the ethnic identity of the state was evidenced by the 
constitution, the flag, or the land. 5% said the ethnic identity was democracy, 
freedom, and the general independence of Kyrgyzstan. Interestingly, although the 
government has been pushing the Manas epic as the most important symbol of Kyrgyz 
identity and history, only 17 people out of 384 people mentioned Manas in connection 
to these series of questions, or any other questions in the adult survey.
Level Two-Crosstab 2 Results by Variable and Gender Control
Gender: No significant relationship.
Age: Of those who said before and/or during the USSR there was but now
there is no state ethnic identity, 62% were younger than 35 years of 
age.
Region: Of those who said yes, the constitution, flag, democracy, 54% live in
Chui. Of those who said yes, Kyrgyz blood, 62% live in the South. 
Ethnicity: Of those who said yes, Kyrgyz blood, 52% were Kyrgyz. _______
AgeG: Of those women who said during the USSR yes, now no, 68% were
younger than 35 years. Of those men who said yes, Kyrgyzstan has an 
ethnicity and who is the constitution, flag, democracy, etc., 69% were 
35 years or older. Of those men who said yes, Kyrgyz blood, 57% 
were also 35 years or older.
RegionG: Of those who said yes, Kyrgyz blood, 62% live in the South.
EthnicityG: Of those women who said yes, Kyrgyz blood, 54% were Kyrgyz. Of 
those men who said yes, Kyrgyz blood, 51% were Kyrgyz.
6.2.6 Active in Politics/Community/Nationalism 
• Are you active in politics/government and how?
Level One
It was predicted that political apathy would be high, indicating frustration and 
blockage from the system and this proved true with 73% saying they were not
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politically interested or active. 18% said they were politically active with 8% claiming 
they use to be but no longer are or are only sometimes now.
Level Two-Crosstab 2 Results by Variable and Gender Control_________________
Gender: Of those who were active, 69% were men. Of those who are sometimes
active or interested, 60% were men.
Age: Of those who were active, 66% were 35 years or older.
Region: Of those who were not active or interested, 50% live in the South. Of
those sometimes active or interested, 57% live in Chui oblast.
Ethnicity: Of those who were active, 46% were Kyrgyz. Of those who are
____________ sometimes active or interested, 50% were Kyrgyz._________________
AgeG: Of those men who are active, 74% were 35 years or older.
RegionG: Of those women who are sometimes active or interested, 50% live in
Chui oblast. Of those men who are sometimes interested or active, 
62% live in Chui oblast.
EthnicityG: Of those men who are sometimes active or interested, 62% are Kyrgyz.
• Are you active in your community? If you are active what do you do?
Level One
It was predicted that community apathy would be high, indicating frustration and 
blockage from the system, and this proved true, and 71% claiming they were not 
active or interested in community work. 20% said they were active in the community 
with 2% saying they used to be or are sometimes now active.
Level Two-Crosstab 2 Results by Variable and Gender Control
Gender: No significant relationships.
Age: No significant relationships.
Region: Of those who said yes, 64% live in the South.
Ethnicity: No significant relationships.
AgeG: Of those men who said they are active, 67% were 35 years or older.
RegionG: Of those women who are active, 61% live in the South. Of those men
who are active, 65% live in the South.
EthnicityG: No significant relationships.
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• Are you a nationalist and why or why not?
Level One
Although it was predicted that nationalism might be significant, the overall responses 
were very low with only 15% who claimed they were nationalistic because they 
thought their ethnicity was better than others or hated other ethnic groups. 83% said 
they were not nationalistic because they grew up in a multi-ethnic country, USSR 
and/or Kyrgyzstan, or they were of mixed blood themselves. Only 2% did not know 
or did not respond and 1% said they were not but could be in the future or were 
sometimes now due to the war in Batken.
Level Two-Crosstab 2 Results by Variable and Gender Control________________
Gender: No significant relationships.
Age: No significant relationships.
Region: Of those who said they were nationalists, 59% live in the South.
Ethnicity: Of those who said they were nationalist, 63% were Kyrgyz.__________
AgeG: Of those women who are nationalists, 59% are younger than 35 years
old.
RegionG: Of those women who said they were nationalists, 45% live in the
South. Of those men who said they were nationalists, 74% live in the 
South.
EthnicityG: Of those women who said they were nationalists, 83% were Kyrgyz.
Of those men who said they were nationalists, 48% were “other.”_____
6.2.7 Life Conditions under Independence Versus the USSR
• Is life different under the new Kyrgyz State than it was during the Soviet 
period?
Level One
The reasons life was better before independence broke down into several categories. 
53% thought life was better under the USSR due to the availability of jobs, money, 
and education, which are now lacking. 26% thought life was better under the USSR 
due to independence, freedom, equality, and democracy that are now lacking. Of 
those who thought life was better now, 9% thought so because people could now be
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Kyrgyz or Muslim, and they could not before. 5% thought there was no difference 
between life under the USSR or Kyrgyzstan and 9% did not know.
Level Two-Crosstab 2 Results by Variable and Gender Control
Gender: Of those who said life was better under the USSR because there was
democracy, freedom, independence, 63% were men.
Age: Of those who said life was better under the USSR because there were
jobs, money, education, 60% were 35 years or older.
Region: Of those who said life was better under the USSR because there was
democracy, freedom, independence, 56% live in the South. Of those 
who said there was no difference, 67% live in the South.
Ethniciiy: Of those who said life was better under the USSR due to democracy,
freedom, independence, 52% were Kyrgyz.
AgeG: Of those women who said life was better under the USSR because
there was democracy, freedom, independence, 62% were under 35 
years of age. Of those women who said life was better now because 
people were free to be Kyrgyz and/or Muslims, 72% were also under 
35 years old. Of those men who said it was better under the USSR 
because there were jobs, money, education, 62% were 35 years or 
older. Of those men who said it was better now because people were 
free to Kyrgyz and/or Muslims, 64% were 35 years or older.
RegionG: No significant relationship.
EthnicityG: Of those women who said life was better under the USSR because
there were jobs, money, education, 49% were Kyrgyz. Of those 
women who said it was better now because people were free to Kyrgyz 
and/or Muslim, 50% were Kyrgyz. _____
6.3 Data Results for Remaining Survey Sets, B.1-D.2
6.3.1 Data Results for Survey Set One (Cl)  Civil Society/NGO Leaders in
Kyrgyzstan: Qualitized Narrative Profile Results Description by Sector
Survey Set One
A.1) Average Adult Population: 384
B. 1) Average Child Population: 384
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C.l) NGO leaders: 25________________________
D.l) Akims\ 7_______________________________
This section highlights the civil society responses (C.l). The research was carried out 
in every oblast in Kyrgyzstan, with the exception of the new oblast of Batken. In C.l 
Jalal-Abad, Osh, and most of Bishkek did not respond. It appears that non-responses 
had more to do with problems concerning organisational and communication logistics 
rather than non-interest.
Demographics
The majority of NGOs, 76%, are directed by women whose average age is 38. Given 
the fact that Bishkek, representing the most sizeable NGO population, received a poor 
response rate and the South, Osh and Jalal-Abad, did not respond at all, the survey 
results are not sufficiently comprehensive. However, at least for Chui, Talas, Issy- 
Kul, and Naryn, these surveys provide valuable insight into a number of “democracy” 
variables. Despite under represented regions, NGO responses when compared with 
the responses from the general adult population survey (A.1) “weigh” significantly 
more per response because their answers are representative of the community as NGO 
directors are perceived as community leaders.
NGO Issues
There is 100% agreement that NGOs have been beneficial to Kyrgyzstan, though one 
with one remarking that NGOs were beneficial three years ago but are no longer so. 
By and large, the NGO workers themselves saw their role as: (1) positive in society, 
(2) serving the underrepresented and “common people,” and (3) a substitute for the 
failure of the state in social services. When asked why they continued to direct their 
NGO, 32% responded that they do so out of love or passion for the job and the 
gratification the job brings in terms of community respect. 52% said they felt obliged 
to serve society and to help make things better in Kyrgyzstan. When asked where 
they would be in ten years, nearly half, 44%, said they would be upwardly mobile 
within the NGO community. Despite USAID’s emphasis on the role of NGOs in 
democracy building efforts, only 8% of NGOs related their importance in society to 
democracy. Yet, 88% thought that NGOs were part of democracy with 48% reporting 
that they created their NGO to push for democratic change.
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Ethnicity
Of those surveyed, 80% responded that the new state of Kyrgyzstan had an ethnicity 
with 60% responding in an affirmative tone that this was distinctly a multi-ethnic 
state. Only 4% noted the issues of “Kyrgyzism” and ethnic tensions. 24% of all 
respondents thought that ethnicity was relevant to their NGO work with 52% 
responding that it was not relevant. When asked to justify this response, 80% did not.
Citizenship
Questions concerning citizenship were designed to: (1) provide a second means to 
elicit feelings of racism or ethnic tensions and (2) determine the level of knowledge 
about what constitutes citizenship. On the issue of “Kyrgyzism,” 36% provided 
answers that indicated that a person had to be “Kyrgyz” in order to be a citizen. Of 
those surveyed, 0% provided the correct legal definition of who was a citizen of 
Kyrgyzstan. While the level of knowledge of what legally constitutes citizenship was 
low, when asked if their NGO helped created a better understanding of citizenship in 
Kyrgyzstan, 80% reported yes. Questions of how the NGO promotion of citizenship 
differed from the government’s promotion were not statistically significant to draw 
conclusions from. These questions were only beneficial in that they provided an 
additional space for some respondents to criticise the government’s commitment to 
democracy. When asked if gender is involved in concepts of citizenship, 80% 
responded that women were not equal and that politicians did not have any interest in 
making women equal.
Democracy and Governance
There were mixed responses to the direct question, “Is Kyrgyzstan a democracy?”
with 32% reporting “maybe,” 36% claiming “yes,” and 24% asserting “no.” When
asked to justify their response, 52% provided no answer. 24% said there was no
democracy in Kyrgyzstan due to government repression, corruption, etc. 12% said
there was democracy due to progressive elements in society. Of those surveyed, 0%
claimed that the government provided democracy. When asked if Kyrgyzstan should
be a democracy, less than half, 44%, provided an affirmative yes. 56% provided no
response on this question. When asked to justify this response, only 20% gave
answers that related to the principles of democracy, i.e. freedom, rule of law, and
equality. When asked what would make Kyrgyzstan a democracy, if it was not, 32%
provided answers related to changes in government and/or citizen behaviour. When
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asked if Kyrgyzstan was not a democracy, what was Kyrgyzstan, 68% gave no 
response and 20% responded that Kyrgyzstan was totalitarian, authoritarian or 
anarchical. When asked who or what could make Kyrgyzstan a democracy, only 4% 
thought that the international community could assist/bring democracy to Kyrgyzstan.
When asked to comment on the government’s role in Kyrgyzstan, 12% said there was 
no government, there was only the president. 28% reported a negative role with 20% 
saying the government played a positive role. When asked about foreign assistance, 
60% said positive things about foreign assistance. 28% said that foreign assistance 
was generally good; however, there were many problems with funds not reaching the 
intended recipients, funds not being used as intended, funds remaining only in 
Bishkek, funds creating a dependency, and not enough knowledge/consideration of the 
local situation/local NGO before providing funds. One respondent said they would 
rather have no foreign assistance at all. However, when asked if their NGO objective 
related to the changes in Kyrgyz society since independence 64% said yes. 56% of 
the 64% gave answers related to human rights or democracy issues. 0% said no. 
When asked if they think and/or want their NGO to contribute to the democratisation 
of Kyrgyzstan, 88% said yes. 0% said no. When asked the final question, what was 
the most important factor for peace, stability, and economic growth in Central Asia, 
44% answered with issues related to ethnic peace, stability, tolerance, and friendship. 
20% answered related to democracy and 16% provided answers related to economic 
growth.
Gender & Politics
When asked why there are so few women in parliament and the White House, 68% 
said this lack was due to male restrictions/behaviour, be these individual, community, 
society, or governmental. 20% thought that women were too passive and this lack 
indicated that women needed to initiate more female solidarity and less passivity. 4% 
said this lack was due to a “Muslim” culture. 64% said that these positions were 
important. When asked if there were many women leading NGOs, 96% said yes. Of 
this group 21% said this was because it was the only way for women to take part in 
decision-making and/or contribute to society and half said it was because women 
could do the job better than men. When asked if men feel free to act in politics, 84% 
said yes. Of this group 45% said this was because men were self-interested and 
politics provided an opportunity to capitalise on that self-interest. No one claimed that 
men are involved in politics for the benefit of society or democracy. When asked if
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women felt free to act in politics, only 8% said yes. 80% said absolutely no or 
generally no.
6.3.2 Data Results for Survey Set One (D.l): Local Oblast/Government Leaders 
(Akims) of Kyrgyzstan: Qualitized Narrative Profile Results Description by 
Sector
Survey Set One________________
A. 1) Average Adult Population: 384
B.l) Average Child Population: 384
C.l)NGO leaders: 25___________
D.l) Akims: 7________________
Demographics
Akims are 100% male with an average age of 43. When interviewing was conducted, 
there were only six oblasts, or local administrative units, in Kyrgyzstan. An oblast is 
led by an akim, or a local governor. Akims are not elected but rather selected and 
appointed exclusively by President Akaev. The new oblast of Batken, an effort to 
appease the neglected population of this region who, by and large, had supported the 
Muslim fundamentalist insurgency of August 1999 in that region, was created after the 
field research was complete. President Akaev tends to replace and rotate the akims at 
a rapid pace. For example, the new Talas akim, Keneshbek Karachalov, was appointed 
in December 1999 after these surveys were completed.
Of the six oblasts, every akim who was in the oblast capital when the researcher was 
also there granted an interview. The two akims, Issy-kul and Talas, who were not 
interviewed, were both travelling in other parts of the country when the researcher was 
in their oblast. In both cases, deputy akims granted meetings but were reluctant to 
complete a formal interview. Although the deputies promised the akim would 
complete the survey upon return and fax the completed survey, this did not occur. The 
akim return rate is thus 67% with four out of six completing a formal interview. 
Biographical information is available on all akims in the appendix.
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NGO Issues
75% thought that women were leading NGOs. Reasons given for women’s 
involvement in NGOs included, “Because they want power and they want to be 
involved in policy” and “Kyrgyz women are very strong and I am glad they run the 
NGOs.” The majority believed that NGOs were beneficial and necessary for society 
because NGOs perform the difficult work of social service providers that others do not 
want to do. The consensus was that NGOs should have the same viewpoint as 
government and help government. While NGOs were, overwhelmingly, perceived to 
be part of democracy, only one akim believed the advocacy component was a 
beneficial part of democracy, “NGOs are pushing people to do better and helping 
government by pushing government to do better.”
Ethnicity
Akims are 100% ethnic Kyrgyz. 100% believed the state did have an ethnic identity 
with 50% claiming this was Turkish based. Multi-ethnic and Kyrgyz responses were 
equally divided. Half of the akims thought that ethnicity was not relevant to their 
work with 25% believing ethnicity was “very important” as, “I [akim] have 
responsibility for all Kyrgyz.”
Citizenship
The majority of akims responded that anyone who lives in Kyrgyzstan is a citizen. No 
akim provided the correct legal definition of citizenship. One akim noted that citizens 
were represented by “their rights.” Other responses were non-sensible. 75% thought 
that their position as akim did not relate to concepts of citizenship, while 25% 
responded that their position as akim was highly relevant to citizenship issues, “Yes, it 
helps. How it helps is a difficult question. But it is several sides of a question: (1) 
Economic and social-political problems, I solve, (2) social dependants, and (3) street 
fighting-security and military. Akims, this office, should be working on these three 
important questions. Security questions are a big concern. There is a problem of 
criminals on the street because it [the country and Chui] is at a crossroads for many 
people... Chechnya, Uzbeks, Uigher—we have problems with the diaspora.”
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Democracy & Governance
75% believed that Kyrgyzstan is a democracy, with one akim stating, “Democracy is 
not something to bring on a plate.” Reasons that Kyrgyzstan was a democracy 
included: free elections, free media, freedom in general, rule of law, and “because our 
president is a democrat.” Half of the akims thought that Kyrgyzstan should be a 
democracy while half did not respond. Regarding the role of government, 50% 
responded that government played a large/strong and positive role while one akim 
said, “It doesn’t play the role it should.”
50% of akims responded with a mixed, positive and negative, response regarding 
foreign assistance, claiming that foreign aid is necessary but “makes us lazy” and “We 
have some problems. I worked in the White House and know the situation well. .. .It 
is good they help us.” 50% of akims mentioned they were “grateful” to President 
Akaev for “bringing” and “getting” the foreign aid.
Regarding the role of akims since independence, one akim noted that before Moscow 
controlled everything and now “We have only ourselves.” Another akim thought, 
“The akim is the assistant to the president, and his [akim] duty is to control people.” 
Only one akim believed he would still be in politics in ten years, “President of 
Kyrgyzstan.” 50% thought that the position of akim would be elected in ten years. 
One akim wanted “more power and money.” Regarding the situation of their country 
in ten years, responses included: “new president. Government should be better- 
economy and democracy better,” “...the most reformed country!” and “Nationalism is 
more and more in Central Asia, even we [Kyrgyz] are doing it ourselves.” 50% of 
akims believed that tolerance and harmony between nationalities was the essential 
factor for the future of Central Asia. One akim claimed that Kyrgyzstan “would be a 
superpower again!”
Gender & Politics
75% thought that women should not be involved in politics; “Why should they be in 
these positions?” and women “should stay home and look after children.” One akim 
thought Islam was responsible for the lack of women in politics while another said it 
was because “women are not very active.” A final akim thought there were many 
women in the White House and Parliament. 50% thought that these were important 
positions because of control and “The White House:., is the command of the 
country.”
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Half of the akims thought that men felt free to act in politics while half thought that 
women did not feel free to act in politics. One akim claimed, “Women will become 
more active.” 75% thought that citizenship did have a “gender” and that was male. 
Rationales included, “Men better understand the concepts of citizenship because they 
feel a responsibility for their family and the republic” and “Our biggest problem is that 
the laws are the same on paper but in life they are different... women are scared.”
6.3.3 Data Results for Survey Set Two (A.2-D.2): USAID Officials and USAID 
Partners in Washington/Kyrgyzstan: Qualitized Narrative Profile Results 
Description by Sector
Survey Set Two__________________________________
A.2) USAID officials in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakstan: 10
B.2) USAID partners in Kyrgyzstan; 2 out of 20______
C.2) USAID in Washington, DC: 10_________________
D.2) USAID partners in Washington, DC: 20__________
The researcher was invited to present results to senior levels at USAID Washington, 
visit the Gender Team in USAID Kazakstan, advise the USAID Mission Director for 
Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan on gender policy, and advise and present findings before 
two high-level USAID partner organisation directors in Washington. Additionally, 
the researcher was invited to an USAID and USAID Partner Strategy Session for 
revising USAID’s Strategy Objectives in Washington and the researcher received top- 
level USAID support and assistance gathering USAID documents and materials. 
However, although all individuals promised to fill out the surveys and requested (and 
continue to request) to receive the complete research results, only two people actually 
completed the surveys. Despite the low-response rate, analysis of Survey Set is still 
valuable because: a) the high lack of response is indicative, and b) the responses that 
were provided carry weight due to the high position of the two responses. Although 
results were minimal, they were sufficient to create the following qualitized narrative 
profiles.
Demographics
The two responses were respectively, the resident representative for the main USAID 
partner NGO that promotes democracy (headquartered in Washington with the local
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office in Bishkek that covers the entire country) and the resident representative of the 
main USAID partner NGO that handles humanitarian and human rights programs 
(headquartered in Washington State with offices in Washington DC). This resident 
representative is located in Osh and manages Southern Kyrgyzstan. Both respondents 
had been in their position in Kyrgyzstan for over 17 months. Both representatives 
were male. Of the possible 60 directors of US PVOs, Washington and Kyrgyzstan 
offices, and USAID representatives, only four are women; one PVO office in 
Kyrgyzstan, two PVO offices in Washington, and one USAED staff member in 
Almaty. The USAID Kyrgyzstan staff members, of two, are both male. Therefore, 
93% of US democracy assistance USAID staff members and partner organisations, 
both in Washington and in Kyrgyzstan, are male.
NGO Issues
Both respondents thought that NGOs were beneficial for society. One respondent 
thought that “definitely” NGOs are part of democracy. The other respondent did not 
know. When asked if there were many women leading NGOs and why or why not, 
both respondents said there were many women leading NGOs; “Almost all. Women 
are more powerful than men individually in this country, and perhaps less prone to 
internal division when trying to achieve a goal. They are not nearly as lazy, or as 
afflicted with alcoholic and other addictions as the men” and “Yes [because] the 
international community has targeted women for training.”
Ethnicity
One respondent thought that Kyrgyzstan had a very Kyrgyz ethnic identity. The other 
thought there was no ethnic identity to the state. When asked if ethnicity was relevant 
to US democracy assistance, one respondent said, “No. We would like to see an 
identity based more of shared values and principles than shared ethnicity.” The other 
respondent did not know. One respondent thought there was a difference between 
men and women regarding ethnicity, “Women are less concerned with it.” The other 
respondent did not think there was a difference. When asked to cite the most 
important factors for peace, growth, and stability in Central Asia both respondents 
cited ethnic tolerance as the key factor. One respondent said ethnic harmony was 
secondary to economic stability.
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Citizenship
Both respondents had a high level of knowledge about how citizens are legally 
represented. One respondent did not think that USAID democracy programs provided 
a better understanding of citizenship issues. The other respondent thought that 
USAID democracy programs did provide assistance with citizenship issues; “Yes. By 
providing models and experience from other democratic countries where ethnicity is 
not the main source of national identity and, in our case, helping those concepts 
become internalised and home-grown through direct apprenticeship.” This respondent 
also thought that this was somewhat different from how NGOs promote citizenship. 
“NGOs promote the idea that citizens can change their circumstances and future.”
Both respondents thought that concepts of gender were involved with issues of 
citizenship due to negative discrimination against women and more positive greater 
female solidarity, respectively. “Women are made to feel as second class citizens with 
very little say in what is going on. Culturally and traditionally this is the way life is” 
and “I have found myself that Russian and Kyrgyz and Uzbek and other women are 
more often friends with each other than their male counterparts, and that the women 
are more apt to work together for a goal without regard to their ethnicity.”
Democracy & Governance
One respondent thought that Kyrgyzstan is a democracy, but “not a perfect one,” and 
the other respondent thought Kyrgyzstan was not a democracy. The yes response was 
justified by stating, “Generally, free elections are held; many officials are elected.” 
The no response was justified by, “It [Kyrgyzstan] is controlled by a bunch of corrupt 
officials who were Communist under the former Soviet Union. Decisions are made in 
secret ” When asked if Kyrgyzstan was not a democracy what was it, one respondent 
said, “It is a proto-democracy, a gestating democracy.” The other respondent said, 
“Kyrgyzstan is a little Russia. A few people in control, massive corruption; I think 
Kyrgyzstan is a mess.”
One respondent thought that Kyrgyzstan should be a democracy because, “People’s
will should be respected.” The other respondent thought that Kyrgyzstan had the
potential to be a democracy. In order to make Kyrgyzstan a democracy, one
respondent said there needed to be, “more freedom of expression, assembly, and
association ... more elections of local officials ... more frequent elections for state
positions, rather than only once every five years.” The other respondent called for,
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“openness, less nepotism, less corruption.” When asked why the US promotes 
democracy in Kyrgyzstan, the respondent said, “Strategically, I suppose, to prevent 
radical Islam from achieving regional strength. Otherwise, out of the goodness of our 
hearts, because we do believe democracy will lead to better lives for people ... and 
there’s truly not much other US interest here.” The other respondent said, “So it 
doesn’t return to Communism.”
Both respondents had a negative view of the government of Kyrgyzstan and a negative 
view of foreign assistance, respectively. “The Kyrgyz government doesn’t necessarily 
like or trust the Kyrgyz people,” and “It [Kyrgyz government] is blocking the 
development due to high taxes and corruption. If those two things could be changed, 
it would do a great deal to help Kyrgyzstan.” “Generally, with notable exceptions, I 
find it [foreign assistance] overblown, overpaid, lazy, arrogant, and basically 
ineffective;” “a lot of money has been dumped here with little supervision and 
capacity building. If there was a partnership rather than sponsorship mentality 
established here in the beginning, Kyrgyzstan would be much further along.” 
Additionally, when asked where they saw the country in ten years, both were hopeful 
but not optimistic.
Gender & Politics
When asked why there are so few women in parliament and the White House, one 
respondent cited “cultural impediments to powerful women. Islam, nomadic 
traditions.” The other respondent claimed, “The mentality of women are inferior to 
men.” Both responded that these were important positions. One respondent said, “I 
think women in Kyrgyzstan are more responsible and trustworthy then men. (or is that 
true about the rest of the world as well?) They care more about families and the 
people. And they are very aware of how to run a household on a small budget.”
When asked if men felt free to act in politics (and why/why not and how) one
respondent thought that men did feel free due to, “changes in laws, upcoming
elections. With, of course, many thousands of exceptions, the men are unfortunately
fundamentally and overwhelmingly lazy, so many opportunities will be missed.” The
other respondent felt that men did not feel free. “I think that most don't care. It would
be interesting to see how many people who are in power now, were in power before.”
When asked if women felt free to act in politics (and why/why not and how) one
respondent thought that women did feel free, “changes in laws, upcoming elections.
They will achieve more, relatively, than men, as they are generally more focused and
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more industrious.” The other respondent thought that women did not feel free, 
“Women are submissive and it is the culture for them to be in the background. The 
majority accepts this role. The few that don't, are quite literally, outcasts.”
6.4 Summary of Key Findings
The following summary highlights comprehensive key findings of all Survey Sets, 
divided by sub-categories correlating to the themes of this research. This summary is 
followed by detailed research results with full responses of Survey Sets found in the 
appendix.
Primary Identity
• The responses to both questions relating to primary identity in Survey Set A.1 
provide overwhelming evidence that gender is a more primary identity for women 
than ethnicity and that ethnic identity is a more primary identity for [particularly 
younger] men.
• The overwhelming majority of those who attached negative adjectives to questions 
of self-identity were young people from the South. The negative self-impression 
indicates a lack of belonging and dissatisfaction among the Southern youth. This 
should cause considerable concern and should be factored into development 
programs dealing with poverty and identity issues in the South. There was also 
evidence of a stronger male youth ethnic attachment/identity, primarily in the 
South of Kyrgyzstan.
Ethnic Origin and Teaching for Self and Children
• A father, the paternal line, was the dominant response as the ethnic educators and 
ethnic determinant of the children with responses to both questions supporting 
each other. In a highly patriarchal society, such as Kyrgyzstan, the survey answers 
indicated that women had little control over how and what ethnic identity their 
children learned. More young, Southern, non-Kyrgyz women gave maternal 
determinant and educator answers than any other region.
• Most adults claimed that they had learned about ethnicity in school, yet only a
small percentage of the same adults said their children learned about ethnicity in
school. Despite these differences, schools still emerged as a significant factor in
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the education of ethnic identity. This is important for future development 
assistance that seeks to promote tolerance education.
Ethnicity o f Self & Other: Qualities and Descriptions
• Regarding ethnic qualities, more than half of the men surveyed responded with 
negative adjectives while more than half of the women responded with positive 
adjectives. The majority of the women and men who gave negative answers live 
in the South. These results support other answers in providing more evidence of 
high levels of dissatisfaction and negative self-image in the South.
• The responses regarding the question about traditions, symbols, values, and 
stories, demonstrated that ethnic symbolism is highly important to all ethnic 
groups questioned, except for Russians. Age proved relevant when, again, the 
youth provided the majority of negative response and those 35 or older gave the 
majority of positive response.
• Women associated ethnicity with “things” such as jewellery, food, and clothing 
while men provided more active and sometimes violent contents of ethnic identity, 
including sheep polo, national games, and subjugating women, such as bride 
kidnapping. These results provide evidence of the association of male violence 
and ethnic identity.
• When asked directly if ethnicity was more important for men or women, both 
sexes of all ethnic groups responded that ethnicity was more important for men 
and less important for women.
Citizenship & Ethnicity o f State
• Only 10% of the average adult population provided “Kyrgyz” related response to 
the question of citizenship.
• 36% of NGOs surveyed indicated that a person had to be “Kyrgyz” in order to be a 
citizen.
• The akims demonstrated lack of understanding that government officials were 
representatives of the population and/or public servants.
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• NGO surveys, akims, and USAID partners all thought that gender was considered 
highly significant in concepts of citizenship, with citizens perceived to be, and 
expected to be, highly male.
• The majority of NGOs responded that Kyrgyzstan as a state has an ethnicity and 
that this is multi-ethnic. This may indicate that the NGO community is more aware 
of the need for tolerance/multi-ethnic identity, etc. The akims, by half, noted that 
the state ethnicity was Turkish based.
Gender and Politics/Community/Nationalism
•  The large majority said they were not active in politics or the community. The 
majority of those who were politically active were Kyrgyz men 35 years or older, 
living in Chui oblast. The majority of those active in the community were men, 
over 35, and women living in the South.
• Only 15% of all adults claimed to be a nationalist; over half of these adults live in 
the South and were ethnically Kyrgyz.
• The majority of responses from the NGOs surveyed indicated that governmental 
positions were important but that women were not free to take part in these due to 
patriarchal behaviour and systematic restrictions.
• Akims clearly responded that women’s place was not in politics but “in the home.” 
Men, akims claimed, belonged in politics because men are more responsible than 
women. These responses correlated with the NGO perception of citizenship and 
politics as male dominated.
• USAID partner organisation representatives in Kyrgyzstan believed gender to be 
relevant to issues related to: NGOs, citizenship, ethnicity, and politics. Generally, 
women were perceived to be discriminated against by the men in society and 
government and treated as “second-class citizens.”
Life Conditions Under Independence Versus the USSR
• The vast majority believes that life was better under the USSR with only a fraction
claiming life is better now. Nearly one third of all people, mostly Kyrgyz men,
208
think life was better under the USSR due to freedom, rule of law, security, and 
democracy.
NGO Issues
• An overwhelming majority of NGOs surveyed thought that NGOs were beneficial 
for society with the overwhelming majority claiming that women dominate NGOs 
because the NGO sector requires hard work and solves difficult social problems of 
which the (male) government does not want to be bothered. Therefore, the NGOs 
reported, women are allowed, even encouraged, to manage the NGO sector.
• All akims thought that all/most NGOs were led by women, should be led by 
women, and are part of democracy.
• USAID partners responses supported that of local NGOs and akims with a belief 
that NGOs are both beneficial for society and the domain of women. USAID 
partner responses also mirrored the local NGO responses in that they perceived 
women as being more responsible and, therefore, “better” at NGO work.
Democracy and Governance Issues
• Among NGOs surveyed, on issues relating to democracy and governance, 
progressive democratic elements of society were seen to originate from civil 
society, citizens, and the population. Conversely, regression in democratic 
advancement was clearly blamed on government action.
• When asked about issues relating to democracy and governance more than half of 
the akims responded that “government” was understood to mean President Akaev.
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6.5 Summary
The field research surveys confirm the hypothesis of this dissertation, that ethnicity 
has a gender component. In sum, gender appears to be a more primary self-identity 
for women than ethnicity. Conversely, men are more attached to their own ethnic 
identity than their gender. Moreover, when questioned about how the opposite sex 
perceives their self-identity both men and women responded that they believed that 
gender is more important for women than ethnicity while men valued their ethnicity 
more than their gender. Respondents saw ethnic identity as transmitted by men; 
perceived ethnicity as paternal and ethnic educators also as paternal. Finally, men 
consistently provided more violent responses than women when asked to name the 
qualities of their ethnicity. One significant spurious result was that ethnic identity is, 
overwhelmingly, learned in school. Moreover, supporting evidence of the significant 
role that ethnicity, gender, and citizenship play in civil and political sectors is 
documented by the survey results. Politics clearly had a male gender correlation. 
Finally, there is some indication that USAID partner NGOs are aware of this gendered 
role but lack the ability to inform programming due to the overall lack of competence 
of US foreign assistance. The following conclusion, Chapter Seven, examines what 
these results mean in terms of future democratic assistance programming.
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Chapter Seven
Gendered Ethnicity and the Future of US Democratic Assistance
“The transversal pathway might be fu ll o f thorns, but at least 
it leads in the right direction ”
(Yuval-Davis 1998:186).
7.1 Feminist Research and Women as Agents of Change
Feminist research has been closely linked with activism and social change. “Merely 
collecting descriptive statistics or experimental data about women does not constitute 
feminist research. Feminist research must be part of a process by which women’s 
oppression is not only described but challenged” (Gorelick 1991:462). The overall 
goal of feminist research is to break the systematic exclusion of women from public 
society, legal standards, historical records and understandings, etc., as well as to 
change normative values associated with women at large and feminist research within 
the academy. As the history of feminist research has been closely linked with 
prescription, participation, and active research, so has this research. This section 
explores prescriptive measures for US democracy assistance in relation to the 
understanding of gendered ethnicity developed in this thesis.
As described in Chapter Three, the majority of research probing gender and ethnicity 
falls into five main categories (Barot 1999:6). The Yuval-Davis-Anthias typology has 
also outlined the ways by which women themselves participate in the ethnic group 
process. Since Barot’s categories and the Yuval-Davis-Anthias typology guided the 
design of this research, field research results are now compared to the relevant aspects 
of both. Although there is some overlap between these two, for the sake of clarity, 
each will be examined separately.
According to Barot’s categories, the theorising that locates the place of national 
identity/nationalism in the female relates to ethnic self-concepts. As the literature 
documents, women’s bodies are often used as “vehicles” for the symbolic depiction of 
political purpose. The results of this research confirmed this theory by male survey 
responses that defined their ethnicity by the behaviour, domination, or appearance of
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women. These responses included issues such as, bridekidnapping, the notion that a 
woman loses her ethnicity when she inter-marries—thereby rendering it not 
acceptable for women to marry outside of their ethnic group, although this is 
perceived as acceptable for men, as well as general comments made by men in the 
Kyrgyzstan research on how “their” women act, behave, dress versus “other” women.
A smaller body of research, mentioned by Barot, focuses on the “special” role of 
women as mothers (and/or women) in the transfer/teaching of ethnic identity. This 
includes a controversial body of research that understands women to be necessarily 
more peaceful than men (Engel 1991:135; Coomaraswamy 1999:8; Reardon 1996). 
The results from the Kyrgyzstan research suggest problems with, at least the first part, 
of this theoiy. Contrary to the popular images, this research did not show that women 
occupied a predominant, or a special, place in teaching ethnicity. The most frequent 
responses to the question, “Who taught you and your children about ethnicity?” was 
schools.187
The Yuval-Davis-Anthias typology relevant to this research includes the argument 
that women serve: (1) as biological reproducers of members of ethnic collectives, (2) 
as reproducers of the boundaries of ethnic/national groups, (3) as central participants 
in the ideological reproduction of the collective and as transmitters of its culture, and 
(4) as signifiers of ethnic/national differences—as a focus and symbol in ideological 
discourses used in the construction, reproduction, and transformation of 
ethnic/national categories.
• Male Honour and the Female as Ethnic Boundary Marker: Point One
The results clearly support the notion that ethnicity and violence have a distinctly 
male component but this research did not probe the degree to which male ethnic 
violence is directed at the “other’s” women. However, the “rejection” of women who 
marry “other” ethnic males did come through in several survey responses where men 
and women related that women should not marry outside of the ethnic group. If they 
do, they lose their ethnic identity. This does support the idea that female members of 
the ethnic are reproducers of the male ethnic boundaries (Yuval-Davis 1997). The
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research results also yielded evidence for the idea that ethnicity is transferred from the 
father to the child through the mother. Therefore, the female (a) body, (b) 
reproductive capacity, and (c) sexual capacity were perceived, at least indirectly, by 
the people surveyed as ethnic markers. Future research might directly question these 
issues.
• Gender as Central to Ethnic Violence and Peace: Point Two
Ethnic violence, usually sexual, is directed inward and committed against the female 
“self’ when male community leaders “mark” and/or “protect” their boundary markers 
with women, themselves, as a prominent ethnic marker. The high levels of violence 
against women during Kyrgyzstan’s “nation/ethnic” building process supports this 
theory. The surveys did not specifically solicit responses relating to violence and this 
also would be an area for future research. Significantly, while the surveys provided 
evidence that women may have shared experiences and interests as women, mothers, 
and wives, that could be leveraged to reduce the significance of ethnic or national 
identity, the research results also indicated that patriarchal social constructions have 
allowed women only limited positions of power and decision-making. Thus, the 
potentially positive factor of gendered ethnicity, as a population base willing to work 
across ethnic lines and promote greater ethnic tolerance, may be confounded by the 
lack of leadership that women are afforded—both by their own communities and 
governments, as well as donors programs. Thus, gendered ethnicity in addition to 
women’s rights and empowerment may prove to be vital, and interlocking, ingredients 
in preventing ethnic conflict, though the evidence is not conclusive.
• Ethnic Myth o f Creation and the Female: Point Three and Four
While these surveys did not demonstrate that women held positions as caretakers and 
educators of ethnic practices and rituals, they did showed that women are more 
concerned with ethnic rituals, such as weddings, holidays, jewellery, and type of 
clothes. This supports the notion that women represent the blank space where men 
can project and transfer an ethnic identity. The surveys also provided evidence that 
women figure symbolically in the originating myths of ethnic identity, as suggested in
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the literature, by the male survey respondents who related their tribe or ethnic origins 
began with a woman who was a warrior, a deer, a fox, the sun, etc. and their father, 
seven generations back, who fell in love with her and “overcame or won her over,” 
married her, and had children (Benton 1998). In such stories, the subsequent 
generations have been “clean, pure, white.” Related concepts of sex, sexual power, 
and women’s role in the formation of ethnic identity as procreation, sacrifice, and 
birth came through in the Kyrgyzstan surveys, supporting the idea that myths of 
ethnic origin are predicated on a sexual order that excludes women from the 
community, the creation, and the polity. The myth of origin relies on “essential 
identities” to define belonging. This results in exclusionary ideologies, in which 
movements toward sexual equality can be abandoned because they are seen as 
undermining sexual differences which define “essential identities” (Charles 
1998:7,12). Again, women’s human rights education may provide a particularly 
important component in democratic assistance that could help decrease ethnic 
possession, inter-ethnic violence, and intra-ethnic violence against women.
7.2 Fraternity, Violence, and Citizenship
Although the results from this research demonstrated that men provide more violent 
associations of their ethnicity than women, in correlation with the body of literature 
reviewed in this dissertation, women are not, therefore, necessarily more “inherently” 
peaceful. However, that men identified with their ethnicity over their gender, only in 
one case out of 384 providing a gendered identity, while women overwhelmingly 
provided gender responses when questioned about their self identity provides 
supporting evidence to the emerging theory of gendered ethnicity that asserts while 
ethnic violence focuses on the female, alternatively female gender alliances may 
reject ethnic conflict—one is less likely to fight for an identity to which one is not so 
strongly attached.
The notion that women have shared experiences and interests as women, as mothers 
and wives is often used as a way of reducing the significance of ethnic or national 
identities. Additionally, when women define themselves as reproducers of their 
collectivity, they gain (or regain) control of their reproductive potential and their own
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sexuality (Moghadam 1994; Papanek 1994; Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989; Charles 
1998:8). By doing so, women may be able to reject intra-ethnic violence directed 
against them as “ethnic boundary markers,” and also reject the inter-ethnic violence 
between ethnic groups (Reid 1998). Women are more vulnerable to possession by 
“the other” (who is male) when women inherently lack self-possession of their own 
(Benton 1998:35). It thus follows that women’s rights and empowerment may be a 
catalyst towards preventing ethnic conflict. Feminist politics, therefore, might 
incorporating the notion of women’s positioning and ethnic differences into its 
agenda, rendering all feminist politics, coalition politics (Yuval-Davis 1998:168).
The results of this dissertation, in relation to the literature on gender and 
nation/ethnicity, led to a conclusion that the female gender has a significant potential 
to be cultivated as an agent of change in democratic transitional societies. This 
potential may be both in preventing/blocking ethnic conflict through gender solidarity 
(with female dominated civil society as a potential mechanism) as well as in 
promoting more general levels of empowerment and fundamental human rights for 
the community as a whole. As noted about the female driven civil society in 
Mongolia, “A second theme that unites these women [Mongolian] is their willingness 
to change, and their desire to be an active agent of change through higher education. 
These are not the passive poor, buffeted by the winds of ill fortune, but strong, 
vigorous women who accept challenges” (Avery 1996:9). The survey results from 
Kyrgyzstan yield ideas and attitudes similar to those described by Avery (1996) of 
Mongolia.
However, the results from Kyrgyzstan also evidenced a frustration on behalf of 
women NGO leaders at not being included at decision-making levels that hold real 
political power. Not restricted to Kyrgyzstan, Waetjen (1999) describes similar 
frustrations for women in Africa: “It was clear to us that we could not hope to tackle 
(poverty, disease, and ignorance) successfully... unless our women were given scope 
through our constitution that enabled them to take a lead in our campaign to limit 
poverty, disease, and ignorance” (Waetjen 1999:676). As the female NGO leaders in 
Kyrgyzstan articulated in their survey responses, so have other researchers noted of 
other women working for change: “Critics argue that, in practice, women’s attempts
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to (re)articulate and forge social change within communities have often been 
interpreted as threat to the status quo by both community members and the wider 
system of power (Kennedy, Kubelska, and Walsh 1993). This is evidenced by, 
particularly, the akim responses that women’s activities in NGOs was acceptable but 
that women were not welcome at higher political, and male, levels, as well the NGO 
responses which described how they were blocked from political activities beyond 
NGO work. These results also confirm the body of literature, outlined in Chapter One 
and Two, that argues concepts of democracy, citizenship, and civil society are highly 
gendered, generally to the disadvantage of women.
As outlined in Chapter Three, attempts to respond to Reich’s call for new citizenship 
models would be greatly aided by a recognition that traditional citizenship models 
have been male, as Chapter Two argued, and have mobilised around concepts of 
“fraternity” and ethnic brotherhood necessarily including violence, as Anderson has 
argued. Furthermore, recognition of the gendered nature of civil societies and the 
linkages this dynamic shares with ethnic identity may aid democracy assistance 
programming in creating democratic procedures that provide means to relieve ethnic 
tensions. Starting from these premises, a feminist analysis of ethnicity potentially 
offers a great deal to those engaged in preventing ethnic conflict and promoting 
democracy.
US democracy assistance, evidenced by Chapter Two and the survey results, has 
neither examined nor understood the complex social realities within which women 
operate. US democracy assistance has failed to recognise the powerful, potential role 
that women can play in consolidating real democratic gains. Women, from the 
Inkataha’s in Africa to the Kyrgyz in Central Asia, must be allowed and encouraged 
to translate their local social action into the political decision-making arena. 
Democracy assistance could do much to capitalise on the power of female civil 
society as an agent of change and ethnic conflict prevention.
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7.3 Implications for US Democratic Assistance & Future Research
“A possible way out o f this impasse is a rights-rather than identity based politics ”
(Charles 1998:8)
In relation to the original hypothesis, this research has outlined the problems with 
current US democratic assistance, arguing that primary flaws involve a non- 
recognition of ethnicity. This contention, analysed by feminist/gender theory, reveals 
the further non-recognition/inclusion and/or restriction of women and/or female 
behaviour both within US democracy assistance, local democracy building and ethnic 
identity construction. This research has argued that the “discovery” of gendered 
ethnicity has particular importance for US democracy assistance in that the tendency 
of women to self-identify with gender over ethnicity and the corresponding tendency 
of men to relate primarily to an ethnic identity may hold importance in ethnic conflict 
prevention programs. Moreover, this research suggests that the predominance of 
women in civil society also holds potential for new programmatic efforts that could 
take advantage of the nature of gender ethnicity in preventing ethnic conflict.
The evidence of this research suggests that: (1) women self-identify with their gender 
above their ethnicity and that when ethnicity does matter to women it takes a different 
form from male ethnic identity: (2) women are more fully involved in civil society 
than men; and (3) there is a greater male identification with ethnicity and with official 
identities such as citizenship and political representation. As noted in Chapter Three, 
ethnic identity represents a persistent and, perhaps, necessary component of human 
society as it exists today. The question, then, is not whether societies can eliminate 
ethnic identifications but under what conditions ethnic identity is destructive to 
human societies. Greater understanding of how, when, and why ethnicity is gendered 
holds the potential to assist in understanding, and thus preventing, ethnic identity that 
is destructive to democracies and human societies in general.
The primary contributions of this dissertation are summarised as follows. (1) While
the gendered nature of ethnicity is an increasingly prominent theme in the feminist
literature, much of this latest research exists with relatively little supporting empirical
evidence. The research of this dissertation provides much needed empirical evidence
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confirming feminist theorising that ethnicity does have a gender component, resulting 
in significantly different understandings and levels of identification of ethnicity for 
men and women. (2) A detailed analysis of USAID documents, provided in this 
dissertation, reveals an overlooked and surprising lack of attention to ethnicity and the 
a largely nominal gender inclusion within USAID’s democracy programming. (3) 
Finally, this dissertation highlights the ambiguity in current claims about the 
importance of civil society—a theme, as demonstrated, that is increasingly part of the 
literature on democracy. While civil society is proven to be largely dominated by 
women, in the case of Kyrgyzstan, this gender imbalance means: (a) that civil society 
risks being dismissed and disparaged as “merely” women’s work instead of 
contributing to greater democratisation of society and culture, (b) that women’s 
participation does not translate into equal participation or validity within formal 
political structures, and (c) that it does not appear to encourage (male) citizens to 
regard women as their political equals.
Rhetoric about the importance of civil society will remain such unless theorists of 
democracy incorporate the gendering of both civil society and the more formal 
channels of political power into their understanding of how civil society, democracy, 
and gender operate. Thus far, the type of critical feminist analysis that would reveal 
these dilemmas has not occurred within USAID assistance. Instead, there appears to 
be a naive and ill-informed celebration of civil society, lacking in comprehensive 
understanding of its gendered dimensions and the implications these have in 
preventing authentic political power and representation for women. Without such 
connections between informal and formal participation it is unlikely that assistance 
programming can take advantage of a female-dominated, civil society that promises to 
be less prone to ethnic conflict.
There are several prescriptive measures put forth in the academy that support and are 
supported by the findings of this research. These could be incorporated in US 
democracy assistance. Rosalind Brunt’s (1989) argues that, “Unless the question of 
identity is at the heart of any transformatory project, then not only will the political 
agenda be inadequately “rethought” but more to the point, our politics aren’t going to 
make much headway beyond the Left’s own circle” (Brunt in Yuval-Davis 1998:182).
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Both the World Bank’s recommendations, acknowledging that ethnic identity can 
affect development outcomes and, thus, that an ethnic analysis should be incorporated 
into all development/assistance programs, and the Swiss Government’s democracy 
assistance to Kyrgyzstan, a model fundamentally based on recognition of ethnicity, 
“Democratic Governance in a Multi-Cultural and Multi-Ethnic Society,” supports 
Brunt’s arguments and the findings of this research that identity, particularly ethnic, is 
an important consideration. While US democracy assistance would benefit from the 
World Bank recommendations and the Swiss model, both fail to include a 
feminist/gender analysis of ethnicity (Youssef 1995:i; Paul deGuchteneire 1998).
Moghadam also offers an important feminist argument, “It is important to provide an 
alternative to these movements [nationalism/ethnic patriarchy], one which is based on 
universal human rights and, at the same time, takes into account and values 
difference” (Moghadam 1994:22). As Moghadam continues to argue, feminism must 
accept the Enlightenment legacy in order to include its basis in “humanism” and the 
moral value set based on respect for autonomy/freedom of individual human beings. 
In too many political ideologies, “Women’s importance as symbols of cultural 
identity legitimise a denial of their rights as human beings” (Moghadam 1994:22). As 
Moghadam suggests, in order to counter this women have to be deconstructed as 
symbols of cultural identity and reconstructed as “human beings.” In other words, a 
rights based rather than identity based political process and structure is necessary. 
Charles suggests that, “This is a task that feminism is uniquely fitted to accomplish” 
(Charles 1998:23).188
Promoting what Yuval-Davis calls “transversal politics” provides a means to 
supersede identity politics and include respect for difference, exclude one privileged 
voice, and recognise the potential of creating common political interests as women 
(Charles 1998:23). In relation to gender inclusion, Yuval-Davis quotes Italian women 
who call the methodology of this recognition “rooting and shifting.” “Rooting” is 
recognising the importance of one’s own memberships/identities while maintaining 
the flexibility to “shift” in relation to understanding other’s memberships/identities. 
Transversalism replaces universalism in that it does not imply a homogenous 
foundation, which is in reality exclusionary (Yuval-Davis 1998:184-185; Yuval-Davis
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and Werbner 1999:1-30). Transversalism might be understood as a rights based 
political process that accounts for the importance of identity.
Finally, Charles Franker s 1962 work, “The Democratic Prospect,” mentioned in 
Chapter Two, provides the most effective rationale as to why democracy maintains its 
status as the most reliable form of government to embody, protect and uphold the 
values of human rights and human dignity. Indeed, Franker s answers to why to 
choose democracy represents the best rationale why democracy assistance, if 
performed thoughtfully, can improve lives, benefit populations, and has the potential 
to embody the principles of human rights and development.189 However, for all of 
Frankel’s insights, gender, arid thus women, are not recognised. Neither is ethnicity. 
David Held also offers a modem version of Frankel’s work when Held argues that it 
is a fallacy to discuss democracy today without thinking about more cosmopolitan 
models of democracy (Held 1993:269). He proposes examing the potential that 
regional parliamentary models may hold in overcoming the inadequacies of today’s 
“democracies.” Frankel’s epilogue and Held’s regional parliamentary models, 
benefiting from gendered ethnic inclusiveness and transversal politics, represent 
powerful beginnings for future research and democratic assistance programming,
A feminist Held and Swiss mixed-model, using the results of this research and the 
World Bank’s results, as well as Frankel’s rationale, combined with a 
Moghadam/Yuval-Davis feminist theory on gendered ethnicity and effective 
grassroots women’s rights advocacy would augment and provide more inclusive, 
effective programmatic structures for US democracy assistance in Kyrgyzstan. The 
scope of feminist/gender research is broad and much territory in the realm of ethnicity 
remains unexplored. While future research, for example, might examine sexual 
definitions of ethnicity, ethnic violence, and the linkage to domestic violence, or 
economic development and ethnic community with a gender analysis, as far as the 
impacts of gendered ethnicity within transitional democracy frameworks, this research 
does demonstrate that there is a necessary recognition that a gendered ethnic analysis 
demands a correction of US democracy assistance programming.
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Gendered constraints of democracy assistance explain, in part, how and why women 
engage in democracy differently and gendered ethnicity expands on emerging 
research that demonstrates the different concepts of identity women possess. Often, 
would-be democracies are fraught with dangerous ethnic divides. Gendered 
understandings of ethnicity have not been comprehensively examined, particularly 
within democratic assistance frameworks. Therefore, understanding the under- 
researched role of gender in ethnic identity during transitional societies will 
necessarily inform democratic institution building. Consideration of gendered 
ethnicity, women’s less violent and more gendered understanding of ethnicity 
combined with women’s ability to promote this identity through a female-dominated 
civil society, may strengthen sustainable democracy and decrease violent ethnic 
sentiments. These are, after all, the self-reported goals of democratic assistance. If the 
goal of US democratic assistance is to promote peaceful, stable democracies, then the 
means by which democracy assistance pursues these objectives should be reviewed in 
consideration of gendered ethnicity, providing more support to women’s concepts of 
identity and their activity in civil society rather than promoting, disproportionately, 
the male, ethnic state structure (Handrahan 2000b).190
7.4 Summary
The non-recognition of the female ability to reject an ethnic identity in favour of a 
gender identity and work with others across ethnic lines within their universal role as 
caretakers and leaders of civil society, indicates that a powerful tool for ethnic 
violence prevention has been overlooked (Reid 1998). Donor promotion of male 
leaders has largely reasserted the public-private dichotomy and helped foster the 
establishment of dominant male ideologies, particularly within “new democracies.” 
Transitional “democracies” have little commitment to gender equality in the home, 
community, or state, and allow, even foster, gendered definitions of “male” 
citizenship and ethnic identity based on male involvement in the public political 
domain, which, as demonstrated in this dissertation, necessarily involves violence.
As Touraine has asserted, “Democracy is not an end in itself’ (Touraine 1997:31). 
Yet, in current US democracy assistance, the promotion of democracy has become an
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end to itself. To remedy this situation it is “high time for self-criticism” (O'Donnell 
1996:47). Effective USAID deconstruction would allow the power and potential of 
women as democratic agents to be seriously examined.191 This research demonstrates 
that gendered ethnicity will have an important impact as a political strategy within 
democratic assistance as appropriate ways of integrating women’s ethnic experiences 
are developed within the decision-making frameworks of democratic assistance.
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Endnotes
Endnotes for Chapter One
1 Thomas Carothers (1999) begins this process with his groundbreaking book, Aiding 
Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve. The work of Carothers is the first serious academic 
exploration into the democracy assistance business.
2See also: Stetson (1995), Peterson (1992), Kandiyoti (1989), Elshtain (1992), Brown, (1986), 
Anthias (1989), Cornell (1990), Elshtain (1997), Tickner (1991), and True (1993).
3“The gender analysis approach is increasingly considered by many development 
professionals as a means to an end.... U.N. studies also assert that the consideration of 
women’s contributions and potential is critical to the outcome of development” (Martin 
GAO/NSIAD-94-16-1994.55).
4A1so known as the Newly Independent States (NIS). The GOA reports defines NIS or FSU 
countries as: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan (Zanardi 1995: 1).
5This assessment is restricted to states rather than private donors.
6Other significant donors to the FSU include the European Union (EU) and Germany. The 
EU’s Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) allocated 
some $2.8 billion from 1991-1999 and Germany has provided $56 billion from 1989-1999 
(Tamoff 1999:6). Germany has given the most funds to the FSU with the US in second place 
(TamofF 1999:6). The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) 
aid flow database on CD-ROM provides comprehensive data on the volume, origin and types 
of aid and other resource flows to recipient countries. Data was retrieved directly by the 
author from “Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development,” Washington, DC Centre, CD-ROM Library, 
also available in http://www.oecdwash.org/PUBS/ELECPUBS/eDdevt.htm#geodist: (1999). 
7According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS) (Tamoff 1999) as of May 1999 
(from 1992) an estimated $6.5 billion in US assistance has gone to the FSU. Of this $6.5 
billion, (as of September 1998-from 1992) USAID had obligated an estimated $5.7 billion 
(Tamoff 1999:3). FY 1999 FSU funds account for approximately $847 million, about 6% of 
total US worldwide foreign aid for 1999 (Tamoff 1999:3). The FY2000 budget requested 
$1,032 billion for the FSU, a 22% increase over the FY 1999 level (Tamoff 1999:2). GAO 
reviewed only 28 awarded USAID Global Bureau contracts between 1991-1996, which were 
estimated at $310 million (Nelson 1996). It is impossible to provide exact assistance figures, 
as USAID did not maintain separate and/or accurate accounts of funds to the NIS. In January 
1995, the State Department Co-ordinator for NIS Affairs reported some $2.9 billion in 
obligations and $1.8 in expenditures for Russia alone through December 1994. Funds for the 
NIS are allocated through P.L. 102-511, otherwise known as the Freedom for Russia and 
Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Market Support Act (October 1992). P.L. 102- 
511 is commonly known as the Freedom Support Act (FSA)(Zanardi 1995). From 1990-1994 
FSA occupied 16.21% of the Department of State’s fund allocated to the FSU (Zanardi 
1995:75). In addition to USAID there are at least 23 other US departments and agencies that 
had programs in the FSU as of 1996, some of which could also be considered democracy 
assistance (Zanardi 1995: 18); however, USAID, US Department of Agriculture (USDA), and 
US Department of Defence (DOD) implemented the majority of programs (Zanardi 1995: 2). 
Between 1990-1994, the US Government (USG) obligated $5.4 billion and expended $3.5 
billion for bilateral non-credit programs to the FSU of which only 5.36% was allocated for 
“democratic” reform (Zanardi 1995:14, 23) although all FSA funds could be considered to be 
democratic assistance.
sAccording to CRS reports, “Foreign aid is an instrument of US foreign policy, and US 
relations and interests in the former Soviet Union determine levels, direction, and types of aid
223
funding” (TaraofF 1999:8). “The Central Asian states., are of increasing interest to the United 
States for their oil production and strategic location... The increase in funding for the NIS 
under the FY 1999 appropriations, however, has permitted a 26% increase for Central Asia to 
S 136.9 million. The Administration had requested an 18% increase for FY 2000 (Tamoff 
1999:11).
Kyrgyzstan holds the water supply of the region and, thus, the region’s access to electric 
power. Due to the former Soviet structure, the Central Asian states are dependent on each 
other for supplies of gas, fuel, power, and water. A looming water conflict provides another 
example of the pivotal role that Kyrgyzstan can play in regional stability or chaos.
10According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) aid 
flow figures since 1991, Kyrgyzstan has received an estimated $1.45 billion (USD) (OECD 
1999) and GAO report NSIAD-96-37 Former Soviet Union (Zanardi 1995:22). 
nThis sentence was written in April of 1999 before the Batken conflict that broke out in 
Kyrgyzstan in August of 1999, only a few days before this researcher arrived in Kyrgyzstan 
to conduct fieldwork. Thus, the field research was undertaken while Kyrgyzstan was at war. 
As this sentence predicted, the conflict is proving hard to contain and has already involved 
three of the five Central Asian states, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbek rebels 
from Tajikistan have declared a Holy War on Uzbekistan and Southern Kyrgyzstan is the 
battleground.
12The GAO is required by Congress to audit federal governmental agencies. Members of 
Congress may request specific audits when a particular concern or problem is evident. GAO 
reports from 1992-1999 were reviewed for this research with nineteen reports relevant to 
USAID democracy and/or WID programs generally and in the FSU. See also: (Fyodorov 
1999; Waller 1996; Johnson 1997; Waller 1997; Kaiser 1999; Lloyd 1999; Cavanaugh 2000; 
Goble 2000; and Pressley 2000).
13Johnson (1997) provides a concise outline of the various forms of feminism, goals, and 
defining parameters.
,4Much has been written critiquing feminists for primarily understanding Western, white 
females, including works by Frye (1982), Collins (1990), hooks (1982, 1984, 1989, 1991), 
Ramazanoglu (1989), Maynard (1994), and Spelman (1988) and Ann Marie Goetz (1991). 
15This debate included many other relevant “actors,” including but not limited to Donna 
Haraway’s “Situated Knowledges” (Haraway 1988).
16For an excellent discussion of all components of gender, see Judith Lorber's Paradoxes of 
Gender, which includes concepts of social control, kinship, and identity (Lorber 1994).
17In other words, female genital mutilation is as horrifying as bulimia and anorexia and both 
are a result of patriarchal oppression.
18Researchers have argued for women to enter the privileged/democratic public space (Jones 
1990), (Pateman 1970), (Phillips 1991), (Phillips 1993), and (Dean 1997).
19See also: Edmondson (1992), Carley (1995), Fish (1995), Goldman (1996), Harris (1993), 
Holmgren (1995), Temkina (1996), Browning (1992), Molyneux (1991), and Pavlycahko
(1992).
20See also: (Kandiyoti 1987), “Emancipated but Unliberated? Reflections on the Turkish 
Case,” which provides similar details regarding female “emancipation.”
21 Significantly, Lenin recognised this and “looked forward” to the day when the “crushing 
drudgery” of women’s housework would end. This was not out of concern for women, as it is 
sometimes interpreted, but out of the need to get women out of the home and into the labour 
market in order to produce. Lenin was also known to say that women’s backwardness pulled 
men back from the “new society—like little worms which, unseen, slowly but surely rot and 
corrode” (Williams 1986:68).
“A word very important to all aspects of Soviet/post-Soviet society—meaning special 
connections. There is no real equivalent word in the English language to blat. The 
importance of blat cannot be stressed enough. Without blat, one was not able to live under 
Soviet, or current, conditions. Blat is often conflated with corruption. The West sees blat as
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using private and personal connections to gain “things”—money, products, influence, 
favours, trips, women, vodka, political freedom, etc. In Western terms this is corruption or 
crony capitalism. In Soviet/Russian terms, this is “how things are done.” There was, and is, 
no other means because there was, and is, no reliable system of rule of law, government, 
taxes, salary, etc. Corruption in Western terms exists and will continue to exist in post-Soviet 
societies until there is no need for blat. Blat is the rule of law.
^Going to the market on crowded buses that often break down, standing in long lines, 
carrying heavy bags, beating rugs, washing clothes by hand, etc.
2419 November 1997at The London School of Economics and Political Science. The panel, 
consisting of leading experts such as Michael Ignatoff, Anthony Smith, and O’Brien, was 
unable to answer the question.
25De Tocqueville, Mills, Byrce, Paine, Jefferson, Madison, Plato, Socrates, and Bentham set 
the stage for theories of democracy. Dahl, Huntington, Lijphart, Gurr, Grey, Zolo, Shapiro, 
Sartori, Schmitter, Karl, Connor, Diamond, Horowitz, Carothers, Bollen, Lipset, Powell, 
Berry, Fukuyama, Philips, Barber, Elamn, and Kaplan will lend to the examination the 
modem democratic process.
26The theories of Smith, Rothschild, Barth, Horowitz, Hutchinson, Gourevitch, Gellner, 
Hechter, de Silva, Gurr, Volkan, Campbell, Anderson, Erikson, Brass, van den Berghe, 
Connor, Ra’anan, Mach, Ryan, Yuval-Davis, and others are brought to bear in this chapter. 
27The notion of praxis, knowledge gathered and processed for the purpose of changing the 
world rather than knowledge gathered for statistical study support the foundation of this 
research (Stanley 1990, 15).
28Kyrgyzstan received more aid money per capita than any other country in Central Asia 
because it was seen as a democracy and, therefore, provided the best place for democratic 
assistance success.
29It is beyond the scope of this research to examine all the problems with democracy 
assistance. This has already been accomplished by Thomas Carothers in Aiding Democracy 
Abroad: The Learning Curve (Carothers 1999). The debates of whether democracy is the best 
form of government or if capitalism breeds democracy are also beyond the scope of this 
research. It is accepted that democracy is currently an arguably effective governmental 
means to promoting human dignity, if applied correctly. Although there are certainly serious 
considerations of whether democracy can be exported and indeed democracy importing even 
suggests a contradiction in terms. Yet, this research refrains from judgement as to whether the 
West should or should not export democracy (Ikenberry 1999; DiPalma 1997,14). Rather, as 
the West is currently doing so, a more valuable examination, with an aim to improving the 
application of such policy, will be put forward.
3 Pateman (1983, 1970), Eisler (1988), De Beauvoir (1989), Elshtain (1992), Duerst-Lahti and 
Kelly (1995), Yuval-Davis (1989), Holgrem (1995), Duran (1991), Johnson (1997), Hartsock 
(1983, 1985, 1997), Haraway (1985, 1990, 1997), hooks (1997), Elshtain (1992), Bordo 
(1989, 1997), Harding (1986, 1997), Hekman (1997), Grant (1991) Tickner (1991), Kandiyoti 
(1988), MacKinnon (1989), Phillips (1991, 1993, 1997), Lovibond (1989), Felski (1989), 
West (1997), Keller (1990), Goetz (1991), Foucault (1972, 1980), Molyneux, (1991) Gorelick 
(1991) Peterson (1992), among others set the theoretical ground for this paper.
Endnotes for Chapter Two
31People did not include women or slaves.
32Held (1993) suggests that the speech was probably composed by Thucydides some 30 years 
later; nonetheless, the words have meaning.
33The feminist/gender field, in comparison, has welcomed constructive criticism with a goal 
to solidify theory that is constantly allowing feedback, critical discussion, and progress of 
gender theory as it relates to all social and natural science issues.
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34These include: (1) explanation and prediction on the basis of general laws, (2) empirical 
verifiability and objectivity, (3) quantification and measurement, (4) systematically, and (5) 
evaluation (Zolo 1992:25).
35Although many theorists would agree there is democracy if there is popular sovereignty, 
political equality, distributive equality, civic consciousness, good economic performance, and 
state competence; however, determinates of when and how these conditions are defined as 
existing is not delineated (Rogers and Cohen 1992:422).
36“If scholars do not attach the same meaning to the concept.... they can at least specify 
which ‘meaning’ they ‘mean’ ” (Schedler 1998:102). As Giovanni Sartori notes, “Different 
things should have different names” (Schedler 1998:103).
37Although USAID has undergone an intense reform since the mid-1990s, the results of which 
have produced innumerable new documents and acronyms, substantive problems remain. 
38US/Washington democracy practitioners refer to those at USAID or USAID partner NGOs, 
that are responsible for US democracy assistance, whether that is policy, procedure, or 
practice. This is also evident in the field research gathered for this dissertation.
39The IMF continued to make loans to Russia even when they were well aware of the $719 
million of IMF loans that the Central Bank transferred to offshore accounts and despite 
former Russian Finance Minister, Fyodorov, publishing an article in The Washington Post, 
begging IMF not to issue more loans (Williams 1999). He said, “The Russian authorities 
have learned the craft of pulling the wool over the eyes of the West, and the West has learned 
to pretend not to notice” (Fyodorov 1999). See also: a whole series of newspaper articles 
issued during the Summer of 1999, regarding IMF loans and Russian government misuse, 
including (LaFraniere 1999; Blustein 1999; Williams 1999; Kaiser 1999; and Fyodorov 
1999). Lloyd notes that there is an estimated $200 to $500 billion in aid and loans to Russia 
that is not in Russia but is in foreign individual bank accounts (Lloyd 1999).
^Although Schedler attempted to correct the basic definitional problems in 1992, his plea was 
ignored. “While ‘democratic consolidation’ may have been a nebulous concept since its very 
inception, the conceptual fog that veils the term has only become thicker and thicker the more 
it has spread through the academic as well as the political world. If it is true that ‘[n]o 
scientific field can advance far if the participants do not share a common understanding of 
key terms in the field,’ then the study of democratic consolidation, as its current state of 
conceptual confusion is condemned to stagnation. The aspiring subdiscipline of 
‘consolidology’ is anchored in an unclear, inconsistent, and unbounded concept, and thus is 
not anchored at all, but drifting in murky waters” (Schedler 1998:92).
41Political parties, legislatures, judicatories, local government, interest groups, and media in 
civil society.
42Stable, coherent, regularised, and effective both in their own functioning and in their various 
relations with one another.
43The theory of democratic transition and consolidation both imply that there is a process, a 
definite time-line, of how and when certain events occur along the political change to 
democracy. This is another serious flaw of democracy theory/practice.
44 See also: a listing of varied democratic definitions (Grey 1997:44-46). Other sources 
include (Shapiro 1996; Cohen 1971; Kainz 1984; Macpherson 1973; and Moss 1975). This 
research also agrees with Christiano seven limits to democratic authority (Christiano 
1997:22).
45For example, Chinggis Khan had a rule of law, the Yasa, and elections. The elections were 
so important that the hordes left Eastern Europe when Ogadei Khan died and returned home 
for the elections of the next Khan. Chinggis Khan also had institutions of justice and 
government; lists of ambassadors survived, demonstrating how regulated his government was. 
^US assistance has provided basically the same assistance program for Russia, Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia, despite the drastic differences in cultural, social, and political 
environments. Central Asia’s funds and programs were lumped in with Russia/NIS for the 
first four years of donor involvement.
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47Lukin calls the democratic assistance effort “a ruthless (though hopeless) attempt by a group 
of fanatical ‘democratic’ ideologues to impose their abstract ideal” (Lukin 1999). “... 
‘Democratic’ activists viewed democracy not as a system of compromises among various 
groups and interests or as the Spartan of powers but as the unlimited power of ‘democrats’
replacing the unlimited power of the communists What emerged from the totalitarian
ruins was not a ‘normal’ democratic country but a society of clans and cliques fighting for 
power” (Lukin 1999:39).
^ “Mongolia confronts students of democracy and regime change with a puzzle: How did a 
country that ‘should have’ ended up at the level of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in terms of 
democratic achievement find its way into company with Hungary and Poland?” (Fish 
1998:129)
49“I do not find alien the concept and practice of democracy. At the heart of Buddhism lies the 
idea that the potential for awakening and perfection is present in every human being and that
realising this potential is a matter of personal effort Thus not only are Buddhism and
democracy compatible, they are rooted in a common understanding of the quality and 
potential of every individual” (Dalai Lama 1999:4).
°“The Mongolian experience holds lessons for scholars, analysts, and policy makers. First, it 
demonstrates the supreme value of a commitment to compromise. Avoiding political 
violence, always and everywhere democracy’s most venomous antagonist, left the door open 
to early, broad strides toward democracy even under inhospitable circumstances. Second, 
Mongolia showcases the virtues of institutions that disperse power, and particularly of a 
legislature-dominant form of semipresidentalism. Third, the Mongolian experience highlights 
the advantage of the absence of a single ‘father’ [sic] of democracy and national 
independence. ... Fourth, Mongolia’s transition demonstrates the enormous potential of 
political parties to advance democratizations” (Fish 1998:139-140).
“ William Bodie (1993) nicely summarises the resulting US ambivalence, “Today the United 
States clearly seeks to cultivate democratic institutions on the territory of the former Soviet 
empire. However, American policy also seeks objectives in post-cold war Europe—arms 
reductions and non-proliferation. Russian economic stabilisation amelioration or ethnic 
conflict—which, though favourable to US interests, may actually hinder the rapid adoption of 
democracy in the region. To date, it is not clear whether the United States is more interested 
in the internal pluralism of the Soviet successor regimes or their external behaviour” (Grey 
1997:255).
52Almost all the democracy researchers agree that promoting democracy has been a central 
goal to US foreign policy (Grey 1997:251). As former Assistant Secretary of State, Talbott 
states, “The American people want their country’s foreign policy rooted in idealpolitik as well 
as realpolitik. The United States is uniquely and self-consciously a country founded on a set 
of ideas, and ideals, applicable to people everywhere. The Founding Fathers declared that all 
were created equal... America’s participation in international affairs is not just about 
stopping or deterring aggression, it is fundamentally about freedom versus tyranny” (Talbott 
1996:49).
53“A s Seymour Lipset pointed out decades ago, the evidence is overwhelming that economic 
development has a strong positive effect on democratisation” (Huntington 1997:5).
MRay goes into a detailed history of the origins (Ray 1997:50).
55If the US foreign policy community wished, it would not take much to recognise the myths 
as Ray has effectively done. “The first such myth is that, although it may be true that 
democratic states have not fought wars against one another, they are just as war-prone as 
autocratic states in general in their relationship with other kinds of states. The other myth is 
that although it may be true that democratic states do not fight wars against one another, this 
is an empirical regularity or pattern that up to this point is entirely bereft of any convincing 
theoretical explanation. It has been reported almost endlessly for years not that ‘nobody 
knows’ ... why democracies do not fight wars against one another” (Ray 1997:57).
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56 (Fyodorov 1999; Waller 1996; Johnson 1997; Waller 1997; Kaiser 1999; Lloyd 1999) and 
(Olcott 2000 Cavanaugh 2000; Goble 2000 and Pressley 2000).
57(Rosseau 1992 Edition; Rousseau 1973; and Rousseau 1974). (Makus 1996) provides a 
comprehensive feminist analysis of Hobbes, Locke, and Mill in relation to politics and 
women.
58 (Zerilli 1994) provides a comprehensive overview.
59In Great Britain, women did not receive the right to retain their citizenship/nationality 
independent of marriage until 1948. By 1981, women were given the right to transfer 
citizenship to their children.(King 1989:22)
Exclusion of women from the social sciences has legitimised subordination and oppression 
(Newland 1991:5).
6113 December 1999, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Thomas Carothers 
Discusses his new Book, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve.” This researcher 
was a participant. This question was from Carol Yost, Director of the Global Women in 
Politics Program at The Asia Foundation, so it could be argued that effectively that Carothers’ 
recommendations appeared to have no impact on traditional male democracy promoters.
62The analytical priority given to a category modelled on a white, Western feminist 
experience has a profound epistemological effect that constrains ‘"the possibility of knowing” 
(Goetz 1991:141).
63Civil society researchers are yet another separate set; Oommen, Sellers, Romanucci-Rossia, 
de Vos, Rex, Burg, and Famen, Fish, among others.
64The previous authoritarian state left no room for public, non-government controlled society. 
All power and prestige was in the state realm, with nearly all members of society members of 
the Communist Party, the only party, in the state system. Therefore, ambitious professionals 
had no choice other than to align themselves with the state structure if they hoped to rise 
professionally.
5A new GIT team (Gender Issues Team) had been established, although none of the four 
team members would correspond with the researcher despite the promise of the mission 
director and the participation of the researcher as one of three experts on gender in Central 
Asia invited by USAID to brief the mission director on issues of gender.
“ Underline added by researcher for both this and the next USAID statement.
67Res Publica is a newspaper; however, the two top editors who have been punished for their 
commitment to a free press in Kyrgyzstan are women.
“ One week before the USSR “gave” Central Asian republics independence all heads of 
Central Asian republics met in Almaty and voted to remain part of the USSR. Thus one is not 
surprised to hear the statement made by the Naryn akim that Kyrgyzstan will be a 
“superpower again.”
69 In his article, Bivens discloses the practices of USAID funded, Burson-Marsteller, a New 
York public relations (PR) firm that implemented a project in Kazakstan to “ensure that the 
Kazakstanis understood the privatisation process” (Bivens 1997:68). The USAID agreement 
provided to the PR firm was a “cost-plus” arrangement where USAID paid all of Burson- 
Marsteller’s expenses plus 7%. This arrangement encourages for-profit firms to spend as 
much as they can—they more they spend the more they make. Bivens, a 26-year-old 
American journalist who knew nothing about either public relations or privatisation was 
offered a package of $90,000 per annum to conduct a bus to billboards to soap opera 
campaign on privatisation. See also (Williams 1999; Lloyd 1999; Fyodorov 1999; Waller 
1997).
70See also: (Avery 1996), “Women of Mongolia,” and (Bystydzienski 1992; Duerst-Lahti 
1995; and Friedl 1986).
71 See appendix for field research results and transcripts with the NGOs; all female directed in 
Naiyn, where they demanded to know why they were not receiving political training to 
contest local office from the donors.
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^Civil society is no different from child-rearing, physical labour in the fields, to gathering in 
hunting and gathering societies (Lorber 1994:33-34).
73“I dare say that in Kyrgyzstan the seeds of democracy are sown in fertile soil however,
there is nothing more difficult than learning to live free” (Akaev 1995:14).
74Exact overall figures for US aid to Kyrgyzstan is subject to controversy and confusion. The 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports, “Among the former Soviet republics 
(excluding the Baltic states), Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Georgia ranked highest in 
cumulative US government aid obligated as of June 30, 1996, with most Central Asian states 
receiving much less (including food, medical, and technical aid, and aid for nuclear weapons 
disarmament and safeguards for Kazakstan). Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan were exceptions, 
with Kazakstan ranked at fifth ($366.44 million) and Kyrgyzstan at seventh ($289.08 
million). In FY 1996, the Administration planned to spend at least $17.6 million in 
humanitarian and technical assistance to Kyrgyzstan, which would rank fourth in such aid per 
capita among the NIS... The Administration request for FY 1997 includes modest increases 
for all the Central Asian states over FY1996 funding. P.L. 104-208” (Omnibus 
Appropriations for FY1997). This reduced the Administration request for the NIS, setting it 
at $625 million for FY1997, which is not expected to affect planned aid for Central Asia. In 
response to a congressional question on November 14, 1995, Coordinator of US Aid to the 
NIS Richard Momingstar indicated that the Administration was planning a phaseout of 
Freedom Support aid to Central Asia by the year 2001, though other aid would continue. 
Besides bilateral aid, the United States contributes funds to international financial institutions 
(IFIs) and nongovernmental relief organisations that aid the Central Asian states (Nichol 
1996).
75 See: http://wvvw.ifes.org
76 See: http://wwAv.abanet.org/ceeli/home.html
77 See: http://www.icma.org/go.cfin and http://www.urban.org/
78 See: http://www.ndi.org see also http://www.kind.net.kg/whoiswho/political parties.htm 
for the details of political opposition leaders in Kyrgyzstan.
79 See: http://www.rferl.org
80 See: http://www.cango.net.kg/
81 See: (Amnesty International 1996).
82“Suppose the following to be the state of affairs on board a ship or ships. The captain is
larger and stronger than any of the crew, but a bit deaf and short-sighted The crew are all
quarrelling with each other about how to navigate the ship, each thinking he ought to be at the 
helm; they have never learned the art of navigation... indeed they say it can’t be taught and 
are ready to murder anyone who says it can. They spend all their time milling round the 
captain and doing all they can to get him to give them the helm. If one fraction is more 
successful than another, their rivals may kill them and throw them overboard... and turn the 
voyage into the sort of drunken-pleasure cruise you would expect. Finally, they reserve their 
admiration for the man who knows how to lend a hand in controlling the captain by force or 
fraud; they praise his seamanship and navigation and knowledge of the sea and condemn 
everyone else as useless... with all this going on abroad aren’t the sailors on any such ship 
bound to regard the true navigator as word-spinner and a star-gazer, of no use to them at all?” 
quoted in (Held 1993:261).
83“What happened in Russia was not reform but a conspiracy on the part of the most effective 
and rapacious part of the Soviet ruling class (the nomenclature) ‘with support from the IMF 
and other Western institutions’ to preserve its dominant position in the country. The 
democratic movement representing the broader ‘middle class’ was thus isolated from real 
power because of its own tactical mistakes” (Lukin 1999:35-36).
mA s of 1996, gang rape comprised 11% of all rapes in Russia (Goldman 1996,44). See also: 
Transition 1999-Human Development Report for Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS, 
available in http://www.undp.org/rbec/pubs/hdr99/foreword.pdf, ISBN No: 92-1-126109-0- 
Sales No: E.99.IH.B.6; 7 (1999).
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Endnotes for Chapter Three
85 Psychology and psychiatry, for example.
86 Volkan, interviewed by author, 6 June 1994.
87“Every group has its clearly defined place within the mental model and its relations between 
groups are conceptually established. In order to prevent the clear image from disorder, 
symbolic boundaries are constructed which separate groups and codify the patterns of 
interactions between them” (Mach 1993:55).
88Many of the pervious secret documents of the KGB and USSR are now available on public 
data bases, such as the US Library of Congress, 
http://www.lcweb.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/intro.html
89Again, this is a very male view of competing interested, inclusion and exclusion, us-them 
rather than a more social-learned female response of sharing and co-operation, 
humans may sometimes opt out of an ethnic identity and other times they are bound by the 
same ethnicity. During the Holocaust, European Jews largely could not elected out of their 
ethnicity. During slavery and into today, American blacks were and are bound primary by the 
phenotypic aspects of their ethnicity. Conversely, some European Jews, prior and during the 
Holocaust, “became” Catholic to escape persecution. Some Uzbeks living in Kyrgyzstan 
registered as “Kyrgyz” under Soviet rule for housing, educational, and other rational 
purposes. Salient to the gender question, field research in Kyrgyzstan demonstrated that when 
a woman married she “lost” her ethnic identity or placed it second to her husband's as the 
family and children bore the ethnic identity of the father. Perhaps this is why gender is more 
salient to women as they are not allowed to maintain their ethnic identity if they marry 
outside of the ethnic group into which they were bom.
9lUntil Nira Yuval-Davis’ book Gender and Nation (1997), the first comprehensive 
examination of the relationship between gender and nationalism.
^Although other areas of Frederick Barth’s research are controversial, Barth’s boundary 
markers concept provide a useful delimited explanation of ethnicity. For Barth, an ethnic 
group has an important ascriptive character that is exclusive and its continuity relies on the 
maintenance of a boundary of identity and values (Barth 1969:14). Barth lists four 
characteristics that define ethnic groups: (1) biologically self-perpetuating, (2) sharing 
fundamental cultural values, (3) creating a field of communication and interaction, and (4) 
membership identifying itself, and is identifiable by others, as distinguishable. Van den 
Berghe has identified “ethnic markers” which demarcate ethnic boundaries. These are: (1) 
genetically transmitted qualities such as phenotype, skin pigmentation, stature, hair texture, 
facial features or other 'racial1 characteristic; (2) human-made ethnic uniforms such as body 
mutations, tattoos, piercing ..etc.; and (3) behavioural characteristics such as speech, 
demeanour, manners, and lore (Van den Berghe 1981:29).
93 The Jewish community, following the matriarchal lineage being an exception.
^One important boundary marker is the ethnic myth. A myth, anthropologists generally 
agree, presents a story about a society which transmits values, norms, and patterns of a given 
culture (Mach 1993:58). The folktale serves a dual purpose as it contains historical 
information and expresses emotional value, i.e., the “logic of myth” (Mach 1993:59). It is 
based more on belief than knowledge and is metaphysical, therefore it cannot be tested 
empirically or rationally, containing structurally encoded principles of human thought which 
allow groups to understand the order of the universal, understand life's goals, form a coherent 
image of the nation, know the communities glories and victories, share the group's suffering 
and loses, and perceive a historical mission. A strong ethnic myth may be the key to long 
term ethnic survival. The mythical construction of the past is therefore a crucial component 
of human identity (Mach 1993: 59, 60, 62-63).
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95Although in this age of political correctness most academics shy away from racial 
characterisation, the phenotypic aspect of ethnic groups cannot be ignored. Whether 
academics are comfortable with the racial aspect of humanity or not, race is an inescapable 
aspect of current human conditions. Human communities define, exclude, include, 
discriminate, and kill over racial differences. Although it is not within the realm of this 
research to debate the primordial aspect of ethnicity, it must be stated, that while ethnicity is 
changeable, fluid, and humanly constructed, that it does not rule out the uncomfortable notion 
that there is something about ethnicity that humans are bom into, i.e., racial and/or phenotypic 
characteristics. To ignore this is to banish racial issues to a realm where they are deemed 
irrelevant. The exclusion of race from the discussion of ethnicity is similar to the exclusion of 
gender from ethnicity. Gender when banished to the realm of irrelevant leaves little room for 
a discourse that can isolate the positive and negative factors that gender may bring to 
ethnicity; similar to the racial discourse. It is convenient for white males in the Academy to 
claim that race is not part of ethnicity, in an effort to move beyond racism and in a fear that 
they might be labelled racist; however, race is relevant to an African-American as they cannot 
move beyond the relevance of the racial or the significance of phenotypic aspects in human 
communities and daily life. Likewise with gender.
96For example, rape in ethnic cleansing.
97Ethnic identity is fluid, changeable, created, re-created, and constructed. It is a human 
concept subject to change, misinterpretation, improvement, and imagination. Therefore, there 
is a significant “constructed” aspect of ethnicity and ethnic relations. However, human life 
also has certain pre-determined biological factors. It is the more or less “fixed” or “given” 
aspects of human physical identity that primordialist assert are salient to ethnicity. These 
scbiologicaI aspects” and created cultural factors are salient to the degree that human 
communities determine that they are relevant. Humans create and attach meaning to “human 
creations,” such as language, religion, custom, and to “natural creations,” such as land 
formations, weather patterns, animals, and biological differences in humans, including race 
and gender. Therefore, ethnicity is both fluid, constructed and “imagined” and “given.” 
98Racial differences or the physical, phenotypic characteristics of different social groups 
labelled race in sociological and anthropological terms of understanding, do not necessarily 
carrying racial messages, racism, or inherent negative or positive characteristics. The key 
aspect of race and ethnicity that has been misunderstood is this: outwardly seen racial 
differences are used by social groups of humans globally to distinguish. Based upon physical, 
phenotypic differences humans have created social justification for inclusion and exclusion. 
To say that phenotypic characteristics are not used by social groups in ethnic boundary 
markers is a methodological error. Certainly, a few privileged elite living in so-called 
cosmopolitan societies and having financial access to the scientific means may change the 
colour of their skin, the shape and colour of their eyes, the colour of their hair, the shape of 
the facial structures, and even their sex. But most of the world is thickly and permanently 
bound within their outward physical appearance known as race and sex.
"As Anthony Giddens has suggested, humans have “manufactured uncertainty” in the post­
enlightenment strive. Giddens duly notes that modernity is far more complex than 
anticipated. Moreover, some “answers” and “progress” have transcended humans into realms 
beyond comprehension. The West, particularly, has seen the future as territory to be captured, 
taken over, shaped, managed, and harnessed. Yet, modernity has created deep uncertainties in 
human lives and produced a world that is beyond control of human understanding. Giddens 
calls this understanding of modernity the cutting-edge debate in social science.
100The most oppressive human rights violations occur when the state embarks on a campaign 
of eliminating ethnic differences in the name of progress and modernity. The policies of 
Hitler, Stalin and Mao, in particular, demonstrate that the freedom to have and to hold, to 
create and recreate one’s ethnic identity is sacrament and the key to global peace. These 
regimes built their policies on “freeing” or transcending people from the “oppressive” chains 
of ethnic identity which resulted in massive human rights violations.
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101Volkan, interviewed by author, 6 June 1994.
102For example, a Kyrgyz identity existed prior to Soviet rule; however, the Soviet State 
manipulated and influenced this identity for nationalistic purposes (Huskey 1995).
103Campbell has named nationalism a tool utilised by the state in pursuit of legitimacy 
(Campbell 1992,11). Anderson calls nationalism an anomaly (Anderson 1991:4).
104For a complete discussion of the violence invoked by the nation-state, refer to David 
Campbell's Politics Without Principle Sovereignty, Ethics and the Narratives o f the Gulf War
(1993). There are over 114 self-determination movements by ethnic groups around the globe 
(Halperin 1992).
105Kyrgyzstan, for example, holds 51 ethnic groups from the Koreans who where moved by 
cattle car from the Russian Far East, to Jews, Germans, and other Russian/European groups. 
Serious irredentism claims of rebel Tajik groups in Southern Kyrgyzstan erupted in ethnic 
conflict during the summer of 1999. Additionally, there are irredentism Uzbek claims in the 
South that created the violent ethnic conflict of 1991.
106“If we accept the premise that ethnic identity is a natural basis for political organisation and 
that nationalism as an ideology has proved its functional power through history then any 
theory of democracy must incorporate contingencies for the resolution of ethnic conflict” 
(Helsi 1997:202). “Politicians can either contribute to or work against the rise of ethnic
conflict Ethnic based political participation is more than just manipulation of the masses
by their leaders. The beliefs held by the people do place constraints on the activities of elites. 
Leaders cannot move too far afield from the mood of the people or the people will quickly 
find new leaders” (Helsi 1997:203).
107Helsi has also provided a solid theoretical framework that democracy assistance could use 
to begin understanding how and why ethnic identity becomes political (Helsi 1997). This 
ethnic-political framework includes five major political conditions and how ethnicity is 
salient to each.
108As most FSU scholars agree, ethnic conflict is a serious threat to the post-communist states 
and the likelihood of successful democratisation (Helsi 1997:213).
109 See also: (Smith 1986, 1996, 1997).
110 “Women are used in defining boundaries and asserting the dominance of some men over 
other men through the protection of ‘their’ women... to protect ‘their’ women they engage in 
violent conflict and rape the women of ‘their’ enemies” (Allen 1998:59). Also described in 
the Burlet-Reid (1998) study described in detail in Chapter Eight.
m“In feet, research has shown that it is not the men who first introduce children into the 
ethnic imagination of their community. It is the women through songs, stories, legends, and 
folk tales. They keep alive the myths and are the first to transmit a sense of the collective 
memory of success and suffering to children. Stories of great kings, the description of ‘other’ 
people are often imbibed by children not from racist patriarchs but from the mother who 
distils this information and first creates an awareness of ethnic or nationalist belonging” 
(Coomaraswamy 1999:8). The field research of this dissertation contradicts this notion. 
112“This place which is assigned to women means not only that women’s sexual behaviour is 
circumscribed but also that ‘other’ men must not be allowed sexual access.... Thus women 
are central to reproducing the collectivity but they are also its weakest spot-sexual access to 
them by an ‘outsider’ destroys their value to the nation” (Charles 1998:10).
113“The domestic sphere, and women within it, are regarded as significant for the transmission 
of cultural identity... Kandiyoti argues that because the domestic sphere, and women within 
it, represents the maintenance of tradition and cultural identity, it assumes a heightened 
significance in the fece of modernising state which undermines cultural diversity by the 
granting of individual, universal rights... ‘This reinforces the stranglehold of communities 
over their women, whose roles as boundary markers become heightened’ ” (Kandiyoti in 
Charles 1998:13). Yuval-Davis “suggests that women accept myths of origin which include 
stories of male control over female sexuality because such stories offer women a place as
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women and elevate their reproductive power-as long as they are in the service of the nation” 
(Charles 1998:21).
114Sarah Burton provides an excellent overview of sexuality and ethnic identity and violation 
relative to ethnic creation (Charles and Hintjens 1998:27-44).
Endnotes for Chapter Four
115This research focuses on USAID’s Democracy and Governance (D&C) sector of the 
Global Bureau’s democratic assistance to the FSU’s Kyrgyzstan. The FSU is USAID’s 
highest profile and largest democracy project. According to the Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) as of May 1999, since 1992 an estimated $6.5 billion in US assistance has 
gone to the FSU (Tamoff 1999). Of this $6.5 billion, (as of September 1998-ffom 1992) 
USAID had obligated an estimated $5.7 billion (Tamoff 1999:3). Fiscal Year (FY) 1999 FSU 
funds account for approximately $847 million, about 6 % of total US worldwide foreign aid 
for 1999 (Tamoff 1999:3). The FY 2000 budget requested $1,032 billion for the FSU, a 22 % 
increase over the FY 1999 level (Tamoff 1999:2). GAO reviewed only 28 awarded USAID 
Global Bureau contracts between 1991-1996, which were estimated at $310 million (Nelson
1996). It is impossible to provide exact assistance figures, as USAID did not maintain 
separate and/or accurate accounts of funds to the NIS. In January 1995, the State Department 
Co-ordinator for NIS Affairs reported some $2.9 billion in obligations and $1.8 in 
expenditures for Russia alone through December 1994. Funds for the NIS are allocated 
through P.L. 102-511, otherwise known as the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian 
Democracies and Open Market Support Act (October 1992). P.L. 102-511 is commonly 
known as the Freedom Support Act (FSA) (Zanardi 1995). From 1990-1994 FSA occupied 
16.21% of the Department of State’s fund allocated to the FSU (Zanardi 1995:75). In 
addition to USAID, there are at least 23 other US departments and agencies that had programs 
in the FSU as of 1996, some of which could also be considered democracy assistance 
(Zanardi 1995:18); however, USAID, US Department of Agriculture (USDA), and US 
Department of Defence (DOD) implemented the majority of programs (Zanardi 1995,2). 
Between 1990-1994, the US Government (USG) obligated $5.4 billion and expended $3.5 
billion for bilateral non-credit programs to the FSU, of which only 5.36 % was allocated for 
“democratic” reform (Zanardi 1995:14, 23) although all FSA funds could be considered to be 
democratic assistance. See also Raballand (2000).
116 See Robert Gee’s (US Assistant Secretary of Energy for Policy and International Affairs) 
testimony before the US House of Representatives (12 February 1998) on why the US is 
active in Central Asia (Gee 1998). According to CRS reports, “Foreign aid is an instrument 
of US foreign policy, and US relations and interests in the former Soviet Union determine 
levels, direction, and types of aid funding” (Tamoff 1999:8). “The Central Asian states ... are 
of increasing interest to the United States for their oil production and strategic location... The 
increase in funding for the NIS under the FY 1999 appropriations, however, has permitted a 
26% increase for Central Asia to $136.9 million. The Administration had requested an 18% 
increase for FY 2000” (Tamoff 1999:11).
117Formerly the battleground for the British/Russian Great Game, Central Asia again stands at 
the heart of processes of modernity. With nuclear Kazakstan, civil-tribal war in Tajikistan, 
which has now crossed the border into Kyrgyzstan, the Uigher cross-border question, deep 
reaching environmental disaster, and fast growing HIV/STD epidemics it is here where 
modernity will create peril or privilege. Named the “new Colombia” for a blossoming drug 
and arms trade, Central Asia is rich with ethnic conflict potential. The kindling for conflict 
includes: bordering Afghanistan, Tajikistan, a puddle of blood and chaos, unknown quantities 
of nuclear and other weapons available at local bazaars, new and potentially vast oil sources, 
the Uigher movement permeating Central Asia’s high mountain passes and challenging
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governmental commitments to freedom of speech and assembly, increasingly militant 
Uzbekistan, a new, extremely well-funded and sophisticated mojahedin from Tajikistan that 
has launched a Holy War on Uzbekistan, and a looming water conflict in the Fergana Valley. 
118There are at least two different spellings of President Akaev’s family name—Akayev and 
Akaev. In order to avoid confusion, the latter has been used throughout this research.
119 See Idinov 1999a, Idinov 1999b and Idinov 1999c.
120See Anderson (Anderson 1999:4).
121 Since independence one can view on quite a few 1916s laid out in large white rocks on 
mountains sides. 1916 is a symbol of Kyrgyz independence and nationalism.
122Issy means hot and Kul means lake in Kyrgyz language. Issy-Kul is a huge, high altitude 
mineral lake that never freezes due to the saline level. Therefore, it provides the perfect place 
for year-around military testing.
123Although Central Asia, including Kyrgyzstan, has described it as a region of “tragic 
experiment” under Soviet rule the average person saw their lives improve from nomadic 
tribalism to citizens of the USSR (Clement 1994:87). The tragedy of the USSR involved acts 
such as redistricting, environmental damage, restrictions of freedom, not generally 
known/understood by the public. As Kyrgyzstan was far from Moscow, when compared to 
other regions, it escaped the brunt of Stalin’s brutality.
124Although there are many indications of the anarchical state of Kyrgyzstan, perhaps the 
most evident is the state of Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA). According to the Kyrgyz 
Committee for Human Rights (KCHR) “police brutality is one of the most urgent problems... 
law enforcement officers break laws and violate human rights [and] decay from the inside” 
(Dyryldaev 1998). The KCHR reports regularly on police abuse, listing details, date, and 
names. These reports can be found at: www.neww.org/countries/Kyrgyzstan/KCHR. “People 
say with dismay that the law of the jungle is beginning to rule,” says a Russian student at 
Jalal-Abad University (Dobson 1995:5).
125“The head of the National Statistical Office in Bishkek boasts that he is no longer overseen 
by parliament. Rather, he answers only to the President. This, he says, ‘guarantees freedom, 
because the president only wants objective statistics.’ In the same vein, a vice president and 
former economic minister responsible for introducing the national currency says he is not the 
father of any reforms. ‘No, President Akaev is our father,’ he says and points to a large 
presidential portrait on the wall” (Bransten 1997).
126According to the US Department of State’s 1999 Country Report. “Although the 1993 
Constitution defines the form of government as a democratic republic, President Askar Akaev 
dominates the Government” (US Department of State, 2000).
U1 The US Department of State reported that the 1995 parliamentary elections were “marred 
by irregularities” (US Department of State 2000:10). “Forced into independence, the Central 
Asian states have created institutional arrangement that rely on the previous Soviet structures, 
with a modicum of “democratic” influences” (Kangas 1995:275). “The major human rights 
question raised in 1994 was whether the Government was manipulating the political system to 
ensure its retention of power” (US Department of State 1995). “Though Akaev has been 
increasingly critical of the role of ‘tribalism’ in Kyrgyz politics, in part its continued strength 
would appear to stem from his own political strategies” (Anderson 1999:43). “The most 
powerful clan in the country is a clan which currently holds the real power. This clan 
includes all the top figures. Bosses of the clan of power are [President] A.[Askar] Akaev,” 
(Kyrgyz Rukhu 1999).
128“The appointment of ethnic Kyrgyz to key positions in the judicial system has led to 
charges by non-Kyrgyz that the system is arbitrary and unfair, and that the courts treat Kyrgyz 
more leniently than members of other groups” (US Department of State 1997).
129Libel, in Kyrgyzstan, is a criminal, not civil, action. Amnesty International (AI) and 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) have both covered the decline in media freedom extensively. 
Both AI and HRW reported on the problems with Res Publika, including the trials of Yrysbek 
Omurzakov, Alexander Alyanchikov, Zamra Sadykova, and Tamara Slashcheva. “This trial
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[Omurzakov] should never have started. The Kyrgyzstani authorities have already been 
internationally condemned for bringing a criminal prosecution in what should be a civil case 
of libel. They are clearly using criminal legislation in a bogus manner to punish and silence a 
prominent government critic” (Korbin 1997). See also (Amnesty International 1997a, 
Amnesty International 1997b; Amnesty International 1996; and Amnesty International 
1997c).
130Under the heading “Freedom of Speech and Press,” in US Department of State 1995 
Country Report, it was reported, “In 1994, the Government restricted these rights” (US 
Department of State 1995). See also the US Department of State’s 1999 Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices (US Department of State, 2000 and Carley 1993). See also 
(Anderson 1999:25-63). Newspaper Kriminal was closed. Asaba’s (independent Kyrgyz 
language newspaper) offices were raided by state security officers on 24 April 1999 during 
the night and erased all of their computer files. In August 1998 Asaba had been evicted from 
its old offices after renting space there for 32 years in order for the MVD (Ministry of Internal 
Affairs) to take over the building (US Department of State 2000). Res Public has had a long 
record of government harassment. Vechemy Bishkek came under fire in 1999 under the 
allegation of unpaid taxes. Militia and tax authorities harassed the newspaper’s owner, 
Aleksander Kim. Kim claims that the allegation of unpaid taxes and subsequent harassment 
only came after the newspaper had interviewed opposition candidates (US Department of 
State 2000,7; International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights 1999a; and International 
Helsinki Federation for Human Rights 1999b).
131“Joumalist Erkin Turaliev confessed that he has recently received an order from the 
presidential spokesman to denigrate the opposition leaders before parliamentary elections” 
Pyramid TV, February 12, 2000 (www.kind.net.kg).
132See RFE/RL reports, (Idinov 2000a; Idinov 2000b; Idinov 2000c; Idinov 2000d; and Idinov 
2000e).
133 These elections, coupled with the government’s failure and apparent weakness in Batken 
during August 1999, represent a loss of respect and fear of the government by the average 
person.
^See the research results of this dissertation, listed in the appendix. See also Richard 
Dobson’s USIA Office of Research survey of the Kyrgyz population regarding the state of 
“democracy” in Kyrgyzstan (Dobson 1995). Although IFES’ USAID funded survey (IFES 
1997) contradicts both this researcher’s findings and Dobson’s results with a reported 60% of 
those interviewed in the IFES survey saying that Kyrgyzstan is a democracy. There are two 
factors that may account for this contradiction: (a) this was early by four years from the field 
research of this dissertation; however, this does not account for the Dobson findings, and (b) 
IFES conducted interviews in people’s homes—which means that people would have been 
self-conscious of making a good impression on their guest and also initials the fear of the 
general population (from Soviet times) that the home may be wiretapped. IFES also reported 
that 43% of people thought the life of their children would be worse than their life— 
compared to only 32% who thought their children’s life would be better. In addition, 86% 
said that official corruption is a serious problem. According to the US Department of State’s 
1999 Country Report. “The Government’s human rights record was generally uneven and 
poor in some areas. The Government limits citizens’ ability to change their government. 
There were credible reports of police abuse and brutality” (US Department of State 2000). 
“Amnesty International also expressed concern at continuing reports of serious human rights 
violations by law enforcement officials, including alleged torture and ill-treatment of criminal 
suspects” (Amnesty International 1998).
135N o teachers, for example, have been paid their 1999 salaries and many have not received 
1998 salaries either. Teachers are owed some $1.3 million USD in back wages by the 
Government (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2000).
I36There are far too numerous cases and examples to mention here; however a few of the more 
renowned cases are listed to provide supporting evidence. For example, the prominent case
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of several senior level government officials (including former Prime Minister Apas 
Jumagulov and former Prime Minister Kubanychbek Jumaliev-current akim in Jala-bad) 
alleged involvement with Shalkar Jaisanbaev, formerly director general of 
Kyrgyzgasmunaizat company who embezzled nearly $200 million in government funds 
related to the ongoing gas crisis. Jaisanbaev left Kyrgyzstan in 1998 and his location is not 
officially known (Idinovn 1999). Former chair of the National Bank and former Finance 
Minister, Marat Sultanov is also suspected of involvement. There is also the high level case 
of Kyrgyzaltyn gold company where Dastan Sarygulov, former President of the company, is 
alleged to have also committed serious fraud and embezzlement against the government 
(Idinovn 1999). “The management of this newly created state company was given to Dastan 
Sarygulov, who had no previous mining experience but was a close associate of President’s 
Akaev’s wife. .. .nearly $20 million worth of gold had been sent to Switzerland by Seabeco” 
(Olcott 1996:102). Dastan is also a very close friend of President Akaev, having been his best 
man at Akaev’s wedding (Anderson 1999:41). Akaev continued to defend Dastan, “a man 
frequently charged with corruption or incompetence” (Anderson 1999:41). These cases are 
widely known and discussed from dinner parties to market stalls. According to Dobson’s 
study, “many participants drew attention to improprieties in the appointment of persons to 
positions of responsibility, especially appointment according to family, clan, or ethnic ties 
rather than competence” (Dobson 1995:2). The knowledge and resentment of the population 
toward the corrupt ethnically Kyrgyz and male government officials is also support by field 
research for this dissertation. One respondent, when asked who was a citizen of Kyrgyzstan, 
said, “Akaev.” Another person said, “Only the corrupt.” See also: a US Army report 
commissioned by the US Library of Congress, “government corruption and malfeasance also 
contribute to an atmosphere of lawlessness, hi the mid-1990’s bribery, kickbacks, and 
influence peddling became increasingly common in government agencies. Law enforcement 
officials have received little cooperation from the legislator in punishing their colleges who 
are caught violating the law. In 1993 the Interregional Investigations Unit, established to 
combat bribery, found itself shut down after twenty successful investigations and replaced by 
an economic crimes investigation unit, some members of which began taking bribes 
themselves” (Curtis 1996).
137“Since 1990 the economic decline in Kyrgyzstan has been steeper than anywhere else in the 
former Soviet Union, save Armenia” (Olcott 1996:98).
138However this number does not include the additional 8,000 Russians who, as of 9 March 
2000 nearly 8,000 (since the beginning of 2000) had applied for immigration to Russia. 
Records for the first three months of 1999 show that only 200 Russians had applied for 
immigration during that same time period. Additionally, there is an estimated 12,000 
Russians left Kyrgyzstan in 1999, most following the Batken incident that also need to be 
included in the immigration statistics (RFE/RL 2000).
139Interview with Raya, President of Tolerance International (Kadyrova 1998 and BBC 2000). 
The area from Kyzyl-Kyya north was relatively safe, with the capital of Osh oblast, Osh City 
itself, still occupied by US Peace Corps volunteers, US foreign assistance representatives, etc. 
The US Peace Corps had removed all volunteers south of Kyzyl-Kyya. Rumours in Osh from 
taxi drivers were that Akaev was too afraid to visit Batken or even Osh for fear of his own 
life. Akaev did visit Batken when the incident was nearly over on 9 October 1999 (RFE/RL, 
1999). “Because Kyrgyzstan authorities were unable to decisively deal with Namangani and 
because several high ranking officers of the internal troops were among the hostages taken, 
the authority of the army and the power-wielding agencies of Kyrgyzstan has been severely 
damaged. This is especially true in the south where civilians had little confidence in the 
government to begin with” (Makarenko 2000).
140As of 12 October 1999, (approved by Parliament on this date) three districts (Lailak, 
Kadamjai, and Batken) in the South West oblast of Osh became a new oblast renamed Batken 
In 1999 there was a war in the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan (Osh oblast) where Muslims 
fighters from Tajikistan (lead by an ethnic Uzbek Juma Namangani) crossed into Kyrgyzstan
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and took over 300 people hostage including four Japanese geologists. This group known as 
mojahedin and Hizb-e T or the Party of Purification, declared a jihad on Uzbekistan and 
threaten to do so to Kyrgyzstan if Kyrgyzstan does not let them through to Uzbekistan and/or 
give them territory for an independent state in Southern Kyrgyz. The group is referred to by 
different names, which include (1) Namangani—named after the leader, (2) Hizb-e Tahrir 
(Party of Purification), (3) the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and (4) the incident is most 
often simply referred to as Batken, after the rayon where the incident occurred. See RFE/RL 
Reports, Idinov 1999a , Idinov 1999b , Idinov 1999c and BBC Reports: BBC 2000a , 
BBC 2000a. See also: (Makarenko 2000 and Idinov 1999).
141The researcher was asked to give a briefing to Glen Anders the USAID Resident 
Representative for Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan regarding gender issues in Central Asia on 15 
December 1999. At this briefing, neither Anders nor his colleagues were aware this statement 
had been made.
142Indeed, even when Max van der Stoel, Commissioner for National Minorities with the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), warned that Central Asia 
might be the “new Kosovo,” few in the US democracy assistance, and particularly the US 
democracy assistance to Central Asia crowd were even aware that this statement had been 
made (Reuters 1999). See also Lubin (1995) where Lubin details US assistance to Central 
Asia from 1993-1996. “Democracy programs often mention ethnic conflict as a constraint 
but rarely incorporate these issues explicitly into programme design as well” (Lubin 
1995:328).
143“Central Asian nations are confronting serious questions regarding their ethnic minorities. 
The titular nationalist in Central Asia now find themselves in the position the Russians 
occupied prior to 1991: each is a dominant ethnic group, confronting a variety of demands 
from the minority populations” (Kangas 1995:280).
144T o this end, Akaev created the “Kyrgyzstan is Our Home” campaign. The country is filled 
with large red billboards, television commercials, posters, and other propaganda announcing 
“Kyrgyzstan is Our Home.” Some of these posters show Akaev encircled by a group of 
multi-ethnic children. Indeed, during this researcher’s surveys many people used Akaev’s 
exact words or attributed to Akaev the idea that “Kyrgyzstan is Our Home,” everyone’s 
home.
145Two examples of the Shamanist and Buddhist influences that have been confused with 
modem Islamic influence included: the wind prayers that are tied on bushes and trees or rock 
piles where they are deemed to be spirits or holy spots. This is a Shamanist trait very close to 
the Mongols. The second is a Buddha carved into a stone face at Issy-Atar, remaining from 
Mongol rule, which today the locals mb butter on its stomach and “pray to Allah.”
146Kara meaning black, as the “Kyrgyz,” to the south of present day Kazakstan, occupied 
higher mountain pasture than the Kazak, who inhabited that steppes to the north. “Kyrgyz” 
because of the altitude and sun, much darker.
147UNESCO Report 1994-2001,National Organising Committee for Manas 1000. The 
Secretary Executive of the Kyrgyz National Commission Adash Toktosunova claims that 
final figures are “confidential.”
148All white Eurasians are thought of as European in Central Asia, as Fydor Dostoyevsky said 
of Russians and Russia’s interest in Central Asia, “In Europe we are hangers-on and slaves, 
whereas we shall go to Asia as masters... In Europe we were Asiatics, whereas in Asia we, 
too, are Europeans” (Dostoyevsky in Meyer 1999:169).
149“Ethnicity remains a critical issue in these countries, as political parties often coalesce 
around ethnic identities” (Kangas 1995:278).
150“Cormption in Kyrgyzstan has taken many forms, but the two dominant ones seem to be 
the establishment of protection rackets and the use of official positions for private gain. In 
December 1998-January 1999 the deputy minister of finance, industry, and ecology were 
arrested on corruption charges” (Huskey 1999:7-8). “Speaking in early 1999 Prime Minister 
Jumabek Ibraimov admitted that "high ranking posts in the Government had been sold in the
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past” (Huskey 1999:18). “Although fortunes have been made, most of the shady dealings 
occurred within a short period; as Chyngyshev (Prime Minister-forced to resigned in 
December 1993 after Gold scandal) himself declared just weeks before his own ouster, almost 
everything of any value in Kyrgyzstan had already been stolen” (Olcott 1996:103). 
According the to US Department of State’s 1999 Country Report. “Economic crimes such as 
tax evasion, embezzlement, and theft of government property, including that of electric 
power, are common. Prosecution for these crimes is relatively rare and sometimes appears to 
be directed at opponents of the Government” (US Department of State 2000). In a recent 
article in the Kyrgyz Press, it is reported that, “for die period of 1992-1996 Kyrgyzstan 
Prosecutor General's Office had revealed more than 10 thousand gross violations of the law. 
The most typical violations are bribery, securities law violations in buying the shares of the 
most profitable enterprises, absence of the necessary documents avowing sources of income 
in acquiring the large blocks of shares by individuals etc... Those million-dollar credits, which 
were got under governmental guarantees, were spent past retrieve. There is no information 
about destiny of 30 million dollars obtained by Social Fund... There is no one sphere of life, 
which is not touched with corruption...The international community knows Kyrgyzstan as a 
country introducing democratic reforms and market economy. In practice, this image masks 
the former command-permission system of management on market relations, which is 
supported with regulatory acts, rules, and instructions. Therefore, potential foreign investors 
such as Daewoo, Samsung, BMW and others prefer to invest to economies of the 
neighbouring countries ...” (Kurmanov 2000). President Akaev does not accept any blame for 
the current state of Kyrgyzstan, ‘Today the country (Kyrgyzstan) is poor, largely because of 
certain events in our history and seventy years spent in the grip of a totalitarian system” 
(Akaev, 1995,10). Akaev continues, “there are three factors hindering the development of 
democracy in the Newly Independent States: the former Party nomenclature, our non- 
democratic folk traditions, and ethnic confrontation.... One of our top priorities is to establish 
inter-ethnic peace and harmony” (Akaev 1995:15). ‘There used to be a popular saying in 
Communist times....”If you don’t steal from the State, then you’re stealing from your own 
family.” The higher up you were, the more you could, and usually did, steal. In this respect, 
little has changed in today’s Kyrgyzstan’ (Bransten 1997).
151“Some of his [President Akaev’s] close relatives and leading supporters have garishly 
enriched themselves at public expense” (Kinzer 1999). See (Hvoslef 1995) for an in depth 
examination of the role of tribalism in modem Kyrgyzstan. “Politics became the art of family 
ties and loyalties that occupied the upper classes of society” (Kangas 1995:273). As the 
newspaper Kriminal argued in 1997 that only Talas and Kemin people ran the country. Kemin 
and Talas, are the homelands of Akaev and his wife respectively. The newspaper was shut 
down for publishing this article (Anderson 1999).
152According to a research survey conducted by USIA, of the many similar interviews, the 
opinion expressed by an orchard manager in Jalal-Abad, explains the corruption of the akim 
system. ‘I think that privatisation is a complete deception! From the very beginning the 
akims [local officials] bent it to their wills like a dog so it served them and not the people! ’ A 
Tajik journalist in Jalal-Abad also said, ‘I agree [with the opinion just cited]. So far, our 
rulers are deceiving the people. Why? Because they’ve expropriated [prikhvatizirovali, a 
play on the word for “privatised”] all the funds. This is expropriation by those who are in 
power, acting through figureheads. They’ve expropriated everything” (Dobson 1995:5-6). 
Moreover, Akaev has moved Northern friends to control the Southern region. For example, 
the aforementioned former Prime Minister Kubanychbek Jumaliev, was fired by President 
Akaev when he was Prime Minister because of corruption was then appointed akim to Jalal- 
Abad. Shuffling of key top government officials is one way that Akaev appears to hold a 
strong intolerance against corruption, while in reality the senior government official fired for 
corruption charges often turns up in another position (Anderson 1999:27).
153There is some evidence that women are less likely to be corrupt and to condone corrupt 
behaviour. According to a recent IRIS, a Washington based research NGO, study reports,
238
“corruption is less severe where women comprise a larger share of the labour force, and 
where women hold a larger share of parliamentary seats” (Anand Swamy 1999).
154Carley calls these the murky aspects that are crucial-and hard to pin down, some of which 
plague the entire FSU, like the absence of reformed legal institutions, and some of which are 
particular to Central Asia, such as the identity crisis. In sum, Central Asia exhibits many 
ambiguous determinants with few absolutes (Carley 1997:293). “During the transition, female 
enrolment in higher education has risen from 55% to 66% of all students” (Kuehnast 
1997:39). So extreme has the violence against women become that the UN issued a report 
warning the government to address the serious issue. “In the face of widespread violence 
against Kyrgyz women—including domestic violence, gang rape, and systematic assault and 
battery-expert members of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women... urged Kyrgyzstan to re-evaluate its programs and policies...astonished at the rise 
in the number of vicious crimes against women, they pressed the Government to identify the 
root causes of that grave phenomena and devise ways to suppress it” (United Nations 1999). 
155“A Western feminist theory seems an extravagant, luxurious emphasis on individual 
fulfilment in light of the material, financial, psychological and physical hardships that 
plagued Soviet society and continue to plague post Soviet society” (Holmgren 1995:20). In 
general, “new feminism” in the FSU, where it exists, has a different style, content, and 
objective from Western feminism (Buckley 1992:64). Stress, in women’s groups, is primarily 
placed on economic and family survival.
156Partha Chateijee has written a great deal about gendered nationalism in India, including 
concepts such as satidah, the immolation of widows, etc. (West 1997:xvii). In this body of 
research Chateijee asserts that due to colonial, the home was the location of “nationalism” 
and under the protection of women, as the public realm was a harsh and destructive 
environment for Indian identity under colonisation. Traditions and customs were deemed 
barbaric and backward, not in line with “modernisation” that the British Empire was 
attempting to bring to India. The home provided a spiritual, private, space for Indian tradition 
and custom that was untouched by colonisation. This is similar to the situation in Kyrgyzstan. 
157It is a consistent Western mistake to understand the FSU in terms of Marxism. Marxism in 
the Soviet Union is similar to Muslims in Kyrgyzstan today. The theory was used as 
propaganda when necessary but society was never formed upon authentic Marxist or 
communist lines. The Soviet Union, and its legacy today, was an abusive, totalitarian regime, 
that used and manipulated its tightly controlled population as a means to the end of global 
political and economic domination, which it failed to achieve.
158Seealso: (Yuval-Davis 1997).
,59In all revolutions, women who had been “loyal” to the cause, who were qualitatively and 
quantitatively necessary to achieve revolutionary objectives, were marginalized when the new 
regime needed a male elite in order to receive international recognition and legitimatisation 
(Lorber 1994:255). An overview of this discussion is presented in Mary Buckley’s 
Perestrokia and Soviet Women (Buckley 1992) and (Pavlycahko 1992:89).
160Of one hundred members of the Jogorku Kenesh, Kyrgyz parliament, only five are women. 
See Eugene Huskey, Kyrgyzstan: The Fate of Political Liberalisation, in CONFLICT, 
C le a v a g e , A n d  C h a n g e  In  C e n tr a l A s ia  A n d  T h e C a u c a su s , 264 (Karen Dawisha and 
Bruce Parrott eds., 1997). Polygamy narrowly lost a vote in the Jogorku Kenesh to make it 
legal in the early 1990’s; however, the parliament has no records of past votes. Magzimov 
Jenish Mamyrakashevich, Jogorku Kenesh staff member, Expert of Government Committee 
on Law-Making, confirmed (Telephone and Personal Interview of September 7 and 6 
respectively, 1999) that the debate took place and that except for one to six votes (he couldn’t 
remember exactly) polygamy would have been legal.
161Wahabism is radically different from the traditionally practised Sufism as it represents “a 
more austere form of Islam. If Sufism is more inward-looking, concentrating on internal 
mysticism, Wahabism is more outgoing, even aggressive” (Corley 1999). Wahabism was 
founded by 18th-century Arabian preacher Sheikh Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, who
239
called for a return to “pure Islam.” Sheikh Muhammad bin Saud joined Wahhab and 
provided political and military power to support. There are now Wahhabis missionaries in 
Kyrgyzstan, financed by wealthy Saudi families (Brauer 1999) and (Pannier 1999), who 
suspected to be part of the Batken rebels and supported by the Taliban. While the first strand 
of Islam is supported by the government and general population of Kyrgyzstan, Wahabism is 
greatly feared (Corley 1999) as the Central Asian population cling to a weakening secular 
statehood. Furthermore, because the fighting in Afghanistan has produced a large number of 
refugee whom have fled into all of the modem Central Asia states, creating tense issues 
around refugee populations, scarcity of resources, and ethnic tensions, Islamic 
fundamentalism is greatly resented. “Saudi Arabia was among the major donors to Islamic 
projects as the formerly communist world opened up again to religion in the late 1980s. From 
Macedonia and Bosnia to Central Asia, the Saudis have been financing the building of 
mosques and medressahs (Islamic schools) and sponsoring theological students” (Corley 
1999).
162In 1970 two mullahs protested about miniskirts, women teachers, and schoolgirls by 
shooting at the legs of women in Western clothing and throwing acid upon the women. 
Gulbeddin Hekmatyar was involved in this event, aiding the mullahs in these human rights 
violations. Hekmatyar was a leader in the mujahideen and hailed a “freedom fighter” by then 
US President Ronald Reagan (Moghadam 1997:85).
163If a man sees another man’s wife naked the husband, in order to save the honour of his 
generations, should kill the man who saw his wife naked. Raya Kadyrova, Director of the 
Kyrgyz NGO, Foundation for Tolerance International, recorded this event and related that she 
was convinced that the Tajik men forced their wives to lay naked. (Kadyora 2000, Kadyrova 
1998, and Berdiev 1999).
164Thus tribalism, while providing a fair amount of stability in the current crisis environment 
is also most likely to lead to future “ethnic” conflict as groups of Kyrgyz citizens, Koreans, 
Germans, Jews, Russians, Uzbek, etc., that have no nomadic past nor tribal lines become 
increasingly frustrated by living in a country that is governed by tribal relations.
165 See also: See President Akaev’s speech to members of aksakal courts, UTRO BlSHKEKA, 8 
May (1999) 2.
166According to the report one Kyrgyz NGO wrote after the 1995 UN Beijing women’s 
conference, “Economic and cultural crisis in Kyrgyzstan led to sudden moral principles 
decline, moral faintheartedness..., gradual forgetting about the historical inheritance, 
indifferent relations among people and many other negative consequences. The transitional 
period burden in all forms first of all hit women. This was reflected in family life where the 
growth of violence in relation to a woman is observed and expressed in beating, systematic 
injury causing, psychological dignity humiliation, and often getting raped by a husband.
... we have to make note that a subject applying violence to a woman in a family is not only a 
husband but also close relatives” (Karasaeva 1998).
1<S7“Russian culture was also heavily promoted in the Central Asian republics, much more so, 
ironically than in Russia itself, where it might have been dangerous to Soviet ideology. In 
Central Asia it became a tool for suppressing the influence of the indigenous culture” (Carley, 
1997:300). A. Tabyshalieva, Director of the Kyrgyz Peace Research Centre, provides an 
overview of current instability factors in Kyrgyz society. These include: economic 
stagnation; sharp drop in living standards; inter-regional dependencies for water, gas, energy, 
raw materials; privatisation attempts are, rightly viewed, as ‘former communist—current 
democrats stealing from the state; division of Labour and new wealth fall along ethnic lines; 
corruption, drug trade, and the Mafia; traditional versus modernity cross-generation conflict; 
brain-drain; water is scarce and the Aral Sea and poor water management will lead to 
increased tensions; general emotional confusion—not knowing where to look now that the 
state is gone; new foreign quests for oil; and the Tajik and Afghan war (Tabyshalieva 1997). 
To Tabyshalieva’s lengthy list this researcher would add; high alcoholism rates, break-up of 
the family, tribalism, foreign corruption, decline in educational standards and general
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rate of drug addition among young men is 2.5 times higher than male adults (Slovo 
Kyrgyzstana 2000/ On 9 October 1998, 700 tons of weapons heading to Afghanistan from 
Iran were confiscated by the Osh National Security Department. The weapons were in 16 
train cars and were labelled humanitarian aid. The weapons includes: anti-tank mines, land 
mines, grenades, machine gun bullets, cannon projectiles, and missiles (Dyryldaev 1998). 
175“Over the last decade, Osh has emerged as a key transit centre for arms headed for the 
Tajik and Afghan battle zones, as well as for drugs destined for Russia and Europe. In 
October 1998, Kyrgyz customs officials discovered 700 tons of weapons sent from Iran to 
Afghanistan camouflaged as humanitarian aid. According to Alexander Zelichenko, an 
official with the Kyrgyz anti-drug police, some 100 kilograms of opium were transported 
daily across the Kyrgyz-Tajik border between 1993 and 1997. Zelichenko says that the main 
danger to the country from the drug trade is that the cash it generates has the potential for 
corrupting badly paid government officials, and indirectly helps to fuel the conflicts in 
Tajikistan and Afghanistan, where warlords use drugs to pay their troops” (Cheterian 1999). 
See also: (United Nations 1997) and (Anderson 1999: 19-21, 90-91).
176“Spread across 22,000 kilometres, the Fergana Valley is the economic, religious, and 
multiethnic heart of Central Asia. It is home to 9 million people, nearly a fifth of the 
population of the region. With a predominately Uzbek population, the valley sprawls across 
three Central Asian nations: Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan—a legacy of Soviet 
efforts to ensure that it would never emerge as a unified regional power. That attempt has 
been successful in many ways, as the valley is the epicentre of the high-stakes political and 
ethnic rivalries that spill across its borders” (Cheterian 1999).
177 See (Akbarzadeh 2000).
Endnotes for Chapter Five
178tThe method must follow the question” (Gene Glass in Tashakkori, 1998:22). The works of 
Glaser and Strauss (1967), Creswell (1995), Brewer and Hunter (1989), Patton (1990), 
Sechrest and Sidani (1995), Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) and Patton (1990), Corbin and 
Strauss (1990), Strauss and Corbin (1994), and Galtaung (1988) have all contributed to the 
dual paradigm research model utilised in this research. Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) 
describe mixed method model as “studies that are products of the pragmatist paradigm and 
that combine the qualitative and quantitative approaches within different phases of the 
research process” (Tashakkori 1998:19). Rule (1997), McKenize, Powell, and Usher (1997), 
Galtnng (1988), Foucault (1980), Gadamer (1975), Harding (1987), Hekman (1990), Stanley 
(1990), Reason (1988), Smith (1987), Webb (1991b), Steier (1991), Unger (1987), Stones
(1996), Sylvan and Glassner (1985), Smith (1999), Blaikie (1993), Crotty (1998), Williams, 
Mundy, and Stuart (1996), Bunge (1998), Dubin (1978), Nicholson and Seidman (1995), 
Tucker (1998), and Renzetti and Lee (1993) have provided a base for paradigm development 
and theoretical research design.
179Coffey and Atkinson (1996), Silverman (1993), Psathas (1994), Denzin and Lincoln
(1994), Stem and Kalof (1996), Dey (1993) Tesch (1990 and 1991), Strauss and Corbin 
(1990), Miles and Huberman (1984), Strauss (1987), Bliss (1983), Sayer (1992), Becker and 
Geer (1982), Fielding and Lee (1991), Gubrium and Holstein (1997), and Ely, Vinz, 
Downing, Anzul (1997) have contributed significantly to construct of qualitative research and 
design in this research. See also: Schacht (1995), Bryman and Cramer (1990), Hedrick, 
Bickman, and Rog (1993), Denscombe (1998), Traub (1994), Malec (1993), Maier (1991), 
Lewis-Beck (1994), Sapsford and Jupp (1996), Boniface (1995) Burstein, Freeman, and Rossi 
(1985), Merton, Coleman, and Rossi (1979), Blossfeld and Prein (1998), Palriarca (1996), and 
Bartholomew (1996) have contributed significantly to concepts of quantitative research and 
design used in the construction of the quantitative theory, data collection, and analysis of this 
research.
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180Located at the Kyrgyz National Statistic Commission http://stat-gvc.bishkek.su/
1811995 figures are the latest one obtainable as found in Geografiia, weekly supplement to the 
newspaper Pervoe Sentiabria December 1995 No. 47 p. 1 (Huskey 1999: 244).
182Due to the danger inherent in travelling in Kyrgyzstan and precisely in travelling to the 
rural region, the researcher travelled whenever possible with a male and female Kyrgyz from 
the oblast in question. This also helped to gain access and trust when conducting akim and 
NGO interviews.
183According to USAID Partner International NGO, Counterpart Consortium’s March 2000 
list of international organisations registered in Kyrgyzstan.
184“In the early 1990s, most observers would have predicted chaotic years and wars ahead for 
the Central Asian republics as a result of weak states unable to protect artificially drawn and 
ethnically confusing borders. Excluding the war in Tajikistan, Central Asia has proven more 
stable than predicted. But as Tashkent-based journalist Abdulkhamid Khojayev puts it: “This 
place resembles the Soviet Union in the early 1980s. It is calm at the surface. ... Everyone 
knows something will happen, but no one knows what” (Cheterian 1999).
185Weber (Weber 1949) was the first to argue that there was a difference between the natural 
and social science; however, he thought that once the subject and object were separated a 
scientific method could be applied. While there are certainly degrees of separation that a 
researcher can place between him/her self and the object of his/her research, social sciences 
are not natural sciences and can never be shaped in the same paradigms. Social sciences 
consist of human interaction between subject and object, and human interaction is always 
tainted by the subjective, inconsistent human condition. Even Comte (1798-1857), the 
founder of positivism, in 1844, recognised that rational thought must be subordinated by a 
love of people and that only motivated in this manner could scientific enquiry into the social 
condition promote progress.
Endnotes for Chapter Six
186 See also: (Yuval-Davis 1998:178) who talks about this paradox. 
Endnotes for Chapter Seven
187“In fact, research has shown that it is not the men who first introduce children into the 
ethnic imagination of their community. It is the women through songs, stories, legends, and 
folk tales. They keep alive the myths and are the first to transmit a sense of the collective 
memory of success and suffering to children. Stories of great kings, the description of ‘other’ 
people are often imbibed by children not from racist patriarchs but from the mother who 
distils this information and first creates an awareness of ethnic or nationalist belonging” 
(Coomaraswamy 1999:8). The field research of this dissertation contradicts this notion. 
188Stetson (1995) provides an excellent alternative framework of citizenship and how it could 
include women. Makus' (1996) conclusion provides excellent prescriptive support. (Dean
1997) and (Voet 1998) both include a useful sections on feminism and the new democracy, 
use this for prescriptive.
189Says Frankel, “no one can say with assurance that democracy makes people wiser or more 
virtuous. But political democracy invites men to think that there may be alternatives to the 
way they are governed. ... the virtue of liberal democracy is that it permits second thoughts... 
it is a system that makes it possible for men, not to love their enemies, but at least to live 
without fearing them” (Frankel 1962: 173, 174, 177). Frankel recognises what US democracy 
assistance has forgotten, that “the importance of the democratic political method lies mainly 
in its non-political by-products. ... in the conditions that protect its liberties in the kind of 
consensus that prevails in the character of the conflicts that go on within it and in the manner
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in which it educates its rulers and citizens... so far as political democracy is concerned these 
conditions are only means to ends: they make competitive, elections possible. But it is 
because a system of competitive elections requires and fosters such conditions that it justifies 
itself. The conditions required for maintaining an honest electoral system are the best reasons 
for wishing to maintain it” (Frankel, 1962:168).
190A GAO study, “US Had Made Slow Progress in Involving Women in Development,” 
demonstrates how little women have been considered in US democracy assistance. Although 
this study was completed in 1993 (Martin 1994), Carothers’ latest assessment of US 
democracy assistance also recommends, similar to the 1993 GAO report that democracy 
assistance does not include women to a sufficient degree (Carothers 1999). Both studies 
conclude that more substantive involvement of women within programmatic frameworks 
would improve the success and quality of assistance.
191 To some degree, this is already being recognised as the field research for this dissertation 
was funded twice by the US Department of State Title Vm, through the Institute for 
International Education and The Kennan Institute.
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Glossary of Russian Terms
Aksakal: Literally translates as white beard, consists of the oldest men in
the village who make all the village decisions, including moral 
and family, and rule the villages as if an elected town and 
family morality council.
Azindan: A place of illegal detention established by village elders, or the
aksakals.
B la t: A word very important to all aspect of Soviet/post-Soviet
society—meaning special connections. The importance of blat 
cannot be stressed enough. It is a concept for which there is no 
real equivalent, nor word, in Western society or English 
language. Without blat one was not able to live under Soviet 
rule or today. It is the current origin and conflation with 
corruption. The West sees blat as using private and personal 
connections to gain “things,” money, products, influence, 
favours, trips, women, vodka, political freedom, etc. In 
Western terms, this is corruption or crony capitalism. In 
Soviet/Russian terms this is “how things are done” there was 
and is no other means because there was and is no reliable 
system of rule of law, government, taxes, salary, etc.
Corruption in Western terms exists and will continue to exist in 
post-Soviet societies until there is no need for blat. Blat is the 
rule of law.
Bride kidnapping: The practice of “stealing” a bride when one cannot afford 
the kalym, or bride price.
Byt: Daily life.
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Cheka: Vse-Rossiyskaya Chrezvychaynaya Komissiya Po Borbe S
Kontrrevolitisiey I  Sabotazhem, or the All-Russian 
Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution 
and Sabotage. The first state security apparatus created 20 
December 1917, the forerunner of the KGB.
Chemozhopye: Black assess—Russian ethnic slur against non-Russian, ethnic 
minorities, particularly those of Asia origin.
Choro: Militias organised by the village elders, aksakals, to inflict
punishment assigned by the aksakals to individuals in a village 
with whom the aksakals have found fault.
Kyxhna: Kitchen, a symbol of freedom during Soviet rule.
Druzhba narodov: Friendship of the peoples, another slogan that supported the 
Soviet meaning of natsionalnost. In other words, one could be 
proud of one’s ethnic particulars as long as that pride supported 
friendship among all peoples/nations of the USSR.
Ethnos: Generally translated at ethnicity. The Russian understanding is
a self-reproducing collective based on self-identification and a 
distinct culture. Also often understood as a determinant of 
social action. Ethnos is synonymous with natsionalnost.
GULAGS: Main Administration of Corrective Labour Camps.
Grazhdanstvo: Citizenship.
Intematsionalnost: Internationalism was a particular slogan that accompanied 
national diversity and uniqueness. This term was, and is, used 
as in, “I am not a nationalist. I am an inter-nationalist as part of 
the USSR.”
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Jenesin aluu: This is the name given to the Kyrgyz tradition that a widow 
may not marry anyone else of her choosing but is required to 
remarry the next of kin in her dead husband’s family, i.e. 
brother, uncle, etc.
Kalym: The price that is paid, by money, property, or livestock to
acquire a bride. The brideprice.
KGB: Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, or the Committee on
State Security.
Natsionalnost: Most often translated as nationality but in Russian/Soviet terms 
refers to an individual’s membership in a collective or nation 
rather than a state citizenship. Natsionalnost is inherited from 
one’s parents.
Natsionalist: Nationalist was very different from natsionalnost, and means 
does one support one ethnic group/nation above the others? 
Does one believe that their nation is better than all other people 
and thus not believe in the equality of nations within the Soviet 
brotherhood? This term connotes a type of racism, arrogance, 
and divisive hatred that could promote conflict between 
ethnic/national groups and a separation from the then USSR 
state. People were taught that to be proud of one’s nation was 
good but to be a nationalist was bad.
Natsionalism: Nationalism. Although the USSR encouraged natsionalnost 
identity, nationalism was not encouraged, and, in fact, was 
active and severely discouraged. Nationalism was seen as 
subverting the State. Same connotation as above.
NKVD: People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs.
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Raznoobrazie: National diversity, encouraged by the Soviet system but only 
within the overarching and strict limits of the Soviet state.
Rabotnitsa:
Svoeobrazie:
Sharoo:
Zhensovety:
Working woman.
National uniqueness, again encouraged by the Soviet system 
but only within the overarching and strict limits of the Soviet 
state.
Female slavery.
Women’s councils.
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Acronyms
ABA/CEEI - American Bar Association/ Central and East European Law 
Initiative 
ADB - Asian Development Bank 
CAR - Central Asian Region 
CEC - Central Election Commission 
CNFA - Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs 
CP -  Congressional Presentation 
D&G -  Democracy and Governance 
DRL - Democracy, Rights, and Labour 
EBRD - European Bank for Reconstruction & Development 
E&E -  Europe and Eurasia (USAID’s Division)
ENI - Bureau for Europe and the New Independent States 
EU - European Union
EU/TACIS - European Union / Technical Assistance for Commonwealth of 
Independent States 
FINCA - Foundation for International Community Assistance 
FY- Fiscal Year
GAO -  Government Accounting Office 
GDP - Gross Domestic Product
GONGO -  Government Operated Non-governmental Organisation
GTD - Global Training Development
GTZ - German Agency for Technical Cooperation
ICMA - International City/County Management Association
IFES - International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IMF - International Monetary Fund
IR - Intermediate Result
ISAR - Initiative for Social Action and Renewal in Eurasia
LEA -  Law Enforcement Agencies
LLR - Low Level Result
MCI - Mercy Corps International
MPP - Mission Performance Plan
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NED -  National Endowment for Democracy 
NDI - National Democratic Institute 
NGO - Non-governmental organisation 
NIS - New Independent States 
NPI - New Partnership Initiative 
NSC - National Security Commission
ODIHR -  OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
ODT - USAID’s Office of Democratic Transitions
OSCE - Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OST - Office of Social Transitions
R4 - Results, Review and Resource Request
SO - Strategic Objectives
SRO - Self-Regulatory Organisations
UN - United Nations
UNDP - United Nations Development Programme 
UNGIDB - United Nations Gender in Development Bureau 
UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNICEF - United Nations Children Fund 
US -  United States
USAID - United States Agencies for International Development 
USIS - United States Information Service 
USSR - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
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Akim’s Bibliographical Information
As o f 1 March 2000
Osh -  Temirbek Akmataliyev: He was former governor (akim) of Talas 
oblast. A refined man whose main activities are putting up monuments of 
great people and organising concerts and marathons. He is also well known for 
his womanising skills, is alleged to enjoy young women. He is also very 
Islamic orientated and gave the most “Islamic” responses when I surveyed 
him. He does not like foreigners and believes that women should not be active 
in public life but rather should be home.
Batken -  Mamat Aybalayev: He was the director of the Kadamjay Surma 
Kombinaty, Kadamjay Region of former Osh oblast, the only Antimony 
Industrial complex in the Republic. He was fired from the office for leading 
the complex to huge financial damages. There was even a criminal case 
opened on him but the results were inclusive probably because he became a 
deputy to Jogorku Kenesh, House of Representatives, and received immunity. 
After Batken crisis, he gained the trust of Akaev again. Batken was not an 
oblast when I was conducting research in August 1999.
Jalal-Abad- Kubanychbek Jumaliyev: Reported to be the “disciple” of 
Akaev -he was formerly Akaev’s student in physics. An apparent smart and 
gentle man who provided very good and honest responses for my research. 
However, as in all areas of Kyrgyzstan, looks can be deceiving; he is under 
criminal investigation and reported to be a main accomplish in the $200 
million scandal that rocked the country. (RFE/RL Article 17 December 1999, 
“Two Former Kyrgyz Premiers Implicated in Corruption Case.” 
http://www.rferl.org).
Talas- Keneshbek Karachalov: He was appointed recently, in December 
1999.1 did not interview him.
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Naryn -  Askar Salymbekov: Askar Salymbekov is one of the first 
“juggernaut” businessmen in the Republic. He is the owner of the “Dordoi” 
complex (Tolchok), the largest bazaar in the country. Now, he is a grand 
patron of a national sport games “ulak. " He was the worst akim I interviewed; 
not very intelligent and obviously corrupt. He did not attempt to provide 
answers that gave the impression that he was concerned about the population. 
He only wanted to talk about his trips abroad and how wonderful Akaev is. 
He also thinks that in ten years Kyrgyzstan will be a superpower “again” and 
he will “be President.”
Chui -  Kurmanbek Bakiev: This Bakiev is from the famous family of 
Bakievs -  all of his brothers have held important positions in the government 
departments (KGB, MVD). His brother Marat Bakiev was a deputy in the 
Jogorku Kenesh and the other brother is the Chief Prosecutor of the Jalal-Abad 
oblast. This was the best akim that I interviewed. He was smart and honest 
about the problems that Kyrgyzstan is facing. He was willing to critique the 
government (within reason) and seemed earnest and sincere about improving 
life in his oblast.
Issy Kul -  Toychubek Kasymbekov: This governor is the one who has been 
in office the longest. He has the reputation, more than others, of a sycophant. 
For example, in the winter of 1998-1999 when Akaev visited his oblast he 
ordered 40 tall pine trees cut from the mountains and put them in the ground 
along the road where Akaev was to drive by. He then boasted to Akaev about 
his efforts to make the region green. I did not have the opportunity to 
interview this akim.
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Two Way Crosstabulation of Key Correlates & the Four Key Variables 
Combined with Controlling for Gender
Having investigated the simple two-way relations between the survey entities 
and the four variables of age, ethnicity, region, and gender the analysis 
progressed to re-examine the two-way relations between the survey entities 
and age, ethnicity and region controlling for gender. The gender control 
resulted in a significant level of relationships that were suppressed or revealed 
when gender was controlled for. This indicated that gender was highly salient 
for the variables in question. Results for the simple two-way relationship 
results are located in the columns sub-headed UC, for uncontrolled, and the 
gender controlled relations are located in the column sub-headed C, for 
controlled, in the Matrix Table. Survey questions that are highlighted by bold 
signify that these questions were affected significantly by gender.
Matrix Key_______________________________________________________
UC Uncontrolled
C Controlled
— No significant relationship
S Significant variable relationship but with the gender cell blank means
that gender is a confounder and controlling fo r gender reveals the 
LACK o f relationship 
X  Significant relationship between variables but look to gender cell to
determine relationship 
OX Controlling fo r gender produced a significant relationship that the
simple variables did not account for; therefore, gender is a suppresser 
o f the two way relationship and SHOULD be controlled for 
XX- Both variables and gender control produced significant relationships.
The gender control results was weaker than the variable; iherefore, 
gender is a mild confounder but a significant genuine relationship 
persist
XX+ Both variables and gender control produced significant relationships.
The gender control result was stronger than the variables; therefore, 
gender is a mild suppresser o f the two-way relationship and SHOULD 
be controlled for
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Survey Set A.1 Significant Results Matrix
Survey Questions Age Region Ethnicity Gender
UC c UC c UC c UC
Who are you? S — — — s — S
Describe yourself in one word? s — s — — — s
How do you know your child’s ethnicity? X XX- s ~ s — —
Who taught ethnicity to your child? X XX- — o x s — s
How do you know your ethnicity? — — s — s — s
Who taught you your ethnicity? — — ~ — s — s
Do you have an ethnic identity? — — — — — — —
What are the qualities of your ethnicity? X XX- s — s — - -
What are the traditions, symbols, values, 
and stories of your ethnicity?
— — — — — — —
Do men and women have different ideas & 
means of ethnic identification?
s — s — — — —
Do you feel an ethnic or citizen identity 
before being a man?
s — — — — " —
Do you feel an ethnic or citizen identity 
before being a woman?
s — — — — — s
Who is a citizen of Kyrgyzstan? — — X XX — — —
Does the new Kyrgyz State have an 
ethnicity?
— ox s — — — —
Are you active in politics/government 
and how?
X XX+ - ox — — s
Are you active in your community? If you 
are active, what do you do?
— — — — s — —
Are you a nationalist, and why or why 
not?
— — — — X XX+ —
Is it different under the new Kyrgyz 
State than it was during the Soviet 
period?
X XX- s s
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Full Text of Original Survey Sets 
Survey Set One-Kyrgyzstan Population
A.1) Adult Primary Self Identification
(Green Form: Adult population, defined in Kyrgyzstan as 18 and 
over. For use in market place interviews). The survey objective 
is to illicit local self-identification o f adult primary identification 
levels and determine if  this differs between gender, rural-urban, 
education level, ethnic groups, etc.
Who are you?
Where do you live?
What do you live in?
Who is a citizen of Kyrgyzstan?
Are you male or female?
What is your age?
What is your education level?
Are you married?
Do you have children?
10) If you have children how many?
11) What age are these children?
12) What sex are the children?
13) Do your children have an ethnic identity?
14) If so, what and how was this determined?
15) Who teaches your children about their ethnic identity?
16) Are your children in school?
17) What do you do for money?
18) Are you active in politics/government and how?
19) Do you have an ethnic identity?
20) If you have an ethnic identity, what is it?
21) How do you know your ethnic identity?
22) What are the qualities of your ethnicity?
23) Are you active in your community?
24) If you are active, what do you do?
25) Who taught you about your ethnic identity?
26) If you’re married, what is your husband/wife’s ethnicity?
27) What are the qualities of your husband/wife’s ethnicity?
28) Does the new Kyrygz State have an ethnicity?
29) If the new Kyrgyz State has an ethnicity, what is it?
30) Is life different under the new Kyrygz State than it was during 
the Soviet period? a) If so, how?
3 l)D o men & women have different ideas/means of ethnic 
identity? a) Why or why not?
32) Do men feel an ethnic identity before being male?
33) Do women feel an ethnic identity being female?
34) What are the traditions/symbols/values/stories of your 
ethnicity?
35) Are you a nationalist and why or why not?
36) Describe yourself in one word.
A.1) CaMOOttpeneneHHe B3pocnbtx
(3eneHan ipopMa: B3pocnoe Hacenemte onpepeneHHoe xax 
rpampaHe 16 /ter m crapuie. Ann MHrepBbto Ha ptmxax m b 
poMax. nepep pacnpocrpaHeHneM Heo6xopxMO npOHyMepoBan 
xaxtpyx) 0opMy).
Uenbio AaHHoro onpoca ABAflCTCA M3yneHMe caMOonpeAeneHMA 
B3poaioro Hace/iemie, m onpeAennTb ecrb am pa3mma no npM3HaxaM 
no/ia, ropoACKUM m cenbcxMM HaceneHMeM, ypoBHeM o6pa30BaHMA, 
3THMH6CXMMM rpynnaMM, M.T.A.
1) Kto Bbi?
2) TAe Bw 5KMBere?
3) B neM Bbi xcMBere?
4) Kt o  abaatca  rpa>xAaHMHOM Kbiprbi3craHa?
5) Bbi MyxHMHa mam JKeHUMHa?
6) Cko/ibKO BaM act?
7) KaxoB Bam ypOBeHb o6pa30BaHMA?
8) Bw )KeHan>i/3aMy3KeM?
9) y  Bac ecrb  astvi?
10) ECAM eCTb ACTM, TO CXOAbXO?
11) CXOAbXO ACT BailJMM ACTAM?
12) Kaxofi non y B aw nx  actcm ?
13) Ecrb am  y Barnux rst& a  aTHMHecxaa npMHaAAOXHOcrb?
14) Ecam Aa, t o  xax aro  onpeAenACTCA?
15) Kto yhmt Bauiwx AereM mx arHMnecxoM npuHaAACTXHOcru?
16) XOA^T AM BaiiiM ASTM B UJXQAy?
17) Ecam BauiM aotm  xo a a t  b mxony, t o  b  xaxyx) m b  xaxott xnacc?
18) KakMM o6pa30M Bbi 3apa6aTbiBaere AeHbm?
19) lAweer am Hoeoe Kbiprbi3cxoe rocyAapCTBO arHMHecTBO?
20) Ecam Aa, to xaxoe?
21) OrxyAa Bbi 3Ha ere  o  rocyAapcrBeHHOM arHMHecxoii 
onpeAeneHHOCTM?
22) Ecam cymecrByeT Kbiprw3Cxow rocyAapcrBeHHOM STHMMecTBO,
BAM ACT AM OHO Ha Bamy )KM3Hb?
23) Ecam cymecTByer KbiprbiscxoPi rocyAapcreeHHOM arHMHecTBO, xax 
OHO BAMACT Ha Bamy )XM3Hb?
24) Ecam y Bac ecrb  arHMnecxaA onpeAeneHHOCTb, oTAMHaercA am oho 
npM Kbiprbi3CX0M rocyAapcrBe o r  Toro, h to  6bino npM Cobctcxom 
Cox)3e?
а) Ecam Aa, to xax?
б) Ecam Aa, t o  noneMy?
c) OrxyAa Bw aro  3H3CTe?
25) OTAMH3IOTCA AM OOHATMA M Cn0C06bl 3THMHeCXOM Onp€A€A6HHOCTM y 
MyjKHMH M )KeHLAMH?
a) noneMy?
26) MyBCTByx)T am  My)XHMHbi cbok) aTHMsecxyx) mam rpa>XAaHCxyx) 
onpeAeneHHOCTb a o  caMOonpeAeneHMA h to  ohm  MyxcHMHW?
27) HyBCTByiOT am m/ mchmhw cboio aTHMnecxyio mam rpaxcAaHcxyio 
onpeAeneHHOCTb ao caMOonpeAeneHMA hto ohm MyjxHMHbi?
28) KaxoBW TpaAMUMM, cm m boaw ,  ueHhoctm ,  m mctopmm  Bamero 
aTHMHecTBa?
29) Bbi HauMOHanMCT? floneMy?
30) O x a p a K re p n 3 y ir re  ce6a oahmm  o io b o m .
31) OnkiiuMTe Bam TunnnHbm pgHb.
B.1) Child Primary Self - Identification
(Blue Form: Child population, defined in Kyrgyzstan as 
18 and under. For use in secondary schools based 
interviews)
The survey objective is to illicit local self-identification of 
child primary identification levels and determine if this 
differs between gender, rural-urban, education level, ethnic 
groups, etc.
1) Who are you?
2) Where do you live?
3) What do you live in?
4) What school do you attend?
5) What grade level?
6) Are you male or female?
7) What is your age?
8) Do you have parents?
9) If you have parents do you have a mother?
10) Do you have a father?
11) Who is your mother?
12) What ethnicity is your mother?
13) Who is your father?
14) What ethnicity is your father?
15) Which parent taught you about your ethnicity?
16) How did they teach you?
17) What did they teach you?
18) What do you learn in school about your ethnicity?
19) Is your teacher male or female?
20) What ethnicity is your teacher?
21) What ethnicity are you?
22) What are the qualities of your ethnicity?
23) Describe yourself in one word.
B.1) flercKoe caMOonpepenemie
( r o /iy 6 a n  cpopM a: f le r c K o e  H a cen eH n e, 
o n p e p e n e H H o e  b  K b ip rb i3 c ra H e  n a n  
H a cen eH n e 1 6 / t e r n  M Jiapiue. f l i t*  M H T epsbto  
b  H an an bH bix  m  cpepH M x tc n a c c a x  u iko / i,  a  
r a /o x e  Ha p b iH x a x  ## b  p o m  a x )
Lle/ibio flaHHoro onpoca ABnfleToi M3yneHMe 
caMOonpefle/ieHM5i AeTCKoro Hace/ieHMa, m onpeAenmb ecrb 
/in pa3HMua no npM3H3KaM no/ia, ropoflCKMM m ce/ibCKMM 
HaceneHMeM, ypoBHeM o6pa30BaHMH, 3thmm6Ckmmm 
rpynnaMM, m.t.a.
1) Kto tw?
2) TAe Tbi >KMBeiub?
3) B neM Tbl >KMBeLLIb?
4) B KaKOM WKO/ie Tbl yHMWbCfl?
5) B KaKOM K /iacce?
6) Tbl Ma/lbMMK MJ1M AGBOHKa?
7) CKOJibKO T e 6 e  JieT?
8) y  Te6fl ecrb poflMTe/iM?
9) y  Te6fl ecrb MaMa?
10)y Te6« ecrb nana?
11)Kto tboji Mam?
12)KaK0Ba STHMMecKafl npMHaA/iewHocrb TBoefi MaMbi?
13)Kto tbom nana?
14)KaK0Ba 3THMMecKa« npMHaAne>KHOcrb TBoero 
nanbi?
15) Kto m3 tbomx poAMTeneM o6yMan Te6a TBoefi 
BTHMMeCKOM npMH3Ane>KHOCTM?
16)KaK ohm re6n 3T0My o6yHa/iM?
17)HeMy ohm  Te6fl ynM/iM?
18)Mto Tbi npoxoAHiub b ujKone o TBoefi sthmhcckom 
npMH3Ane>KH0crM?
19)Tbom yMMTe/ib My>KHMHa mjim >KeHU4MHa?
20)KaKOBa STHMHecKaa npMHaAnewHocrb TBoero 
yHMTenfl?
21)KaKOBa TBOft 3THMHecKaa npMHaA/ie>KHOCTb?
22)KaKOBbi KanecTBa TBoero 3THMHecrBa?
23)OxapaicrepM3yM ce6fl oahmm oiobom.
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C l Civil Society
(Yellow Form: This survey was administered to leaders o f Kyrgyz 
civil society/NGOs.)
1) What is your name?
2) Where do you live?
3) What is your position?
4) Are NGOs beneficial for Kyrgyz society?
a) Why or why not?
5) Are you male or female?
6) What is your age?
7) Does the new Kyrgyz State have an ethnicity?
8) If the new Kyrgyz State has an ethnicity what is it and why?
9) Who is a citizen of Kyrgyzstan?
10) How are these citizens represented?
11) Does your organisation help to create a better understanding of 
what
it means to be a Kyrgyz citizen?
a) If so how?
b) Is this different than how the government promotes Kyrgyz 
citizenship?
a) If yes, why and how?
b) If no, why and how?
12) Is Kyrgyzstan a democracy?
a) Why or why not?
b) Should it be?
c) Why or not?
d) If it is not a democracy what would make it one?
e) If it is not a democracy what is Kyrgyzstan?
f) If it is a democracy who/what made/makes it a 
democracy?
13) Why did you create this organisation?
14) Are the NGOs part of democratic structures in
Kyrgyzstan?
15) If you have an ethnicity what is it?
16) Is your ethnic identity relevant to your work?
a) If yes, why and how?
b) If no, why not?
17) What do you think of the government’s role in Kyrgyzstan?
18) What is your knowledge and opinion of foreign assistance in
Kyrgyzstan?
19) Why do you continue to direct this organisation?
20) Where do you see yourself, professionally, in ten years?
a) Your organisation?
b) Your country?
20) Is the objective of your organisation related to the changes in 
Kyrgyz society since independence?
a) If so, how?
21) Do you think, and/or want, your organisation to contribute to the
democratisation of Kyrgyzstan?
22) Why are there so few women in Parliament?
a) In the White House?
b) Are these important positions?
c) Why or why not?
23) Are there many women leading NGOs?
a) Why or why not?
24) Do Kyrgyz men see political space or opening for them 
themselves?
a) If so, why and how?
b) If so, why and how to they act or not act on this space?
25) Do Kyrgyz women see political space or open for them 
themselves?
a) If so, why and how?
b) If so, why and how to they act or not act on this space?
26) Is gender involved in concepts of Kyrgyz citizenship?
a) If yes, why and how?
b) If no, why not?
27) What is the most important factor for peace, stability, and
economic growth in Central Asia?
Cl rpampaHCKoe oGmecrBO
(JKenran cfxjpMa: flaHHbM BonpocHHK 6yper pa3paH 
pyKoaoflCTBy Kbiprb&CKoro rpampaHCKoro o6mecrBa. 
HH<popMapHB o peaTenbHOcm KampoH opraHM3at4MM 
Gyper 3anMCbisa Tbcst.)
22)KaK Bac 30ByT?
23)lAe Bbi >KMBeTe?
24)KaKOBa Bama AO/i>KHOCTb?
25)no/ie3Hbi m  HnO unn Kbiprbi3CKoro o6utecrBa?
a) noneMy?
26)Bbi My>KHMHa unn xceHmima?
27)CKO/ibKO BaM /ier?
28) HMeeT /in HOBoe Kbiprbi3CKoe rocyflapcrBO 3THMHecTB0?
29) Ecjim cymecTByeT Kbiprbi3CKoe rocyAapcrBeHHOM 
STHMHeCTBO, HTO 3TO M nOHCMy?
30) Kto flB/ifleTCfl rpa>KflaHHHOM Kbiprbi3craHa?
31)KaK npeAcraB/ieHbi AaHHbie rpa>KAaHe?
32) CoAeMCTByeT m  Bama opraHM3aun5i /lynmeMy noHMMaHmo 
Toro, HTO 3H3HMT 6blTb rpa»<A3HMH0M Kblprbl3CTBHa?
a) Ec/im Aa, to  KaK?
6) 0T/lMHaTC5l Jill 3TO OT TOTO, KaK npaBMTeJlbCTBO npOABMraeT 
Kbiprbi3Koe rpa>KAa hctbo?
b) Ecjim Aa, to KaK?
r) Eoim Her, to  noneMy?
33) Ecrb jim b Kbiprbi3craHe fleMOKpaTMJi?
a) noneMy?
6) flOJDKHa JIM OHa 6blTb?
b) noneMy?
r) Ecjim fleMOKpaTMM HeT, to nTO Momo 6bi 
cofleMCTBOBaTb ee co3flaHMto?
A) Ecjim Kbiprbi3craH He AeMOKpaTMneH, to  KaKOM oh? 
e) Ecjim Kbiprbi3daH AGMOKpaTMneH, to Kro/nTO 
cnoco6cTByeT 3TOMy?
34)fljifl nero 6bma co3AaHa Baiua opraHM3auMH?
35) ?\BJiflKDTCfl Jim Hno nacrbK) AeMOKpaTMnecKOM crpyKrypbi 
Kbiprbi3craHa?
36) Echm y Bac ecrb 3THMnecTBO, KaKoe oho?
37) 1/lMeeT jim Baiua pa6oTa OTHOiueHMe k Barnetf BTHMnecKOM 
npMH3A^ e>KHOCTM?
a) Eoim Aa, to  KaKoe m noneMy?
6) Ecjim HeT, to noneMy?
38)Mto Bbi AYMaeTe o pojim npaBMTejibcrBa b Kbiprbi3craHe?
39) KaKOBO Baiue 3H3HMe m MHeHMe no noBOAy MHOcrjDaHHOM 
noMomM Kbiprbi3craHy?
40) noneMy Bbi npoAOJiwaeTe ynpaBJiflTb btom opraHM3ai4MeM?
41)TAe Bbi ce6fl bmamtc b npoc))eccMOHajibHOM njiaHe nepe3 10 
Jier?
а) B BameM opraHM3auMM?
б) B BameM crpaHe?
20) HMeiOT jim OTHomeHMe uejiM BameM opraHM3auMM k 
nepeMeHaM b Kb/prbi3CKOM o6mecTBe noaie He3aBMCMMOCTM?
a) Ecjim Aa, to KaKMM o6pa30M?
21) CnMTaeTe jim Bbi nTO Bama opraHM3auM*i A^JiaeT bkji3a  
b npoqecc A6MOKpaTM3ai4MM Kbiprbi3craHa?
22) noneMy b napJiaMeHTe TaK Majio >kchiamh?
а) B BejiOM AOMe?
б) Ba>KHbl JIM 3TM nOCTbl?
b) noneMy?
28) MHOrO JIM >KeHIAMH, pyKOBOAHlAMX HnO? 
a) noneMy?
29) npMHMMaiOT jim Kbiprbi3CKMe My>KnMHbi aKTMBHoe ynacTMe b 
noji MTMnecKOM AeaTejibHOCTM?
a) Ecjim Aa, t o  KaK m noneMy ohm AeMCTByiOT Ha noji MTMnecKOM 
apeHe?
30) npMHMMaiOT jim Kbiprbi3CKMe >KeHiAMHbi aKTMBHoe ynacTMe B 
noji MTMnecKOM AeflTejibHOCTM?
a) Ecjim Aa, t o  KaK m noneMy ohm AeMcreyiOT Ha noji MTMnecKOM 
apeHe?
31)BoBneneH jim Bonpoc nojia b KOHuenuMio Kbiprbi3CKoro 
rpaw aH CTBa?
а) Ecjim Aa, to noneMy m KaK?
б) Ecjim HeT, to noneMy?
27) KaKOM CaMbIM BcDKHbIM (JjaKTOp flJlfl MMpd, CTa6MJlbHOCTM M 
BKOHOMMneCKOro pa3BMTM« B UeHTpaJlbHOM A3MM?
D. 1 Government Reactions
(Pink Form: This survey was conducted in an effort to determine 
how individuals in elected and political salient appointed positions, 
in the Parliament, the White House, and the Ministries, view the 
NGOs.)
1) What is your name?
2) Where do you live?
3) What is your position?
4) Are NGOs beneficial for Kyrgyz society?
a) Why or why not?
5) Are you male or female?
6) What is your age?
7) Does the new Kyrgyz State have an ethnicity?
8) If the new Kyrgyz State has an ethnicity what is it and why?
9) Who is a citizen of Kyrgyzstan?
10) How are these citizens represented?
11) Does your government position help to create a better
understanding of what it means to be a Kyrgyz citizen?
a) If so how?
b) Is this different than how the NGOs promote Kyrgyz 
citizenship?
c) If yes, why and how?
d) If no, why and how?
12) Is Kyrgyzstan a democracy?
a) Why or why not?
b) Should it be?
c) Why or not?
d) If it is not a democracy what would make it one?
e) If it is not a democracy what is Kyrgyzstan?
f) If it is a democracy who/what made/makes it a democracy?
13) What do you do in your position?
14) Are the NGOs part of democratic structures in Kyrgyzstan?
15) If you have an ethnicity what is it?
16) Is your ethnic identity relevant to your work?
a) If yes, why and how?
b) If no, why not?
17) What do you think of the government’s role in Kyrgyzstan?
18) What is your knowledge and opinion of foreign assistance in
Kyrgyzstan?
19) How long have you been in this position?
20) Where do you see yourself, professionally, in ten years?
a) Your government office? b) Your country?
21) Is the objective of your government office related to the changes
in Kyrgyz society since independence? 
a) If so, how?
22) Do you think, and/or want, your government office to contribute
to the democratisation of Kyrgyzstan?
22) Why are there so few women in Parliament?
a) In the White House?
b) Are these important positions?
c) Why or why not?
32) Are there many women leading NGOs?
a) Why or why not?
33)Do Kyrgyz men see political space or opening for them 
themselves?
a) If so, why and how?
b) If so, why and how to they act or not act on this space?
34) Do Kyrgyz women see political space or open for them
themselves?
a) Is so, why and how?
b) If so, why and how to they act or not act on this space?
35) Is gender involved in concepts of Kyrgyz citizenship?
a) If yes, why and how?
b) If no, why not?
27) What is the most important factor for peace, stability, and economic 
growth in
Central Asia?
M l P eaK tiua n p a sM T en b ttta
(Po30Baa (popMa. ash Han aHKera 6yaer pacnpocrpaHeHa ana onpetae/ieHHa 
OTHOiueHHfuwu, M36paHHbix M/1H Ha3HaneHHbix b napnaMeHT, Benbifi floM, 
H MHHHCrepCTBa K HHQ)
1) KaK Bac 30Byr?
2) fae Bu >KMBere?
3) KaKafl y Bac flO/DKHOCTb?
4) flo/ie3Hbi nil Hno Ann Kbiprbi3CKono o6mecrBa?
a) noneMy?
5) Bu MyjKMMHa mjim JKemuMHa?
6) CKO/ibKO BaM Jier?
7) Ecjim cymecTByeT Kbipru3CKoe rocyAapcrBeHHOM arHMnecrBO, ■no a ro  m 
noneMy?
8) Kto flBJinercsi rpa>KAaHMHOM Kupru3craHa?
9) KaK npeAcraeneHu AaHHue rpaxcaaHe?
10) CofleMCTByeT m  Bama npaBMrenbCTBeHHan AO/DKHOCTb nymueMy noHMMaHmo 
TOTO, MTO 3H3MMT 6blTb rp3)KAaHMH0M KblpTbl3CTaHa?
a) Ecjim Aa, to KaK?
11) Or/iHHaTcn m  a ro  o r  toto, KaK HnO npOABMraior K upru3Koe 
rpa)KAaHCTBO?
6) Ecjim Aa, to KaK?
b) Ecjim Her, to noneMy?
12) Ecrb jim b Kupru3craHe AeMOKpamn?
a) noneMy?
6) Aon)KHa jim OHa 6brrb?
b) noneMy?
r)  Ecjim ACMOKpaiMM hct, to mto Momo 6bi coAettcrBOBarb e e  C03AaHMio?
A) Ecjim Kbiprbi3craH He AeMOKparmneH, to KaKOM oh?
e )  Ecjim Kwprbi3craH AeMOKparnneH, to k to /h t o  cnoco6cTB yeT  arOMy?
13) MeM Bbi 3aHMMaerecb 6yAynM Ha BameM nocry?
14) Rbiumotoi jim H(10 nacrb io  ACMOKparMneocoft crpyicrypbi KbiprbiacraHa?
15) Ecjim y  Bac e c rb  STHMnecrBO, Kaxoe oho?
16) HMeeT jim Bama p a 6 o ra  OTHomeHMe k BameM 3THrmecK0M 
npMHaAJiexHOCTM?
a )  Ecjim Aa, to  KaKoe m noneMy?
6 ) Ecjim HeT, to noneMy?
17) Mto  Bbi AyMaere o  pojim npaBMTejibcraa b  Kbiprbi3craHe?
18) KaKOBO Bame 3HaHne m MHeHMe no  noBOAy MHOcrpaHHOM itomoium 
Kbiprw3CTaHy?
19) KaK AOJiro Bbi HaxoAnrecb Ha AaHHOM aojdkhoctm?
20) f a e  B u ce6a  bmamtc b npocpeccMOHa^bHOM nnaH e nepe3  10 JieT?
а ) B npaBMTejibcrBeHHOM ica6MHere?
б) B BameM crpaHe?
21) Hm qot  jim OTHomeHMe uejiM Barnero npaBMTejibcreeHHoro cxpMca k nepeMeHaM 
B Kbiprbl3CKOM OGlUeCTBe nOCJie He3aBMCMMOCTM?
a) Ecjim Aa, to kokmm o6paaoM?
2 2 ) C n m a e re  jim Bbi m o  Bam npaBMrejibCTBeHHbiM cxJjmc pjenaer b k jh a  b n p ouecc  
A6MOKpaTM3aUMM Kbiprbl3CT3Ha?
2 3 ) noneM y b napjiaMeHTe TaK Majio )k€hiamh?
а )  B BejioM AOMe?
б) Ba)KHbl JIM 3TM nOCTbl?
b) /ToneMy?
24) Mhopo jim xeHiiuiH, pykoboablumx Hno?
a) noneMy?
2 5 ) npMHMMaiOT jim KbiprbJ3CKne MyjKnMHtJ aKTMBHoe y n a c m e  b nojnrm necxoM  
A&ITeJlbHOCTM?
a) Ecjim Aa, to KaK m noneMy ohm AeftcreyiOT Ha nojiMTMnecKOM apeHe?
26) npMHMMaior jim Kbiprbi3CKMe >KeHLUMHbi aKTMBHoe y n a c m e  B nOJIMTMneCKOM 
AejnejnbHOCTM?
a) Ecjim Aa, to KaK m noneMy ohm AGMCTByiOT Ha nojiMTMnecKOM apeH e?
27) BoBJieneH jim Bonpoc nojia b KOHuenuMK) KbiprbiXKOro rpawAaHCTBa?
а )  Ecjim Aa, to noneMy m KaK?
б )  Ecjim H er, to  noneMy?
2 8 ) KaKOM CaMbIM Ba>KHblM (J)aKTOp AJ1B MMpa, Cra6MJU>HOCTM M 3KOHOMMneCKOTO pa3BMTMB 
UeHTpa/lbHOM A3MM?
Survey Set Two-International Donor Population
A.2-R2 USAID Officials in Kyrgyzstan(Regional Desk, ie. Almaty) 
& Washington, DC.
(Grey Form: This survey will be conducted in an effort to determine
attitudes, understandings, and degree o f inclusion o f gendered 
ethnicity in democratic assistance programs in USAID officials in 
Kyrgyzstan.
1) What is your name? (Optional)
2) What is your position?
3) Are NGOs beneficial for Kyrgyz society? a) Why or why not?
4) Are you male or female?
5) What is your age?
6) Does the new Kyrgyz State have an ethnicity?
7) If the new Kyrgyz State has an ethnicity what is it and why?
8) Who is a citizen of Kyrgyzstan?
9) How are these citizens represented?
10) Does USAID democracy programs help to create a better
understanding of what it means to be a Kyrgyz citizen?
a) If so how?
b) Is this different than how the NGOs promote Kyrgyz
citizenship?
c) If yes, why and how?
d) If no, why and how?
11) Is Kyrgyzstan a democracy?
a) Why or why not?
b) Should it be?
c) Why or not?
d) If it is not a democracy what would make it one?
e) If it is not a democracy what is Kyrgyzstan?
f) If  it is a democracy who/what made/makes it a democracy?
11) What do you do in your position?
12) Are the NGOs part of democratic structures in Kyrgyzstan?
13) Is ethnic identity relevant to USAID democracy assistance?
a) If yes, why and how? b) If no, why not?
14) What do you think of the Kyrgyz government’s role in 
Kyrgyzstan?
15) What is your knowledge and opinion of foreign assistance in
Kyrgyzstan?
16) How long have you been in this position?
17) What are the traditions, symbols, values, and stories of Kyrgyz
ethnicity?
18) Why does the US government promote democracy in 
Kyrgyzstan?
19) Where do you see Kyrgyzstan in ten years?
20) What is the objective of USAID democracy assistance to
Kyrgyzstan?
21) Do concepts of ethnic identity differ between male and female
Kyrgyz? a) If so, how?
22) Are USAID democracy funds contributing to the democratisation
of Kyrgyzstan? a) If yes, how? b) If no, why not?
23) Why are there so few women in Parliament?
a In the White House?
b) Are these important positions?
c) Why or why not?
24) Are there many women leading NGOs? a) Why or why not?
25) Do Kyrgyz men see political space or opening for them 
themselves?
a) If so, why and how?
b) If so, why and how to they act or not act on this space?
26) Do Kyrgyz women see political space or open for them 
themselves?
a) If so, why and how?
b) If no, why and how to they act or not act on this space?
27) Is gender involved in concepts of Kyrgyz citizenship?
a) If yes, why and how? b) If no, why not?
28) What is the most important factor for peace, stability, and economic 
growth in
Central Asia?
C.2-D.2 USAID Partner Organisations in Kyrgyzstan & 
Washington, DC
(Red Form: This survey will be conducted in an effort to determine
attitudes, understandings, and degree o f inclusion o f gendered 
ethnicity in democratic assistance programs in USAID partner 
organisations in Kyrgyzstan.
1) What is your name (Optional)?
2) What is your position?
3) Are NGOs beneficial for Kyrgyz society? a) Why or why not?
4) Are you male or female?
5) What is your age?
6) Does the new Kyrgyz State have an ethnicity?
7) If the new Kyrgyz State has an ethnicity what is it and why?
8) Who is a citizen of Kyrgyzstan?
9) How are these citizens represented?
10) Does USAID democracy programs help to create a better 
understanding of what it means to be a Kyrgyz citizen?
a) If so how?
b) Is this different than how the NGOs promote Kyrgyz 
citizenship?
c) If yes, why and how?
d) If no, why and how?
11) Is Kyrgyzstan a democracy?
a) Why or why not?
b) Should it be?
c) Why or not?
d) If it is not a democracy what would make it one?
e) If it is not a democracy what is Kyrgyzstan?
f) If it is a democracy who/what made/makes it a democracy?
12) What do you do in your position?
13) Are the NGOs part of democratic structures in Kyrgyzstan?
14) Is ethnic identity relevant to USAID democracy assistance?
a) If yes, why and how? b) If no, why not?
15) What do you think of the Kyrgyz government’s role in 
Kyrgyzstan?
16) What is your knowledge and opinion of foreign assistance in
Kyrgyzstan?
17) How long have you been in this position?
18) What are the traditions, symbols, values, and stories of Kyrgyz
ethnicity?
19) Why does the US government promote democracy in 
Kyrgyzstan?
20) Where do you see Kyrgyzstan in ten years?
21) What is the objective of USAID democracy assistance to
Kyrgyzstan?
22) Do concepts of ethnic identity differ between male and female 
Kyrgyz? a) If so, how?
23) Are USAID democracy funds contributing to the democratization 
of Kyrgyzstan? a) If yes, how? b) If no, why not?
24) Why are there so few women in Parliament?
a) In the White House?
b) Are these important positions?
c) Why or why not?
25) Are there many women leading NGOs? a) Why or why not?
26) Do Kyrgyz men see political space or opening for them 
themselves?
a) If so, why and how?
b) If so, why and how to they act or not act on this space?
27) Do Kyrgyz women see political space or open for them 
themselves?
a) If so, why and how?
b) If no, why and how to they act or not act on this space?
28) Is gender involved in concepts of Kyrgyz citizenship?
a) If yes, why and how? b) If no, why not?
29) What is the most important factor for peace, stability, and economic 
growth in
Central Asia?
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Complete Results for All Survey Sets Except A.1
Data Results for Survey Set One (C.l) Civil Society/NGO 
Leaders in Kyrgyzstan
Position
12% Of those surveyed are Deputy Directors; of these 8% Male 
68% Of those surveyed are Directors; of these 29% Male
Gender
24% Men 
76% Women
Average Age
38
Are NGOs beneficial fo r  KYRGYZSTAN?
4% Responded, Yes but three years ago—not now 
96% Responded, Yes
Why or Why not?
4% Responded “Four girls got a job!”
8% Responded with answers related to democracy promotion or
assistance
8% Responded that their NGO supported the state
12% No response
68% Responded that their NGO helped society because the
government could not and NGOs are “closer to the problems 
of the common people” and/or “protected” common people. 
Examples of responses include:
•  “NGOs help when the government is not able to help,”
• “The development of the third section is essential. The 
third section is an important factor for the development 
and democratisation, and for building a civic society as 
they [NGOs] are more closer to the common people and 
know their needs,” and
•  “They help people who are not protected and the 
government in resolving problems of social importance.”
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Does the new Kyrgyz, State have an ethnicity?
4% Didn’t understand 
16% No 
16% Yes etc.
The extra responses included:
• “There are more than 80 ethnic groups in Kyrgyzstan,”
• “Yes, it is a sum total of factors: historical traditions, 
language, state,”
• “Yes, independence and most of the population is 
Kyrgyz,”
• “Yes, but multicultural ”
64% Yes
I f  yes, what is State ethnic identity and why?
4% Provided irrelevant responses 
4% Didn’t understand
4% Responded that multi-ethnicity causes problems,
“Kyrgyzstan has a very mixed ethnic population that 
sometimes causes separatists attitudes and movements 
that has a threat to the state unity”
28% No response
60% Responded with a positive, assertive tone that Kyrgyzstan is 
multi-ethnic. Examples of such responses include:
• “Kyrgyzstan is an international state. There about 90 
ethnic groups and ethnic community organisations that 
protect their cultural traditions and customs” and
• “Kyrgyzstan is a multinational state: for example, we have 
Yakuts, Dungans, etc.”
Who is a citizen o f  Kyrgyzstan?
0% Provided the correct legal response
4% Responded closest to the real answer, responding, “those who
lived in Kyrgyzstan no less than 3 years and are willing to 
accept a Kyrgyz citizenship.”
20% Responded with either “bom” and/or “lives” in Kyrgyzstan
40% Responded with answers that defined citizenship as legally
granted by the state, i.e., “who has a passport” or “who has 
citizenship.”
36% Provided subjective responses such as:
• “has passport and feel patriotic,”
• “everybody who identifies themselves with Kyrgyzstan's 
culture, traditions and political system,” or
• “who was bom in Kyrgyzstan, have citizenship, and who 
loves Kyrgyzstan.”
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How are these citizens represented?
0% Responded as predicted. This was meant to determine
political representation; however all respondents repeated 
answers relating to legal or other means of determining if one 
was or was not a citizen.
4% Didn’t understand 
20% No response
Does your organisation help to create a better understanding o f  what it means to be a 
Kyrgyz citizen?
80% Reported, Yes their organisation did promote an
understanding of citizenship. This is concerning considering 
that 0% know what actually constitutes citizenship.
20% Responded, No
I f  so how?
8% Responded with economic or business related answers
12% Responded with unity, community or collective action related
answers
12% Responded with human rights related answers
24% Responded with civic/political or environmental
education/training answers 
44 % No response
Is this different than how the Government promotes Kyrgyz citizenship?
8% Yes-maybe, slightly or sometimes
16% No
24% Yes
52% No response
I f  yes, why and how?
4% Responded with pro-government responses 
8% Provided anti-government responses, such as:
• “Government works according to the program designed 
for a long period o f time, and we work on the programs 
designed for a more shorter period of time. I think we 
work on the basis of partnership, but the government 
works from the position of power” and
• “Our government helps people only by word of mouth in 
reality it [the Government] suppresses any display of civil 
activity.”
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16% Responded with irrelevant answers 
72% No response
I f  no, why and how?
96% No response. It is determined that the respondents,
accounting for the 96% no response rate saw this follow-up as 
excessive and redundant.
Is Kyrgyzstan a democracy?
8% No response
32% Responded that Kyrgyzstan might be a democracy or is at the 
beginning of democracy. Examples of responses include: 
“Partly,” “Yes, according to the Constitution,” and “First 
steps of democracy”
24% Responded, No. Examples of No responses include, “No, rich 
people have the power”
36% Responded, Yes
Why or why not?
12% Responded with irrelevant answers, i.e. “to have a developed
society”
12% Responded that Kyrgyzstan is a democracy due to a
progressive elements. Examples include:
• “Many political parties, NGOs, variety of education, travel 
abroad, open borders, study of different languages and 
cultures” and
• “We can express our opinion more freely, present and 
push our ideas, independently resolve our own problems, 
and independently make decisions on our meetings.”
24% Responded that Kyrgyzstan in not a democracy due to
repressive government. Examples include:
• “Everything is just for a show,”
• “Government doesn’t consider and listen to the opinion of 
its common citizens,”
• “I can't see a full democratisation of Kyrgyzstan. 
Democratisation is a long process, but there are a lot of 
women organisations that became active and who 
promotes the progress of democracy in Kyrgyzstan,”
• “High level officials are corrupt, and human rights are 
often violated in our country. And women still under the 
influence of prejudice,” and
• “There are no democratic traditions, citizens are passive, 
and the government has a wrong policy.”
52% No response
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44% Yes 
56% No response
Why or why not?
8% Responded with answers related to financial growth
4% Responded with answers related to international reasons, i.e.,
“Because the world community, development requires it” 
20% Responded with reasons that related to principles of
democracy. Examples include, “There is no progress without 
real democracy built on the basis of law.”
68% No response
What would make Kyrgyzstan a democracy?
4% Provided irrelevant responses
8% Responded with a mix of government and citizen action.
Examples include:
• “Self-consciousness and activity o f Kyrgyz citizens, and a 
replacement of the government leaders” and
• “So far, only our elite has declared the democracy. It is 
necessary that common people got imbued with this idea”
12% Responded with answers related to citizen action/education
12% Responded with answers related to government action.
Examples include: “Order, law observance, law improvement, 
financial stability o f citizens, and justice of the government.” 
64% No response
I f  Kyrgyzstan is not a democracy what is Kyrgyzstan?
12% Responded that Kyrgyzstan is in the “process” of 
democratisation or “on the way to a democracy.”
20% Responded directly that Kyrgyzstan is “totalitarian,”
“authoritarian,” “bureaucracy,” or “anarchy.” One respondent 
answered, “No Kyrgyzstan says it's democratic, but 
government's corruption stops the development of the 
democratisation. And our legal system is not perfect.”
68% No response
I f  Kyrgyzstan is a democracy who/what made/makes it a democracy?
4% Responded that the international community could bring 
democracy
I f  yes, why and how?
4% Responded that related to non-discrimination such as,
“Democratic development touches everybody no matter what 
their ethnic belongings.”
8% Responded with answers related to the responsibility to serve 
the people
8% Responded with answers related only to Kyrgyz ethnic people 
80% No response
I f  no, why not?
4% Responded ethnicity was not important because, “I belong to 
the primary nationality of Kyrgyzstan, I’m Kyrgyz.”
12% Responded that ethnicity is not important because there 
should be no discrimination 
84% No response
What do you think o f  the Government*s role in Kyrgyzstan?
4% Provided irrelevant answers
12% Responded that there was no government, there was only 
President Akaev such as, “In Kyrgyzstan, the government 
doesn't have any role, everything is in the President's power, 
and it (the government) expresses only his (President) will, it 
doesn't have any activities and therefore any work.”
12% Responded that government played a big role in Kyrgyzstan 
20% Responded with a positive response of governmental role 
24% No response
28% Provided a negative response o f governmental role
What is your knowledge and opinion o f  foreign assistance?
4% Responded with negative opinions of foreign assistance, such 
as “Thank you, but we should be able to leave without it and 
rely on ourselves”
8% No response
28% Provided positive opinions of foreign assistance; however 
noted that there were problems such as:
• “Kyrgyzstan receives a lot of foreign assistance which is 
very good. The only question is how we use it,”
• “Kyrgyzstan receives foreign aid, but in most situations it 
is not being used for the purposes it was given to,”
• “The foreign assistance for Kyrgyzstan is huge. Support 
goes to all spheres o f life, but assistance doesn't always 
finds its people — technical assistance and money stays in 
Bishkek,” and
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• “I'm aware of the amount of the foreign help, but don't 
know where it all goes, and a foreign aid makes 
Kyrgyzstan dependent.”
60% Provided positive opinions of foreign assistance
Why do you continue to direct this organisation?
16% No response
32% Responded they did this work because they “loved it” and/or
it provided self-fulfil and community respect. For example, “I 
love what I'm doing. I'm realising my dream — increase of the 
culture and education level of the nation.”
52% Responded with answers that indicated obligation to NGO or
to society. For example: “I feel obligated to help elderly poor 
Russian people.”
Where do you see yourself professionally in ten years?
4% Provided irrelevant answers 
12% Didn’t know 
40% No response
44% Responded that they would be in the NGO community, in a 
higher position of responsibility
Where m il your country he in ten years?
4% Didn’t know
4% Responded, “In Russia”
4% Responded, “In parliament”
12% Responded, “active citizen or protecting human rights”
72% No response. It appears that this question was misunderstood,
given the large no response rate and the response that were 
given were personal rather than country.
Is the objective o f  your organisation related to the changes in Kyrgyzstan since 
independence? I f  so, how?_____________________________________________
8% Didn’t know/understand 
28% No response
64% Responded, Yes. O f these, yes responses 56% provided 
answers related to human rights and/or democracy 
promotion/protection. Examples include:
• “There is been a totalitarian regime and colonial 
dependence, and that's why liberation, increasing of 
national identity and democratisation is necessary” and
• “Yes. Our organisation is dealing with Human Rights 
protection and in any country this is an important factor.”
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Do you think and/or want your organise
Ky>m■Man? *rK  ft
icratisation o f
4% Maybe
8% No response
88% Yes. Examples include:
• “Yes, if not the organisation then I myself,”
• “Yes. The existence of our NGO is already a democracy,” 
and
• “Yes, [NGOs] further the growth of people who believe in 
themselves.”
Why are there so few  women in Parliament and White House?
4% Responded that the lack was due to the “Muslim community” 
8% No response
20% Responded that the lack related to women’s behaviour, “No 
women solidarity, political passivity and our mentality”
12% Responded that the lack related to men’s behaviour. Example 
include:
• “Kyrgyz mentality and Kyrgyz men love power” and
• “Men don't want women in Parliament, they [men] do 
everything push them behind. If there were more women 
in Parliament and in the WH, many problems would be 
resolved much faster”
56% Responded that the lack related to male societal/government 
restrictions. Example include:
• “Because in our society people think that women are 
weak” and
• “We have problems with gender balance, these positions 
are needed for women, because our main problems are 
social problems and women are more closer to the social 
problems.”
Are these important positions? Why or why not?
0% No 
40% No response
64% Responded, Yes. Of these, yes responses 24% responded
these positions are important to recognise equality. Examples 
include:
• “Yes, they are important because they decide people’s 
fate,”
• “Yes. Positions in Parliament would help to increase the role o f 
women in the society, and to promote further education of women 
and increasing number of women in Parliament,” and
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• “Yes. Women are more attentive, stubborn, bring more comfort 
and poetic.”
Are there many woman leading NGOs? Why or Why not?
4%  Didn’t know
96% Responded, Yes. Of these responses . 21% Responded that
NGO work was the only way to take part in decision making.
50% responded yes because women could do the job better
than men. Examples include:
• “Yes, because this is the only way for women to manifest 
themselves,”
• “Yes, it's a way for them [women] to realise their huge 
potential, and to show that they also can lead and meet 
their goals,”
• “Yes, because women always get the most difficult tasks 
to deal with,”
• “Yes, because its available and its not paid,”
• “Yes, because they [women] better see and realise 
problems in the society and try to resolve them ASAP. 
Women are more purposeful and diligent” and
• “Yes, because they do not drink.”
Do men fee l free to act in politics? I f  so, why and how they act or not on this space?
4% No response 
8% Sometimes
84% Responded, Yes. Of these 45% Responded this was because 
men were self-interested. Examples include:
• “Yes, mainly they act in their own interests,”
• “Yes. Sometimes legitimately, sometimes not,” and
• “Yes. They act in their own interests.”
Do women fe e l free  to act in politics? I f  so, why and how do they act or not on this 
space?___________________________________________________________________
8% Responded, Yes 
12% No response 
40% Responded, No
40% Somewhat, “a few,” or “would like to.” For example, “Yes, 
but not many of them. The time came when women realised 
that government needs their help”
Is Gender involved in concepts o f  Kyrgyz citizenship? Why or Why not? A nd how?
This question no and yes was understand both ways, i.e., no, because 
there is discrimination and yes because there is discrimination
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4% Responded “President Akaev”
16% No response
24% Responded, No. 55% of which Responded this was because 
women were not equal. For example:
• “No, according to the law we have equal rights. But our 
society has its own unwritten rules” and
• “No, there are no equal rights.”
28% Didn’t know. For example, “Don't know, perhaps not, 
because they [politicians] don't have interest in gender 
balance.”
28% Responded, Yes. For example, “Yes, according to law, but 
not in reality.”
What is the most important factor for peace, stability, and economic growth in Central 
Asia?
4% Responded, “Liquidation of corruption and illiteracy, and 
improving the legal system.”
16% No response
16% Responded related to the economy, “Political stability and 
economic growth -- GDP on the level o f 8-10% per year”
20% Responded with answers relating to democracy. Examples 
include:
Examples include:
• “The development of democracy, but the true democracy, 
not imaginary one,”
• “To build a democracy in Kyrgyzstan, and active 
involvement o f women in the democratisation process,” 
and
• “Democratic development and maintenance of human 
rights.”
44% Responded with answers related to stability, security, and 
ethnic peace/tolerance. Examples include,
• “It's essential to know the ethnic differences of every 
nation, pay more attention to the youth — how/where we 
want to see them” and
• “Economic, military and political partnership with NATO, 
etc., smart use of foreign aid and the end of the religious 
expansion.”
Data Results for Survey Set One (D.l): Local 
Oblast/Government Leaders 
(Akims) of Kyrgyzstan
100% Male
43
25% Lived, before becoming akim in the oblast he was now directing.
75% Where from Bishkek or other oblasts.
25% No response
75% Responded that NGOs were necessary/important for society.
Examples include:
• “We need them for our society... they do the difficult
work. Why bother them?”
• “Yes because they help our society so much. In short, we
need NGOs. For example one NGO helped children,
schools and teachers.”
%100 Responded, Yes. O f the yes response one claimed, “it is
multi-ethnic,” another “we have land which we allow everyone
to live on.”
25% Responded that the state is Kyrgyz based.
25% Responded that the state was “one home for all citizens, like
Akaev says”
50% Responded that the state is Turkish based.
25% Responded, those with passports 
75% Responded, all who live here
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How are these citizens represented?
25% Responded, “by their rights”
25% Responded, “everyone should be peaceful” 
25% Responded, by quantity o f ethnic groups 
25% No response
Does your government position help to create a better understanding o f  what it means 
to be a Kyrgyz citizen?_______________________________________________________
25% Responded, No
25% No response
25% Responded, “My position doesn’t matter. I would help no 
matter what”
25% Responded, “Yes, it helps. How it helps is a difficult
question. But it is several sides of a question. 1) Economic 
and social-political problems. I solve 2) social dependants and 
3) street fighting-security and military. Akims, this office, 
should be working on these three important questions.
Security questions are a big concern. There is a problem of 
criminals on the street because it [the country and Chui] is a 
crossroads for many people... Chechnya, Uzbeks, Uigher--we 
have problems with the Diaspora.”
Is this different than how NGOs promote Kyrgyz citizenship?
25% No response
75% Responded, no difference. Examples include:
• “We are all citizens o f Kyrgyzstan and should have the 
same views”
• “The akim helps the NGOs and NGOs help the akim with 
his work”
Is Kyrgyzstan a democracy?
25% Responded, “Democracy is not something to bring on a plate” 
75% Responded, Yes. One example, “We are an island of 
democracy. We are a big island.”
Why or why not?
25% Responded, “Because half of the media is opposition and we 
have free elections.”
25% Responded, “We have freedom, pluralism o f ideas and an 
opportunity to progress.”
25% Responded, “Because our President is a democratic people 
now have democratic views.”
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25% Responded, “We have a government and laws and
departments and how people take these laws that makes a 
democracy. We have all conditions for a democracy here... 
we have a great deal of democracy.”
Should it be?
50% No response
50% Responded, Yes. One response included, “Yes. It is an
optional system. ... simple, people have another option but [I] 
think it is the best... people make this system.
Are NGOs part o f  democracy?
25% No response
75% Responded, Yes. Of these responses one added, “Of course. 
NGOs give a balance to society. The main goal of a 
democratic society is to make a balance and to have some 
conditions to give people opportunities to give the best of 
their abilities. NGOs are pushing people to do better and 
helping government by pushing government to do better.”
I f  you have an ethnic identity what is it?
100% Kyrgyz
Is your ethnicity relevant to your work?
25% No response
25% Responded, Yes. “It is very important to my work... I have a 
responsibility for all Kyrygz.”
50% Responded, No, ethnicity is “not relevant” or “does not 
matter.”
What do you think o f  the Government’s role in Kyrgyzstan?
25% No response
25% Responded, “We can do all”
25% Responded, “A great role. All countries must have a 
government”
25% Responded, “It doesn’t play the role it should”
What is your knowledge and opinion o f  foreign assistance?
25% No response
25% Responded, “We have some problems. I worked in the White 
House and know the situation well. The role of foreign aid,
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such as EBRD, Islamic Bank, etc. it is good that they help us. 
The social sphere is a very important role to Kyrgyzstan. 
UNDP is very important. They help schools, hospitals, etc. 
Germany and Switzerland helps—France, the Netherlands, 
TACIS, Danish, ADB. .. we are grateful to foreign aid to our 
President Akaev for getting all the aid.”
25% Responded, “Because our President is an international
politician. We are grateful to our smart President for brining 
us so much aid.”
25% Responded, “I have two opinions on this question. First, we 
need foreign aid but second it makes us lazy, it makes us 
parasites.”
Where do you see yourself professionally in ten years?
25% Responded, “This depends on God.”
25% Responded, “I will be serving the people.” 
25% Responded, “President of Kyrgyzstan.” 
25% Responded, “I never thought about it.”
Where do you see the position o f  akim in ten years?
25% Responded, “Elected.”
25% Responded, “More independent more working for the regions. 
The Polish system is
very good we should be like the Polish system... more power 
more money... we can fix our problems ourselves.”
25% Responded, “More developed, good structure.”
25% Responded, “By elections... small changes... better education 
and better trained people.”
Where will your country he in ten years?
25% No response
25% Responded, “New President. Government should be better- 
economy and democracy better.”
25% Responded, “It will be the most developed country because 
we have excellent reforms and we will be the most reformed 
country!”
25% Responded, “Kyrgyzstan in ten years we have very interesting 
time... mentality... We have a quiet mentality... nationalism is 
more and more in Central Asia, even we [Kyrgyz] are doing it 
[nationalism] ourselves.”
Is the objective o f  your office related to the changes in Kyrgyzstan since 
independence? I f  so, how?_______________________________________
25% No response
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25% Responded, Yes
25% Responded, “There is a big different. Moscow gave all
before. Akims were controlled. Now we have only ourselves. 
[Akims] should follow and enforce the laws of Kyrgyzstan.” 
25% Responded, “I work long hours and dream about work. The
Akim is the assistant to the President and his duty is to control 
people. There is a direct connection [between democracy and 
the position of akims] We are no afraid of elections..
Why are there so f&v women in Parliament and White House?
25% Responded, “Islam, but why should they be in these 
positions?”
25% Responded, “Women are not very active.”
25% Responded, “Because they do not run for office. You can say 
there are few... [because] Kyrgyz [women] should stay at 
home and look after children.”
25% Responded, “There are many. I don’t think the number is 
small.”
Are these important positions? Why or why not?
50% No response
50% Responded, Yes. “makes laws and controls laws,” and “in the 
USA the White House is not important, here it is the 
command of the country .”
Are there many women leading NGOs? Why or Why not?
25% No response
75% Responded, Yes. Explanations include:
• “Women and children NGOs are more active,”
• “All NGOs are led by women.. Kyrgyz women are very 
strong and I am glad they run the NGOs”
• “Because they want power and they want to be involved in 
policy”
Do men feel free  to act in politics? I f  so, why and how they act or not on this space?
50% No response
50% Responded, Yes. Explanations included: “According to our 
law everyone can get involved” and “we are all political 
people-men.”
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Do women fe e l free  to act in politics? I f  so, why and how do they act or not on this 
•>
SI) (ICC •
50% No response
50% Responded, No. Explanations included, “Women will become 
more active in politics” and “Less than men.”
Is Gender involved in concepts o f  Kyrgyz citizenship? Why or Why not? And how?
25% No response
75% Responded, Yes. Explanations included:
• “Male”
• “Men better understand the concepts of citizenship 
because they feel a responsibility for their family and the 
republic.”
• “We are all the same. Our biggest problem is that the laws 
are the same on paper but in life they are
different.. women are scared.”
What is the most important factor fo r  peace, stability, and economic growth in Central 
Asia?
25% Responded, “Roots”
25% Responded, “People getting along better between nations—a 
better life, economy, work. The Fergana Valley is very 
important—farmers, youth problems...”
25% Responded, “Is we have peace we can have growth in ten 
years we will be a superpower again!”
25% Responded, “Harmony and tolerance between people.”
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Data Results for Survey Set Two (A.2-D.2): USAID Officials 
and USAID Partners 
in Washington/ Kyrgyzstan
Position
Resident Representative (Entire country-based in Bishkek) 
Southern Regional Manager (Osh-Jalal-Abad)
%100 Male
Average Age
33 and 38
Are NGOs beneficial for Kyrgyzstan?
• “Yes”
• “Yes. NGO’s have the ability to meet the needs of the people in a 
more direct and personal way, if they work in an open and 
democratic way.”
Does the new Kyrgyz State have an ethnicity ?
•  “Yes”
• “No, everyone here is identified by their nationality. They are 
separate and distinct ”
I f  yes, what is State ethnic identity and why?
•  “Primarily Kyrgyz, by virtue of numbers and state dominance of 
Kyrgyzstan ”
• “No response”
Who is a citizen o f  Kyrgyzstan?
•  “Anyone bom in Kyrgyzstan or naturalised.”
• “People who have a Kyrgyz passport.”
333
How are these citizens represented?
• “By deputies in Parliament, in local councils, and through the 
elected president and his administration ”
• “There is the local village council, then rayon administration, then 
Oblast administration, then Deputies at the national level.”
Do USAID democracy programs help to create a better understanding o f  what it means 
to be a Kyrgyz citizen?
• “Yes. By providing models and experience from other democratic 
countries where ethnicity is not the main source of national identity and, in 
our case, helping those concepts become internalised and home-grown 
through direct apprenticeship.”
• “No”
Is this different than how NGOs promotes Kyrgyz citizenship?
• “Somewhat. NGOs promote the idea that citizens can change their 
circumstances and future.”
• “No response”
Is Kyrgyzstan a democracy?
•  “Yes, but not a perfect one.”
• “No”
Why or why not?
• “Generally free elections are held, many officials are elected.”
• “It is controlled by a bunch of corrupt officials who were 
communist under the former Soviet Union. Decisions are made 
in secret.”
Should it be?
• “Yes”
• “It has great potential (much better than the other 'Stans).”
Why or why not?
•  “People’s will should be respected.”
•  “I suppose there must be many years of training and maybe when 
the soviet generation passes on, the children of democracy will 
make change.”
334
What would make Kyrgyzstan a democracy?
• “More freedom of expression, assembly, and association would 
make it more of a democracy. So would more elections of local 
officials. So would more frequent elections for state positions, 
rather than only once every five years.”
• “Openness, Less nepotism, Less corruption.”
I f  Kyrgyzstan is not a democracy what is Kyrgyzstan?
• “It is a proto-democracy, a gestating democracy.”
• “Kyrgyzstan is a little Russia. A few people in control, massive 
corruption, I think Kyrgyzstan is a mess.”
I f  Kyrgyzstan is a democracy who/what made/makes it a democracy?
• “In relative terms, however, surrounded as it is by non­
democracies, it looks pretty good.”
• “No response.”
Why do you do in your position?
• “I work with Parliament and political parties to help build them as 
democratic institutions.”
• “I work with NGO’s, local government structures and people to 
try to improve food sustainability, drinking water, infrastructure 
and people’s abilities to help themselves.”
Are NGOs part o f  democracy?
• “Definitely”
• “No”
Is ethnicity relevant to USAID democracy assistance?
• “No. We would like to see an identity based more of shared 
values and principles than shared ethnicity.”
• “Don’t know”
What do you think o f  the Government's role in Kyrgyzstan?
• “The Kyrgyz government doesn’t necessarily like or trust the 
Kyrgyz people.”
•  “It is blocking the development due to high taxes and corruption. 
If those two things could be changed it would do a great deal to 
help Kyrgyzstan.”
335
What is your knowledge and opinion o f foreign assistance?
• “Will this be quoted anywhere? Generally, with notable 
exceptions, I find it overblown, overpaid, lazy, arrogant, and 
basically ineffective.”
• “It depends. If you are talking about grants or credits. I think 
there are too many credits given to Kyrgyzstan. The grants are 
not managed as well as they could be. My opinion is a lot of 
money has been dumped here with little supervision and capacity 
building. If there was a partnership rather than sponsorship 
mentality established here in the beginning Kyrgyzstan would be 
much farther along.”
How long have you been in this position?
•  20 months
• 1.5 years
What are the traditions, values, symbols, stories o f  Kyrgyz ethnicity?
•  “The Manas epic, of course. Also, a kind of adaptable, tolerant, 
agrarian Islam.”
• “Do you mean Kyrgyz as in the people or Kyrgyz as in the 
citizen? If citizen, they are varied amongst the many groups here 
(the big 3 Kyrgyz, Uzbek and Russian) and by region (north -  
south) and by oblast.”
Why does the US promote democracy in Kyrgyzstan?
•  “Strategically, I suppose, to prevent radical Islam from achieving 
regional strength. Otherwise, out o f the goodness of our hearts, 
because we do believe democracy will lead to better lives for 
people — and there’s truly not much other U.S. interest here.”
•  “So it doesn’t return to communism.”
Where do you see Kyrgyzstan in ten years?
•  “Either fractured between the surrounding states, or with its own 
non-ethnic political identity based on democratic principles.”
• “My dream is to see a country that is moving towards a better 
economic situation. To have 30% poverty and less 
unemployment. To have a government that is by the people, for 
the people and with the people. But that is a dream. I fear that it 
will be business as usual.”
336
What is the object o f US democracy assistance in Kyrgyzstan?
• “To help promote stability in the region, and combat the 
alternative of communism or radical Islam.”
•  “It feels like USAID does not want Kyrgyzstan to revert to 
communism.”
Do concepts o f  ethnicity differ between male ami female Kyrgyz?
• “Yes. Women are less concerned with it.”
• “I don’t think so.”
Arc US democracy funds contributing to the democratisation o f  Kyrgyzstan?
•  “Helping create indigenous democrats.”
• “Yes and No. When the money is used correctly, then people understand 
that in a democratic society there are checks and balances. No, because 
there was corruption during the soviet times. So life goes on as usual in 
that respect but the amounts of money is much greater.”
Why are there so fe w  women in Parliament and White House?
•  “Cultural impediments to powerful women. Islam, nomadic 
traditions.”
• “The mentality of women are inferior to men.”
Are these important positions? Why or why not?
• “Yes. Influence future lives.”
• “Yes. I think women in Kyrgyzstan are more responsible and trustworthy 
then men. (or is that true about the rest of the world as well?) They care 
more about families and the people. And they are very aware of how to 
run a household on a small budget.”
Are there many women leading NGOs? Why or Wlty not?
•  “Yes. Almost all. Women are more powerful than men individually in this 
country, and perhaps less prone to internal division when trying to achieve 
a goal. They are not nearly as lazy, or as afflicted with alcoholic and other 
addictions as the men.”
• “Yes. The international community has targeted women for 
training.”
Do men feel free  to act in politics? I f  so, why and how they act or not on this space?
• “Yes. Changes in laws, upcoming elections. With, o f course, 
many thousands of exceptions, the men are unfortunately
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fundamentally and overwhelmingly lazy, so many opportunities 
will be missed. With, of course, many thousands of exceptions, 
the men are unfortunately fundamentally and overwhelmingly 
lazy, so many opportunities will be missed.”
• “No, I think that most don't care. It would be interesting to see 
how many people who are in power now, were in power before.”
Do women fe e l free  to act in politics? I f  so, why and how do they act or not on this 
space?__________________________________________________________________
• “Yes. Changes in laws, upcoming elections. They will achieve 
more, relatively, than men, as they are generally more focused 
and more industrious.”
• “Women are submissive and it is the culture for them to be in the 
background. The majority accepts this role. The few that don't, 
are quite literally, outcasts.”
Is Gender involved in concepts o f  Kyrgyz citizenship? Why or Why not? A nd how?
• “Probably. I have found myself that Russian and Kyrgyz and Uzbek and 
other women are more often friends with each other than their male 
counterparts, and that the women are more apt to work together for a goal 
without regard to their ethnicity.”
• “Yes. Women are made to feel as second class citizens with very 
little say in what is going on. Culturally and traditionally this is 
the way life is.”
What is the most important factor fo r  peace, stability, and economic growth in Central 
Asia?
• “It is a race, in my view, between the impulses towards fracture 
and balkanisation along ethnic lines, and a growing consciousness 
which we should encourage of Kyrgyz citizenship which is based 
on shared values and goals, and less on the ethnicity of the 
citizens. A melting pot, or at least a rich stew, rather than 
ingredients stored separately on the shelf.”
• “I think economics is the number one issue. People need to know that they 
will be able to eat, cloth their children and have a roof over their heads. 
Secondly, there needs to be respect and understanding of other cultures, 
religions and traditions. There is a long history of problems in this region 
due to these factors. It is not something new at all but friction that has 
simmered over a long time.”
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Data Frequency Tables
Frequency Table One 
Results from Survey Set A.1 
(First Grouping of Categories Used 
for Crosstab 1 and Level One Results)
Demographics
EDUCLEV1
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid No Response, Non« 2 .5 .5 .5
Secondary 168 43.8 43.8 44.3
University, Specilise 214 55.7 55.7 100.0
Total 384 100.0 100.0
MARSTAT1
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid Divorced 20 5.2 5.2 5.2
Married 251 65.4 65.4 70.6
Single 108 28.1 28.1 98.7
Widowed 5 1.3 1.3 100.0
Total 384 100.0 100.0
SPOUSEG1
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid Mixed 2 .5 .5 .5
Don't Know, None, No 
Response 111 28.9 28.9 29.4
Kyrgyz 140 36.5 36.5 65.9
Russian/Slavic, 
Non-Asian, German.. 41 10.7 10.7 76.6
Tribal 8 2.1 2.1 78.6
Other, Korean, Jewish.. 82 21.4 21.4 100.0
Total 384 100.0 100.0
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DOMONEY1
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Professional 48 12.5 13.0 13.0
Bazar Worker, Driver 99 25.8 26.8 39.8
Alternative Economy,
Trade, Business, Private 65 16.9 17.6 57.5
Firm
Factory, Cafe, cashier 23 6.0 6.2 63.7
Farmer, Shepherd 9 2.3 2.4 66.1
Unemployed, Pensioner, 
housewife, student 71 18.5 19.2 85.4
Government 54 14.1 14.6 100.0
Total 369 96.1 100.0
Missing System 15 3.9
Total 384 100.0
Primary Identity
WH0AREG1
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid Citizen 20 5.2 5.6 5.6
Profession /Work 62 16.1 17.3 22.9
Gender 65 16.9 18.2 41.1
Name 92 24.0 25.7 66.8
Ethnicity or Region 31 8.1 8.7 75.4
Positive Adjectives 1 .3 .3 75.7
Negative Adjectives 5 1.3 1.4 77.1
Other, None, Don’t know,
No response, Person 82 21.4 22.9 100.0
Total 358 93.2 100.0
Missing System 26 6.8
Total 384 100.0
SELFDES1
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid Human, Person, Being 66 17.2 17.2 17.2
Ethnic 21 5.5 5.5 22.7
Gender 65 16.9 16.9 39.6
Positive Adjectives 177 46.1 46.1 85.7
Negative Adjectives 21 5.5 5.5 91.1
Profession 26 6.8 6.8 97.9
Don't Know, No response 8 2.1 2.1 100.0
Total 384 100.0 100.0
340
Ethnic Origin and Teaching fo r Self and Children
CHILDTA1
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid School, Books, 
history, teacher,... 43 11.2 11.9 11.9
Father, Grandfather, 
male generations 82 21.4 22.7 34.5
Mother, Grandmother 44 11.5 12.2 46.7
Parents 56 14.6 15.5 62.2
Grandparents 15 3.9 4.1 66.3
Community, relatives, 
neighbours, family.. 6 1.6 1.7 68.0
No Response, Don't 
know, No one, Other 116 30.2 32.0 100.0
Total 362 94.3 100.0
Missing System 22 5.7
Total 384 100.0
ETHCHIL1
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Mixed 5 1.3 1.3 1.3
Don't know, None, No 
Response 107 27.9 27.9 29.2
Kyrgyz 139 36.2 36.3 65.5
Russian / Slavic, 
Non-Asian... 37 9.6 9.7 75.2
Tribal 13 3.4 3.4 78.6
Other, Korean, Jewish 82 21.4 21.4 100.0
Total 383 99.7 100.0
Missing System 1 .3
Total 384 100.0
CHILDDE1
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Blood, Genes, Land 15 3.9 3.9 3.9
Father, Grandfather, 85 22.1 22.1 26.0Male Generations
Mother, Grandmother 12 3.1 3.1 29.2
Parents 80 20.8 20.8 50.0
Passport, School,
Language, Mosque, 17 4.4 4.4 54.4
Family Name, State
Parents & Passport, 
School, Language,.. 19 4.9 4.9 59.4
Don't Know, None, 156 40.6 40.6 100.0No response
Total 384 100.0 100.0
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HKN0WET1
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Blood,Genes, Land 37 9.6 9.7 9.7
Father, Grandfather, 117 30.5 30.5 40.2Male Generations
Mother, Grandmother 16 4.2 4.2 44.4
Parents 144 37.5 37.6 82.0
Passport, School,
language, Mosque, 25 6.5 6.5 88.5
Family, Name, State
Parents & Passport, 
School, Language,.. 21 5.5 5.5 94.0
Don't know, None, No 23 6.0 6.0 100.0Response
Total 383 99.7 100.0
Missing System 1 .3
Total 384 100.0
WH0TAUG1
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid School, Books, 
history, teacher, 96 25.0 35.6 35.6
literature,including 
Fatjer. grandfather, 
male generations, 53 13.8 19.6 55.2
Askal court, Army 
Mother, Grandmother 37 9.6 13.7 68.9
Parents 31 8.1 11.5 80.4
Grandparents 14 3.6 5.2 85.6
Community, relatives, 
neighbours, family, 13 3.4 4.8 90.4
television, radio 
No Response, Don't 
know, None, No One, 26 6.8 9.6 100.0
Missing
Total
Other
Total
System
270
114
384
70.3
29.7
100.0
100.0
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Ethnicity o f Self & Other: Qualities and Descriptions
ETHQUAG1
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Don’t Know / None/Lost 40 10.4 10.5 10.5
Quality of "their" women 3 .8 .8 11.3
Negative Adjectives 43 11.2 11.3 22.5
Not Adjectives / 
Defined by things 27 7.0 7.1 29.6
Positive Adjectives 248 64.6 64.9 94.5
Profession / Work 4 1.0 1.0 95.5
Religion 3 .8 .8 96.3
Tribal / Ethnic 14 3.6 3.7 100.0
Total 382 99.5 100.0
Missing System 2 .5
Total 384 100.0
ETHSYMG1
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Don't Know/Don't Have / 157 40.9 41.0 41.0Many
Family Celeb 74 19.3 19.3 60.3
Religion (ind religious 
holidays) 28 7.3 7.3 67.6
Dress, Customs,
Jewellery, 18 4.7 4.7 72.3
appeareance.food
Phenotypic appearance 1 .3 .3 72.6
Literature, Songs, 
Dance, Stories, Folk 33 8.6 8.6 81.2
National Games 25 6.5 6.5 87.7
Negative Adjectives 
including drinking 13 3.4 3.4 91.1
Positive Adjectives 31 8.1 8.1 99.2
Land-Mountain-Country-
Livestock 3 .8 .8 100.0
Total 383 99.7 100.0
Missing System 1 .3
Totaf 384 100.0
343
Y0URETH1
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Mixed 8 2.1 2.1 2.1
Don't Know, None, No 
Response 25 6.5 6.6 8.7
Kyrgyz 172 44.8 45.1 53.8
Russian/ Slavic, 
Non-Asian, German,.. 65 16.9 17.1 70.9
Tribal 14 3.6 3.7 74.5
Other, Korean, 
Jewish, Chinese 97 25.3 25.5 100.0
Total 381 99.2 100.0
Missing System 3 .8
Total 384 100.0
ETHNICM1
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid No Response, Don't 
Know 134 34.9 34.9 34.9
Depends on 111 28.9 28.9 63.8Person/education, Same
Yes, difference and
ethnicity is more 14 3.6 3.6 67.4
important for women
Yes, difference and
ethnicity is more 119 31.0 31.0 98.4
important for men
No difference (my
ethnicity/region) but 6 1.6 1.6 100.0
others are unequal..
Total 384 100.0 100.0
MANETHN1
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Man 269 70.1 70.4 70.4
Ethnic 100 26.0 26.2 96.6
No response, don't 
know, other 6 1.6 1.6 98.2
Depends on person 3 .8 .8 99.0
Man & Ethnic-Cannot 
Separate 4 1.0 1.0 100.0
Total 382 99.5 100.0
Missing System 2 .5
Total 384 100.0
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W0M0REG1
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid Woman 300 78.1 78.1 78.1
Ethnic 71 18.5 18.5 96.6
No Response, 
Don’t Know, Other 10 2.6 2.6 99.2
Depends on person 3 .8 .8 100.0
Total 384 100.0 100.0
NATI0NA1
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Ves, I love people more, 
Kyrgyz are better... 56 14.6 14.6 14.6
No, because, mixed
blood, grew up with 
nations,..
317 82.6 82.6 97.1
No response, don't 
know, others 6 1.6 1.6 98.7
Sometimes, due to 
Batkan 5 1.3 1.3 100.0
Total 384 100.0 100.0
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Citizenship & Ethnicity of State
CITIZEN1
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Everyone, Anyone, Me, 
All People 103 26.8 27.0 27.0
Anyone who is born here 23 6.0 6.0 33.0
Anyone who lives here 130 33.9 34.0 67.0
Legal Definition 46 12.0 12.0 79.1
Ethnic Kyrgyz Related 37 9.6 9.7 88.7
Gender Related answer 3 .8 .8 89.5
Positive Adjectives 17 4.4 4.5 94.0
Negative Adjectives 2 .5 .5 94.5
Don't know, No response 17 4.4 4.5 99.0
Other 4 1.0 1.0 100.0
Total 382 99.5 100.0
Missing System 2 .5
Total 384 100.0
KYRGYNE1
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Before USSR, Negative... 15 3.9 4.0 4.0
No 35 9.1 9.3 13.2
Yes, constitution, flag, 
land... 7 1.8 1.9 15.1
Yes, Kyrgyz blood,.. 113 29.4 29.9 45.0
Yes, Democratic, Free, 
Independent.. 19 4.9 5.0 50.0
Don't Know, No 
response, Maybe.. 189 49.2 50.0 100.0
Total 378 98.4 100.0
Missing System 6 1.6
Total 384 100.0
Active in Politics/Community/Nationalism
ACTPOLI1
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid No, Not Interested,.. 281 73.2 73.2 73.2
Yes, Votes, reads 68 17.7 17.7 90.9papers,...
Interested, Sometimes, 
Used to be 29 7.6 7.6 98.4
No Response, Other 6 1.6 1.6 100.0
Total 384 100.0 100.0
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ACTC0MM1
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid No, Not Interested 273 71.1 71.3 71.3
Yes, Party Member, 
NGO worker,... 77 20.1 20.1 91.4
Interested, Sometimes, 
Used to be 7 1.8 1.8 93.2
No Response 26 6.8 6.8 100.0
Total 383 99.7 100.0
M/ss/ng System 1 .3
Total 384 100.0
Life Conditions under Independence Versus the USSR
BETTERU1
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Better under USSR, 
jobs, money, education. 
Better under USSR,
198 51.6 52.4 52.4
independence, freedom 99 25.8 26.2 78.6
democracy
Better now we can be 
kyrgyz, muslims, ..etc 32 8.3 8.5 87.0
No Difference, Same 17 4.4 4.5 91.5
No response, Donl 
know, Other 32 8.3 8.5 100.0
Total 378 98.4 100.0
Missing System 6 1.6
Total 384 100.0
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Frequency Table Two
Results from Survey Set A.1 
(Second Grouping of Categories Used for Crosstab2 and Level 
Two Results)
Demographics
EDUCLEV2
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid Secondary 168 43.8 44.0 44.0
University, Specilised 214 55.7 56.0 100.0
Total 382 99.5 100.0
Missing System 2 .5
Total 384 100.0
MARSTAT2
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Single, Divorced, 
Widowed 133 34.6 34.6 34.6
Married 251 65.4 65.4 100.0
Total 384 100.0 100.0
SPOUSEG2
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Dont Know, None, No 
Response 111 28.9 28.9 28.9
Kyrgyz, Tribal 148 38.5 38.5 67.4
Russian, Slavic, 
Non-Asian, German... 41 10.7 10.7 78.1
Other 84 21.9 21.9 100.0
Total 384 100.0 100.0
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D0M0NEY2
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Professional 48 12.5 12.5 12.5
Bazar Worker, Driver 99 25.8 25.8 38.3
Alternative Economy, 
Trade, Business 65 16.9 16.9 55.2
Factory, Cafe, Cashier, 
Farmer, Shepherd 32 8.3 8.3 63.5
Unemployed,
Pensioner, housewife, 86 22.4 22.4 85.9
student, Missing
Government 54 14.1 14.1 100.0
Total 384 100.0 100.0
Primary Identity
WH0AREG2
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Citizen, Positive 
Adj, Negative Adj 26 6.8 6.8 6.8
Profession / Work 62 16.1 16.1 22.9
Gender 65 16.9 16.9 39.8
Name 92 24.0 24.0 63.8
Ethnicity or Religion 31 8.1 8.1 71.9
No respone, 
Person, Missing 108 28.1 28.1 100.0
Total 384 100.0 100.0
SELFDES2
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid Human, Person, Being 66 17.2 17.6 17.6
Ethnic 21 5.5 5.6 23.1
Gender 65 16.9 17.3 40.4
Positive Adjectives 177 46.1 47.1 87.5
Negative Adjectives 21 5.5 5.6 93.1
Profession 26 6.8 6.9 100.0
Total 376 97.9 100.0
Missing Don't Know, No response 8 2.1
Total 384 100.0
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Ethnic Origin and Teaching for Self and Children
ETHCHIL2
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid Don’t Know, None, No 
Response, Missing 108 28.1 28.1 28.1
Kyrgyze, Tribal 152 39.6 39.6 67.7
Russian, Slavic, 
Non-Asian,.. 37 9.6 9.6 77.3
Other 87 22.7 22.7 100.0
Total 384 100.0 100.0
CHILDDE2
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Blood Geners, Father, 
Grandfather... 85 22.1 23.0 23.0
Mother, Grandmother 12 3.1 3.3 26.3
Parents 80 20.8 21.7 48.0
Passport, School,
Language, Mosque, 36 9.4 9.8 57.7
Parents,...
Don't Know, None, No 156 40.6 42.3 100.0response
Total 369 96.1 100.0
Missing System 15 3.9
Total 384 100.0
CHILDTA2
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid School, Books,
history, teacher,... 43 11.2 11.2 11.2
Father, Grandfather, 
Community, relatives 88 22.9 22.9 34.1
Mother, Grandmother 44 11.5 11.5 45.6
Parents 56 14.6 14.6 60.2
Grandparents 15 3.9 3.9 64.1
No Response, Don't 
Know, Other, Missing 138 35.9 35.9 100.0
Total 384 100.0 100.0
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Y0URETH2
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Kyrgyz 172 44.8 44.8 44.8
Russian / Slavic, 
Non-Asian, German,.. 65 16.9 16.9 61.7
Other 147 38.3 38.3 100.0
Total 384 100.0 100.0
HKN0WET2
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Blood, Genes, Land, 
Father, Grandfather 154 40.1 40.1 40.1
Mother, Grandmother 16 4.2 4.2 44.3
Parents 144 37.5 37.5 81.8
Passport, School,
Language, Mosque, 46 12.0 12.0 93.8
Parents Passport
Don't Know, none, no 24 6.3 6.3 100.0reponse, missing
Total 384 100.0 100.0
WH0AUG2
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid School, Books,
History, Teacher... 96 25.0 25.0 25.0
Father, Grandfather, 
Community, Relatives 110 28.6 . 28.6 53.6
Mother, Grandmother 37 9.6 9.6 63.3
Parents 101 26.3 26.3 89.6
Grandparents 14 3.6 3.6 93.2
6.00 26 6.8 6.8 100.0
Total 384 100.0 100.0
Ethnicity of Self & Other: Qualities and Descriptions
ETHQUAG2
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Don't Know / None ../ 42 10.9 10.9 10.9Missing
quality of women / 
not adjectives, 
profession, religion,..
51 13.3 13.3 24.2
Negative Adjectives 43 11.2 11.2 35.4
Positive Adjectives 248 64.6 64.6 100.0
Total 384 100.0 100.0
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ETHSYMG2
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid Don't Know/ Don't
Have / Missing / Many 158 41.1 41.1 41.1
Family Celeb / Religion 102 26.6 26.6 67.7
Positive Adjectives, 
Dress, Customs, 49 12.8 12.8 80.5
Jewellery,
Negative Adjectives / 
Phenotypic, 17 4.4 4.4 84.9
Land-Mountain.. 
Literature, Dance, 
Songs, Stories, Folk 58 15.1 15.1 100.0
Total 384 100.0 100.0
ETHNICM2
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid No Response, Don't 
Know 134 34.9 34.9 34.9
Depends on Person, 
No difference 117 30.5 30.5 65.4
Yes, difference and
ethnicity is more 14 3.6 3.6 69.0
important for women
Yes, difference and
ethnicity more 119 31.0 31.0 100.0
important for men
Total 384 100.0 100.0
MANETHN2
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Man 269 70.1 70.1 70.1
Ethnic / Man 
Ethnic-Cannot separate 104 27.1 27.1 97.1
No response, don't know, 
other, depends on person 11 2.9 2.9 .100.0
Total 384 100.0 100.0
W0M0REG2
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Woman 300 78.1 78.1 78.1
Ethnic 71 18.5 18.5 96.6
No reponse, don't know, 
depends on person 13 3.4 3.4 100.0
Total 384 100.0 100.0
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Citizenship & Ethnicity of State
CITIZEN2
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid Everyone, Anyone, 
Me, All People 103 26.8 26.8 26.8
Anyone who is born 
OR Lives here 153 39.8 39.8 66.7
Legal Definition 46 12.0 12.0 78.6
Ethnic Kyrgyz Related 37 9.6 9.6 88.3
Gender, Positive &
Negative Adjectives, 45 11.7 11.7 100.0
Don’t Know, Other
Total 384 100.0 100.0
KYRGYNE2
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Before USSR, 
Negative, No 50 13.0 13.0 13.0
Yes, Constitutions, flag, 
Democratic, Free,... 26 6.8 6.8 19.8
Yes, Kyrgyz Blood,.. 113 29.4 29.4 49.2
Don't Know, None, No 
One, Missing 195 50.8 50.8 100.0
Total 384 100.0 100.0
Active in Politics/Community/Nationalism
ACTPOLI2
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid No, Not interested,... 281 73.2 73.2 73.2
Yes, Votes, reads 
papers,... 68 17.7 17.7 90.9
Interested, sometimes, 
used to be, no response 35 9.1 9.1 100.0
Total 384 100.0 100.0
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ACTC0MM2
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid No, Not interested, 
Sometimes, 280 72.9 72.9 72.9
Yes, Party member, 
NGO worker... 77 20.1 20.1 93.0
No Response, Missing 27 7.0 7.0 100.0
Total 384 100.0 100.0
NATI0NA2
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Yes, 1 love people more, 
Kyrgyz are better...
No, because, mixed
56 14.6 15.0 15.0
blood, grew up with 317 82.6 85.0 100.0
nations,..
Total 373 97.1 100.0
Missing No response, donl 1.6know, others vj
Sometimes, due to c 1.3Batkan O
Total 11 2.9
Total 384 100.0
Life Conditions under Independence Versus the USSR
BETTERU2
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Better under USSR, jobs, 
money, education,.. 198 51.6 51.6 51.6
Better under USSR,
independence, freedom, 99 25.8 25.8 77.3
democracy
Better now we can be 
Kyrgyz, muslim,..etc 32 8.3 8.3 85.7
No difference, No 
response, missing 55 14.3 14.3 100.0
Total 384 100.0 100.0
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Summary of USAID Democracy Programming in Kyrgyzstan 
USAID ACTIVITY DATA SHEET 1997
PROGRAM: KYRGYZSTAN 
TITLE: Citizens'Participation, 110-S002.1 
STATUS: Continuing
PROPOSED OBLIGATION AND FUNDING SOURCE: FY 1997: 
$3,000,000 Freedom Support Act
INITIAL OBLIGATION: FY1993; ESTIMATED COMPLETION 
DATE: FY 1999
Purpose: Increased citizens' participation in political and economic decision­
making.
Background: Kyrgyzstan remains the most open Central Asian country, but 
there have been a number of recent setbacks on the road to democracy. 
Examples include the muzzling of some newspapers, constitutional changes 
that limit the power of the legislature, and the disqualification of several 
candidates in recent presidential elections. In this environment, the importance 
of building and sustaining a vibrant non-government sectoral with active 
citizen participation and a free media becomes even more important.
USAID Role and Achievements to Date: Active support of local non­
governmental organisations (NGOs) remains a central part of the USAID 
program in Kyrgyzstan. Through December 1995, 64 grants had been 
provided to local groups active in such areas as the environment, human 
rights, agricultural development, women's rights, media, civic education, and 
election law reform. An effective USAID presence supported the presence of 
foreign observers at various Kyrgyz elections, ensuring that problems brought 
to the attention of both private groups and governmental institutions in order 
to improve electoral practices in future. USAID grantees have also been 
influential in establishing a voluntary lawyer's union for Kyrgyzstan, 
encouraging the development of local bar associations, and promoting public 
discussion on pending legislation.
Description: USAID-funded program activities largely involve technical 
assistance, training, and grants to local NGOs. The local NGO sector receives 
special attention, in terms of the legal and regulatory environment, in terms of 
introducing greater professionalism and new management skills to NGOs, and 
in terms of effecting social change and providing needed social services. 
Under a competitive small grants programs, a number of local organisations 
are eligible to receive direct programming support. A new initiative will 
provide training to private television stations to improve programming quality 
and enhance their financial viability.
Host Country and Other Donors: The United States is the major foreign 
donor working in the area of democratisation in Kyrgyzstan. Programs 
supported by the various USG agencies, including those of USAID and USIA, 
are closely co-ordinated.
Beneficiaries: Immediate beneficiaries include individuals directly associated 
with Kyrgyzstan NGO sector. Many more will benefit as various NGOs 
increase their public interest presence and expand their social service 
programs. Tens of thousands should also benefit from improved programming
and management skills at the country's independent television stations. More 
broadly, all citizens stand to gain from strengthened civil society and the 
opportunity to help shape the future economic, political, and social life of the 
country.
Principal Contractors, Grantees, or Agencies: Several USAID-funded 
American NGOs such as the American Bar Association/CEELI, National 
Democratic Institute (NDI), Internees, International Republican Institute (IRI) 
and the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) have played 
important roles in promoting democracy in Kyrgyzstan. Familiar American 
groups such as Goodwill Industries, Aid to Artisans, and the Citizens Network 
for Foreign Affairs, which together form The Counterpart Consortium, also 
participate in local NGO development.
Major Results Indicators3": Number of changes made to government policy 
as a result of citizen participation. Number of new federations, organisations, 
coalitions, etc. formed to promote/oppose specific policies/legislation-Number 
and types of fora in which NGOs engage state institutions in policy debate.
* These are illustrative indicators. ENI M issions are in the midst o f the complex process o f 
developing measurable country-specific indicators and targets, which w ill be completed by 
June 1996.
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ACTIVITY DATA SHEET KYRGYZSTAN 1998
TITLE: Citizens'Participation, 110-S002.1 
STATUS: Continuing
PROPOSED OBLIGATION & FUNDING SOURCE: FY 1998 
$4,000,000 FREEDOM Support Act
INITIAL OBLIGATION: FY 1993; ESTIMATED COMPLETION 
DATE: FY 1999
Purpose: Increased citizens' participation in political and economic decision­
making.
Background: Despite occasional setbacks along the way, Kyrgyzstan remains 
the most open Central Asian country. In particular, there have been many 
recent examples of steps to expand information flows and promote greater 
transparency in the government decision-making process. For example, with 
USAID support a Consultative Council on Legal Reform provides a new 
mechanism for the executive, parliament, donors, NGOs and private citizens 
to gain access to information and participate in planning and discussing the 
ongoing reform program.
USAID Role and Achievements to Date: Active support of local non­
governmental organisations (NGOs) remains a central part of the USAID 
program in Kyrgyzstan. By one estimate, some 420 NGOs were active in a 
variety of areas, including environment, human rights, agricultural 
development, women's rights, media, civic education, and election law reform. 
This number represents an increase of 157 NGOs over the previous year.
Civic education programs are being developed, based partly on the results of a 
USAID-funded survey tracking voter opinions and attitudes. USAID grantees 
have also been influential in establishing a voluntary lawyer's union for 
Kyrgyzstan, encouraging the development of local bar associations, providing 
comments on draft legislation, and promoting public discussion on pending 
legislation.
Description: USAID-funded NGO activities largely involve technical 
assistance, training, and grants to local NGOs. The local NGO sector receives 
special attention, in terms of the legal and regulatory environment, in terms of 
introducing greater professionalism and new management skills to NGOs, and 
in terms of effecting social change and providing needed social services. 
Under a competitive small grants programs, a number of local organisations 
are eligible to receive direct programming support. A new initiative will 
provide training to private television stations to improve programming quality 
and enhance their financial viability.
Host Country and Other Donors: The United States is the major foreign 
donor working in the area of democratisation in Kyrgyzstan. Programs 
supported by the various U.S. Government agencies, including those of 
USAID and USIA, are closely co-ordinated. Beneficiaries: Beneficiaries 
include members of Kyrgyzstan's NGOs, independent television stations,
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lawyers, members of the judiciary, members of parliament and the public at 
large.
Principal Contractors, Grantees, or Agencies: Several USAID-funded 
American NGOs such as the American Bar Association/CEELI, National 
Democratic Institute (NDI), Intemews, and the International Foundation for 
Election Systems (IFES) have played important roles in promoting democracy 
in Kyrgyzstan. Familiar American groups such as Goodwill Industries, Aid to 
Artisans, and the Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs, which together form 
The Counterpart Consortium, also participate in local NGO development.
Major Results Indicators: Baseline Target
No. of Advocacy NGOs 0(1992) 400 (1999)
No. of draft laws and policies 0(1992) 16 (1999)
with NGO input
No. of independent stations 0(1994) 7 (1999)
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ACTIVITY DATA SHEET KYRGYZSTAN 1998
TITLE: More effective, responsible, and accountable local government 110- 
S002.3
STATUS: New
PROPOSED OBLIGATION & FUNDING SOURCE: FY 1998 $2,000,000 
FREEDOM Support Act
INITIAL OBLIGATION: FY 1998 ESTIMATED COMPLETION 
DATE: FY 2001
Purpose: Demonstrate more effective, responsible, and accountable local 
government
Background: Kyrgyzstan, with limited arable land and a lack of readily 
accessible natural resources, has embraced the ideals of market reform as its 
only path forward. However, economic hardship continues and economic 
difficulties affecting large numbers of the population threatens the economic 
transition process as a whole. One approach toward dealing with these 
problems is decentralisation, providing local authorities with greater 
responsibility for both raising revenue and determining how that revenue is 
spent.
At this point, Kyrgyzstan is far ahead of its neighbours in terms of delegating 
decision-making authority to local authorities. The range of legislation related 
to this area over just the past year is impressive. For example, progressive 
changes in the tax law allows designation of certain taxes to different levels of 
government. The October 1996 Presidential decree encourages formation of 
municipal associations as well as the development of municipal charters as the 
primary documents of local government.
USAID training and technical assistance have helped to demonstrate the 
benefits associated with effective, responsible, and accountable local 
government in one pilot test site. Using this model, USAID demonstrated how 
activity in health and housing can usefully be carried out at a local level for 
maximum effectiveness. Similarly, USAID's activity in intergovernmental 
finance supports the critical element of creating a resource base for social 
sector reform. The time is opportune in Kyrgyzstan to address the generic 
issues relative to financing and administration of social benefits and services 
in addition to the more sector specific issues covered under Strategic 
Objective 3.2 (Improved sustainability of social services and benefits).
USAID Role and Achievements to Date: USAID implemented the Municipal 
Finance and Management (MFM) Project in Central Asia as part of the 
Democratic Pluralism Initiatives (DPI) program from 1994 through 1996. 
Karakol, Kyrgyzstan was chosen as one of two municipalities in Central Asia 
(the other being Atyrau, Kazakstan) in which to implement the project. An 
external evaluation, marking the completion of the project, was conducted in 
October 1996, with a view toward providing further information about 
possible future directions. The evaluation concluded that significant strides 
towards democracy building were made, especially in view of the short life
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cycle of the project. Key events highlighted included preparation and use of a 
city budget; a significant increase in the % of taxes received and retained in 
Karakol; the introduction and use of computer systems and software in the tax 
and finance departments; and the preparation of a draft city charter for Karakol 
that is now under consideration. The establishment of an information office 
and increased media exposure also increases transparency and makes local 
citizens more aware of developments related to local government. In addition, 
USAID is now implementing a pilot land registration process for use by 
municipalities. This project, which will be expanded with World Bank 
resources, is critical for ensuring that local governments have the revenue base 
needed to effectively carry out their responsibilities. In addition, this project 
will support USAID-assisted efforts at providing privatisation of land at the 
local level through land auctions and encouragement of private sector real 
estate development.
Description: USAID believes the time is appropriate to expand the initiative 
begun in Karakol to other oblasts and municipalities in Kyrgyzstan. The 
inability of the central government to meet subsidy requirements at the local 
level is motivating policy makers to devolve key financial and other 
authorities to the local level. USAID would build on lessons learned from the 
MFM and housing reform projects and from other donors to ensure efficiency 
and effectiveness. USAID funded training and technical assistance would be 
directed to the national as well as selected local levels to facilitate 
decentralisation reforms.
The October 24, 1996 decree by the President of Kyrgyzstan ‘On the 
Measures for On-Going Improvement of Local Self-Governments in the 
Kyrgyz Republic’ sets the stage for continued assistance. As one recent EU- 
TACIS activity concluded, there are very few additional resources available to 
local governments in the near term—and the only hope for providing municipal 
services is through increased efficiency. In keeping with this view, USAID 
plans to support administrative development at the local government level. 
Activities will be closely co-ordinated with ongoing assistance in the 
development of local resource bases to guarantee a degree of fiscal 
independence to local government, in the development of indigenous 
nongovernmental organisations, and in the development of sustainable social 
services.
Host Country and Other Donors: USAID will work closely with the various 
governmental entities involved in local government issues, including 
ministries, the presidential apart, parliament, local level officials and 
government employees. A number of other donors also support activities with 
a local government dimension, including the World Bank, Asian Development 
Bank, and EU-TACIS.
Beneficiaries: Elected officials and government employees at the oblast and 
municipal level will benefit directly. Also, private citizens of Kyrgyzstan, 
especially those classified as part of the ‘vulnerable group’ (i.e., elderly
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pensioners, women, and children) will benefit from improvements in the social 
safety net and more targeted and effective social services.
Principle Contractors, Grantees, or Agencies: To be determined. Mission 
plans to ‘buy in’ to existing assistance mechanisms or to competitively 
procure services depending on which will provide the best benefit to the U.S. 
Government, cost and other factors considered.
Major Results Indicators:*
*This is a new strategic objective, indicators and targets will be finalised 
during the next planning period.
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USAID ACTIVITY DATA SHEET 1999
PROGRAM: KYRGYZSTAN 
TITLE: Citizens'Participation, 110-S002.1 
STATUS: Continuing
PROPOSED OBLIGATION AND FUNDING SOURCE: FY 1999: 
$2,050,000 FREEDOM Support Act
INITIAL OBLIGATION: FY 1993; ESTIMATED COMPLETION 
DATE: FY 2004
Purpose: Increased citizens' participation in political and economic 
decision-making.
USAID Role and Achievements to Date: Over 450 NGOs have been 
established. USAID is helping them work with the public, the mass media, 
and lawmakers to build a constituency that can advocate for reforms. A 
notable achievement by NGOs was their success in pressuring parliament 
to hold open hearings to debate proposed legislation affecting farmers. 
USAID has assisted the National Association of Local Self-Government, 
in the forms of funding for seminars, publications, and in planning for 
future decentralisation. Help has been provided in election organisation 
and procedures as well as in the presentation of the first public broadcast 
of political candidate debates. USAID advisors were instrumental in 
achieving the incorporation of international recommendations into the new 
Kyrgyz Draft Election Code, which will be submitted, to parliament in 
1998.
Description: Kyrgyzstan is the most progressive of the five Central Asian 
Republics in the area of government accountability. Creation of a legal 
infrastructure to further expand such accountability, as well as to 
encourage NGO and media development and citizen participation, is one 
of USAID's principal efforts in Krygyzstan [sic]. Assistance to the local 
NGO community aims especially at increasing its professional and 
management capabilities, allowing it to advocate policy agendas, influence 
legal and regulatory processes, effect social change, and provide needed 
social services. Under a competitive small grants program, a number of 
local organisations are receiving direct program support. Private television 
and radio stations are receiving training to improve programming quality 
and enhance their financial viability.
Host Country and Other Donors: The United States is the major foreign 
donor working in the area of democratisation in Kyrgyzstan. USAID 
closely coordinates its programs with those supported by other U.S. 
Government agencies, including the U.S. Information Agency.
Beneficiaries: Beneficiaries include activists of NGOs, personnel of 
independent television and radio stations, lawyers, judges, members of 
parliament, and the public at large.
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Principal Contractors, Grantees, or Agencies: Several USAID-funded 
American NGOs, including the American Bar Association/CEELI, the 
National Democratic Institute (NDI), Intemews, and the International 
Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), have played important roles in 
promoting democracy in Kyrgyzstan. Aid to Artisans, the International 
Center for Not-for-Profit Law, and the Citizens Network for Foreign 
Affairs, which together form the Counterpart Consortium, also participate 
in local NGO development.
M ajor Results Indicators: Baseline Target
No. of NGOs engaged in advocacy 0 (1992) 50 (1999)
No. of draft laws and policies 0 (1994) 15 (1999)
with NGO input
Average length in minutes of daily 10(1994) 15(1999)
independent news broadcasts
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USAID ACTIVITY DATA SHEET 1999
PROGRAM: KYRGYZSTAN
TITLE: More effective, responsible, and accountable local government 
110-S002.3
STATUS: Continuing
PROPOSED OBLIGATION & FUNDING SOURCE: FY 1999: 
$2,000,000 FREEDOM Support Act
INITIAL OBLIGATION: FY 1998; ESTIMATED COMPLETION 
DATE: FY 2002
Purpose: More effective, responsible, and accountable local government.
To assist Kyrgyzstan democratic and market reform efforts through 
promoting more effective, responsible, and accountable local government. 
This will be achieved by increasing citizen participation in local 
government, increasing the capacity at the local level to address citizen 
needs, and developing a more favourable national policy and enabling 
framework for reform at the local level.
USAID Role and Achievements to Date: As Kyrgyzstan struggles with 
liberalisation and decentralisation of government structures on the path 
from autocracy to democracy, USAID is promoting these principles by 
demonstrating the benefits of effective delivery of services through local 
governments responsible and accountable to their citizenry. The Central 
Government has increasingly moved responsibility for social programs 
(notably housing, health and education) and for management of physical 
assets to local levels. Unfortunately, the authority over fiscal resources, as 
well as development of qualified personnel at the local level, has not 
proceeded at the same pace. Although their powers are limited, local 
councils, composed of residents directly elected from districts in 
competitive elections, have been created and represent a promising step 
toward representative democracy and accountability.
The Municipal Finance and Management Project (MFM) and the Housing 
Sector Reform Project (HSRP) both addressed local government issues in 
Kyrgyzstan and were completed by the end of FY 1997. Under the MFM 
project, assistance was provided, on a demonstration pilot basis, to the city 
of Karakul. As a result, the city upgraded overall management, improved 
systems and procedures for budget implementation, introduced 
expenditure controls, converted to an automated information management 
system, increased transparency and accountability of municipal operations, 
and established citizen information services. Communication and 
coordination between oblast, city, and tax collection officials was 
strengthened, which facilitated revenue forecasting and cash management.
Under the HSRP project, USAID worked closely with several town and 
city administrations, developing procedures for conducting public auctions 
of land use rights, and helping residents of apartment buildings form
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condominium associations in order to assume responsibility for managing 
and maintaining formerly state-owned property. Preliminary assistance 
was also provided to the Government's Office of Local Self-Government 
and the National Association of Local Self-Government (NALSG). In 
addition, ongoing work with the NGO sector and in health care reform has 
impacted substantially on the role and functioning of local government.
Description: USAID has demonstrated by its sector-specific work in the 
areas of housing and health the need to work at the local level for 
maximum effectiveness. Work in intergovernmental finance has been 
initiated. The Central Government has moved rather decisively toward 
administrative decentralisation. Charters for all 455 villages have been 
adopted, and town charters are in the process of being adopted. Ownership 
of many properties and facilities is being transferred to local governments. 
However, the GOK has hesitated to take bold steps toward fiscal 
decentralisation. More also remains to be done to improve local 
government administration. The time is opportune to tackle issues generic 
to financing and administering municipal social services and benefits, in 
addition to working on issues specific to the health sector as addressed by 
Strategic Objective 3.2.
A new SO 2.3 program is being developed in FY 1998 to capitalise on the 
successes of earlier programs impacting on local government and to 
address local government issues on a comprehensive and consolidated 
basis. Emphasis will be placed on the development of local capacity to 
competently and transparently carry out additional responsibilities. A 
sustainable, responsive and accountable local government system is 
expected to be established in Kyrgyzstan over the period of the activity.
The program strategy will build on the significant earlier breakthroughs 
made in shifting control of major capital assets, such as land and housing, 
to city authorities and residents, thereby offering real possibilities for 
personal empowerment and democratisation. It will also set in place 
training programs for local officials to enhance their skills at problem­
solving and increase their receptivity to innovation and change, which will 
lead to more effective management of local government.
Assistance will broaden residents’ participation and self-sufficiency by 
working with individual owners' associations, thus extending and 
deepening the reforms achieved when housing management was shifted to 
residents. Priority will be given to quickly setting in place a 
comprehensive in-service training program. Human capacity development 
is an essential first step to making needed changes and adopting new 
techniques at the local level. The emphasis will be on reaching a broad 
audience with training in needed skill areas, particularly leadership and 
financial management.
The training will be followed up with ‘extension service’-type 
consultancies in receptive municipalities, enabling the trained officials to 
apply their skills and adopt new practices. ‘Best practices’ demonstrations
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of particular municipal management systems (in such areas as budget and 
finance, and competitive public procurement from the private sector) will 
be undertaken in receptive localities to showcase the application of reform 
in the real world. In addition, members of the directly-elected city councils 
will receive training on their role, and on the functions of city councils in 
democratic local governance.
A corollary objective of the program will be the expansion of local self- 
government by empowering it to undertake more responsibilities, which 
will require greater local authority and resources. This empowerment will 
reduce the dependence of municipalities on central government and 
increase their reliance on support from their communities.
Host Country and Other Donors: USAID will work closely with various 
Kyrgyz entities involved in local government issues, including the Office 
of Local Government in the Presidential Apparat, the Academy for 
Management, and the municipal association NGO, as well as the 
parliament and local (and national) level officials, both appointed and 
elected. A number of other donors also support activities with a local 
government dimension, including the World Bank, the Asian Development 
Bank, and EU.
Beneficiaries: Elected officials, and government employees at the oblast 
and municipal levels, will benefit professionally. The citizens of 
Kyrgyzstan will benefit from improvements in local government services 
made possible by successful decentralisation.
Principle Contractors, Grantees, or Agencies: To be determined.
USAID plans to ‘buy in’ to existing assistance mechanisms or to procure 
services competitively, depending on which will provide the best benefit to 
the U.S. Government, cost and other factors considered.
M ajor Results Indicators:*
♦This is a new strategic objective in  FY 1998. Indicators and targets are now being 
developed.
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USAID ACTIVITY DATA SHEET 2000
PROGRAM: KYRGYZSTAN
TITLE AND NUMBER: Increased Citizens' Participation in Political and 
Economic Decision-making, 110-SOO2.1 
STATUS: Continuing
PROPOSED OBLIGATIONS AND FUNDING SOURCES: FY2000: 
$2,750,000 Freedom Support Act
INITIAL OBLIGATION: FY93; ESTIMATED COMPLETION 
DATE: FY 2004
Summary: Kyrgyzstan is the most progressive of the five Central Asian 
Republics in the area of parliamentary independence. The creation of a 
legal infrastructure to further expand such government accountability, as 
well as to encourage NGO and media development and citizen 
participation, is one of USAID’s principal efforts in Kyrgyzstan.
Assistance to the local NGO community aims especially at increasing its 
professional and management capabilities, allowing it to advocate policy 
agendas, influence legal and regulatory processes, effect social change, 
and provide needed social services. USAID’s program includes a strong 
emphasis on building social partnerships between civil society, 
government and the business sector. Under a competitive small grants 
program, a number of local organisations are receiving direct program 
support. Private television and radio stations are receiving training to 
improve programming quality and enhance their financial viability.
Key Results: Three key intermediate results were concluded to be 
necessary to achieve the Strategic Objective. NGO participation in civil 
society must be strengthened, information on domestic economic policies 
and politics must become more widely available, and the government must 
become more responsive and accountable to citizens and citizens 
organisations.
Performance and Prospects: There has been significant progress in all 
aspects of USAID's democracy assistance in Kyrgyzstan, and USAED 
expects this progress to continue. Over the past year, ABA/CEELI- 
supported legal information centres (LCLI) in Kyrgyzstan have been a 
tremendous asset to the Ministry of Justice, parliamentarians, lawyers, and 
citizens; impressive statistics include the following: LCLI has served 
15,944 clients, librarians have loaned over 63,776 publications to patrons 
and have responded to informational inquiries from 420 organisations; and 
the LCLI reports that its ‘most active consumer of informational requests 
is the Ministry of Justice.’ ABA/CEELI has also been working closely 
with the former Deputy Director of Parliament's Legal Department on the 
first draft of the Legislative Drafting Manual. Over 150 representatives 
from all five Central Asian Republics and all sectors of society 
participated in a social partnership conference in Kyrgyzstan organised by 
the USAID-fimded Counterpart Consortium. A highlight of the conference
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was a speech by the State Secretary of the Kyrgyz Republic who spoke of 
the sincere interest of the government to work with the NGO community 
to develop social partnerships. Several specific projects including the 
‘Central Asia Mass Media Association for Social Partnerships’ and 
support for ‘Democratic Elections in Central Asia’ were formed as a result 
of the conference. The recent National Referendum on Amendments to the 
Constitution of Kyrgyzstan was probably the year's most significant single 
event affecting the legal, political, and economic spheres in the country. 
Though there was controversy with respect to the voting, there was also 
lively debate leading up to the referendum. A concerted effort among three 
of the US AID partners helped to widely broadcast information on the 
referendum on radio and TV stations; in addition, thousands of copies of 
pertinent information were distributed to the public from USAID- 
supported legal information centres. The most recent draft of the election 
law addresses the major concerns USAID voiced regarding the previous 
draft and appears to be one of the most progressive laws in the region. As a 
result of USAID assistance, several journalist associations are active in 
Kyrgyzstan and they have participated in reviewing draft legislation and 
submitting commentary to parliament.
Possible Adjustments to Plans: In FY 2000, USAID is anticipating 
additional programming in the area of women’s legal rights issues and 
women’s participation in political processes.
Other Donor Programs: Civil society development is a multi-donor 
effort in Kyrgyzstan. UNHCR, OSCE/ODIHR, UNDP and Soros all 
support local NGOs with small grants. The UNHCR is co-funding NGO 
resource centres along with USAID. In the area of independent media, the 
UNDP, OSCE/ODIHR, and Soros support journalist associations and 
conferences. In the political processes area, UNDP is implementing an 
‘atomisation’ of elections. USAID and the EU co-ordinate with 
parliamentary assistance.
Principal Contractors, Grantees or Agencies: Several USAID-funded 
US PVOs such as the American Bar Association/CEELI, Intemews, the 
National Democratic Institute (NDI), and the International Foundation for 
Electoral Systems (IFES), are playing a role in promoting democracy in 
Kyrgyzstan. Counterpart International, Aid to Artisans, and the 
International Center for Not-for-profit Law, which together form the 
Counterpart Consortium, also participate in local NGO development. 
Initiative for Social Action and Renewal in Eurasia (ISAR) will also 
participate in the development of local environmental NGOs.
Selected Performance Measures:
Baseline Target
Number of NGOs involved 70/74(1996) 75/50(2001)
in advocacy (media/gov) v 7
Average daily minutes of local news
programming
Number of Parliamentary hearings and committee 2 (1996) 45 (2001)
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1 (1994) 12(2001)
meetings addressing legislative/policy issues
USAID ACTIVITY DATA SHEET 2000 
PROGRAM: KYRGYZSTAN
TITLE AND NUMBER: More Effective, Responsive, and Accountable 
Local Government, 110-S02.3 
STATUS: Continuing
PROPOSED OBLIGATIONS AND FUNDING SOURCES: FY 2000: 
$1,250,000 Freedom Support Act
INITIAL OBLIGATIONS: FY 1998; ESTIMATED COMPLETION 
DATE: FY 2004
Summary: The Kyrgyz Republic has taken significant steps in the 
transition toward more effective, responsible and accountable local 
governments. While democratic institutions and practices are fragile, a 
discernible move away from authoritarian rule and towards a sustainable 
democracy is clear. The central government has created an Office of Local 
Government with a clear mandate to strengthen local governments. A non­
governmental organisation (NGO), the National Association of Local Self- 
Governments comprised of elected village leaders (Councillors) and the 
elected mayor of Bishkek has been incorporated into a larger Congress of 
Communities, which includes NGOs as well as subunits such as block and 
neighbourhood committees. Elections have been held in the 455 villages 
for the local council. All of the villages have enacted charters and the 
country’s 19 towns plus Bishkek are in the process of doing so. As a 
further move to strengthen local government, the national government has 
begun a process of transferring state-owned assets to local governments. 
However, limited authority, resources and skills at the local government 
level are serious constraints to the Government’s efforts in creating strong 
local governments. In order to support more effective, responsive and 
accountable local government, USAID has initiated efforts to address these 
constraints. Immediate beneficiaries are public sector officials and service 
providers. Ultimate beneficiaries are the local people who will benefit 
from improved public services.
Key Results: The USAID Local Government objective stated above will 
be achieved through three intermediate results: Practices promoting citizen 
input and involvement adopted; practices improving delivery of services 
and management of resources adopted; and powers of local governments 
increased. Although there were delays in project start-up, steps towards 
achieving the results are underway. A Memorandum of Understanding has 
been signed between the Congress of Local Communities and USAID to 
provide a range of technical assistance. Work has commenced in Tokmok 
as one of the pilot cities for developing budgeting and financial 
management systems. Mechanisms are in place to deliver the training 
courses in financial management, general management and leadership 
which are being adapted to the Kyrgyz situation.
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Performance and Prospects: Activities under the Local Government 
Initiative were late in starting due to slow recruitment of staff by the 
contractor. However, over the past few months the pace of implementation 
has increased and year one targets are close to being achieved. By June 
1999, efforts towards strengthening the Congress of Local Communities 
(National Association of Local Governments) as a nongovernmental 
organisation (NGO) which can upgrade the skills of local officials and 
effectively advocate the interests of local government will have 
commenced. The Office of Local Government under the President has 
started implementing its agenda to strengthen local government.
Assistance to form democratically controlled housing associations to 
perform functions previously performed by government agencies has 
started. Leadership Skills Training for Chief Administrators and Local 
Council members in selected municipalities is continuing. The target city 
for developing a competitive procurement system as a model of a ‘good 
local practice’ to improve management of resources has been selected and 
training has started. A model budget format, an end of year financial report 
plan, and a public hearing process in which public comment is made on 
documents are being developed as a model for citizen input and 
involvement in a city’s administration.
Despite the progress made to date, an enormous agenda remains in the area 
of local government empowerment. Villages, towns and cities are severely 
constrained by the Ministry of Finance’s control over their budgets. The 
newly enacted tax law provides for the collection of a number of local 
taxes and fees, but these sources provide only a fraction of the required 
local revenues. Despite the reforms being implemented by the President’s 
administration to increase local autonomy, the Ministry of Finance remains 
a strong opponent of fiscal decentralisation. USAID will continue to 
address this issue through policy dialogue at the highest levels.
Possible Adjustments to Plans: Year two work plans will complete on­
going programs as well as complete the implementation of model ‘good 
practices’ in two local governments.
Other Donor Programs: A number of other donors including the World 
Bank, UNDP, EU, and the Soros Foundation also support activities with a 
local government dimension that build around the principles of promoting 
sustainable human development in the country through decentralised 
management of development.
Principle Contractors, Grantees, or Agencies: International City/County 
Management Association, ICMA.
Selected Performance Measures:
Baseline
Adoption of practices promoting citizen input and involvement 0 (1998)
Adoption of practices improving delivery of services and management of ^ , 1998}
resources ^
fj ff /I
tFFFtF
Target 
3 (2000)
3 (2000)
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